




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OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE
ON THE
ITALIAN QUESTION.

BY

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY,

HER MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS.

LONDON:

HARRISON, 59, PALL MALL.

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1859.

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
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P R E F A C E.

SINCE the close of the great struggle waged against the elder Napoleon, the condition of Italy has formed the principal difficulty of European politics. Statesmen and diplomatists have laboured diligently and earnestly, with the view of finding a remedy for the anomalous state of affairs in this part of the continent of Europe; but the evil gradually became more formidable, until it at length assumed a character so complicated as to render a satisfactory and an amicable solution almost impossible. In addition to the inconveniences and discontent that must naturally arise out of a foreign occupation, the Italians have been divided amongst themselves, and have, in too many instances, wasted their energies in projects, which, if successful, could not have insured the regeneration of their native country. Yet, there can be little doubt, that, had Italian reformers united for the common good of Italy, definite improvement might, even under existing arrangements and institutions, have been achieved and a wonderful amelioration accomplished.

The territorial arrangements of Italy, settled by the final treaty of Vienna, have undergone but little change amid the various convulsions of the last forty years. A knowledge of the nature of these arrangements is essential to the right understanding of what is now passing in that part of Europe, and to this branch of the subject it is natural that the attention of the student and the inquirer should be in the first instance directed.

These arrangements have been thus graphically described by a recent writer.*

“ The King of Sardinia received back all his dominions, according to the boundaries existing in 1792, with some few changes in the frontier on the side of Geneva. To these were added the city of Genoa, and the territory attached to it in former times when it was a republic. The emperor of Austria united with his hereditary monarchy the newly-erected kingdom of Venetian-Lombardy, in which were included the districts of the Valteline, Bormio, and Chiavenna parts of the Swiss canton of Grisons. Istria was not included in the Austrian kingdom of Illyria. The valley of the Po was fixed upon as the boundary between the Papedom and Parma. The House of Este was again declared sovereign over Modena, Reggio, Mirandola, Massa, and Carrara. The Empress Maria Louisa received the state of Parma as a sovereignty for her life, after which it was to fall to the Duchess of Lucca and her heirs, who were to give up a territory in Bohemia to the Duke of Reichstadt, the son of Napoleon and Maria Louisa. Prince Ferdinand of Austria, received Tuscany and the district of Piombino, with the title of Grand Duke. He also obtained the sovereignty of the isle of Elba, on condition of reserving in that island the rights of Prince Buoncompagni Ludovisi. The infanta Maria Louisa received Lucca as a sovereign dukedom, and with it a yearly pension of 500,000 francs, till the decease of the Empress Maria Louisa. The pope was fully reinstated in all his dominions, with the exception of a few small portions on the left bank of the Po ; but Austria reserved the right of recruiting in Ferrara and Comacchio. Ferdinand of Naples was again acknowledged as king of both Sicilies, and the republic of San Marino and the Prince of Monaco were guaranteed in the enjoyment of their ancient rights.”

Such, briefly stated, was the settlement of the Italian territory, made by the great powers of Europe assembled in congress. It soon became evident that this was, however, a settlement which many of the Italian people did not wish to see maintained. Four principal parties struggled to obtain the ascendancy in the Italian peninsula. There was first Austria, anxious to extend her influence, even over those parts of Italy, the inhabitants of which did not acknowledge her sway. Her chief antagonist was Sardinia, whose rulers cherished the design of absorbing neighbouring states and founding an important

* See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. xii. New Edition.

Italian Kingdom. The third party consisted of the constitutional reformers, whose aim was rather a confederation of different states than the formation of an extensive Empire. These were all opposed by the democratic sections, each of which desired to form a Republic, in some shape or other, according to the particular views of its followers. Thus the Italians themselves were unfortunately scattered and divided; while some were in favour of a large Empire under the rule of the King of Sardinia, others advocated Constitutional Government in another form. A confederation of the various Italian States found favour with another section, whilst by others the most revolutionary projects were entertained. The secret revolutionary society of the Giovine Italia, or young Italy, instituted by Mazzini, had for its object the formation of one large republic, and the activity of its emissaries sufficed to keep many portions of Italy in continual agitation. Hence general distrust has long prevailed, even amongst those Italians most anxious for reform and reorganisation. The monarchist and the supporter of constitutional government could not sympathise with the republican or the secret fomentor of anarchy and rebellion. Those legitimate opportunities for improvement, which the progress of time is certain to produce, were thereby either entirely lost, or being misused, aggravated those evils which they might, if judiciously employed, have altogether removed.

Austria was, indeed, guaranteed in the possession of her Italian provinces by the Treaty of Vienna; yet she was bound to act with moderation and caution, and on no account whatever to commit herself to a policy that might imperil her position in the Italian peninsula. Goaded probably by the undisguised hostility and the nefarious proceedings of the revolutionary leaders, Austria has in some degree failed to adapt her system to the

requirements of the age, and a ceaseless struggle has been waged between this power and assailants of every kind and degree. Jealous of the interference of foreign rulers, anxious not only to maintain her footing, but to extend her influence in these rich and fertile provinces, and exasperated by the taunts of republican leaders, Austria has employed means scarcely calculated in an age of progression to attain the objects her rulers had in view. The reverses she suffered in the campaigns of the elder Napoleon rendered Austrian statesmen suspicious of every effort made on the part of France; and the fact cannot be concealed, that French rulers and diplomatists have always indulged aspirations respecting the restoration of their influence in Italy, if not of the actual ejection of the Austrian and the complete re-establishment of the Gallic rule. A struggle has therefore been going on since the settlement of 1815, and the explosions that have from time to time occurred prove how difficult was the task of maintaining tranquillity amongst populations thus influenced and agitated.

With these hostile elements at work it will perhaps excite wonder that outbreaks were not of more frequent occurrence. A convulsion broke out at Naples in July, 1820, when the troops mutinied and demanded the Spanish constitution. The king was inclined to make concessions, but Austria, Prussia and Russia, acting on the principles of the Holy Alliance, resolved to take the matter in hand. The Emperors of Austria and of Russia, and the Prince Royal of Prussia, attended by Ambassadors from England and France, met at Troppau, in October of the same year. From this place an invitation was issued to the King of the Two Sicilies to attend a Congress at Laybach. In a state paper, dated Troppau, December 8th, 1820, it was declared, "The monarchs assembled at Troppau resolved to invite the King of the

Two Sicilies to an interview at Laybach; a step, the sole object of which was to free the will of the King from all external constraint, and to place His Majesty in the situation of a mediator between his misled people and the States whose tranquillity was threatened. As the Monarchs were resolved not to recognize Governments which had been produced by open rebellion, they could not enter into negotiations except with the King alone. Their ministers and agents at Naples have received the necessary instructions to this effect." By the "unalterable maintenance of the spirit of those treaties, to which Europe owes peace, and the union between its states," these Powers desired to execute the difficult task before them. Their object was in fact to unite together for the purpose of suppressing rebellion, under what form soever it might appear, and France and England were invited to participate in this step. It was further stated in the circular note before referred to, that—

"The system adopted between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, is not a new one; it reposes on the same maxims which were the basis of the treaties by which the union of the European states was founded. The intimate harmony between the courts which are in the centre of this union, can only gain by it in strength and duration. The union will consolidate itself in the same manner as it was formed by the monarchs who founded it, and has been gradually adopted by all those who were convinced of its evident, now less than ever to be doubted, advantages. No further proof is necessary, that neither thoughts of conquest, nor the pretension to violate the independence of other governments in their internal administration, nor the endeavour to impede voluntary and wise ameliorations, consonant with the true interests of nations, has had any share in the resolutions of the allied powers. They desire nothing but to maintain peace, to free Europe from the scourge of revolution, and to prevent, or to lessen, as far as in their power, the evil which arises from the violation of all principles of order and morality. On these conditions they think themselves entitled, as the reward of their cares and exertions, to the unanimous approbation of the world."

This manifesto called forth a reply from Lord Castlereagh, dated Jan. 19, 1821, in which this minister grap-

pled first with the general question, the establishment of certain general principles for the regulation of the future political conduct of the Allies in the cases therein described, and secondly, with the proposed mode of dealing, under these principles, with the existing affairs of Naples. It was evident that the British Government were not prepared to accept the doctrines laid down.

"The system of measures," Lord Castlereagh wrote in that despatch, "proposed under the former head, if it be reciprocally acted upon, would be in direct repugnance to the fundamental laws of this country. But even if this decisive objection did not exist, the British Government would nevertheless regard the principles on which these measures rest, to be such as could not be safely admitted as a system of international law. They are of opinion that their adoption would inevitably sanction, and, in the hands of less beneficent monarchs, might hereafter lead to a much more frequent and extensive interference in the internal transactions of States, than they are persuaded it is intended by the august parties from whom they proceed, or can be reconciled either with the general interest, or with the efficient authority and dignity of independent sovereigns. They do not regard the alliance as entitled, under existing treaties, to assume, in their character as allies, any such general powers, nor do they conceive that such extraordinary powers could be assumed, in virtue of any fresh diplomatic transaction among the allied courts, without their either attributing to themselves a supremacy incompatible with the rights of other States, or, if to be acquired through the special accession of such States, without introducing a federative system in Europe, not only unwieldy and ineffectual to its object, but leading to many most serious inconveniences."

The Congress of Laybach, however, persisted in settling the matter on the principles set forth in their circular. They decided on rescinding the constitution granted to the Neapolitans, and entrusted to the Emperor of Austria the power of putting down the rebellion. The Austrians at once addressed themselves to the task, and the former order of things was restored. A somewhat similar movement occurred in Piedmont, but this was in like manner suppressed. Such was the first solution of the Italian difficulty attempted under the auspices of Russia, Austria and Prussia.

The French Revolution of 1830 caused considerable excitement in Italy, but the tranquillity of Piedmont and Lombardy was not seriously disturbed. A provisional government, however, ruled in Modena, and Parma imitated the example set by this State. The temporal power of the Pope was abolished by a provisional government at Bologna, whereupon Austria interfered, and poured troops into the revolted districts. Those rulers who had been expelled were reinstated on their thrones, and an understanding was entered into between Austria and France, by which the first-mentioned power was permitted to interfere for the purpose of putting down insurrections, without permanently occupying the revolted districts. The Austrians had no sooner withdrawn from the Legations than disturbances again broke out. The Austrian troops returned for the purpose of restoring order, and a French fleet landed an army at Ancona in 1832. Thus France and Austria were both established in this part of Italy, from which their forces were not withdrawn until 1838.

Things kept getting worse. The attention of the Governments of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France was directed to the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in the dominions of the Pope, and a memorandum recommending important reforms was presented to him. In a despatch to Lord Minto, dated September 18, 1847, and containing instructions for his mission to Italy, Lord Palmerston stated with reference to this somewhat important step:—

“ But in 1831 and 1832 a peculiar combination of political circumstances induced the Governments of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, most urgently to advise the then reigning Pope to make great changes and improvements, both administrative and organic, in his dominions; and the principal improvements thus recommended were detailed in a paper which was presented to the Roman Government by Count Lutzow, the Austrian ambassador at Rome, and by him in the name of the Five Powers strongly

pressed upon the Papal Government. These recommendations however produced no result, and were put by, unattended to, by the government of the late Pope. Her Majesty's Government have not learned that as yet the reforms and improvements effected or announced by the present Pope, have reached the full extent of what was recommended in the memorandum of 1832; and Her Majesty's Government therefore conceive that all the powers who were parties to the framing of that memorandum are bound to encourage and to assist the Pope, as far as he may require encouragement or assistance from them, in carrying out to their full extent the recommendations given by the Five Powers to his predecessor. Such a course the British Government, at all events, is prepared to pursue; and you are authorised to give an assurance to this effect to the Roman Government, and to say that Her Majesty's Government would not see with indifference any aggression committed upon the Roman territories, with a view to prevent the Papal Government from carrying into effect those internal improvements which it may think proper to adopt."

The elevation of Cardinal Mastai Ferretti to the Papal Chair, and the important concessions with which he inaugurated his reign, produced a wonderful impression upon the Italian people. It soon became evident that some movement was contemplated, and on the 13th of August, 1847, the Austrians occupied the town of Ferrara. In the meantime their army in Lombardy had been considerably reinforced. At this juncture the Russell Government determined upon sending Lord Minto on a mission to the various Italian Sovereigns. As part of the noble Earl's instructions, dated September 18, 1847, we find:—

"Her Majesty's Government are deeply impressed with the conviction that it is wise for sovereigns and their governments to pursue, in the administration of their affairs, a system of progressive improvement; to apply remedies to such evils as upon examination they may find to exist; and to remodel, from time to time, the ancient institutions of their country, so as to render them more suitable to the gradual growth of intelligence, and to the increasing diffusion of political knowledge; and Her Majesty's Government consider it to be an undeniable truth, that if an independent Sovereign, in the exercise of his deliberative judgment, shall think fit to make within his dominions such improvements in the laws and institutions of his country, as he may think conducive to the welfare of

his people, no other government can have any right to attempt to restrain or to interfere with such an employment of one of the inherent attributes of independent sovereignty."

Lord Minto found the train laid for an explosion. Towards the close of 1847 popular demonstrations occurred in various parts of Italy, and concessions were made by certain rulers. A revolution occurred in Lucca, which was afterwards annexed to Tuscany, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna. The first shock of the revolution of 1848 was felt in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, from whose Sovereign the concession of a Constitution was obtained. The flame spread over Europe, and the growing antagonism between Austria and Sardinia assumed a more definite shape. The Austrians were expelled from a considerable portion of their Lombardo-Venetian kingdom by the Sardinian army, led by its gallant King. Harassed by tumults at home and insurrection abroad, the Austrian Government despatched Baron Hummelauer to London early in 1848, with definite proposals for the immediate settlement of the Italian question. As a basis of negotiation Austria, on the 24th of May, 1848, proposed to the British Government that:—

"Lombardy would cease to belong to Austria, and would be free either to remain independent or to unite herself to any other Italian state she herself might choose. She would take upon herself, on the other hand, a proportionate share of the Austrian national debt, which would be transferred definitively and irrevocably to Lombardy. The Venetian state would remain under the sovereignty of the Emperor; it would have a separate administration, entirely national, settled by the representatives of the country themselves, without the intervention of the Imperial Government, and represented at the central government of the monarchy by a minister whom it would maintain there, and who would conduct the relations between it and the central government of the empire."

This offer was repeated in various forms and with additional concessions, and its acceptance was strongly urged upon the British Government by Lord Ponsonby. The

English ministry, however, firmly refused to treat upon this basis, and, on the 17th of July, 1848, Lord Palmerston wrote the following despatch to Lord Ponsonby :—

“ Foreign Office, July 17, 1848.

“ My Lord,—With reference to your Excellency’s despatch of the 8th instant, inclosing a copy of a note from Baron Wessenberg relating to the steps taken by Austria for the pacification of the revolted provinces in Italy, I have to say that a question so important in itself, and so mixed up with national feeling and with traditional policy, as the question whether Austria shall or shall not retain a portion of her Italian possessions, has seldom been decided simply by negotiation, and without an appeal to arms ; and it seems now to have become inevitable that the fortune of war must, to a certain degree at least, determine the manner in which this question between Austria and the Italians is to be settled.

“ The part which naturally belongs to the British Government in this matter is to remain spectator of events, until invited by the contending parties to interpose by good offices with a view to an amicable arrangement.

“ I am, &c.

(Signed) “ PALMERSTON.”

The war therefore went on, the Sardinians were driven out of Lombardy, and the Austrian Government no longer felt inclined to grant the concessions, which in a perilous crisis, it had been induced to propose.

During the revolutionary excitement the Pope quitted Rome, and the Republic was proclaimed. After various negotiations the French Government in 1849, sent an army to restore the papal authority. The republicans were overwhelmed, the republic suppressed, and in the following year the Pope returned to the imperial city. French troops were however retained at Rome for his protection, and the Austrians remained in the Legations. Thus the effects of the revolution were in a great measure obliterated, and the former order of things was restored. The rivalry between Sardinia and Austria had not however been extinguished and the agents of the secret societies continued to pursue their revolutionary projects.

In 1848 Austria and the Italians carried on the struggle without the interference of any other power, and this circumstance rendered the opportunity a most favourable one for obtaining a satisfactory settlement of that phase of the Italian question, in which they were particularly interested. The concessions offered by Austria were not however accepted; and Sardinia was finally worsted in the contest. From that time both Austria and Sardinia have been energetically engaged strengthening their respective positions and developing their resources, while France has been evidently watching the right moment to attempt to recover the ground she had lost in the Italian provinces. The war against Russia for a short season diverted the attention of Europe from this complicated question, while the appearance of Sardinia at the side of England and France in the Crimea, showed the anxiety of her government to gain for their country a prominent position in the European confederacy. At the Paris conferences for the restoration of peace, in 1856, the question of the settlement of Italy was once more mooted. At the sitting of the Congress on the 8th of April in that year, Count Walewski brought the subject before the assembled diplomatists. After referring to other matters, "which it might be advantageous to take up, in order to prevent fresh complications;" Count Walewski said, "the Pontifical States are equally in an abnormal condition; that the necessity for not leaving the country to anarchy, had induced France as well as Austria to comply with the demand of the Holy See, by causing Rome to be occupied by French troops, while the Austrian troops occupied the Legations."

He states that France had a twofold motive for complying without hesitation with the demand of the Holy See, as a Catholic Power and as a European Power. The title of eldest son of the Church, which is

the boast of the Sovereign of France, makes it a duty for the Emperor to afford aid and support to the Sovereign Pontiff; the tranquillity of the Roman States, and that of the whole of Italy, affects too closely the maintenance of social order in Europe, for France not to have an overbearing interest in securing it by all the means in her power. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to overlook the abnormal condition of a power which, in order to maintain itself, requires to be supported by foreign troops.

Count Walewski does not hesitate to declare, and he trusts that Count Buol will join in the declaration, that not only is France ready to withdraw her troops, but that she earnestly desires to recall them so soon as that can be done without inconvenience as regards the internal tranquillity of the country and the authority of the Pontifical Government, in the prosperity of which the Emperor, his august Sovereign, takes the most lively interest.

“The first Plenipotentiary of France represents how desirable it is for the balance of power in Europe that the Roman Government should be consolidated in sufficient strength for the French and Austrian troops to be able, without inconvenience, to evacuate the Pontifical States; and he considers that a wish expressed in this sense might not be without advantage. In any case, he does not doubt that the assurances which might be given by France and Austria as to their real intentions in this respect, would have a salutary influence.

“Following up the same order of ideas, Count Walewski asks himself if it is not to be desired that certain Governments of the Italian Peninsula, by well-devised acts of clemency, and by rallying to themselves minds gone astray but not perverted, should put an end to a system which is directly opposed to its object, and which, instead of reaching the enemies of public order, has the effect of weakening the Governments, and of furnishing partisans to popular faction. In his opinion it would render a signal service to the Government of the Two Sicilies, as well as to the cause of order in the Italian Peninsula, to enlighten that Government as to the false course in which it is engaged. He is of opinion that warnings conceived in this sense, and proceeding from the powers represented in the Congress, would be the better received by the Neapolitan Go-

vernment, as that Government could not doubt the motives which dictated them."

Lord Clarendon addressing himself to the subject declared that he did not—

"Consider it of any use to inquire as to the causes which have brought foreign armies into various parts of Italy; but he considers that even admitting that those causes were legitimate, it is not the less true that the result is an abnormal and irregular state of things, which can be justified only by extreme necessity, and which should come to an end as soon as that necessity is no longer imperiously felt; that, nevertheless, if endeavours are not made to put an end to that necessity, it will continue to exist; that if we are content to depend upon the armed force, instead of seeking to apply a remedy to the just causes of discontent, it is certain that a system little honourable for the Governments, and lamentable for the people, will be perpetuated. He conceives that the administration of the Roman States presents inconveniences from whence dangers may arise which the Congress has the right to attempt to avert; that to neglect them would be to run the risk of labouring for the benefit of such resolutions as all the Governments condemn and wish to prevent. The problem which it is a matter of urgency to solve, consists, he conceives, in combining the retreat of the foreign troops with the maintenance of tranquillity, and the solution depends on the organisation of an administration which, by reviving confidence, would render the Government independent of foreign support: that support never succeeding in maintaining a Government to which the public sentiment is hostile; and there would result from it, in his opinion, a part which France and Austria would not wish their armies to perform. For the wellbeing of the Pontifical States, as also for the interest of the sovereign authority of the Pope, it would, therefore, in his opinion, be advantageous to recommend the secularisation of the Government, and the organisation of an administrative system in harmony with the spirit of the age, and having for its object the happiness of the people. He admits that this reform might perhaps offer in Rome itself, at the present moment, certain difficulties; but he thinks that it might easily be accomplished in the Legations.

"The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain observes, that for the last eight years Bologna has been in a state of siege, and that the rural districts are harassed by brigands: it may be hoped, he thinks, that by establishing in this part of the Roman States an administrative and judicial system, at once secular and distinct, and that by organising there a national armed force, security and confidence would rapidly be restored, and the Austrian troops might shortly withdraw without having to apprehend the return of fresh troubles; it is at least an experiment which, in his opinion, ought to be at-

tempted, and this remedy proposed for indisputable evils ought to be submitted by the Congress to the serious consideration of the Pope.

“As regards the Neapolitan Government, the first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain is desirous of imitating the example given him by Count Walewski, by passing over in silence acts which have obtained such grievous notoriety. He is of opinion that it must doubtless be admitted in principle that no Government has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other States; but he considers there are cases in which the exception to this rule becomes equally a right and a duty. The Neapolitan Government seems to him to have conferred this right, and to have imposed this duty upon Europe; and as the Governments represented in the Congress are all equally desirous to support the monarchical principle and to repel revolution, it is a duty to lift up their voices against a system which keeps up revolutionary ferment among the masses instead of seeking to moderate it. ‘We do not wish,’ he says, ‘that peace should be disturbed, and there is no peace without justice; we ought, then, to make known to the King of Naples the wish of the Congress for the amelioration of his system of government—a wish which cannot remain without effect—and require of him an amnesty in favour of the persons who have been condemned or who are imprisoned without trial for political offences.’”

Count Orloff refused to take part in a discussion for which his instructions had not provided, and Count Buol followed in the same strain. After some general remarks from Baron Manteuffel, Count Cavour expressed his opinion that—

“The occupation of the Roman States by the Austrian troops assumes every day more of a permanent character; that it has lasted seven years, and that, nevertheless, no indication appears which would lead to the supposition that it will cease at a more or less early period; that the causes which gave rise to it are still in existence; that the state of the country which they occupy is, assuredly, not improved; and that in order to be satisfied of this, it is enough to remark that Austria considers herself obliged to maintain, in its utmost severity, the state of siege at Bologna, although it dates from the occupation itself. He observes that the presence of the Austrian troops in the Legations and in the Duchy of Parma destroys the balance of power in Italy, and constitutes a real danger for Sardinia. The Plenipotentiaries of Sardinia, he says, deem it, therefore, a duty to point out to the attention of Europe a state of things so abnormal as that which results from the indefinite occupation of a great part of Italy by Austrian troops.

“As regards the question of Naples, Count Cavour shares entirely

the opinions expressed by Count Walewski and the Earl of Clarendon; and he conceives that it is in the highest degree important to suggest modifications which, by appeasing passions, would render less difficult the regular progress of affairs in the other States of the Peninsula."

This strong expression of opinion called forth a reply from Baron Hübner, who stated that—

"The first Plenipotentiary of Sardinia has spoken only of the Austrian occupation, and kept silence in regard to that of France; that nevertheless the two occupations took place at the same time, and with the same object; that it is impossible to admit the argument drawn by Count Cavour, from the permanency of the state of siege at Bologna; that if an exceptional state of things is still necessary in that city, while it has long since ceased at Rome and Ancona, this appears at the utmost to prove that the dispositions of the people of Rome and of Ancona are more satisfactory than those of the city of Bologna. He remarks that in Italy it is not only the Roman States which are occupied by foreign troops; that the Communes of Menton and of Roquebrune, forming part of the Principality of Monaco, have been for the last eight years occupied by Sardinia; and that the only difference which exists between the two occupations is, that the Austrians and the French were invited by the Sovereign of the country, while the Sardinian troops entered the territory of the Prince of Monaco contrary to his wishes, and maintain themselves therein, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Sovereign of the country."

In answer to the Austrian plenipotentiary, Count Cavour maintained that he—

"Is desirous that the French occupation should cease as well as the Austrian, but that he cannot help considering the one as being far more dangerous than the other for the independent States of Italy. He adds, that a small corps-d'armée, at a great distance from France, is menacing for no one; whereas it is very alarming to see Austria resting on Ferrara and on Placentia, the fortifications of which she is enlarging, contrary to the spirit if not to the letter of the Treaties of Vienna, and extending herself along the Adriatic as far as Ancona.

"As for Monaco, Count Cavour declares that Sardinia is ready to withdraw the fifty men who occupy Menton, if the Prince is in a condition to return to the country without exposing himself to the most serious dangers. Besides, he does not consider that Sardinia can be accused of having contributed to the overthrow of the ancient Government, in order to occupy those States, since the Prince has

not been able to maintain his authority in the single town of Monaco, which Sardinia occupied in 1848, in virtue of the Treaties."

Thus the matter ended; and Count Walewski congratulated himself on having induced the Plenipotentiaries to interchange their ideas on the Italian and other questions discussed at the sitting of the 8th of April, and while admitting "it might have been possible, perhaps with advantage, to express themselves in a more complete manner on some of the subjects," declared the interchange of ideas that had taken place to be not without advantage. The result, as far as the bearing of the Italian question discussed, Count Walewski further declared to be as follows,—

"That the Plenipotentiaries of Austria have acceded to the wish expressed by the Plenipotentiaries of France for the evacuation of the Pontifical States by the French and Austrian troops, as soon as it can be effected without prejudice to the tranquillity of the country and to the consolidation of the authority of the Holy See.

"That the greater part of the Plenipotentiaries have not questioned the good effect which would result from measures of clemency, opportunely adopted by the Governments of the Italian Peninsula, and especially by that of the Two Sicilies."

A memorial relating to the affairs of Italy, addressed to the Governments of France and England, was drawn up by the Sardinian Plenipotentiaries on the 16th of April, 1856. In this document the grievances, real or assumed, of Sardinia were detailed, and the bearings of the question as it affected Austria and Sardinia discussed. Nothing was however done; and thus matters remained until the few words addressed by the Emperor Napoleon to the Austrian ambassador at Paris on New Year's Day in the present year showed that the long-expected crisis was at hand.

In this volume will be found abundant evidence of the efforts made by English diplomatists and statesmen to obtain a pacific solution of the controversy. From the moment that the warning was given they toiled energeti-

cally and diligently to avert that struggle of which none can pretend to say what the final consequences may be. They believed, as everybody who peruses these documents will perceive, that it was possible, in spite of acknowledged difficulties and numerous complications, to settle the matter in a pacific manner. Had France, Austria, and Sardinia addressed themselves to the task with firmness and devotion, the calamity of war in Europe might have been averted, and the wholesale destruction of life and property that has already taken place, entirely prevented.

June 13th, 1859.

...and his family to assist in the struggle of which we
can pretend to say with the first consequences may be
They believed as everybody who knows the circumstances
will perceive, that it was possible in spite of all
legitimate differences and numerous complications to settle
the matter in a quiet manner. Had I been present
and Garibaldi addressed his words to the task with firm-
ness and devotion, the certainty of war in Europe might
have been averted, and the wholesale destruction of life
and property that has already taken place, entirely pre-
vented.

June 11th 1870.

...and his family to assist in the struggle of which we
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OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

ON

THE ITALIAN QUESTION.

No. 1. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 2.)
(Extract.) Paris, January 1, 1859.

IT is the custom of the Emperor, when the Diplomatic Body wait upon His Majesty on the occasion of the new year, to say a word or two to each of them individually. This afternoon, when His Majesty approached the Austrian Ambassador, he said, with some severity of tone, "that although the relations between the two Empires were not such as he could desire, he begged to assure the Emperor of Austria that his personal feelings towards His Majesty remained unaltered."

No. 2. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 4.)
(Extract.) Paris, January, 3, 1859.

THE words spoken by the Emperor to the Austrian Ambassador during the reception of the Diplomatic Body by His Majesty on New Year's Day, to which I had the honour to call your Lordship's attention in my despatch of the 1st instant, have of course been commented upon, with the usual additions and exaggerations that accompany the repetition of verbal statements, and have occasioned considerable disquietude in the public mind.

Yesterday evening, at the Empress's reception, the Emperor accosted M. de Hübner with his usual affability, and it may be hoped, therefore, that this incident will be forgotten.

No. 3. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 8.)
(Extract.) Paris, January 7, 1859.

I HAD some conversation yesterday with Count Walewski relative to the panic which has been caused by the Emperor's speech to M. de Hübner on New Year's Day. His Excellency, in admitting and lamenting the fact, said that the sense of His Majesty's words had been greatly exaggerated, and that His Majesty had no other intention in addressing M. de Hübner as he had done, than to express regret at the present state of the relations between Austria and France, while giving the Emperor of Austria the assurance that that state did not interfere with

the personal sentiments of friendship and esteem which the Emperor felt to His Imperial Majesty.

Count Walewski added that, in order to allay the apprehension which I had noticed, an article would be inserted in the "*Moniteur*" to reassure the public mind.

(Inclosure.)—*Extract from the "Moniteur" of January 7, 1859.*

(Translation.)

Paris, January 6, 1859.

PUBLIC opinion has been agitated for some day past by alarming reports, to which it is a duty of the Government to put an end, by declaring that nothing in our diplomatic relations authorizes the fears to which these reports tend to give birth.

No. 4. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 10.)

(Extract.)

Turin, January 3, 1859.

I REGRET to have to report to your Lordship that, during the last three weeks, the posture of affairs in Lombardy has not improved.

Cases of insult to Austrian officers, both civil and military, are on the increase, and the temper of the lower orders is so bitter towards the Austrians that, it is clear, if a revolution does take place at Milan, it will begin at the bottom and not at the top of the body politic.

I know that several Milanese noblemen have expressed their apprehension and alarm at this state of things, and say that, if a revolution broke out, they would have no control over it, but would be placed between two fires—the Austrian authorities and the mob. They neither dare support the authorities, for fear of being classed by the mob as Austrians, nor will their sense of self-respect allow them to take part with the mob against the Austrians.

The authorities at Milan, thus far, have exercised forbearance; but I understand that a system of signals has been preconcerted in order that the garrison may know how to act.

These facts will suffice to show the condition of things at Milan, and, as a general rule, the same holds good of all the towns in Lombardy.

The Legations are in no better condition. Parma and Modena alone are tranquil, though, if Lombardy and the Legations were to rise, those Duchies too would be carried away by the general impulse. We are authorized, therefore, to consider that Northern Italy is ripe for insurrection.

It is greatly to be deplored that some of the recent Decrees of the Austrian Government, particularly those which relate to the circulating medium and to conscription in Lombardy, should have been so badly conceived, and so clumsily executed, as to have increased the irritation of the people against their Governors.

But so it is; and hence it is that I do not believe the Sardinian Government need be charged, as it has been charged in some quarters, with having increased that excitement and irritation.

The mere existence of a system of government as free as that of Sardinia is excitement enough to people in the condition of the Lombards, Venetians, and the Pope's subjects.

To this must be added the representations made by immigrants to Piedmont from those States to their friends and relatives at home. Some of these persons, gentlemen by birth and education, who have acquired a Sardinian naturalization, have formed at Turin a Society which they call the "Central Committee for the Liberation of Italy," and they send into every part of Italy inflammatory addresses bidding the people prepare for another effort to free Italy from foreign rule.

The Sardinian law of the press either does not, or will not, reach those persons, and the effect of these exhortations upon Lombards, Venetians, and Romagnuoli may easily be imagined.

But, even supposing that these inflammatory addresses produced no effect whatever, it is certain that the national Italian party has, during the last three years, absorbed the Carbonari and the greatest part of the Republicans, and this is more especially the case in that extremely ill-governed part of Italy, Southern Romagna.

The King of the Two Sicilies, confiding in the powerful protection of Russia, has made no attempt to gain the suffrages of England and France, or the affections of his people, by a more reasonable system of government; and if Tuscany shows no signs of excitement, I know that even that mild and docile people would add their quota to a national movement.

The condition of Italy, then, is such, that an outbreak in Lombardy or in the Legations might be extended in a very short space of time, over the whole Peninsula.

The question which arises is, what would be the conduct of Sardinia under that condition of things?

Since my return to my post I have never failed to point out to this Government, and even to the King, in a conversation which I had the honour to hold with His Majesty on the 31st ultimo, that Great Britain would see with displeasure the peace of Europe disturbed; that she would respect existing Treaties, and would require the other co-signatories to respect them too, holding herself free to act in such way as she deemed best with respect to that Power which should be the first, without just cause, to go to war; that she takes a warm interest in the prosperity of Sardinia, and in her present system of government; but at the same time, whilst professing her desire not to permit undue pressure being applied to her from without, she was entitled to expect that Sardinia should give no cause of offence to her neighbours.

To this both Count Cavour and the King replied that no cause of offence had been or would be given by Sardinia to her neighbours. His Majesty added, that the political horizon was threatening, but, as far as he was concerned, the House of Savoy would pursue its old course of loyalty to its engagements; and, whilst he regretted certain matters in a neighbouring State, he had no hesitation in saying, that neither intrigue nor revolution would ever be countenanced by his country.

Count Cavour said, that if people expected that Sardinia was going to declare war, they were likely to be disappointed.

These assurances are satisfactory as far as they go; but it is to be apprehended that Sardinia herself may either be carried away by the torrent of public opinion in Italy, or may become the victim of circumstances which she would be wholly unable to control.

Those circumstances may occur naturally enough. A rising in Lombardy may be expected to create a great excitement at Turin, the army is notoriously desirous for war; it is said by persons who know it, that it will fall into disorganization if there is no war; that many of the best officers will leave it: a considerable pressure will be brought to bear upon the Government by the "National party;" by appeals from without by the Universities: by the Extreme Left, and by a large portion of the Centre, in the Chamber of Deputies; by the immigration. The King, personally, is not averse to war, though he would naturally be averse to risk the interests of his family by a hasty declaration of war against Austria. It is not, I think, likely that either he or his Government would go as far as that, but they would probably go some way towards it. They would, probably, march a corps of observation to the Ticino, and make an appeal to France and England, and to the other Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris, under the 22nd Protocol.

The condition of Italy at that date (8th April, 1856) was bad: it is now worse; and the Sardinian Government might urge that they can no more afford to have a periodical revolution in Italy than can their neighbours; that, placed, as they are, between two great Powers, each armed to the teeth, Sardinia cannot reduce her war expenditure within such limits as would relieve the people from an undue pressure of taxation; that she may be called upon by either of those Powers, on one day to violate her law of asylum, as had been the case with France; and on another, to violate her laws of the press, as had been the case with Austria; consequently she was forced to exhaust her resources in maintaining the means of defending her independence; that at Paris she had warned the Congress of the complications which would inevitably result to Europe if the situation and condition of Italy were neglected; that neglect to listen to that warning had produced revolution on her frontiers, and that intervention had become necessary.

If Sardinia were to confine herself to such a demonstration as that, perhaps good might come of it, as it might lead the great Powers to examine more closely than they have yet done, the condition of things in Italy.

But if the Sardinian Government were, from one cause or other, unable to stop at that point, if they went one step further, what would France do?

The Emperor of the French is, as often as not, his own Foreign Minister.

Such being the posture of affairs in this quarter, your Lordship may well believe that I have been guarded in my language.

I cannot close this despatch without calling your Lordship's attention to the few words which the Emperor of the French let drop when he received the diplomatic corps a few days ago. It is reported and published here that His Imperial Majesty said to M. Hübner, "Je regrette beaucoup que les rapports des deux Gouvernements soient si mauvais, mais dites à l'Empereur que mes sentiments personnels sont toujours les mêmes."

In the present condition of Italy, these words are likely to be considered as tantamount to a declaration of war, and therefore we must not expect any diminution of the agitation which now exists in this Peninsula.

No. 5. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, January 10, 1859.

MY LORD,—HER Majesty's Government have heard from your Excellency, with deep concern, that the state of the relations between the French and Austrian Courts is of a nature so unsatisfactory that, in your own opinion, and that of the public of France, it might at any moment lead to a still further and more fatal estrangement. The speech of the Emperor to M. Hübner on New Year's day, increased the general alarm, which has extended to this country; and although subsequently a more courteous treatment of the Austrian Minister was displayed at the Tuileries, and the "Moniteur" has attempted to reassure the public mind, the agitation is not diminished.

Her Majesty's Government have such entire confidence in your Excellency's tact and judgment, that they feel that no given instructions can be so useful as a full liberty left to your Excellency to take advantage of the most fitting occasions to urge upon the Emperor, and upon his Ministers the paramount importance of preserving the peace of Europe under any circumstances in which the vital interests of France itself are not imperilled.

Her Majesty's Government received and hailed with sincere satisfaction the assurances with which, in 1852, the Emperor of the French consecrated his election to the Throne. Those

assurances were that His Imperial Majesty would observe and maintain the Treaties which were then the law of Europe, and Her Majesty's Government are bound to say that no pledge was ever more faithfully and loyally kept.

The European benefit of an unbroken alliance between England and France has been the result of that honourable policy ; and Her Majesty's Government, who believe that the peace of Europe is ever in the hands of those two great Empires, feel the deepest anxiety whenever France appears likely to be in hostility with any of the Great Powers of the continent.

Her Majesty's Government must state to your Excellency that, in the evident ill-humour displayed reciprocally between France and Austria at this moment, they can perceive no great national question or interest involved which can reasonably cause such a feeling. No portion of the territory of either is threatened by the other ; no commercial privileges are asked or refused by either ; no point of national honour is at stake in either country.

The solution of a sentiment which has apparently brought these two States to the verge of collision, appears to Her Majesty's Government to be found in mutual faults of temper and indiscretion on the part of the two Governments, and neither party appears disposed to make such sacrifices as would put an end to the panic which they have caused, and the practical evils which they may create.

It is under these circumstances that an impartial State like England is justified in proffering to her two allies the best and most sincere advice that she can give.

I repeat, that I trust to your Excellency to perform this duty, and I hope you will not omit to point out to the French Government, that while no French interest is at stake between France and Austria, there is a State and there are persons who, to increase its territory and fortify their personal position, ardently desire to involve two powerful Empires in a war from which they expect to obtain those results.

That war, if it be what is expected, namely, an Italian war, can neither be short nor decisive. It may begin as a conflict in which three Monarchies are engaged, but looking at the soil on which it will be waged, and the elements which it will contain, it must, ere long, expand into a war of opinions. Among these theories, your Excellency may be assured that those of a Republican hue will not be the faintest.

Of such a war France would have to bear the heaviest expenditure of blood and treasure, against a foe possessing great military power, and a determination to use it to the last ; while the phases of the contest would give new life to that dreaded class who look in anarchy alone for a realization of their avarice or ambition.

Her Majesty's Government have already pressed upon Austria,

analogous advice, and they believe that they will also be aided in their counsels by the Court of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government would wish your Excellency to go further, and frankly to enter into the present state of Italy with the French Government. I am aware from a conversation which Lord Clarendon held lately at Compiègne with the Emperor, and which his Lordship repeated to me, that His Imperial Majesty has long looked at the internal state of Italy with interest and anxiety. It may be, although I have no reason for believing such is the case, that he imagines that in a war with Austria, and having Sardinia as an ally, he may play the important part of the regenerator of Italy. If so, the Treaties of 1815 must be effaced, for such a redistribution of territory could not be effected without the consent of the parties to those Treaties. But those compacts have insured to Europe the longest peace on record, and in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government still answer their original purpose, in maintaining the balance of power.

I would not, however, have your Excellency believe that Her Majesty's Government are indifferent to the just discontent which affects a large portion of the Italian populations. Yet it is not in a war between France and Austria that their relief is to be found. Such a war may bring about a change of masters, but assuredly it will not give them independence, and without independence liberty is hopeless.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that it is in the union and good understanding of France and Austria, that an amelioration and gradual improvement of the condition of the Italians can be now begun and finally effected. If, happily for that people, those two Governments would occupy themselves seriously to insist upon and carry out the reforms demanded by both justice and policy in Central Italy, they would doubtless succeed.

In an effort so glorious for both countries, and so beneficial to Austria, Her Majesty's Government would heartily join; although they are of opinion that, as a Protestant country, England should not take too prominent a part, lest she should excite a suspicion that she was swayed by motives of a sectarian character. If Prussia and Russia approved, they would stand in the same light as England: and if it should appear to the two great Roman Catholic Empires that any modification of the territorial distribution of Central Italy would contribute to the peace of the country and good government of the people, without enfeebling the spiritual authority of the Pope, Her Majesty's Government would be ready, together with the other Powers who were parties to the Treaties of 1815, to give it their best consideration.

These views of Her Majesty's Government your Excellency will propound to the French Government when you have a fitting opportunity. Your Excellency's task is to avert, if possible, the

curse of a war, which I am convinced would be one of the longest and bloodiest on record, in which all the worst passions of conflicting theorists, exiled pretenders, and adverse races would be mingled in a deadly struggle.

It is also to urge a peaceful course of action, in lieu of a policy so pregnant with those calamities.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 6. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 11.)
(Extract.)

Paris, January 10, 1859.

THE article in the "Moniteur," intended to reassure the public mind, which I had the honour to inclose in my despatch of the 7th instant,* has had, as I anticipated, the contrary effect. People naturally ask themselves why the language of it is so pointedly guarded, and why more positive assurances of the peaceable intentions of the Government are not given, if there is really no cause for alarm.

No. 7. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Hudson.*

Foreign Office, January 12, 1859.

SIR,—HER Majesty's Government have read with painful interest your despatch of the 3rd instant,† on the present state of Italian politics; and they have seen, with no small anxiety, the growth of the impression, now generally prevalent, that Europe is on the eve of witnessing the commencement of a war in Italy, in which Austria and France may be the first actors, but which will inevitably convulse the whole of the Italian race, even if its influence is not felt throughout Europe.

In such a state of things, Her Majesty's Government hasten to send you their views and policy fully embodied in my despatches to Her Majesty's Ministers at Paris and Vienna.‡

Her Majesty's Government cannot shut their eyes to the probability that Sardinia may be lured, by the prospect of aggrandizement, to take part in the approaching conflict, or, at all events, to encourage the discontented spirits in Italy to look forward to a change in the distribution of power in that country, which might lead to the creation of an Italian Kingdom, or, at all events, of an Italian Confederation, in which Sardinia would hold a prominent position.

Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that no policy could be more fatal to Sardinia, than one based upon such expectations. The part that she could play in a war between Austria and France would be very secondary; and she may be well assured that, like other small States acting in concert with a more powerful ally, her interests would not be consulted either

* No. 3.

† No. 4.

‡ Nos. 5 and 8.

in the prosecution or at the conclusion of the war. The internal prosperity which Sardinia has acquired would disappear before the march even of a friendly army; and the Sardinian Government must know, even by recent experience, that the liberal institutions on which she justly prides herself, would be equally distasteful to friend and foe, on whichever side she might be found in an Italian war.

Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to see what reliance Sardinia can place on the feelings of the Italian people, if she keeps alive in her recollection the events of the last struggle carried on by Austria in Lombardy. The desire of the Lombards for amalgamation with Sardinia was evanescent, and they finally repudiated the idea of such an union. Sardinia can have no just grounds for supposing that national jealousies, the growth of centuries, would in that respect be different in 1859 from what they were in 1848.

You will take every opportunity to bring these considerations forcibly before the Sardinian Government, and to urge upon it not only the duty, but the expediency, of abstaining from any course of conduct calculated to embitter the animosities which now unfortunately exist between the Austrian and French Governments, and from acting a part so unprincipled as, without any aggression on the part of others, to provoke the calamities of a European war.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 8. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, January 12, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE to instruct your Lordship to take an early opportunity of stating to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government have witnessed with much concern the increasing estrangement between Austria and France, which has at last become so notorious as to produce a general impression that Europe is on the eve of witnessing a contest between those two States, and that the battle-field selected by them will be Italy.

On two occasions—one more than a month ago—I stated to Count Apponyi, verbally, the apprehensions of Her Majesty's Government, and ventured to give him their views and opinions in the form of advice. They were analogous to those which I now submit to your Lordship.

Her Majesty's Government therefore have hoped, and still continue to hope, that maturer reflection on both sides will avert a calamity the results of which no human foresight can divine; and, deprecating all officious interference with Austrian affairs, your Lordship can scarcely find it necessary to assure Count Buol that we are ready and anxious to exert our utmost influence to assuage animosities, and explain away causes of offence, if only a

disposition is shown by either party to avail itself of our good offices for that purpose.

It appears, indeed, to Her Majesty's Government that the existing ill-feeling between the two Imperial Courts has its origin not so much in any real and patent cause of disagreement, as in mutual distrust of each other's views and intentions, and the consequent disposition to give an unfavourable construction to every measure to which either party may have recourse. There are no questions of territorial claim or occupation, none of commercial injury, or of disregarded rights, which can be alleged on either side as justifying the coldness and reserve, not to say suspicious irritability, which characterize their present intercourse. Yet it appears to Her Majesty's Government that neither party evinces a sincere disposition to come to a frank understanding with the other, or to make any sacrifices, however unimportant, to bring about so desirable a result.

With these impressions, it must be evident to the Austrian Government that no unseemly wish to interfere with its independent line of action induces Her Majesty's Government to tender their advice to Austria. That advice is offered from a sincere desire to see her prosper as one of the most important members of the European family of States, and as one of Her Majesty's most ancient allies.

Her Majesty's Government therefore desire your Lordship, while there is yet time, to place before the Imperial Court some considerations which they hope may not be without influence at the present crisis.

It is impossible to deny that a war once begun in Italy would soon assume the character of a revolutionary contest; and no human foresight can perceive what results would remain to Europe when, after a long and desperate contest, the combatants had sunk from exhaustion into peace. Such a war, however begun at first, would soon be adopted as one of dynasties and opinions, in which exiled pretenders, and every class of political theorist, would see the possible realization of their wishes.

It cannot be predicated that France would be a gainer from such a state of things. On the contrary, it is probable that she would be far from finding her account in it. But it is certain that Austria, even if she were to come out of the contest triumphant, would suffer to an irreparable extent in all her material interests.

It is with sincere pleasure that Her Majesty's Government pay a just tribute to Austria, by admitting that the government of her Italian provinces has been conducted by the Archduke Viceroy with great ability, and in a spirit of conciliation and liberality which does His Imperial Highness the greatest honour. Her Majesty's Government ardently trust that in the interests of the Italians themselves, and of the peace of Europe, the Austrian

Government will continue to pursue a course which cannot fail to bring to its side the public opinion of impartial and independent States. It appears to Her Majesty's Government to be of paramount importance at this critical moment for Austria to enlist public opinion in her cause, and to take more than common care to avoid every act that could possibly be construed into a wilful offence to those States, who may, perhaps, desire a quarrel with her. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, urge your Lordship to take every opportune occasion to impress this truth on the Austrian Government.

Your Lordship will frankly tell Count Buol that should such a struggle as we deprecate be the result of the present estrangement between France and Austria, England would remain a neutral spectator of the contest, and that in no case would public opinion in this country render it possible for her to assist Austria as against her own subjects, if the contest assumed the aspect of a revolution of her Italian Provinces against her Government.

The public opinion in England has a natural tendency to sympathize with Italian nationalities, but Her Majesty's Government believe that those sympathies would not be aroused to any active form against Austria, unless Austria put herself patently in the wrong, and either became an aggressor or gave France or Sardinia a fair excuse for beginning a war.

Her Majesty's Government do not deny that Austria has cause of uneasiness in Italy, but they maintain that it cannot be mitigated or removed by plunging into war with France or Sardinia. If Austria and France could be induced to take a just estimate not only of their own political interests, but of the course which would most effectually contribute to the happiness of the Italian populations throughout the whole extent of the peninsula, Her Majesty's Government feel that the work would be already half-accomplished, and the rest of Europe, instead of looking forward with anxiety to the future, would only have to congratulate itself on the prospect at length opening to them of Italian regeneration unstained by deeds of violence and bloodshed.

No one looking on the state of Italy can doubt that many causes of just discontent are to be found in the general administration of the country, and Her Majesty's Government, sympathizing, as they unquestionably do, with the sufferings of the Italian population, would gladly lend their best efforts to produce an amelioration in the existing state of things. But they know that such amelioration can never be effected, with any certainty of permanency, by war. It may produce a change of masters, but it will not confer independence: it may, perhaps, contribute to the elevation of some fortunate individuals, but it will ensure the disorganization of the whole social system, and indefinitely retard the material improvement of the Italian population.

On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government entertain but little doubt that if Austria and France—the former an Italian, and both Roman Catholic States—laying aside mutual suspicion, were to join heartily with a view to promote, by peaceful means, the regeneration of Italy, their combined influence would speedily effect a change in the present unhappy state of affairs, and contribute to establish confidence between rulers and their subjects.

Her Majesty's Government have not failed to press upon the Government of France considerations such as these, and they have not hesitated to express their conviction that France, though she may have no material stake at issue, could have little or nothing to gain in an Italian war.

As the common friends, then, of both parties, and as sincerely desirous of the welfare of the Italian people, Her Majesty's Government entreat the two Imperial Courts to lay aside their animosities and to act in peaceful concert for that important object. Her Majesty's Government think that it would not only be becoming in Austria, from her peculiar position in Italy, but also advantageous to her in the public opinion of Europe, if she were to make the first advances, and propose to the French Government to join with her in considering the best means of reforming the glaring abuses in the Papal dominions which occupy Central Italy. Austria is an Italian State, and both Austria and France are now occupying the Papal territory with their troops. Such a position cannot be lasting, and Her Majesty's Government submit to both Austria and France that it is their public duty to terminate, if possible, a state of things which has become intolerable.

Your Lordship may assure Count Buol that the earnest support of Her Majesty's Government will not be withheld at Paris from any overtures which the Cabinet of Vienna may there make for the establishment of a good understanding with France with regard to Italy, or for giving effect to her praiseworthy efforts.

Her Majesty's Government would further be prepared to contribute, as much as in them lies, to make any propositions emanating from such a common understanding on the part of Austria and France, acceptable to the parties in Italy to whom they might be addressed.

If it should appear to Austria and France, the two great Roman Catholic Empires, after mutual counsel on the subject, that any modification of the existing territorial arrangements in Central Italy would be likely to contribute to the peace of the country and the good government of the people, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared, in conjunction with the other Powers by whom the present order of things was established in 1815, to give their best consideration to any

measures calculated, without enfeebling the spiritual power of the Pope, to effect objects so desirable in the interests of humanity, and so important as regards the general peace of Europe.

But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, at the outset of the endeavours which might be made by Austria and France to induce any of the Sovereigns of Central Italy to agree to, and carry out, such reforms in the internal administration of their dominions as may be required by justice and sound policy, it would not be expedient that England should appear to take the initiative or prominent part.

So much of ecclesiastical polity is involved in these questions, more especially as regards the Papal States, that the interference of a Protestant country in the proposed reforms might be looked upon with suspicion, and rather injure than benefit the cause.

It appears, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government, to be essential that Austria and France, by reason of their more direct interest in, and the means they can bring to bear on, matters at issue, should take a leading part in their adjustment; leaving it to Her Majesty's Government, and to those of Prussia and Russia, equally dissenting with themselves from the Church of Rome, to support, by such means as they might deem most advisable, the efforts of the Catholic Powers to induce the Pope, and other Italian Sovereigns, to sanction a change of system for the benefit of their respective subjects.

Your Lordship will enter fully, with Count Buol, on this important subject, and you will earnestly press upon him the expediency of an early decision, while there is yet time for an honourable and amicable understanding being effected with France. The present opportunity once lost, no other may present itself, until the resources of both countries are wasted in a war undertaken by the aggressor, whoever he may be, for no national purpose, and defensible by no principle of morality.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 9. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, January 12, 1859.

SIR,—THE instructions to Lords Cowley, Bloomfield, and Augustus Loftus, and to Sir James Hudson, of which copies are herewith transmitted to you,* will fully inform you of the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the present state of the relations between Austria and France, and of the efforts that we are making in order to avert, if possible, a war between those two Powers in Italy.

Notwithstanding the disposition which the Russian Government has so constantly shown since the conclusion of the war

* Nos. 5, 7, 8, and 10.

to cultivate the friendship of France, and the unceasing bitterness which characterizes its relations with Austria, Her Majesty's Government yet hope that it would not refuse to co-operate in their endeavours to preserve the general peace of Europe.

Her Majesty's Government cannot believe that Russia, in her own interest, would not deprecate as much as England the terrible results of an European war, and not foresee the wrecks which it would leave behind it.

The knowledge which the inclosed despatches will give you of the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, will enable you to take advantage of any opportunity to second those wishes while conversing with Prince Gortchakoff or other influential persons, on a topic which cannot fail to attract as much attention at St. Petersburg as in other capitals of Europe.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 10. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, January 12, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE apprehensions which are generally felt at the present time that a war is imminent between Austria and France, and that Italy will be the theatre of it, have determined Her Majesty's Government to attempt to induce those two Powers, instead of seeking occasion of quarrel with each other, to unite in a common course of friendly action, in order to effect the improvement of the social and moral condition of the Italian people.

I inclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of despatches which I have for this purpose addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, and also a copy of one which I have addressed to Sir James Hudson,* instructing him to use his best endeavours to dispel any illusion which may exist in Sardinia that the result of a war between Austria and France would turn to her own advantage.

Her Majesty's Government feel convinced that the Government of Prussia will share in their anxiety to avert the calamities which such a war would entail upon Europe, and therefore I do not hesitate to instruct your Lordship to communicate frankly, though confidentially, to Baron Schleinitz the nature of the instructions which have been sent to Paris and to Vienna; and you will urge his Excellency to move the Prince Regent to authorize his Ministers in those capitals to combine their efforts with the Representatives of Her Majesty, in order to induce the Austrian and French Governments mutually to abstain from any course of conduct calculated to bring about a state of hostility between them.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

* Nos. 5, 7, and 8.

No. 11. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Hudson.*

Foreign Office, January 13, 1859.

SIR,—THE telegraphic despatch which you have sent to this office, and the public journals, give so nearly the same report of the King of Sardinia's speech to his Chambers, that Her Majesty's Government have no reason to doubt that these statements are correct.

Assuming them to be so, I cannot for a moment conceal from the Sardinian Government the apprehensions which that Address has caused in Her Majesty's Government, while every subsequent hour has brought to them tidings from abroad, indicating that the public mind shares deeply in those apprehensions.

Her Majesty's Government are surprised that the Sardinian Government, by whose advice His Majesty's speech was delivered, did not foresee the effect that it was likely to produce in a country so easily agitated as Italy has ever been by either her just or exaggerated hopes of changes in her internal policy.

The language uttered from the Sardinian Throne, if accurately reported by you, is calculated to excite those who are oppressed, and those who indulge in impossible theories, to look to Sardinia as the champion of both, and to trust to the sword of Savoy for a realization of their desires.

None more than Her Majesty's Government sympathize with the wrongs which portions of the Italian people have endured on the part of their rulers. Her Majesty's Government know them to be almost intolerable, but they are equally convinced that it is not by provoking the terrible curse of a European war that any part of Europe will acquire real freedom, or her people obtain happiness.

If a consequence so fatal to the prosperity of all countries should arise as a war, I wish you to point out to the Sardinian Government the utter ignorance, as to its results, in which we must all be involved.

The only certainty that Her Majesty's Government can foresee is, that considering the elements which it must upheave, its duration and its miseries will be prolonged to an incalculable period.

In a war so begun, the Republicans of every possible hue, the dreamers of every impracticable theory, the exiled pretenders to thrones, and all, in short, who seek revenge, gain, or power, will expect to find their account.

If Sardinia believes that from such a struggle she will come forth in a more prosperous and honourable position than she occupies at present, Her Majesty's Government believe she will be utterly deceived in this deadly lottery.

England has always viewed in Sardinia the model for Europe of a young Constitutional State daily increasing in prosperity, as the fruit of her liberty, so wisely granted by a politic Sovereign, and so reasonably enjoyed by an intelligent and grateful people.

It was a sincere satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, equally felt by every successive Administration, to point out Sardinia as a living argument to refute the statements of those who maintained that Constitutional States were impossible in Italy. The experiment has been tried, and until now has vindicated those principles of civil and religious liberty which both England and Sardinia represent.

But if Sardinia should unfortunately be the first to provoke, by either imprudence or ambition, a calamity which Providence has averted from the largest part of Europe for forty-three years, Sardinia will show the world that a popular Government may be as unwise and as grasping as the single mind of an ignorant or despotic ruler.

Such a consummation to a career so brilliantly begun as that of Sardinia, would be most deeply deplored by Her Majesty's Government for the sake of Sardinia herself.

But for the interests of humanity in general Her Majesty's Government must be still more anxious; and you will frankly show Count Cavour the terrible responsibility of the Minister who, unassailed by any foreign State, and with no point of honour at stake, appears to invite a European war by addressing himself through his Sovereign to the suffering subjects of other Powers.

This imprudent act has, however, been committed, and in the panic which has followed, Count Cavour may already read public opinion. Her Majesty's Government, nevertheless, have thought it a duty which they owe to Europe, to express, without reserve, their sentiments of concern and anxiety at an Address for which, not only to her allies, but to the God whom in that Address she invokes, Sardinia is deeply responsible.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 12. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 13.)

Paris, January 12, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE accounts received by the French Government from their Agent at Milan, whom Count Walewski describes as a most trustworthy person, are, that although it is impossible to deny that considerable agitation prevails in Lombardy, it is not that sort of agitation likely to terminate in an outbreak. He cannot even pronounce whether it is natural, or whether it is excited from without.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 13. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 15.)
(Extract.)

Paris, January 14, 1859.

I HAD a long and not an unimportant conversation with Count Walewski this afternoon. I went to his Excellency for the purpose of communicating to him the substance of your Lordship's

despatch of the 10th instant,* relative to the present political crisis ; and, with this view, I read to him the greater part of your observations.

I should neither do justice to your Lordship nor to Count Walewski himself if I refrained from recording the profound impression which the argument running through that despatch made upon his Excellency. Some of the passages he requested me to read twice over, others at once elicited his warmest approval ; and I do not allow myself to doubt that the tenour of your Lordship's remarks will be faithfully conveyed to the Emperor.

I particularly pointed out to Count Walewski the total disinterestedness of the advice proffered by Her Majesty's Government ; for of all quarters of Europe, I observed, a war in Italy would be least prejudicial to the material interests of Great Britain.

After hearing me, and expressing, in general terms, his appreciation of the masterly statement which I read to him, his Excellency said that he would state at once that, serious as was the aspect of affairs, it would not be rendered more serious by any proceedings on the part of France. France had no wish to go to war or to induce others to go to war ; and if she took up arms, it would be on a question of right and in the defence of existing Treaties. Such, his Excellency said, was the Emperor's firm determination. His Majesty would not declare war if unprovoked, or himself provoke a war on the part of others ; and if others would be as prudent as His Majesty, the crisis would pass over.

The reverse of the medal was to be looked for in the possible imprudence of other Powers ; the gravity of the crisis was to be sought elsewhere. So long as Austria remained within her own frontier, she might act as she pleased ; he would guarantee there would be no interference from France : but let her once march a soldier into any other part of Italy, excepting the Legations, he would answer for nothing. He did not mean to declare that, even then, France would interfere, but, in all probability, Sardinia would, when the complications which might ensue might involve all Europe. In one word, he looked upon the peace of Europe as being at this moment in the hands of Austria.

Count Walewski assured me, further, that the Emperor's instructions to Prince Napoleon on his Imperial Highness' departure for Turin, had been of a most pacific character.

No. 14. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Russell.*†

Foreign Office, January 13, 1859.

SIR,—The prevailing apprehensions of approaching troubles in

* No 5.

† A similar despatch, *mutatis mutandis*, was addressed on the same day to

Italy, growing out of, or followed by, a war between Austria and France in that country, cannot have failed to make a serious impression on the Papal Government, and to lead it to consider what effects such a calamity may have on the temporal power of the Pope.

Her Majesty's Government are exerting themselves, and will still continue to use their utmost efforts, to prevail upon the Governments whom public rumour designates as prepared to embark in this contest, to refrain from pursuing the acrimonious discussions which have of late interrupted their amicable relations, and, on the contrary, to unite cordially in a common course of action, with the view, if possible, of effecting, by moral influence, such an improvement in the general state of Italy, as, by allaying the discontent which a large portion of the Italian people so justly feel at the system of government under which they live, may at once improve the social condition of the people, and establish feelings of confidence and goodwill between them and their rulers.

Whether, in the state of feeling that now exists between the Governments of Austria and France, there needs any insurrectionary movement in Lombardy or any part of Italy to give an excuse for an open rupture between those two Powers, certain it is that both are looking forward to, and preparing for, the day when their armies shall stand in hostile array against each other on the plains of Lombardy. But, unquestionably, the probability of immediate collision, and, at all events, the calamities that must ensue from it, would be much diminished, if the Governments of Italy were spontaneously to express their readiness earnestly to consider, with the two Great Roman Catholic Powers of Europe, the means of improving the administration of their several States for the benefit of their subjects, and to offer substantial guarantees that such improvements, once agreed upon, should be honestly carried out.

Her Majesty's Government have pointed out to the two Imperial Courts that, by united action for this object, they would not only relieve the rest of Europe from the apprehensions under which it now labours, but would probably set on foot in Italy an order of things calculated to allay the animosities which unhappily prevail in the several Italian States, and which, as long as they exist, must always be a source of disquietude to all Powers interested in the maintenance of the general peace.

Her Majesty's Government are aware that, from affinity of religion, and from the military position which Austria and France at present occupy in the Roman States, the initiative of any attempt in this direction most properly belongs to those two Powers, and that Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, standing in

Mr. Corbett, at Florence, with the following addition :—"I have addressed an instruction in the words of this despatch direct to Mr. Russell at Rome."

both respects on a different footing, could not advantageously propose to assume a prominent part in any such measure. But Her Majesty's Government have intimated their readiness to contribute, as far as their assistance may be likely to avail, to bring about a better order of things in Italy. The Government and people of this country sympathize sincerely with the wrongs of the Italian people, but they feel that those wrongs will be redressed more effectually by peaceful than by violent means. They look forward with alarm to the beginning of disturbances in Italy, whether originating in insurrection or in war, because they are assured that troubles once begun will speedily overspread the whole country, and that the conflict which will arise must inevitably disorganise still more its entire social system, and be attended with an amount of human misery which cannot be anticipated without dismay.

In any such contest, indeed, the part which this country would have to play is sufficiently indicated by its local position and the general tendency of its political institutions. A war in Italy would not directly affect any material British interests; neither would it be consistent with our political principles to interfere otherwise than by advice in the internal affairs of the Italian States. Therefore, Her Majesty's Government would consider it incumbent upon them to observe the strictest neutrality between the contending parties, and would not see in the struggle, while in progress, or in its result as long as it should be confined to Italy, any justifiable motive for assuming any other attitude in regard to it than that of a spectator, deeply lamenting, indeed, the calamities which they might witness, but declining any active part in a contest not directly affecting British interests, and begun, as they would consider it, by the chief actors in it, without any sufficient cause.

I have thought it advisable to give you this general insight into the views of Her Majesty's Government at the present crisis; and although it would not be advisable that you should seek occasion to enter upon these matters with the Papal Government, you will, if obliged to do so, regulate your language by the tenour of this despatch.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 15. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 16.)

Turin, January 9, 1859.

MY LORD,—WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday evening, acquainting me that great agitation exists at London and in Paris, on the subject of an expected Italian war, and inquiring what are the symptoms at Turin, and the preparations making for war, I have the honour to state that I have no notion that the Sardinian Government will commit so great an

act of folly as would be a declaration of war against Austria : the stake is too great, and the forces too unequal.

But Sardinia desires to drive the Austrians out of Italy, and, as a matter of course, to occupy her seat in Italy. Not being able to accomplish this by her own proper forces, she must look for assistance elsewhere—either in a general Italian revolution, or in a promise of support from France.

I am not one of those who believe in this immediate general Italian revolution. Seven years of bad wine crops, silk crops, and corn crops, with heavy taxation, have reduced the Northern Italians to skin and bone. Any traveller must have remarked the rags of the peasant, the worn-out horses and carts, and the absence of gentlemen's equipages at the Corsos of Milan, Brescia, Verona, and Bologna. And the Sardinian Government know as well as I do, that if they cross the Ticino they will find empty treasuries, a famished people, and, comparatively speaking, few resources. In addition to this they will find 80,000 well-appointed Austrian troops, in very strong positions, who are not to be surprised as they were in 1848-49.

That they will find the entire population with them I have no doubt ; but that population is in the starved condition I have described : consequently, I cannot believe that Count Cavour and his Cabinet would be so ill-advised as to risk an army (and they have but one), in a contest where the odds are in favour of the enemy. There is, therefore, nothing left for it but to suppose that a secret understanding exists between the Emperor of the French and the King of Sardinia, to the effect that if Sardinia attacks Austria she will be assisted by France.

But against this I have to offer that the Sardinian attack must be preceded by such a state of things as will justify a declaration of war ; that this state of things does not at this moment exist, though it may be called into existence by a general revolution in Lombardy or the Legations, but that this general revolution is not a thing to be looked for immediately.

If the expressions used by the Emperor of the French to M. Hübner on new year's day are to be taken to mean that war is imminent between France and Austria, then of course the general Italian revolution is advanced by so much the nearer to us, and perhaps they were intended to have that effect, and at Turin they have produced that effect. But, as I said before, the odds against Sardinia, as regards Austria, are too great to permit her to attack, unless France is ready to march to her assistance. It is at Paris, therefore, rather than at Turin, that the motive power will be applied to this Austrian war and Italian revolution, but I think that neither France nor Sardinia are prepared for the former, and that both desire to be justified by the latter, and that the latter is further off than most people imagine ; for there is a considerable interval between the act of revolution and the desire to revolt :

and though a revolution is the act of a moment, it must be preceded by the intention and the preparation ; and for my part I doubt, whatever the intent may be, that the Italians are prepared for a general revolution.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 16. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 17.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, January 12, 1859.

As might have been expected, the words addressed by the Emperor Louis Napoleon to Baron Hübner on new-year's day, produced here considerable sensation, and have tended to give a consistency to the warlike reports with which the foreign press have lately abounded. But I must confess that the incident alluded to has been apparently, to me, viewed here with far more calm, and far less passion, by the Government than by the public.

Whatever effect the Emperor Louis Napoleon may have sought to produce on this Government by the words he addressed to Baron Hübner, I may confidently state that it has neither produced that of fear nor of anger. I have never seen Count Buol more calm or unmoved, notwithstanding the very serious aspect of the relations between the two countries.

No. 17. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 17.)
(Extract.)

Berlin, January 13, 1859.

I CALLED to-day at the Foreign Department, as the Sardinian Envoy was leaving it.

Baron Schleinitz told me that he had just had an animated conversation with Count de Launay, and that that Minister's object in seeking an interview with him was evidently to converse on the danger of an outbreak in Italy, for he at once alluded to the increase of the Austrian garrisons as likely to oblige Sardinia to take corresponding military measures. His Excellency appears to have replied that he was not aware of any intention whatever on the part of the Imperial Government to meddle with the affairs of Sardinia ; that Austria, he presumed, felt obliged to add to her disposable force in Lombardy on account of the agitations which prevailed at this moment in her Italian possessions ; and that he hoped there would be no interference with the arrangements stipulated by the Treaties of 1815, to which Prussia was a party ; and that whatever Power attempted to infringe them would forfeit all claim to her sympathies.

I told Baron de Schleinitz that Count de Launay had spoken to me last evening much in the same sense as he had now done to his Excellency, adding, however, that he hoped Sardinia might count on the old friendship of England if serious complications arose, and that in my answers I had also alluded to the necessity

of observing the stipulations of the Treaties of 1815, and had said that England could have no concern, under present circumstances, with what might occur in Italy, and that those who wished for our goodwill must carefully avoid doing anything towards disturbing the peace of Europe.

Count de Launay appears to have sought, in the course of his conversation with Baron de Schleinitz, to discover whether his Government might count on the neutrality of Prussia, and he has left the conviction on his Excellency's mind that it is only waiting a signal from Paris to make a fresh attempt to carry out the traditional policy of the House of Savoy ; but his Excellency thinks the case is not beyond a remedy ; and he observed that though the moment was certainly critical, he considered the danger might be averted by diplomatic interference.

No. 18. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 17.)

Berlin, January 15, 1859.

MY LORD,—I SAW Baron Schleinitz yesterday, and read to him your Lordship's despatch of the 12th instant,* on the apprehensions generally entertained, that a war is imminent between Austria and France, and that Italy will be the theatre of that war.

I told his Excellency that I had not had time since the arrival of the messenger, a few hours before, to examine, with the care which the importance of the subject demanded, the various despatches which your Lordship had forwarded for my information, and the substance of which I was authorised to communicate confidentially to his Excellency, and that I should ask him to appoint an early time when we could examine the subject together.

Baron Schleinitz said that the Prussian Government were ready to devote their best energies to devise means of preventing the realization of the dreaded complication in the affairs of Italy, and that I could at once assure your Lordship that he would heartily unite his efforts to those of Her Majesty's Government in endeavouring to bring about an improved understanding between Austria and France, and that he hoped that means would be found to dispel the dark clouds which now overhang the political horizon.

Before leaving Baron Schleinitz, I made allusion to the social and moral condition of the people of Central Italy, as one of the causes of the present disturbed state of the public mind, and observed, that if France and Austria could be induced to consider together the best means of improving the state of the Italian people, a great point would be gained.

His Excellency replied to my observations, by expressing his

* No. 10.

doubt whether the tendering of advice to Austria and France, which, if followed, might affect the fundamental institutions of the Roman Government, would not meet with incalculable opposition both at Vienna and Paris: and judging from the few words which Baron Schleinitz said, I must believe that though he desires to lend all the assistance in his power towards removing the immediate causes of estrangement between Austria and France, he is not as willing to propose to them a modification of the present system of government in Central Italy.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 19. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 18.)

Turin, January 10, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship copy and translation of the speech delivered this day by His Majesty the King of Sardinia on the occasion of the opening of the Chambers.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

(Inclosure.)—*Speech delivered by His Majesty the King of Sardinia on the opening of Parliament, January 10, 1859.*

(Translation.)

SENATORS, DEPUTIES.—THE new Legislature, after a year's existence, has not disappointed either the hopes of the country or my expectations.

Thanks to its enlightened and loyal assistance, we have overcome the difficulties of our political situation at home and abroad, and have thus strengthened that broad basis of nationality and progress on which our free institutions rest. Pursuing the same course, you will this year effect fresh reforms in the various branches of legislation and of the public administration.

Last session you had before you certain projects with regard to the administration of justice. In resuming, this session, your inquiry into this subject, I trust that you will turn your attention to the re-organization of the magistracy, the institution of Courts of Assize, and the revision of the Code of Procedure.

You will be again called upon to consider the question of the reform of the communal and provincial administrations. The very lively interest excited by this measure will be an inducement to you to give it your especial care.

Some modifications will be laid before you of the law on the National Guard, in order that, while preserving intact the basis of this noble institution, those reforms may be introduced which experience suggests as fitted to render its future action more efficacious.

The commercial crisis, from which our country did not escape with impunity, and the calamity which has repeatedly befallen our

principal branch of industry, have diminished the State revenue, and have hitherto prevented the realization of the hopes we had conceived of a perfect balance of public revenue and expenditure.

This will not hinder you, in your discussion of the future Budget, from reconciling the State requirements with the principles of strict economy.

SENATORS, DEPUTIES,—The horizon of the new year is not all serene ; notwithstanding, you will prepare yourself, with your accustomed alacrity, for your parliamentary duties.

Cheered by the experience of the past, we advance with courage to meet the uncertainty of the future. That future will be a happy one, if we rest our policy on justice, and the love of liberty and our country.

Our country, small in territorial possessions, gained a position in the Councils of Europe, because it is great by the ideas it represents, and the sympathies it inspires. This condition is not free from dangers, since, though respecting Treaties, we cannot be insensible to the cry of suffering which reaches us from so many parts of Italy.

Strong in our unanimity, trusting in our good right, we wait with prudence and firmness the decrees of Divine Providence.

No. 20. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 18.)

Paris, January 17, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE Austrian Ambassador has informed Count Walewski, by order of his Government, that the Austrian troops stationed in Lombardy and the Venetian States have been reinforced. Count Buol gives assurances that this measure has been taken with reference to internal tranquillity only.

Count Walewski replied to M. de Hübner, that he regretted the necessity under which the Austrian Government had found themselves of augmenting their forces in Italy, as it would, no doubt, be followed by a similar proceeding on the part of Sardinia.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 21. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 21.)

Turin, January 17, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the Address of the Sardinian Chamber of Deputies to the Speech from the Throne on the opening of this Parliament on the 10th instant.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

(Inclosure.) *Answer of the Chamber of Deputies to the Speech from the Throne.*
(Translation.)

SIRE,—The Elective Chamber, encouraged by your approbation

and your counsels, hastens to return you the only thanks worthy of your acceptance, by seconding with alacrity and unanimity the lofty resolutions matured in your mind and in the wishes of the nation.

The Bills which your Majesty announces for the reorganization of the Magistracy, to render more prompt and certain the administration of justice, and to enlarge the privileges of the Communes and Provinces, and to reform the National Guard, in order that it may more effectually aid your brave army in defending the territory of the State ; all these are to us new proofs of the address with which your Majesty knows how to combine the necessities of a strong discipline with the rights of liberty.

And this prudent moderation is more than ever necessary in grave and difficult times, such as, perchance, are now coming, and for which your Majesty would prepare us, exhorting us to hope well from our country and from the future. And, Sire, you are justified in drawing from the past auguries of a hopeful future. Your people, in reviewing the chequered events of the last ten years, have proof that your voice has never deceived them, even when, with pain and austere, it advised necessary resignation, or demanded sacrifices, of which the fruits could not immediately be seen. And now your voice, dear and influential to all civilised people, pitying the afflictions of Italy, has awakened the recollection of solemn promises, as yet unfulfilled, but, at the same time, has calmed blind impatience, and strengthened among the people the faith in the providence of civilization, and the reparatory power of public opinion.

If this consoling arbitration—if this appeal to public reason, should draw down dangers and threats on your sacred head, the nation which venerates in you its most loyal Prince, which recognizes in you the powerful champion of the cause of liberty in the Councils of Europe, which sees all the anger of factions humiliated by the great example of your good faith, and which knows that in you, and through you, has at last been discovered the great secret, lost for so many years, of Italian unity, will gather round you, and will show that it has relearnt the ancient art of reconciling the obedience of the soldier with the liberty of the citizen.

No. 22. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 21.)

Turin, January 17, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE Russian Minister at this Court, Count Stackelberg, called upon me the day before yesterday, and told me that he had received instructions from his Government to be extremely reserved in his language with the Sardinian Government upon the present posture of affairs in Italy ; that he was to look on and

report: and he added that he felt convinced his Government would take no part against Austria, in case she were forced into a war with France and Sardinia, for his master was occupied with several internal reforms, to which he attaches extreme importance.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 23. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 21.)
(Extract.)

Turin, January 17, 1859.

WITH your Lordship's permission I will continue my report upon the state of Italy, from the point where I left it at the close of my despatch of the 3rd instant.*

I then stated that the words used by the Emperor of the French to M. Hübner on new year's day, would increase the agitation in Italy. They were followed on the 10th instant by the speech of the King of Sardinia, on opening the session of Parliament, and in that speech all those Italians who desire change saw they were not forgotten.

They have accepted and are contended with the phrase which describes their "grido di dolore," their cry of anguish, which is interpreted as a cry for aid, which is listened to by Piedmont, and which will be answered by French and Piedmontese cannon.

That is the way it has been interpreted, but the effect has not been what France and Piedmont probably expected.

The effect has been to satisfy the Lombards and the Romagnuoli that they were not forgotten, and the consequence of that impression and conviction has been to calm their pre-existing agitation.

The words of the Emperor, and the speech of the King, instead of acting as fuel to fire, have acted as oil upon water. The Italians say we are prepared to revolt, but we will wait till you come.

This condition of things will permit me to spare your Lordship the infliction of a long report; but the position of those parts of Italy which were expected to rise, but which do not rise, is at this moment precisely that of waiting for France and Piedmont.

Events clearly have gone too quick for France and Piedmont. They counted upon matters being ready in spring or summer; the fruit has ripened in midwinter, and whatever France may be, Piedmont certainly is not prepared to enter upon an immediate campaign.

Her Prime Minister has no ready money. Sardinian stock is down 5 per cent. upon the mere rumour of war, which would be as unpopular here with the monied classes as it is in France and in England.

Austria in the meantime has not been idle, and if a French

army comes into Lombardy, it will find plenty of work cut out for it.

No. 24. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 21.)
(Extract) Paris, January 19, 1859.

HAVING taken measures for bringing to the Emperor's knowledge portions of your Lordship's despatch of the 10th instant,* concerning the state of the relations between France and Austria, and the general apprehension that war might be the consequence, His Majesty was pleased, in a conversation which I had with him yesterday evening, to advert to these matters.

His Majesty, in admitting that great alarm and disquietude prevailed, said that he was quite unable to divine the reason of it: he was not aware of anything that rendered war more probable to-day than it was three months ago; nor had he the slightest wish or intention to provoke one. It was true, that about a fortnight ago, he had received a pressing letter from the King of Sardinia, stating that he (the King) had information, on which he could rely, that he was about to be attacked by Austria, and entreating him (the Emperor) to give him such assistance as would enable him to bring up his outlying troops to the Austrian frontier. On the receipt of this letter, the Emperor continued, he had stopped the embarkation of two batteries of Artillery which had been destined for Algeria, but he had taken no other precautions whatever, and he supposed that this must have alarmed the public mind.

"What I said to M. de Cavour," continued His Majesty, "I repeat now: my sympathies have always been, and still are, with Italy. I regret that Lombardy should be in the possession of Austria, but I cannot and do not dispute the right of the latter. I respect existing Treaties, because they are the only landmarks we have; so long as Austria remains within her own frontiers, she is, of course, mistress to do as she pleases. With regard to Sardinia, if she provokes hostilities unjustly, and places herself in the wrong, she must expect no support from me."

I should mention that when speaking of the tenure of Lombardy by Austria, the Emperor observed, that he was not surprised that large reinforcements should have been dispatched to strengthen the troops garrisoning that country, but they need not have been placed in a position on the Tessin, thus provoking a counter-demonstration on the part of Sardinia.

I rejoined, that not being a military man, I could not say how far an advanced position on the Tessin was necessary to the safety of the Lombardian frontier. But, however that might be, I said that I could not forget that in 1848, Count Buol, being then Austrian Minister at Turin, received the most solemn assurances

from the late King, Charles Albert, that there was no intention of attacking Lombardy; whereas, when His Majesty gave these assurances orders had been actually expedited to the Sardinian troops to march and pass the frontier. It was not astonishing that a Government of which Count Buol is a member, with a recollection of this act of treachery, should take care that Austria was not again surprised.

No. 25. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 21.)
(Extract.)

Paris, January 19, 1859.

DURING the conversation which I had with Count Walewski, a few days ago, and of which I had the honour to give your Lordship a summary in my despatch of the 14th instant,* I drew his Excellency's attention to the opinion so strongly expressed by Her Majesty's Government, that if any reforms were to be effected in the institutions of Central Italy, it must be by means of the common action of France and Austria upon the Papal Government, aided by a less direct interference on the part of the other Great Powers. I remarked, moreover, that could the two Imperial Governments be persuaded to engage in so beneficial a work, a great step would have been made towards smoothing those misunderstandings which threatened so seriously, at this moment, the continuation of their peaceable relations.

Count Walewski replied that he by no means wished to repel the idea suggested by your Lordship, but that he did not think the moment a favourable one for executing it. He reminded me that the scheme had been tried two years ago, and had not succeeded, the two Governments having failed even to come to any common understanding as to the bases of the reforms to be proposed. If they could not agree then, what hope, he asked, was there of better success now? His Excellency, however, seemed desirous to make me comprehend, though without in any way committing himself, that Her Majesty's Government might, perhaps, be the medium of communication between the two Imperial Governments.

I need not call your Lordship's particular attention to the discussions respecting Italy which took place towards the latter end of the Conferences of Paris, because they are yet fresh in the memory of all those who take an interest in public affairs. Suffice it to say, that they contain ample proof of the Emperor's continued desire to ameliorate the lot of the Italian populations.

The Emperor soon became aware that, without the goodwill and assistance of Austria, no plan of amelioration could succeed. Therefore in the spring of 1857, overtures were made, by His Majesty's orders, to the Cabinet of Vienna, with a view of inducing the Austrian Government to join His Majesty's Govern-

* No. 13.

ment in proposing a series of reforms for the consideration of the Pope. It was hoped that these reforms once effected, both the French and Austrian troops might be gradually withdrawn from the Pontifical States, to be replaced by troops, partly native and partly foreign, in the Pope's pay.

The Emperor's proposal was so far listened to favourably at Vienna, that it was agreed that Count Colloredo, the Austrian Ambassador at Rome, should be instructed to confer with his French colleague, the late M. de Rayneval, to see in what measure the two Cabinets could arrive at a common understanding.

The views of the two Governments eventually proved to be irreconcilable. The reports of M. de Rayneval, moreover, went to demonstrate that an ecclesiastical was the only possible form of government at Rome; that the laity in general were so ignorant and so ill educated, that the administration of affairs could not be safely entrusted to them, and that to effect a change, were it even possible to obtain the Pope's consent, would be a step from bad to worse. He asserted also, that the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome would probably be followed by excesses of a revolutionary character.

The Emperor, in face of these difficulties, found himself obliged to abandon all hope of realizing his benevolent intentions.

It was a saying of the first Napoleon, somewhat paradoxical, no doubt, in his mouth, that the Pope must be treated with as if he had 300,000 men at his back. The saying, however, showed the difficulties with which even that firm mind had to contend when the head of the Roman Catholic Church was his opponent. And if such was the case in those days of irreligion and infidelity, what must it be now when the Roman Catholic Church has recovered so much of its then lost authority.

In truth, the Pope's strength lies in his weakness, and we may well ask what you can do with a man who, the moment that pressure is put upon him, exclaims, "Do with me what you will: drive me from Rome, but remember that I am as much the Pope whether seated on a barren rock, or on the throne of St. Peter."

I can hardly confine myself to treating the question of the Pontifical States alone. Even if Naples and the Duchies require no particular mention, Sardinia cannot be passed over. The events of the last few years have shown Sardinia to be bent on putting herself forward as the champion of the regeneration of Italy. Even if this noble design has been obscured by the more ambitious projects of territorial aggrandizement, which are so evidently its concomitants, it is the basis on which Sardinia rests her claims to sympathy. That sympathy has been freely given by the Emperor; nor have the inconveniences to which the Imperial Government has at times been exposed by the too liberal institutions of its neighbour affected, in any way, His

Majesty's sentiments. Sardinian statesmen have not been slow to turn this kindly feeling to good account, and to Count Cavour must be awarded the meed of skilful and dexterous management in handling it.

But the time has come when these tactics are expected to bear their fruit. Sardinia has made the discontented in Italy believe that, strong in the sympathy and backed by the influence of France, she can effect their deliverance. Sardinian resources have been taxed to the utmost to be ready for the crisis. The problem must, at last, be solved. In the meantime Europe is appalled, from one end to the other, by the dangers which such a situation presents.

No. 26. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 24.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, January, 20, 1859.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 12th instant,* relating to the present serious state of affairs in Italy, and portraying the dangers which menace Europe if that peninsula should again become the battle-field between Austria and France.

I have, accordingly, lost no time in bringing under the notice of Count Buol the important topics therein referred to, and I have deemed it advisable to read that despatch to Count Buol *in extenso*, in order to impress on his Excellency, with greater force, the wise and judicious counsels which are therein contained, and in order that the advice and the opinions of Her Majesty's Government should be placed before his Excellency in the same clear, conciliatory, and forcible language in which they are embodied in your Lordship's despatch.

Before reading that despatch I stated to Count Buol as a prelude to it, that it was the ardent desire of Her Majesty's Government to use their best endeavours to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, and that they considered it a duty to humanity, on an occasion like the present, to tender their good offices in any way that might further this desirable end. I further added that these laudable efforts on the part of Her Majesty's Government were not solely confined to Austria, but that your Lordship had, in like manner, most strongly urged both at Paris and at Turin a moderate and peaceful policy, and had most strenuously recommended those States not to forsake the path of peace and conciliation.

Count Buol listened with the deepest interest and attention to the reading of this despatch. At its termination I requested his Excellency to reflect over the very important subject to which it referred, and to reserve till another opportunity the expression of his opinion respecting it. I have now the honour to report

* No. 8.

to your Lordship a *résumé* of the conversation which his Excellency held with me, this day, on my reverting to this subject.

Count Buol commenced by stating that as I had not made a formal communication to him of this despatch (for such I stated had not been my instruction), he should not reply to it in any formal manner, but merely consider it, and refer to it, in the light of remarks which I had addressed to him in the course of conversation. He expressed himself as fully sensible of the kind and friendly motives which had moved Her Majesty's Government to offer their advice and counsel at the present critical moment, and he appreciated the cordial and sincere interest which they evinced for Austria. But he could not conceal from me his fears, that the opinions set forth in your Lordship's despatch might produce more harm than good, if these same views and opinions had been likewise expressed at Paris and Turin. "In fact," said his Excellency, "I regret that you have read that despatch to me; I regret, also, that it has been written. If," continued Count Buol, "you wish to preach peace and to prevent war, address yourselves with firmness to France and Piedmont. We are not meditating war; we shall not be the aggressors. Tell the Emperor Louis Napoleon that Great Britain will not passively look on, if His Majesty should commence hostilities. Say to him that should he take such a course, it will be at his own risk and peril. On the other hand, warn King Victor Emmanuel that England will not sanction any act of wilful aggression, undertaken in full peace, by Piedmont against Austria. If Great Britain is prepared to hold this language, no war will arise."

In referring to that portion of your Lordship's despatch respecting any possible territorial change which might be deemed desirable by all parties in Central Italy, his Excellency stated with some emphasis that he considered this proposal as a most dangerous doctrine, and as subversive of the Treaties of 1815.

I stated to Count Buol that your Lordship's intention and wish was not to inflame the Italian minds, or to raise hopes which could not be pacifically realised. Your Lordship had given the soundest advice to the Cabinet of Turin not to commit any wilful infraction of the peace, and you had deprecated in the strongest terms any attempts to carry out the reforms required in Italy by physical force, and had advocated at Paris, as well as here, the desirableness of an harmonious understanding between Austria and France on the affairs of Italy.

"There are," I observed to his Excellency, "two courses to pursue with respect to Italy, where the present state of things is intolerable, and cannot last. The reforms, which must inevitably be made, can be effected by peaceful negotiation, and the establishment of a complete agreement between Austria and France, with far more chance of eventual success than by the ruinous

action of war. Such is the course urged on your attention, and recommended by Her Majesty's Government. The other course, and only alternative, must be, eventually, revolution and war; and I have no doubt that your Excellency will agree that the remedy in the last alternative is as dangerous as the evil which it seeks to cure." I recalled to him the opinions enunciated at the Conference of Paris, when the continued occupation of the Roman States was acknowledged to be an irregular state of things which could not last, and served only to perpetuate the bad government of those States. It amounted almost to an annexation, which was opposed to the spirit of the European Treaties. If, therefore, I said, you will do nothing by peaceful means, and in concert with France, for the amelioration of the Italian Governments, be assured that a war will be inevitable, and no human foresight can tell to what ultimate changes it may lead. You reply, "We shall not begin war. We do not meditate any aggression." But let me tell you that at this moment the decision of peace or war is no longer within the hands of the Governments, but is transferred into those of the Mazzini and revolutionary party, whose aim has always been to bring about a breach between France and Austria for the attainment of their own ends. You are, therefore, playing the game of the revolutionary party, and you will inevitably fall into the trap which they have laid.

"How so?" said his Excellency. I replied, by loudly declaring your intention of giving succour to the minor independent States of Italy, you will give a pretext for others to oppose such intervention, and you thus place it in the hands of Mazzini, by getting up some disturbance in Parma or Modena, to bring about that very collision with Piedmont, and, probably, also with France, which that party are desirous for. If your Excellency, I continued, gives me the assurance that in no case will Austria move a soldier across her frontier in Italy without previous concert with France, then I shall consider that war may be averted.

No, said Count Buol, I cannot give you that assurance, for it would be a surrender of our sovereign power. We shall not intervene in any State unless our aid is asked for, and in that case it will be granted, and the knowledge that it will be granted is the best preservative of order. But, said his Excellency, let me ask you what you will say to Piedmont if she were to attack us? I said I could not imagine such an eventuality. It would be a mouse attacking the lion; but I should then say, what I should equally say of you, if you move a soldier across your frontier, that she is the aggressor.

Count Buol then said, that the agitation and excitement had greatly subsided in Lombardy since the Austrian reinforcements had arrived, and that he did not entertain the same fear as that

with which Her Majesty's Government were impressed of a disturbance arising in Italy. The accounts from Paris were also more satisfactory, the public mind and the press were far more calm and reassured. His Excellency added that there was really no question of difference between Austria and France, except the Belgrade affair, which might be considered closed; and he did not partake of the alarm felt for the peace of Italy.

His Excellency expressed a fear that a political crisis was imminent in Piedmont, and he seemed to think that Count Cavour, if driven to a last extremity, might, to retain power, resort to some violent course which might produce an open collision with Austria. For this danger Austria had provided, and if any aggressive act was attempted against Austria by Piedmont, they were perfectly prepared to repel it.

With respect to the proposal in your Lordship's despatch, that Austria and France should come to some agreement on Italian affairs, Count Buol stated that some months ago the French Government had addressed certain proposals for the reform of the Papal States; that the Austrian Government had cordially entered into those views, and had expressed their readiness to co-operate with France, within a certain limit, and with certain reserves, to obtain their acceptance at Rome. The French Government had then promised to take the matter into further consideration and to resume it ("d'y revenir"). Since that period, which coincided with the publication of M. de Rayneval's despatch, no further notice had been taken of the matter by the French Government, and the Austrian Government had received no reply to their last communication; therefore Austria could not now take the initiative in resuming that question. But, said Count Buol, I am not aware whether it be known at Paris that you have given this counsel and made the proposal to us; for, if it should appear that these proposals of your Government have been rejected by us, you will be doing us a bad service with the French Government, although with the best of intentions, for we shall be viewed as more obdurate and less conciliatory than we now are; and I therefore pray you to take care how you act in this sense. But the truth is, we can never come to an understanding with France on Italian affairs, for we start from two different points: first, we do not consider France to be an Italian Power; secondly, France sympathises with and protects the cause of nationalities, whereas we support that of the Sovereigns, Governments, and of "l'ordre établi;" therefore there can be no basis on which to found a concert or perfect co-operation. Nor is it necessary. It is a great mistake to think that Italy requires change. If Italy is left quiet, if agitation is put down, and if the hopes of certain parties who only seek their own aggrandisement are annulled, there will be no commotion, no war,

in Italy, and no cause for the measures which are counselled in the despatch you have read to me.

Count Buol finally said that Her Majesty's Government may be assured that the Austrian Cabinet will evince the greatest caution and prudence not to provoke hostilities in Italy, but that if other parties intent on bringing about a war in Italy were to do so, Austria was perfectly prepared to accept it. He trusted that Her Majesty's Government would use their powerful influence at Paris and at Turin, where the decision as to peace or war mainly rested, to urge the sacred observance of Treaties, and the grave responsibility which will be incurred, if, through the instrumentality of France and Piedmont, the peace of Europe should be unhappily broken.

No. 27. *Lord Bloomsfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 24.)

Berlin, January 20, 1859.

MY LORD,—WITH reference to my despatch* of the 15th instant, in which I reported having read to Baron Schleinitz your Lordship's despatch† of the 12th instant, on the possibility of a war growing out of the excitement and discontent prevailing in Italy, I have now the honour to inform your Lordship that I have had another interview with his Excellency on this subject.

I stated that, having been directed to communicate to him frankly, though confidentially, the nature of the instructions which had been sent to Her Majesty's Representatives on the present aspect of affairs, I felt I could not better fulfil the intentions of Her Majesty's Government than by reading to him the despatches which your Lordship had addressed, on the 12th instant, to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Turin.

His Excellency listened attentively, occasionally noting some of the most important passages, and when I had finished he begged me to return his warm thanks to your Lordship for this important communication.

He seemed highly to approve of the expectant attitude which your Lordship points out as the most advisable to be adopted at this moment, adding that it was the course which he considered, under existing circumstances, equally advantageous to the interests of Prussia, and the most likely to prevent a disturbance of the peace of Europe. He observed, further, that the interests and objects of the two countries were identical; both desired the maintenance of peace, and both, therefore, would strive, through their Representatives at Vienna and Paris, to bring about a better understanding between Austria and France.

I inquired if he intended giving any special instructions to the

* No. 18.

† No. 10.

Prussian Chargés d'Affaires at the two Imperial Courts on the matter alluded to in your Lordship's despatches, which I had just brought to his knowledge. His Excellency replied that he did not think it necessary at this moment to furnish them with any precise instructions for their guidance beyond this general one, that they should endeavour to place themselves on a good and confidential footing with Lord Cowley and with Lord Augustus Loftus, and act in concert with them.

This, he said, was the only instruction he could forward to Paris and Vienna at this moment, and that he should do so without delay, and that he hoped Her Majesty's Representatives at those Courts would be disposed to communicate confidentially with those of Prussia.

I must add that I have every reason to believe that Baron Schleinitz already holds here, and will direct the Representatives of Prussia at the Great Courts to hold, language in conformity with that of Her Majesty's Government; that he is fully imbued with the importance of England and Prussia acting together for the purpose of effecting a better understanding between France and Austria, and of thus, perhaps, averting the calamity of a war which might grow out of the continuance of that distrust of one another which now unhappily exists between the Cabinets of Paris and Vienna.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No 28. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.**

Foreign Office, January 25, 1859.

MY LORD,—I INCLOSE herewith to your Excellency a copy of a despatch from Lord Bloomfield,† reporting a conversation which he had held with Baron Schleinitz on the occasion of his communicating to him the despatch which I addressed on the 10th and 12th instant to your Excellency, and to Her Majesty's Representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Turin, on the subject of the present state of the relations between France and Austria, and the unsatisfactory state of things in Italy.

Your Excellency will perceive from this despatch, that the Prussian Government cordially adopt the views of Her Majesty's Government, as expressed in my despatches above referred to, with regard to the attitude that should be assumed by the two Governments under existing circumstances. They are of opinion that the interests of Prussia in this respect are identical with those of Great Britain; and that, as both are equally desirous for the maintenance of peace, they should endeavour, through their Representatives at the French and Austrian Courts, to bring about a better understanding between the two countries.

Baron Schleinitz does not, however, intend to send special in-

* A similar despatch sent on the same day to Lord A. Loftus.

† No. 27.

structions to the Prussian Representatives at the two Courts to move in the matter at present ; but he has expressed his intention of instructing them to endeavour to place themselves on a good and confidential footing with your Excellency, and with Lord A. Loftus, and to act in concert with you.

I need not point out to your Excellency the great advantages which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, are to be derived from the united action of Great Britain and Prussia at the present moment ; and I have, therefore, only to instruct you to meet frankly the advances made to you by your Prussian colleague, in pursuance of the instructions which he has, probably, already received, and to communicate with him confidentially and unreservedly on all occasions when the united actions of the two Governments may be advisable for the furtherance of their common policy.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 29. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 25.)

Paris, January 23, 1859.

MY LORD,—COUNT WALEWSKI mentioned to me yesterday, that he had been greatly annoyed at receiving intelligence that the Austrian troops of occupation in the Papal States had been augmented by 5,000 men, without any previous communication made to the Papal Government. He added that the Pope had protested against this proceeding.

Count Walewski animadverted upon this matter as being another proof of the inconsiderate policy of Austria, and he said that it would be in vain to hope for a better understanding between the two Governments, as long as acts of this nature were persisted in.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 30. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 25.)

Paris, January 24, 1859.

MY LORD,—SINCE I addressed your Lordship yesterday, Count Walewski has informed me that the Pope having protested against the augmentation of the Austrian forces in the Legations, the Austrian Ambassador at Rome apprized Count Buol, by telegraph, of this protest ; and that orders have been sent, in consequence, to suspend the march of all the reinforcements destined for Ancona which had not reached that town. One battalion only had arrived, whereas five were to have been sent.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 31. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, January 25, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE received your despatches of the 23rd and

24th instant,* respecting the intention of the Austrian Government to increase their military force in the Papal States, and the abandonment of that intention in consequence of objections made by the Pope.

Her Majesty's Government are glad to find that this matter has been settled, for they have so repeatedly warned the Cabinet of Vienna against any such proceeding as that which was in contemplation, that they would have considered it to be wholly useless to make a renewed attempt to turn it aside from the project, however mischievous might be the results to be anticipated from its execution.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 32. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, January 26, 1859.

YOUR Excellency's despatches of the 19th instant,† have been read by Her Majesty's Government with great interest.

Your Excellency will express to His Imperial Majesty the pleasure which Her Majesty's Government feel at his assurance that he will not assist Sardinia should she be the aggressor.

The unceasing advice of Her Majesty's Government to Austria has been to keep strictly within the limits of Treaties; to avoid all cause of offence to her Italian neighbours; to relax, as far as possible, all rigour towards her Italian subjects; and to adopt towards France a friendly and conciliatory policy.

While Her Majesty's Government in the interests of the general peace of Europe, which may as easily be disturbed by dissensions between the German States themselves as by any other cause, have continually advised those States to settle their differences, they have always, on such occasions, and on many others, urged upon them the necessity and propriety, in dealing with France, of avoiding every act and expression which might wound the susceptibilities of that nation.

I spoke on this point to the Duc de Malakoff when I received him yesterday, and I requested his Excellency to repeat my words to His Imperial Majesty.

The policy of Her Majesty's Government is simple and intelligible. It is, to maintain the peace of Europe, as a blessing paramount to all others, whether to Europe as a whole, or to each of the nations.

England is not an aggressive Power. With her large Empire, she adopts a defensive position, but cannot desire to enlarge her territory. England has no rancorous prejudice against any nation whatever, and at this moment the feelings of the English people are as friendly to her latest enemy, Russia, as before the war. But those of Russia towards Austria are not so, and the vindictive

* Nos. 29, 30.

† Nos. 24, 25.

sentiments with which it is to be feared she views that Power cannot be overlooked by statesmen who know that a policy of passion, and not of positive interest, must be fatal to peace. But unjustifiable as it would be in her, it would be far more so in England or France, who have not the same cause of enmity to Austria as Russia, to be duped into carrying out a foreign policy of personal revenge.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that the only security for peace is to be found in the strict and even the pedantic observance of those Treaties which France has hitherto so loyally kept.

It is superfluous to tell your Excellency that there is not a State in Europe which has the most remote desire to see or make an aggression upon France, and if that be thought true by France herself, the question of peace or war is in her hands.

She therefore has a greater responsibility than any other Power in Europe.

When the Emperor declared, after his accession to the Throne, that "*l'Empire c'est la paix*," your Excellency will remember that all Europe hailed that declaration as a certain pledge of peace. Your Excellency will continue respectfully to urge on His Majesty, on suitable occasions, the risk to himself, to his reputation, and to his country, of departing from that memorable dictum. It is the earnest and sincere conviction of Her Majesty's Government, who would venture to advise His Imperial Majesty in the character of friends as well as of allies, that should he now rush, with Sardinia, into the changes and chances of an Italian war, he will sacrifice the national interests of France, which desires peace and internal prosperity.

No. 33. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 26.)

Turin, January 19, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAD the honour to receive, last night, your Lordship's despatch of the 13th instant,* containing your Lordship's remarks upon the speech which the King delivered from the Throne on the opening of the Sardinian Parliament on the 10th instant: and this morning I called upon Count Cavour, and read that despatch to his Excellency, who listened to it with great attention; and, at its conclusion, said he would write to the Marquis d'Azeglio in reply to your Lordship's observations. At the same time, he begged to observe, that the effect of that speech had not been what your Lordship anticipated, for he was happy to say that it had calmed the agitation in Italy; and he desired to point out now, as he had pointed out in Paris in 1856, that if the Italians believed that the Great Powers meant to interest themselves in their welfare, intended to promote, and had the courage to insist upon, internal reforms being applied to such

* No. 11.

maladministration as that which existed, for instance, in the Legations, and in the Neapolitan State, ten years' peace might be guaranteed to Europe ; that the state of things in Lombardy and in the Legations was not the work of Piedmont, but was the natural consequence of the neglect of the Great Powers to interest themselves in the fate of a country which had a peculiar claim upon them, and who, by their Protocol of Paris, had recorded their sense of Italian grievances, and their opinion that they ought to be redressed.

Consequently, if the Italians now saw good reason for believing that the same Powers again interested themselves in their welfare, he was convinced that the peace of Europe would not be disturbed by them. He concluded by saying that he was very sensible of the kind interest which Her Majesty's Government took in the welfare and prosperity of Sardinia ; and he requested me to leave with him your Lordship's despatch, in order that he might read it to the King, who, he was certain, would feel gratified at its tenour.

I told the Count that it was not in my power to comply with his request, not having any instructions on that head, but that I would apply for them ; at the same time I could assure him that Her Majesty's Government had not failed to give their best attention to the present condition of Italy, with a view to improving it ; that, assuming this to be equally the object of the other Powers, Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the best way to effect it was, not by war, but by laying aside animosity, and by acting in peaceful concert for that important object ; that one of the first objects to be considered would be the glaring abuses in the Papal dominions which occupy Central Italy, and which are now occupied by Austrian and French troops—a state of things which ought to terminate.

Presuming, therefore, that the interests of Italy, and no other end, is desired, it is clear that the first step ought to be the establishment of a good understanding amongst the Powers concerned ; consequently, that it might be expected that Her Majesty's Government would aid in making any proposition emanating from such a common understanding acceptable to the parties in Italy to whom they might be addressed, even to the point of consenting to a modification, in that portion of this Peninsula, of existing territorial arrangements, always in the hope of contributing to the peace of this country, and the well-being of its people.

Her Majesty's Government might be expected, in conjunction with the other Powers by whom the present order of things was established in 1815, to give their best consideration to any measure calculated, without enfeebling the spiritual power of the Pope, to effect objects so desirable in the interests of humanity, and so important as regarded the general peace of Europe.

As, however, the interference of a Protestant Power, like Eng-

land, in an attempt to induce Catholic Princes to carry out such reforms in the internal administration of their States as may be required by justice and sound policy, might be inexpedient, might be looked upon with suspicion, and might injure, rather than benefit, the cause, Her Majesty's Government would rather see France and Austria lead the way, by reason of their more direct interest, and the means they can bring to bear on matters at issue, leaving it to Her Majesty's Government (and, it is to be hoped, to those of Russia and Prussia, equally dissenting with themselves from the Church of Rome) to support, by such means as they might deem most advisable, the efforts of the Catholic Powers to induce the Pope, and other Italian Sovereigns, to sanction a change of system for the benefit of their respective subjects.

To this, Count Cavour replied, that Sardinia is ready to support any steps which may tend to ameliorate the condition of the Roman States; that she can refer to the Memorandum of the 27th of March, 1856; but that she believes that any internal reforms could not offer effectual guarantees without the separation of the spiritual from the temporal power; and, consequently, that she has but small hope of seeing such a course of action crowned with success.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 34. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 26.)
(Extract.)

Turin, January 20, 1859.

I HAVE this day placed your Lordship's despatch of the 13th instant* in the hands of Count Cavour, in order that he may read it to His Sardinian Majesty.

No. 35. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 28.)

Turin, January 23, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE excitement which has died away in Lombardy and Central Italy is on the increase in Turin.

The constant movement of troops, the marriage of the Prince Napoleon and Madame Clotilde, make people ask what move is to follow next.

The ministerial circles and their organs all talk war, and there is no argument, whether absurd or not, which is not used to prove that war between France and Austria is inevitable.

The effect of this has been to cause a fall of 11 per cent. in Sardinian securities, and to depreciate fancy stocks to panic prices. Railway shares and *crédit-mobilier* have gone down 40 per cent., and business between this market and Lyons and Paris is totally suspended. The merchants say they would infinitely prefer war to this state of things, for that would ensure the cir-

* No. 11.

culatation of some money, whilst at present every day adds to their embarrassment and loss.

The most serious feature that I have remarked is, that orders have been sent by the Minister of War to the Admiralty at Genoa to keep the fairway in that harbour clear of shipping, which leads me to suspect that transports may be there expected from Toulon.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 36. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 28.)

Paris, January 27, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE Russian Ambassador has apprised Count Walewski that in reply to the wishes expressed by your Lordship at St. Petersburg that the Russian Government should join their efforts to those of Her Majesty's Government for the maintenance of peace, Sir J. Crampton was informed that Russia could give no advice to those who did not apply for it, and that it must be well known on which side her sympathies would be found.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 37. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 30.)

Turin, January 25, 1859.

MY LORD,—AT a ball which the King gave in honour of the betrothal of his daughter Madame Clotilde to Prince Napoleon, His Majesty took me aside and desired me to tell him frankly what I thought of the present state of things in Italy and in other parts of Europe.

I replied that I had communicated to his Minister for Foreign Affairs the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon the speech which His Majesty had delivered from the Throne on the 10th instant; and that I believed Count Cavour had laid that opinion before him.

The King said that he had read it attentively, and he then repeated pretty exactly the arguments which Count Cavour has addressed to M. d'Azeglio, and which that Minister will have communicated to your Lordship, showing that the speech from the Throne had calmed agitation in Italy, &c.

I said, in answer to this, that I believed the agitation had calmed down, because the Italians expected a liberatory army in the shape of a Franco-Sardinian corps to drive the Austrians out of Italy, and because they had suffered so much in 1848-49 that they had no wish to repeat the experiment of a revolution, at all events till they saw whether that liberatory army arrived or not.

Upon this, the King said that his position is a difficult one,

and he wished to know what is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon it.

I said I had, at a recent interview with Count Cavour, told him in general terms what I believed to be the wish of Her Majesty's Government. I had no instructions to make any proposition, or to give any advice. The general sentiments of Her Majesty's Government were pretty well known, and I had no hesitation in repeating to His Majesty what I had said to his Minister; and I then repeated to the King, as nearly as I could recollect them, the arguments which I used to M. de Cavour, which I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch of the 19th instant,* and I told the King that more honest or more useful advice could not well be given, I thought, to a Power situated as is Sardinia; and I added that, as His Majesty had done me the honour to speak to me on the subject, I felt bound to state that not only Her Majesty's Government, but all Europe, would attach a very heavy responsibility to that Power which provoked war; that the questions at issue were such as might be settled by discussion in Council a great deal better than by an appeal to the "bloody lottery" of war; and that, if the advice tendered by Her Majesty's Government was accepted in the same spirit of frankness by the Catholic Powers, the solution of the Italian question might begin next week, and be settled in a few months; at all events as much of it might be settled as would ensure peace to Italy for the next ten years.

To this the King again said that his position was a difficult one, and that nothing should tempt him to commit any such act as would justify Austria in attacking him, whilst at the same time he need hardly state that he had not the slightest notion of attacking Austria, and this (he said with great emphasis) I desire you to convey to the Queen's Government.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 38. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 31.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, January 27, 1859.

COUNT FLEMING, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, has informed me that he has communicated to Count Buol a despatch from Baron Schleinitz with reference to Italian affairs, and the critical relations now existing between Austria and France.

This despatch, couched in the most friendly and conciliatory terms, was analogous in its import and object to that which your Lordship addressed to me on the 12th instant.† It counselled the greatest caution and prudence to the Austrian Government not to afford any pretext or cause for the commencement of a war with Sardinia or France, the duration and limit of which no

* No. 33.

† No. 8.

human foresight could foresee, and the disastrous effects of which would be equally felt by all the Powers of Europe.

Count Fleming left that despatch with Count Buol, stating that he would call on the following day for the purpose of learning his Excellency's opinions on the important subject of which it treated.

No. 39. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 31.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, January 27, 1859.

I AM privately informed that Count Buol has received from nearly all the German minor Governments the most satisfactory assurances of their entire disapproval of the hostile attitude assumed by France against Austria, and of their alliance and adhesion in the event of a war.

Count Buol lately expressed to me his great satisfaction at the tone and spirit of the whole German press; and stated, that if the object of the Emperor of the French had been to feel the pulse of the German nation, he had received a most salutary warning, and that any hopes he may have indulged in of disuniting Germany had been a most signal failure.

I profited by this allusion to impress on his Excellency the great importance of caution and prudence, and that Austria should do nothing which could be construed into an act of aggression or provocation of war against either Piedmont or France. I did so the more earnestly, I said, as an opinion existed that Austria would take the initiative and cross the Ticino. His Excellency assured me in the most positive terms that no such intention existed on the part of Austria, and that I might be certain that they would scrupulously abstain from provoking a contest by any act of aggression.

His Excellency stated to me that very exaggerated reports had gone abroad of their increasing their army at Ancona, and of their augmenting their fortifications. He said that some few men of the Artillery and Engineers had been sent there to repair some trifling portions of the existing rampart, but that no additions to the garrison were intended.

He also mentioned that the Sardinian papers had made some unfounded statements with regard to their occupation of Ferrara. No alteration, however, had been made in that garrison, which they occupied in virtue of the Treaty of 1815.

No. 40. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 31.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, January 27, 1859.

COUNT BUOL has addressed a despatch to Count Apponyi for communication to your Lordship, on the present critical state of affairs in Italy, and the dangers which menace the peace of Europe.

It was known, said Count Buol, that France had taken steps, both in London and in Berlin, to ascertain how far the English and Prussian Governments would remain neutral in such eventuality.

Count Buol was ready to admit that France might sympathize with Sardinia. He was ready even to go further, and to admit that France should engage to succour Sardinia if attacked by Austria, but he could not understand that England could remain neutral, if France and Sardinia were unjustly, and without provocation, to attack Austria.

Count Buol stated to me that he did not apprehend any disturbances in Lombardy; and that, if allowed to do so, the agitation which had existed of late throughout the Italian States would subside. He still feared that a crisis in Sardinia was inevitable, but he did not consider that this crisis should of itself be productive of war.

I observed to his Excellency that, in view of the present agitation in the public mind in Italy, it was natural and necessary to seek out whence the original cause and evil arose. It was incontestable that there was great discontent among the populations, and more especially in the Roman States; that the Government of the Papal States was notably bad and corrupt, and that this produced very naturally a want of confidence on the part of the governed towards their rulers.

The first step to be taken, therefore, in order to remedy this evil, was to reform the abuses which existed, too patently to be disavowed, in the Government of the Roman States? and that if Austria and France were to take this matter into serious consideration, and to co-operate for that laudable purpose, they would do more than any number of bayonets to put down agitation and discontent.

He replied, as he had previously done, that Austria and France could never harmonise together on Italian affairs; and that any attempt made in the sense I had indicated, would be only likely to estrange them more, and to produce a greater dissidence and coldness than at present existed.

No. 41. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Jan. 31.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, January 27, 1859.

SINCE I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship, no very material change has taken place here as concerns the Italian affairs, and the relations of this Government with France. The news, however, received from Italy, are generally more satisfactory: the agitation in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom has greatly abated; and the public mind is relieved, at least momentarily, from the fear of any immediate hostilities. From Paris, likewise, the reports, both private and official, are more encouraging. The

Emperor Louis Napoleon is reported to have returned to the pacific course from which he had apparently digressed, and greater confidence was felt as to the maintenance of peace. This satisfactory change in the political atmosphere is attributed to various causes—to the influence of Her Majesty's Government; to the manifest aversion to war, not only in France, but in Europe; to the successful attempts in the cause of peace of those who exercise an influence over the Emperor; to the salutary warning which the Emperor has received, by the clear manifestation of public opinion in favour of peace; and, lastly, though not perhaps in a lesser degree, to the temporary absence of Prince Napoleon from Paris. It is hoped and thought that the dark political clouds which had threatened the peace of Europe are, for the moment, dispersed; but confidence in the future is not restored, and the feverish state of the public mind is evinced by the fluctuating state of the exchanges, by their continued depression, and by the difficulty which they experience in regaining their buoyancy.

Nor is this want of confidence in the maintenance of peace surprising, when notable facts are of daily occurrence to produce it; great military precautions in Lombardy have been taken by the Austrian Government, and are of that magnitude as not to leave a doubt that they have been dictated by other causes than those of providing an ordinary and sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the Austro-Italian States.

Then, again, Sardinia is engaged in concentrating all her disposable military forces from distant parts on the Lombard frontier; the National Guard has been called under arms, and the whole country is busily employed with military preparations; whilst in addition to this inflammable matter, the press of Europe is daily occupied with discussing the chances of war, and in some instances, with an evident desire to produce one.

Such is the position—and the alarming position—of affairs in Europe. The question to be asked, then, is, first, where are the causes, and what are the elements, which are to produce this war? Second, can this terrible scourge be averted, and by what means?

The state of Italy is the question which is at present uppermost in men's minds, and is the one out of which war may at any moment arise. The public mind of that peninsula is extremely agitated, and this agitation is produced by several causes, partly natural, partly fictitious. There is, in general, a great discontent on the part of the Italian people, and want of confidence in the Italian rulers, the effect of long periods of bad government and of oppression. Wrongs have been committed on the one hand; and wrongs have been long left unredressed on the other. A system of intolerance, of religious bigotry, and of persecution, has

imparted to the sufferers feelings of hatred, of despair, and of revenge. The result is, that the whole population is unsound and undermined; and it is a well-known fact that the Sovereign Pontiff could not remain at Rome unless protected by foreign bayonets.

But the present agitation is mixed up with other causes. There is, and has been, fostered by the Mazzinist party, a feeling and a cry for "nationality," which is a common watchword, under which garb is concealed, and with which is intimately blended, the ambition for aggrandizement and the lust for conquest on the part of some; the republican dogmas and hopes on the part of others; and the long-cherished desire for liberty and freedom on the part of all. These separate and several elements are now conglomerating, with a view to produce a general conflagration, in which each party looks to obtaining his own end.

This eventuality may be near or far, but it is certain; and it therefore behoves the European Powers, in the cause of humanity, in the cause of peace, and the general security of Europe, to concert together and to devise means for the purpose of averting so terrible a calamity as war. It may be possible to do so even at this the eleventh hour, if the combined counsels of Europe can be brought into practical union, so as to force the Italian Governments and rulers to adopt those reforms in their administration which are their only means of future safety, with a view to content their populations, and to render them happy and loyal subjects.

It must be clear to every reasoning mind that there are but two means for the solution of what is generally termed the Italian question, namely, either by a Conference of the Powers of Europe for the purpose of averting war, or by revolution and war itself.

No. 42. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, February 2, 1859.

BARON BRUNOW called upon me by appointment yesterday, in order to exchange the ratifications of the late Commercial Treaty.

He described the Russian Government as anxious to prevent the breaking out of war between Austria and France, and he urged me, over and over again, to employ all the influence of Her Majesty's Government to prevent such an occurrence.

I said in reply, that Her Majesty's Government had done so, and now could go no further; but that we were not prepared to make any declaration beforehand of the policy which, in such a state of things, would be pursued by this country, as this must necessarily depend upon eventualities, and that England must be understood as reserving to herself entire freedom to act as cir-

cumstances might oblige her to do. I pointed out to him, however, how easily an Italian war would become an European war: if, for example, Trieste were attacked by the French and Sardinian fleets, or even if, without such a *casus foederis*, the German Powers were compelled, by the force of public opinion throughout Germany, to take part with Austria in resisting French aggression.

No. 43. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 5.)
(Extract.)

Paris, February 4, 1859.

THE information has reached Paris that it is the intention of the Sardinian Government to repudiate the Treaties existing between that country and Austria. Among them is one which binds either Government to give up deserters to the other from their respective armies, and the Sardinian Government hopes, in this way, to give an asylum to disaffected Austrian soldiers.

On my inquiring of Count Walewski this afternoon whether he had any information upon the subject, he said that he believed the intelligence to be true, and that the Sardinian Government justified themselves on the plea that Austria had not carried out certain engagements contracted under her Commercial Treaties with Sardinia.

No. 44. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, February 4, 1859.

THE Prussian Minister at this Court has been instructed to inform me that the Cabinet of Berlin, viewing the present state of public affairs in the same light with Her Majesty's Government, is prepared to co-operate with them in order to bring about a peaceable solution of the difficulties of the present moment. The Prussian Government concurs with Her Majesty's Government in thinking it desirable, while matters are in their present state, to abstain from any declaration as to its future course of proceeding, being of opinion that such reserve may have the effect of causing hesitation on the part of any Power who might feel that by acting singly, it would become responsible for all the consequences that might ensue from an interruption of peace, or from an infraction of Treaty.

The Prussian Government hopes, indeed, that the strongly-expressed public opinion of Germany against the aggressive views attributed to the Sardinian Government may not assume such a degree of intensity as, on the one hand, to wound the susceptibilities of France, or, on the other hand, encourage Austria to deviate from the prudent and conciliatory policy recommended to her by Prussia. Still the Prussian Government looks forward, as the possible result of matters taking a serious turn in Italy, to the bonds of union between the German

States being strengthened by the consideration of common danger, and to such union enabling Germany to uphold the principles of peace and equity which she advocates; but in the meanwhile it will do its best to induce Austria to act with moderation and in a spirit of conciliation, and to refrain from interfering beyond her own frontier, even though she might be authorized to do so, until she had exhausted every effort to obtain, if not the concurrence, at all events the assent, of other Powers to her having recourse to action. If the Great Powers, with a sincere desire to avert the calamities of an European war, should be disposed to unite their efforts for placing the internal peace of Italy on a more sure foundation, Prussia would readily co-operate for that end by her advice and by her influence. She is of opinion, however, that any changes or reforms in Italy should be based on respect for the existing rights of the Italian Sovereigns, and for existing Treaties; and if such reforms are to be applied to the States of the Church, she would, like England, prefer that the initiative of any proposals should be taken either by both or one of the two Powers who have hitherto undertaken to maintain order in those States, or, at all events, by a Roman Catholic State, inasmuch as Prussia being a Protestant country, could not, without giving rise to great inconvenience, act otherwise than with reserve in such a matter.

In addition to this communication, made directly to Her Majesty's Government, I find, from Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin, that the Prussian Government has lost no time in apprizing the Austrian, French, and Russian Governments of its sentiments on these matters.

The Prussian Minister at Vienna has been instructed to exhort the Austrian Government studiously to refrain from any steps calculated to lead to an interruption of the general peace, and, being assured, by the powerful reinforcements which it has sent into its Italian Provinces, against any insurrectionary movement in that quarter, to forbear from pressing matters beyond the limits of diplomatic discussion, and even to abstain from taking advantage of the rights conferred by Treaty on Austria, in some instances, to interfere for the repression of political disturbances in countries beyond her own frontier. Prussia would rather recommend Austria, before resorting to extremities, to make a direct appeal to the Emperor of the French, as the adoption of such a conciliatory course might be attended with the best results. In short, Prussia, though it does not recommend Austria to waive any of her admitted rights, counsels her to act with the utmost deliberation and forbearance, in order that, even if by so doing she should not be able to avert the threatened evils, she might still enlist on her side the general goodwill and sympathy of Europe.

The Cabinet of Berlin, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris

is instructed to say, shares with the French Government the hope that the present difficulties between France and Austria may be adjusted by diplomatic means. As regards Italy, more particularly, Prussia trusts that neither Austria nor Sardinia will incur the serious responsibility of aggressive action ; and she feels satisfied that the Emperor of the French will not desire to encourage any tendency of opinion towards exclusive nationality, when it shall appear that with such a tendency a spirit of revolution is closely allied, and that His Imperial Majesty will have no sympathy for projects which would substitute disorder and arbitrary power for the public law of Europe, and for the Treaties on which it rests. The peril of the present crisis in Italy is made the more evident by the excitement which it has called forth in Germany in favour of an Empire whose rights are supposed to be threatened.

In this state of things Prussia, who is counselling at Vienna prudence and moderation, appeals to France on her side to restrain culpable expectations, or imprudent provocation. Herself having no direct interest in Italian affairs, Prussia will be prepared to receive with favour any proposal calculated to avert future dangers, to put an end to the existing state of tension as regards them, and to facilitate the settlement by diplomatic interference, of any difficulties which may arise ; and in order that she may be able more effectually to contribute to the maintenance of peace she will reserve to herself full liberty to act as she may see occasion.

The Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg is directed to express to Prince Gortchakoff the hope that the Representatives of Russia at Vienna and at Turin will be instructed to co-operate with their Prussian colleagues in endeavours to allay the irritation prevailing at those Courts, to dissuade both parties from measures calculated to aggravate the perils of the present moment, and to make them severally understand the serious responsibility which the aggressor would incur.

No. 45. *Mr. Corbett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 7.)
(Extract.)

Florence, January 29, 1859.

M. LENZONI, the Tuscan Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured me in the strongest terms, and with an air of great sincerity, that there never had been any intention to invite, or disposition to allow, the entrance of Austrian troops into the Grand Duchy ; that the Tuscan Government felt convinced they could rely on their own army, in case of need, to maintain public order. His Excellency added that Tuscany desired to remain neutral in case war broke out in the north of Italy at the present crisis.

I have also had some conversation on this subject with the President of the Council, who held the same language as the Minister

for Foreign Affairs, but at the same time his Excellency asked me whether Tuscany could, in case of need, count upon the material assistance of either France or England ; to which I answered that I was not instructed to make any promise of the kind, but merely to advise the Tuscan Government, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, not to admit Austrian troops into the Grand Duchy, as any false move at this moment might cause a war, the results of which no one could foresee.

No. 46. *Mr. Corbett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 7.)
Florence, January 29, 1859.

MY LORD,—WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 13th instant,* communicating to me the views of Her Majesty's Government on the political state of Italy at this moment, I have the honour to state that, in the course of a conversation which I held a few days ago with M. Baldasseroni, the President of the Council, he adverted to the great difficulty which would attend the establishment of Constitutional Government in any of the Italian States, and chiefly on account of the absence of any aristocratic element of sufficient influence to counteract the aggressive tendencies of democracy. He considered that the only aristocracy in Italy who really enjoyed the necessary consideration and weight in their country to entitle them to a distinct share in the Government was to be found in the States of the Church ; and his Excellency also remarked that there was a great deal of exaggeration in all that was said as to the mis-government of that part of Italy.

I have, &c.

EDWIN CORBETT.

No. 47. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 7.)
Vienna, January 30, 1859.

MY LORD,—COUNT BUOL having lately referred in conversation to certain obligations and Treaties existing between Austria and the minor Italian States for mutual aid and assistance in case of need, I have referred to the archives of this Legation to ascertain whether they contain any record of such Treaties and obligations, and their exact nature and bearing.

I have accordingly found that, in February 1848, a Treaty of the nature mentioned was entered into between Austria and the Dukes of Modena and Parma, and was published *in extenso* in the "Wiener Gazette" of February 13, 1848.

A copy of this Treaty was transmitted in Viscount Ponsonby's despatch of February 13, 1848, to Viscount Palmerston.

For your Lordship's convenience I annex herewith a copy, in translation, of the Treaty in question, which was identical for the two Duchies.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

* No. 14.

(Inclosure.) *Treaty between His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and His Royal Highness the Archduke Duke of Modena, for the mutual preservation of Internal and External Peace and Legal Order in their States.*

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Royal Highness the Archduke Duke of Modena, animated with the common desire of drawing closer the ties of friendship and relationship which exist between them, and of preserving by their united endeavours the internal and external peace of their dominions, have agreed to conclude a Special Treaty for that purpose. To this end they have named as their Plenipotentiaries :—

The Emperor of Austria, His Highness Clement-Wenzel-Lothar, Prince of Metternich Duke of Portella, Count of Königswart, a Grandee of Spain of the First Class, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Royal Hungarian Order of St. Stephen, and of the Golden Civil Order of Merit, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty's Actual Chamberlain, Privy Councillor, &c., &c., &c. ;

His Royal Highness the Archduke Duke of Modena has named Count Theodore Volo, his Chamberlain, and they, after having exchanged their full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles :—

ART. I. In every case of external attack upon the Italian States of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and His Royal Highness the Duke of Modena, the High Contracting Parties bind themselves to reciprocally tender help and succour to each other by all the means in their power, so soon as this shall be asked for by one side from the other.

II. Inasmuch as the territories of His Royal Highness the Duke of Modena advance into the lines of defence of the Italian provinces of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His Royal Highness the Duke of Modena accords the right to His Majesty the Emperor of marching Imperial troops into the Modenese territories, and of occupying its fortresses, as often as the interests of the common defence or military precaution requires it.

III. Should circumstances arise within the States of His Royal Highness the Duke of Modena of a nature to cause apprehension, that legal tranquillity and order may be disturbed, should such turbulent movements increase to revolt, and that the means at the disposal of the Government were not sufficient to quell the same, His Majesty the Emperor engages, upon being required to do so, to furnish the necessary military assistance for preservation or restoration of tranquillity and legal order.

IV. His Royal Highness the Duke of Modena engages not to conclude with any other Power a Military Convention of any sort whatsoever, without the previous consent of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.

V. Everything which relates to the maintenance of the troops

of the one party, when operating within the territory of the other, shall be regulated without delay by a special agreement.

VI. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged within a fortnight, or sooner if possible.

In attestation of which, we, the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and of the Archduke Duke of Modena, have signed and sealed with our arms the present Treaty.

Done at Vienna, December 24, 1847.

(L.S.)

P. METTERNICH, m.p.

(L.S.)

CT. THEODORE VOLO, m.p.

[A Treaty of a similar nature is concluded between His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and the Infant Duke of Parma.]

No. 48. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 7.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, February 1, 1859.

I REPORTED to your Lordship, on the authority of Count Buol, that the rumoured augmentation of the Austrian garrison at Ancona had been greatly exaggerated.

In conversation with his Excellency to-day, I again referred to the grave importance of the Austrian Government acting with extreme caution and prudence, and of their taking no step which could bear the semblance of a provocation, or of any undue pressure on the independent Italian States. I profited of this occasion to observe, that the intended augmentation of the Austrian garrisons at Ancona and Bologna had, I was informed, produced a bad impression at Paris; the more so, as it had been determined on without any reference even to the Papal Government. At this moment, when so much irritation and excitement existed, and when the eyes of all Europe were turned to Italy, any measure of this kind must naturally cause great disquietude and some alarm.

His Excellency denied that any augmentation of those garrisons had ever taken place, and had ever been intended, beyond a few men to fill up vacancies, and he most positively assured me that there was no intention on the part of the Austrian Government to reinforce them. He appeared to treat the whole thing as an invention of the newspapers, and said to me with much openness, "We make no secret of the movement of our troops. If you had come to me I would have told you at once that there was no truth in these reports." His Excellency added further, "We have no right to increase our garrisons in the Roman States without the application or sanction of the Pope."

Count Buol remarked on the extreme sensibility of the French Government. "They," said Count Buol, "send a fresh battalion

to Rome, without making any notification to us, and if we send a few men only to Ancona, they fulminate against us."

I replied to his Excellency, that however regrettable, still, unfortunately, great sensitiveness existed at Paris at this moment on all matters relating to Italy, and that, on that account, the Austrian Government should be doubly cautious and prudent, in every respect, to avoid producing irritation unnecessarily.

His Excellency admitted this, observing, with much calmness, that if, as it appeared, the Emperor Louis Napoleon was returning to a pacific course, which could not be effected in twenty-four hours, every facility should be accorded to him to do so.

I cannot state to your Lordship how far the reports of the intended augmentation of the Austrian garrisons in the Roman States, and the protest of the Pope, mentioned by Count Walewski, may be authentic. Count Buol certainly led me to consider that the whole was an invention of the press, but I was not anxious to push him too far on the subject, my principal aim being, as the question was at an end, to impress on him the urgent necessity of extreme caution and prudence, and of not unnecessarily irritating the French Government by measures, the consequences of which had not been maturely considered.

No. 49. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 7.)
(Extract.)

Turin, February 2, 1859.

THE reception which the King met with at Genoa was very warm. The Genoese, ordinarily so cold and so calculating, upon this occasion exceeded the loyal demonstrations of the Piedmontese of Turin and Alexandria.

At first I was astonished at these unaccustomed marks of affection to a Sovereign to whom hitherto they have been barely civil; but the Genoese explained their motive, which is, they expect France to declare war with Austria; they believe the Austrians will be driven to their fortresses; and they calculate that the whole carrying trade of Lombardy and the Duchies will fall into their hands.

Your Lordship is aware that the question of Italian independence has been adopted with great warmth by the Italian women; at Genoa this is particularly the case. The Genoese ladies have sided, on this occasion, with the merchants, and I found them foremost in getting up demonstrations, addresses, illuminations, and all the details of public receptions. One curious feature of the King's visit to Genoa was the absence of the priests: that city swarms with them; their influence is immense; and yet scarcely a priest was to be seen; and their influence seems to have been swept away and overborne by the violence of the National Party and the eager speculating spirit

of the merchants. It is clear to me that Genoa has adopted the war policy of M. de Cavour.

At the ball which the King gave the night before last, His Majesty told me he believed war to be inevitable. Prince Napoleon was more cautious and guarded, but he allowed it equally to be seen that war will shortly be declared between France and Austria. General Niel has made a reconnaissance along the Ticino, and he has examined the works at Alexandria, and the Tête de Pont at Casale.

I am not inclined to attach much importance either to the reconnaissance or to the inspection, because it is not likely that a fight will come off on the Ticino, and the works at those two places are insufficient to stop an army such as Austria could pour into Piedmont, and therefore we can hardly expect General Niel to say much about them, but his language during this visit has been cautious, moderate, and very guarded, very much attached to his English companions in arms in the Crimea, and speaking of them handsomely and warmly; but he has expressed himself as satisfied with General La Marmora's arrangements, and those "arrangements" have been made with a view of a campaign in Lombardy.

Both at Turin and at Genoa, therefore, we may take it for granted that the war policy is in the ascendant; for however bitterly the Clerical Party may hate M. de Cavour, not one of them has had the courage to ask him a question about either the marriage of Princess Clotilde and Prince Napoleon, which they detest, or about the war, which they fear.

To sum up my impression of the last fortnight, I am bound to say that the War Party in this country has made a great stride in advance, and appears to be carrying public opinion with it.

The next test will be the application of Count Cavour for a loan, and as this will touch the Piedmontese mind far more nearly than the marriage, we shall then see whether or not there be any party in this country capable of taking a stand against the war policy of the King's Cabinet.

No. 50. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury*.—(Rec. Feb. 7.)
Turin, February 4, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of the "Official Gazette" of Piedmont of the 3rd instant, which contains the reply which His Sardinian Majesty gave to the Municipality of Genoa upon the occasion of their congratulating His Majesty upon the marriage of the Princess Clotilde.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

(Inclosure.) *Reply of His Majesty the King of Sardinia to the Municipality of Genoa.*
(Translation.)

I AM very grateful for the spontaneous and affectionate recep-

tion made me by the Genoese on this occasion. My daughter and Prince Napoleon were deeply moved by it.

It was my intention to solemnize in Genoa this happy event.

As I have already observed, on another solemn occasion, the political horizon is clouded. In the event of great difficulties arising, I am sure that Genoa will be second to no city of the kingdom in helping, by its generous sacrifices, the triumph of the common cause.

No. 51. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 7.)

(Extract.)

Paris, February 6, 1859.

It is with unfeigned satisfaction that I acquaint your Lordship with the improved state of feeling here, in those quarters where it was most necessary. This desirable change is to be attributed in a great degree to the debates on the opening of Parliament, and to the certitude thereby acquired, that it is the determination of the statesmen of all parties in England to maintain inviolate those Treaties on which the balance of power in Europe reposes, however much some of them may regret the sanction which they give to the present territorial distribution of the Italian Peninsula.

No. 52. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 8.)

Turin, February 5, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the Sardinian Minister of Finance (Lanza) yesterday afternoon presented to the Chamber of Deputies a Bill for a loan of 50,000,000 francs (2,000,000*l.* sterling).

On laying this Bill on the table of the House, he said that this loan is called for by the extraordinary armaments which Austria is making in the Lombardo-Veneto, and particularly upon the line of the Ticino and the Po; her concentration of troops between the former river and the Adda; and the large reinforcements which she has recently made to the garrisons of Cremona, Pavia, and Piacenza; her detachment of troops to various villages along the Po and the Ticino; the measures she has adopted with reference to cantonments and magazines; the prohibition to export horses from the Lombardo-Veneto into Piedmont; and her recent loan of 6,000,000*l.* sterling.

As the Piedmontese Cabinet, said Signor Lanza, can only consider these military preparations as denoting her intention to make war, they have considered it their duty to take such precautionary measures as they deem advisable; and accordingly, he had to propose, for the consideration of the House, the Bill which he now laid before it, for a loan of 2,000,000*l.* sterling in order to enable them to take such measures as would ensure the defence

of the country in case of attack, and the maintenance of her liberty and independence.

This Bill will come on for discussion almost immediately.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 53. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 9.)

Turin, February 6, 1859.

MY LORD, — WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date,* reporting to your Lordship that the Minister of Finance had presented a Bill to the Chamber of Deputies for a loan of 50,000,000 francs, I have the honour to report that Count Cavour has addressed a circular to the Diplomatic Agents of Sardinia abroad to the following effect:—

That His Sardinian Majesty's Government have asked the consent of Parliament to contract a loan of 50,000,000 francs, intended to provide for any events which may occur in Italy, events the nature of which cannot be foreseen. In order to correct any false judgments that this measure might produce in the country, Count Cavour thinks it advisable to state the idea which prompted this measure.

Nearly three years ago, the Sardinian Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Paris, while pointing out the lamentable condition of Italy, protested against the extension of Austrian influence in Italy beyond that stipulated by Treaties; and stated that, unless something were done, the peace of the world might be endangered.

England and France listened favourably, and reproduced these sentiments in almost a solemn manner at the Congress.

Italy hoped, and for a time seemed tranquillized; but, little by little, her hopes dwindled away. The condition of Italy has not been modified. Austria's illegitimate influence, which is a constant menace to Piedmont, has rather increased. On the other hand, the other Italian States continue that system of Government which must provoke discontent and disorder. Although the dangers entailed on Piedmont by this state of things continued to augment, yet her conduct has always been marked by a spirit of propriety and reserve quite undeniable. If Piedmont boldly refused to admit the pretensions of Austria, who required modifications of the national institutions, yet her attitude was not hostile when Austria seized a pretext, almost universally considered futile, to break off, with *éclat*, diplomatic relations.

Sardinia confined herself to confiding to friendly States her forebodings, verified daily, and to inviting their attention to the state of the Peninsula. She never concealed her sympathy for, and how she was preoccupied by, the state of most Italian provinces. But when she thought it right to do so publicly, she did

* No. 52.

it as decorously as possible. By her example, her conduct during the war, and at the Congress by her demonstration of commiseration for Italian people, Sardinia has attempted to re-awaken hope, patience, and calm, where they no longer reigned. She carefully abstained from all provocation; and if public law has been infringed in Italy, no accusation can be made against Sardinia as a Treaty breaker. This moderation has been appreciated by public opinion in Europe; but Austria's present warlike preparations, evidently directed against Sardinia, whose army is very feeble compared to that of Austria, forces Sardinia to provide against this danger, which may become imminent. These Austrian preparations, generally known to Europe, are the following:—

At the beginning of January, before the King's speech in Parliament, Austria announced, in her official journal, that 30,000 men had been sent to Italy. This corps, added to the troops permanently fixed in Italy, was quite out of all proportion to the simple requirements of internal peace and order. At the same time that these troops were sent to Lombardy and Venice with extreme rapidity, frontier battalions, who never leave their country but in case of war, arrived. The garrisons of Bologna and Ancona have been reinforced; but, what is still more serious, Austria has concentrated a considerable force on our frontier. She has brought together between the Adda and the Tessin, and particularly between Cremona, Plaisance, and Pavia, a veritable army of operation, which surely is not destined solely to protect those towns. During several days the left bank of the Tessin looked like a country where war was about to break out. The villages have have been occupied by detached bodies; measures for forming magazines taken; videttes were placed on the bridge at Buffalora, the limit of the two frontiers.

It is needless to mention what has been said by Austrian officers high in command at Milan, as a Government cannot always be held responsible for the language of its agents; but it is right to call attention to the reception at Venice of the troops from Vienna, and of the ostentatious and vast preparations made at Plaisance in occupying some forts constructed in defiance of Treaties, and lately neglected. All this has excited the country.

Confiding in the patriotism of the King and Government, the country remains calm, but requires that the necessary measures of precaution be taken. This is why the garrisons in Sardinia and beyond the Alps have been called into Piedmont, and why this loan is demanded. This demand, which I think will be adopted, while proving that the Government know what the country requires from them, will preserve tranquillity. It is hoped that there will be no difficulty in convincing public men that these measures, strictly defensive, far from endangering the peace of Europe, will calm agitation in Italy, and encourage the belief that Piedmont, strong in her right, and aided by allies that the justice of her

cause can alone procure her, is ready to fight the element of disorder in the Peninsula, whether caused by Austria or by revolution.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 54. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 9.)
Paris, February 8, 1859.

MY LORD,—WITH reference to Sir James Hudson's despatch of the 6th instant,* transmitted by this occasion, giving the substance of a circular despatch which Count Cavour has addressed to the Sardinian Representatives abroad on the present state of affairs in Italy, I cannot help submitting the question, Why, if the Sardinian Government entertain such apprehensions of an attack from Austria, do they not apply to the Great Powers of Europe to test the intentions of the Cabinet of Vienna, rather than incur expenses which they must be well aware could in no wise enable Sardinia to compete with such a force as Austria could bring to bear upon her.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 55. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 11.)
(Extract.) Paris, February 9, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to state that a despatch from Count Buol touches upon the question of Italy, in reply to a despatch which it seems Count Walewski addressed to M. de Banneville a short time back, and in which his Excellency cautioned the Austrian Government against the complications which might arise from unforeseen incidents, meaning the interference of Austria in the internal affairs of other Italian States.

Count Buol, in his rejoinder to M. de Hübner, states that Piedmont is far more likely to give rise to unforeseen incidents than Austria, and it is to Piedmont, therefore, that the advice of the French Government should be directed. He calls to mind the Treaties, offensive and defensive, which Austria has with the Duchies of Modena and Parma, which, he says, might oblige Austria to go to the assistance of either of those States, but he intimates the belief that the Governments are strong enough in themselves not to require external aid.

Count Walewski told M. de Hübner that he could not admit that Piedmont alone required advice, but that advice had been addressed to her as well as to Austria. The Emperor's policy, he said, in respect to Piedmont, was faithfully represented in the Earl of Derby's speech, on the 3rd instant, in the House of Lords, which, no doubt, Count Buol and M. de Hübner had read. With respect to the Treaties which Austria had with the Duchies, Count Walewski told M. de Hübner that he was desirous of avoiding a

* No. 53.

discussion of principles, but that he trusted those Treaties might never be put in execution, since grave complications might—he did not say would—be the result.

I have had some conversation lately with M. de Hübner respecting these Treaties, and I have endeavoured to impress upon him that, if grave disorders take place in the Duchies, the only prudent course which the Governments can pursue is to address themselves to all the Powers, and not to Austria alone; but he has given me clearly to understand that he is not in a position to offer advice of the kind to his Government.

No. 56. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, February 12, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 9th instant;* and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which your Excellency gave to the Austrian Envoy at Paris, with regard to the Treaties existing between Austria and the Duchies of Parma and Modena; and I have to instruct you to inform Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government has already advised Austria not to interfere with those Duchies without first communicating with the French Government, and the other Powers, upon the subject.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 57. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government regret that they cannot as yet perceive any sure ground for considering that the apprehensions which, since the commencement of the present year, have been felt, that the peace of Europe was about to be interrupted, need no longer be entertained; and they feel it incumbent on them not to relax their efforts to avert so grievous a calamity as a war which would certainly not be confined to Italy.

The circular which Count Cavour has addressed to the Sardinian Legations on the subject of the loan which it is proposed to contract for military purposes, however open it may justly be to criticism and objection, appears to Her Majesty's Government to offer an opportunity which should not be neglected for renewing their friendly advice to both parties, and for pointing out a method which, if acted upon with sincerity and good faith, may obviate the chances of collision between them.

Count Cavour justifies the loan on the ground of the menacing attitude taken up by Austria on the Sardinian frontier. But Her Majesty's Government think that the Cabinet of Vienna should meet this statement of the Sardinian Minister by publicly declaring

* No. 55.

that Austria, if she be not herself first attacked, has no intention of undertaking any aggressive movement against Sardinia, might express its willingness, either directly or through the good offices of common friends, to come to such an understanding with Sardinia as might enable both parties to lay aside their mutual distrust, and withdraw their forces from their respective frontiers.

It seems to Her Majesty's Government that by such a course Austria must necessarily gain. If Sardinia concurs, Austria will be relieved from the apprehension of foreign invasion, and discontent in the Lombardo-Venetian Provinces will sustain a severe discouragement; if Sardinia declines so reasonable an overture, Austria would stand in a better position before the world, as having omitted no measure within her reach to avert the occasion for an appeal to arms.

I have to instruct your Lordship to bring these considerations before Count Buol, and to express the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government that Austria will find it consistent with her dignity, as it is unquestionably for her advantage, to adopt the advice thus given to his Excellency in a spirit of the sincerest friendship.

No. 58. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Hudson.*

Foreign Office, February 12, 1859.

SIR,—THE apprehensions which were very generally felt at the commencement of the present year, that Europe was on the eve of witnessing the breaking out of war in Italy, have not been essentially allayed by anything that has lately occurred. You have already been instructed to make known to the Government of Sardinia the feelings with which Her Majesty's Government would view the occurrence of such a calamity, but I regret to observe that no impression seems to have been made upon it by the considerations which you were instructed to lay before it.

If the speech of the King of Sardinia to his Chambers was calculated to elicit the remarks contained in my despatch of the 13th January,* the subsequent language of Count Cavour, in his circular of the 6th instant (which I have, however, only read in the public journals), and, still later (if he is correctly reported), in the Chamber on the 9th instant, could not fail to occasion the greatest anxiety to Her Majesty's Government. It is impossible, indeed, for any impartial person to agree with Count Cavour in seeking to justify the military preparations of Sardinia by the menacing attitude assumed by Austria. If the attitude of Austria imposes on Sardinia the present necessity, the language and conduct of Sardinia are, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, chiefly to blame for that attitude.

If Sardinia had not taken advantage of the feelings with which

* No. 11.

the population of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom was assumed to be animated as regards the Austrian Government, to raise the cry of Italian liberation, Austria would probably have had no occasion to take up a defensive position on her frontier, but might have confined herself to maintaining the internal tranquillity of her own provinces.

Her Majesty's Government, having ever taken a deep interest in the welfare of Sardinia, which, in their belief, depends upon the maintenance of peace and the development of her internal resources, would see with the utmost satisfaction a change in her present policy. It is a hazardous game to play to speak lightly of the observances of Treaties in regard to Austria, when Sardinia holds under Treaty alone the fairest portion of her Italian dominions.

It is scarcely possible to hope that Sardinia can come forth unscathed from the contest for which she is apparently preparing. The very measure which has now passed the Chamber is evidence that the resources of the country must be severely taxed, if she persists in her present policy ; for the loan which is required for the preparation will only be the precursor of many others, which will be exhausted in the prosecution of war.

But in any such war the position of Sardinia will not long be that of a principal : whether she is aided by a foreign nation, or by a revolutionary movement throughout the whole of Italy, she will, from the comparative smallness of her resources, soon descend into the position of an auxiliary ; and when peace is restored she will, in all probability, experience even a worse fate than that of an ordinary auxiliary, and will find that the interests of the House of Savoy will not be allowed to stand in the way of a new adjustment of the North of Italy, either under a monarchical or under a republican form of government.

Convinced that such will inevitably be the result of the course into which Sardinia is about to enter, Her Majesty's Government most earnestly implore the Cabinet of Turin to pause in its present headlong career. It may be still within its power to avert the danger which it has so rashly courted ; it may still be able to control the passions which it has so injudiciously excited ; it may still, with courtesy, retract the applications which it has made for foreign support ; and it may still come to such a common understanding with Austria as to admit of that Power, reassured against any sinister designs on the part of Sardinia, abstaining from any demonstration of force on the frontier of Lombardy calculated to excite uneasiness at Turin.

Her Majesty's Government have no reason to suppose that Austria courts an Italian war ; but, on the other hand, it cannot be supposed that Austria will submit without a struggle to the invasion of the territories which she holds under the united sanction of the Powers of Europe, or allow a foreign State to hold

out encouragement to the disaffected within the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, would urge the Cabinet of Turin, if sincerely desirous of averting the calamities of foreign war which Count Cavour's circular despatch would seem to deprecate, frankly to disclaim any hostile intentions against Austrian territory, and to announce its willingness to enter into an understanding with that Power, by which the menacing attitude at present assumed by Austrian and Sardinian troops on their respective frontiers should mutually and simultaneously cease.

You will communicate with Count Cavour, and other influential members of the Sardinian Cabinet, and, if you have an opportunity, with the King himself, in the sense of this despatch; and you will say that Her Majesty's Government do not address to Sardinia alone exhortations to forbearance and moderation in regard to Austria, but that Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna will be instructed to do his utmost to inculcate the same doctrines on the Cabinet of the Emperor, and will urge it to declare that Austria harbours no sinister design against Sardinia, and that if she be not herself attacked, she has no intention of taking an aggressive part against any portion of the dominions of Sardinia.

It is impossible for the Sardinian Government to doubt the deep interest that England has ever shown in the fate of Italy and her people, and how sincerely Her Majesty's Government have regretted the failure of those negotiations which took place in 1831 and 1857, with the object of ameliorating the internal administration of the Italian States. The continued estrangement between the Courts of London and Naples, and the consequent suspension of their diplomatic relations, although manifestly inconvenient to the public and private interests of British subjects, is a living proof of the sentiments entertained by Her Majesty's Government towards the populations of Italy.

It is therefore earnestly desired by Her Majesty's Government that Count Cavour, instead of indulging in generalities, as he has done both in his Circular to his Envoys, and in his late speech to the Chamber, should specify in detail the evils which he signalizes both with regard to the Austrian and Papal States in Italy. His Excellency's great political experience of that Peninsula must enable him at once to point out such as are within the reach of a remedy, and also what that practicable remedy may be.

I therefore instruct you to put these questions before Count Cavour, and to press him, in the interest of the Italian people and of the general peace of Europe, during which alone political ameliorations can be effected, to give his opinion to Her Majesty's Government on these practical subjects.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 59. *Mr. Corbett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 12.)

Florence, February 5, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that addresses to the army and people of Tuscany have been clandestinely circulated lately in the Grand Duchy, for the purpose of exciting them to assist Sardinia, in case of a war breaking out between that country and Austria.

The language of these addresses is that of a Tuscan speaking to his countrymen ; but the general impression is that they emanate from Turin.

I have, &c.

EDWIN CORBETT.

No. 60. *Mr. Corbett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 12.)

Florence, February 5, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAD, yesterday, some conversation with M. Bal-dasseroni, the President of the Council, upon the present aspect of affairs in Europe, and I again pressed upon his Excellency the inexpediency of allowing Austrian troops to enter the Grand Duchy.

His Excellency again declared that there was no intention to invite them to do so, as their assistance was not required to preserve order, and that no object would be gained by their occupying this country, as, in case of war between France and Austria, its fate would be decided in the plains of Lombardy. He added that, as the Grand Duke was absent, he could not answer for what His Imperial Highness might have done, but that the desire of the Government was to maintain the *status quo*, and that nothing but a successful revolutionary movement in this country could induce Tuscany to assist Sardinia in a war against Austria, in which case they would look to the powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna for assistance to maintain it.

His Excellency told me that the country was quite quiet, and that the lower orders of Leghorn, who used to give the greatest cause for anxiety, were in full employment, and indisposed to any movement.

I have, &c.

EDWIN CORBETT.

No. 61. *Capt. Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 12.)

(Extract.)

Berne, February 9, 1859.

ALTHOUGH Switzerland cannot, from her size and the nature of her institutions, be supposed to exercise any great influence on the affairs of Europe, yet, from her contiguity to the Powers at issue on the Italian question which at present rivets public attention, the state of opinion with reference to that question in this country may not be without interest to your Lordship.

My information is principally derived from conversation with inhabitants of this city, but, as during the recent sitting of the

Federal assembly, they have been in communication with intelligent persons from the different Cantons, the opinions of these last, as well as those set forth by the press, may give some idea of public feeling amongst different parties in Switzerland on this subject.

The Ultramontane Party, strong in most of the Roman Catholic Cantons, openly express their sympathies on behalf of Austria. To these may be added those families, and they comprise a large number, who have relatives serving, or who have served in the Austrian or Neapolitan armies.

The Democratic party are divided on it ; a section of them, receiving an impulse from the many Italian political refugees in Switzerland, are loud in their cry for Italian independence, not unmingled, however (especially on the part of those of ultra-republican principles), with distrust of France and Sardinia.

Others, and these comprise most of the leaders of the Radical party, whilst affecting sympathy for Italian independence, deprecate any violent interference on the part of France, shrewdly remarking that the Treaties of Vienna and Paris in 1815 afford them the best security for their own neutrality and independence, whilst a new arrangement might throw their flank open to their giant neighbour. This feeling has more immediate reference to a rumour which has obtained belief with some that France has entered into a Secret Treaty with Sardinia to secure Lombardy for her, on condition that she, France, should acquire Savoy.

In the Canton of Tessin there are, doubtless, many who warmly sympathize with the revolutionary movement in Italy ; but the conciliatory conduct of the Archduke Maximilian, and of General Bourger, the Governor of Milan, has done much to soften down the feeling of hostility which for several years existed between the Austrian and Tessinese authorities, and I am not aware of any demonstration of feeling on the Italian question having taken place in that Canton.

It is not to be disguised that a feeling of fear and dislike to France exists, more or less, throughout Switzerland.

The recollections of the plundering razzia of Marshal Brune in 1798 ; of the iron hand of Napoleon ; and, more recently, the arrogant tone assumed by France on the Refugee question—have engendered feelings which it would be difficult to efface.

It was with a view to remove these prejudices that I believe M. Turgot was sent hither with the rank of Ambassador, his kindly character being well calculated to effect that result ; but I think he would admit that his success has been but partial.

A visit from the French Emperor this summer is spoken of at the French Embassy. He doubtless would be received in a manner due to his position and talents, and personally I think there is a friendly feeling towards him ; but the experiment might be a dangerous one, owing to the number of loose and desperate characters

amongst the refugees scattered throughout Switzerland, and the inefficiency of the police in many parts.

No. 62. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, February 13, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE relative situations of France and Austria have assumed an aspect so alarming to the rest of Europe, that Her Majesty's Government are earnestly desirous of averting, if possible, the dangers which they threaten.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the course most likely to produce this result would be an amicable interference on the part of Great Britain to ascertain, by the consent of both those States, how their mutual relations could be placed on a more friendly footing. The intimate knowledge your Excellency has of the French Court, its ideas and aspirations, joined to your personal intimacy with Count Buol, point you out at once as the most fitting person to carry out this object.

You will therefore hold yourself in readiness to go to Vienna at the shortest notice.

It would, however, be indispensable to your success, that you should intimate to the French Government the wishes and hopes of Her Majesty's Government, and discover what are the points which France makes her chief subject of complaint against Austria, and what concessions she desires to obtain from that Power. If they rest upon what is called the Italian question, I assume they would include the evacuation of the Papal States by both Austrian and French troops; the amelioration of the law and government of those States; and a guarantee, on the part of Austria, not to attack Sardinian territory.

There is a fourth point which would probably be put forward by the French Government, but which, I imagine, would be more difficult of attainment, namely, the abrogation or modification of the Treaties of 1847, between Austria and the Duchies of Parma and Modena.

Her Majesty's Government foresee great difficulty for Austria on this question, and it would be perhaps straining her national pride too much to insist on abrogation. Austria has a right to make Treaties, offensive and defensive, with any independent State, if she pleases so to do, but nevertheless it might, I hope, be possible to induce her and the Duchies to expunge the Article which obliges Austria to assist them as against their own subjects.

However this may be, your Excellency will lose no time in ascertaining from the French Government their sentiments with respect to the above-mentioned subjects, and whether the pacific interference of a mutual ally, like Great Britain, would be agreeable at this moment.

Her Majesty's Government would prefer that your Excellency should execute these instructions unofficially, and that your mission to Vienna should be of the same character, so that we should avoid having compromised either Empire to any line of opinion or conduct.

Should the French Government look favourably on your project, you will immediately come to London, to confer with Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 63. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 14.)

Turin, February 10, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to state that the Bill for a loan of fifty millions of francs, as drawn up by the Minister of Finance and accepted by the Chamber of Deputies, was as follows:—

“Article I. The Minister of Finance is authorized to contract a loan of fifty million francs, by alienation of the rente on the public debt.

“Art. II. The annual payment for the extinction of this debt shall not exceed 1 per cent. of the nominal capital of the rente.

“Art. III. The provisions of the Law of 24th December, 1819, relative to sequestrations, transfers (save to bearer), mortgages, prescriptions, are extended to the present Law.

“Art. IV. The operation concluded, the Minister of Finance shall report thereupon to Parliament.”

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 64. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 17.)

Paris, February 14, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAD the honour to receive this morning your Lordship's despatch of yesterday's date.*

I lost no time in seeing Count Walewski on the subject-matter of it.

Representing to his Excellency the apprehensions entertained by Her Majesty's Government in consequence of the relative situations of France and Austria having assumed an aspect so alarming to the rest of Europe, I asked whether the French Government would be willing that Her Majesty's Government should, by an amicable interference, endeavour to ascertain how the mutual relations of France and Austria could be placed on a more amicable footing.

It appeared, I said, to Her Majesty's Government that this ostrangement between their two allies rested on what is called the Italian question, and that if the evacuation of the Papal States by

* No. 62.

both Austrian and French troops, together with an amelioration of the law and government of those States, could be effected, and if some guarantee could be obtained from Austria not to attack Sardinian territory, a better understanding would be promoted between the Austrian and French Governments. Her Majesty's Government had, moreover, reason to believe that the French Government desired to procure, if possible, the abrogation or modification of the Treaties of 1847 between Austria and the Duchies of Parma and Modena. Her Majesty's Government were not indisposed, I added, to make an attempt in this direction. The entire abrogation of these Treaties it might be difficult to attain, since Austria had an undoubted right to make Treaties, offensive and defensive, with any independent State if she pleased to do so ; but Her Majesty's Government hoped, nevertheless, that it might be possible to induce her and the Duchies to expunge the Article which obliges Austria to assist the Sovereigns of the latter as against their own subjects.

Her Majesty's Government, I said further, were desirous of ascertaining the sentiments of the Imperial Government upon these points, and whether the interference of a mutual ally like Great Britain would be agreeable at this moment.

Her Majesty's Government had directed me to give to these inquiries as unofficial a character as possible. Should the answer of the French Government encourage them to make similar inquiries at Vienna, a like unofficial form would be adopted, since it was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid having compromised either Empire, should their hopes of leading them to a reconciliation prove abortive.

Lastly, I stated that Her Majesty's Government had been pleased to select me to proceed on this confidential mission to Vienna, in the event of the French Government accepting the offer of their good offices ; but I begged Count Walewski, should this choice be for any reason displeasing to the Imperial Government, not to allow any personal feelings of courtesy to myself to interfere with his saying so.

Count Walewski observed that on a matter of so much importance he could give me no answer without previously taking the Emperor's orders ; but that he would see His Majesty as soon as possible, and inform me of the result.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 65. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 17.)

Paris, February 16, 1859.

MY LORD,—SINCE I wrote to your Lordship on the 14th instant,* I have been confined to the house by indisposition, but Count Walewski called upon me this afternoon.

* No. 64.

His Excellency said that he had informed the Emperor of the conversation which he had with me, and that he had been commanded by His Majesty to express to Her Majesty's Government His Majesty's grateful acknowledgments for the fresh proof of friendship and interest which the proposal of Her Majesty's Government evinced for him. His Majesty accepts that proposal, and will be very glad if the step which Her Majesty's Government offers to take, has the result which Her Majesty's Government propose to themselves.

In reply to the invitation of Her Majesty's Government to state his views with regard to Italy, the Emperor is of opinion that it will be desirable to obtain the following points:—

The abrogation of the separate Treaties which Austria has with Naples, Tuscany, and the Duchies ;

The adoption by all the States of Italy of a system of government which would admit of the taxes being voted by an Assembly of some sort ;

The separate administration of the Legations by a Roman Prince named by the Pope, the seat of Government being Bologna (Count Walewski, however, wished it to be distinctly understood, that under no circumstances would the French Government force the hands of the Pope) ;

Pecuniary aid from all the Roman Catholic States to the Pope for religious purposes, and the consequent reduction of the taxes levied in the Papal States.

His Majesty is pleased also to say that he approves my being employed on this very delicate mission.

I observed to Count Walewski that, although there was nothing in any of the points which he had mentioned to me to which Her Majesty's Government was likely to take exception, I could not flatter myself with the expectation that many of them would meet with a favourable reception by Austria. I mentioned, particularly, the defensive parts of the separate Treaties, and the interference which was proposed with the internal administration of the whole of the States of Italy. I remarked further, that the question of pecuniary aid to the Pope, was hardly a matter on which Her Majesty's Government could interfere.

Count Walewski replied that I was not to consider what he had said in the light of an ultimatum, but as simply representing the wishes of His Imperial Majesty. His Excellency intimated further that if it were possible to induce Austria to mitigate her military rule in Lombardy, it would have a good effect on the populations of Italy.

I propose setting out for London as soon as my present indisposition will permit me, when Her Majesty's Government can decide whether they will take any further steps in this matter.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 66. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 19.)
(Extract.) Paris, February 18, 1859.

BEFORE leaving Paris, and in view of the probability of your Lordship sending me to Vienna on the confidential mission which you contemplate, I think it advisable to state in as few words as possible, the appreciation which I have formed of the state of affairs here.

Your Lordship is aware that I am not one of those who believe that the Emperor seriously contemplates war at the present moment. I deduce this opinion from facts: first, that no preparations for war have been made; secondly, that there is no just cause for war. A variety of circumstances, however, have occurred lately, which have alarmed the public mind, and induced people to believe that war is at our doors. The indiscreet language held at Turin; the King's speech to his Chambers; the Emperor's allocution to M. de Hübner; His Majesty's speech in opening the Legislative session; the marriage of Prince Napoleon; the tone of the Ministerial press, and the pamphlets said to be published by authority; the coldness existing between the Austrian and French Governments; the well-known desire of the Emperor to ameliorate the condition of the Italian populations by administrative reforms, which it is conjectured would be opposed by Austria; and lastly, the silence maintained by His Majesty with respect to his real intentions—have one and all contributed to produce the uneasy feeling which pervades, not only France, but the greater part of Europe. Add to this the thousand-and-one rumours circulated daily respecting intentions which are purely chimerical, and armaments which exist but in the imagination, and your Lordship will understand how this panic has maintained itself, though the situation, if reduced to its proper proportions, is not so serious as it is generally represented to be.

At the same time rumours of war accustom men's minds to contemplate war, and I am far from saying that the Emperor may not have been led to examine the state of affairs, and to ask himself whether he should advance or recede. He has, moreover, found himself brought by a series of circumstances nearer war than he was aware of, or was provided for, and hence the extraordinary activity which has lately prevailed in every department both of the army and navy.

No doubt this is a precarious state of things; but I am of opinion that the desire for peace predominates in the Emperor's mind. I believe, therefore, that His Majesty accepts with sincerity your Lordship's proposal to endeavour to place the relations of France and Austria on a better footing; nor do I conceive that matters would be in a worse state than they are now should the attempt be unattended by success.

Your Lordship should, however, be made aware of the great

irritation caused here by the attitude assumed by Germany, because it may have considerable influence on any negotiations that may be undertaken.

No. 67. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 21.)

Berlin, February 19, 1859.

MY LORD,—UPON the arrival yesterday of the messenger, I thought it advisable to read to Baron Schleinitz a copy of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, of the 12th instant,* in which your Lordship suggests that the Austrian Government would do well to take advantage of the opportunity offered by Count Cavour's circular to declare that the Imperial Government had never intended any aggressive movements against Sardinia, and that it was willing to come to some understanding with Sardinia, which might enable both parties to lay aside their mutual distrust, and withdraw their forces from their respective frontiers.

I stated to Baron Schleinitz that I thought a similar communication on the part of the Representative of Prussia at Vienna might be of advantage, and I left the despatch with his Excellency.

He has now informed me that he entirely approves of the idea put forward by your Lordship, and has written in the sense of your despatch to Count Flemming, directing him to give any support in his power to the steps which Lord Augustus Loftus may take in the execution of those instructions.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 68. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 22.)

Turin, February 18, 1859.

MY LORD,—A CALM has succeeded the agitation which has prevailed in Northern Italy for the last six weeks, due, I think, almost entirely to the speeches of Her Majesty's Ministers in Parliament, which have dispelled many illusions, cleared up many doubts, and given confidence to all reasonable people in Italy.

If I have not reported on this point before to-day, my silence has been caused by the necessity of waiting till I could perceive the effect on the minds of Italians of those speeches in Parliament; and as the jealousy of most of the Italian Governments, and their restrictions upon the circulation of news, are very great and very active, we are forced to wait for weeks, instead of days, before any positive notion can be formed of the real condition of public opinion in this peninsula.

The general impression appears to be one of satisfaction at the

* No. 57.

frank, manly, and liberal tenour of the advice tendered by Her Majesty's Government to Paris, Vienna, and Turin.

A very slight measure of reform would satisfy now the desires of a large party of moderate men in Central Italy, and they hope that the advice of Great Britain to the Governments of France, Austria, and Rome may be adopted in the spirit in which it is offered.

They, therefore, await to see the upshot of the efforts now making in this sense by Her Majesty's Government, grateful for the attempt, and grateful for this fresh proof of the true interest which England takes in the condition of Italy.

At the same time, it is useless to attempt to conceal the fact, that if those efforts of Her Majesty's Government are not met in a similar spirit by the Powers in question, the Italians of Northern and Central Italy will continue this agitation: they are steadily organizing for that purpose, and, whilst they admit there is little to gain in exchanging one set of foreign masters for another, they flatter themselves with the hope that mere change may produce some beneficial effect, either in taxation, or in an administration of their civil affairs more in consonance with what exists in other European States.

In this notion they are encouraged by what has recently passed at Paris and Turin; they have interpreted the expressions of the Emperor of the French to M. Hübner, his speech to the Legislature, the marriage of Prince Napoleon, the recall of troops from Algiers, as meaning war with Austria; they have heard of the sympathy of Piedmont, as set forth in the King's speech from the Throne, and they have since received the Sardinian Parliamentary reports, and they will make their comments on the Government majorities, in both Houses, on the loan: the effect of all this will be to confirm them in their belief in war by France and Piedmont upon that Power, which they conceive to be the bar to the better administration of their respective districts.

They know, however, perfectly well that, if war does ensue, they are certain to be harried by both armies, and their hope of escape by means of the advice tendered by your Lordship is natural. I think, therefore, that the present condition of things will not be disturbed till it becomes plain that Her Majesty's Government have failed in their attempt to persuade France, Austria, and the Governments of Central Italy to consider the remedy to be applied to the disorder under which portions of this peninsula now labour.

I have remarked at Turin a very sensible change for the better in public opinion; the interposition of England is regarded as a guarantee for sound practical ideas, and useful ameliorations in civil government. I have met with no one not disposed to concede that merit to Great Britain; and I have no hesitation

in saying that war may be staved off, a better and healthier tone be introduced into public feeling, and a more correct administration of public affairs result from the mediation of Her Majesty's Government in the affairs of this peninsula.

The task is not a light one, neither will it be easy to reconcile men of such crude and extreme opinions in politics as are to be found in Italy. But the condition of things is so unsound, the risks of war so great, the losses so certain, that the very dangers of the situation will facilitate, if not a solution, at all events some such an arrangement as will insure the continuance of peace.

We may also hope that those Powers to whom Her Majesty's Government have offered their good offices and advice, will at least admit that reforms, conceived in the spirit suggested and advocated by Her Majesty's Government, and suited to the capacity of the people, will deprive agitators, no matter of what class, creed, and country, of their chief power of mischief, and will relieve this peninsula from that constant flux and reflux of extreme opinions which prevents improvements in the social condition of its inhabitants.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 69. *Capt. Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 22.)

Berne, February 18, 1859.

MY LORD,—M. STAEMPFLI, the President of the Swiss Confederation, called upon me yesterday, and entered frankly upon the present state of affairs in Europe, and the apprehensions of a war in Italy.

He said that this matter had attracted the anxious attention of the Federal Council, where it had been fully discussed, and that they had arrived at a decision to maintain the strictest neutrality, giving no encouragement, directly or indirectly, to either party. He added that he was himself fully impressed with the conviction that this was the course marked out for Switzerland by duty and sound policy.

I said all I could to confirm him in this opinion, reminding him that it was the loyal conduct pursued by Switzerland during the Hundred Days, and her adherence to her engagements, which had secured for her at Paris, in 1815, much more favourable concessions and territorial arrangements than had been previously granted at Vienna, and that a breach of neutrality on her part, in the event of a war, might contribute to the disruption of those Treaties, any alteration in which, as regarded herself, must be detrimental to her safety and independence. I added that the British Government had used, and were using, their most strenuous efforts to avert war, and that strong hopes were entertained of success; but that, in any case, if Switzerland

adhered strictly to a system of neutrality, she might depend on the influence of England being exerted to maintain that security guaranteed to her by Treaties.

Disturbances have taken place in the Tessin during the elections for the Grand Council now pending, the struggle being between the Clerical and Radical parties. The polling bureau at Ponte Inéser was attacked, shots fired, and it is stated that one man was killed, and several wounded. Order was subsequently restored by the Cantonal troops.

It is significant that, during this period of excitement on the Lombard frontier, no demonstration of sympathy with the cause of Italian independence has taken place as far as I can ascertain.

The mutual exasperation, however, of the contending parties will probably throw fresh difficulties in the way of the adjustment of the question of the Tessinese Bishopric.

The elections have hitherto resulted in a majority for the Radicals.

I have, &c.

E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 70. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, February 22, 1859.

MY LORD,—I THINK it desirable that, although no definite instructions as to your conduct and language at the Court of Vienna, to which your Excellency is about to repair, can be so useful as an entire latitude granted to you by Her Majesty's Government, you should be furnished with a record of the substance of the conversations which you have held with the Earl of Derby and myself during your stay in London.

The conversations which you have held with Count Walewski in respect to Italian policy, are a guide to the objects which it will be your task to obtain. Four of these appear to Her Majesty's Government, and I believe also to your Excellency, to be within our reach, viz.:—

1. Evacuation of the Roman States by the Austrian and French troops.

2. Reforms of administration in the same States, either on the plan put forward by the Great Powers in 1831, or by France and Austria in 1856-57.

3. A security for the better relations between the Governments of Austria and Sardinia.

4. The abrogation or modification of the Austro-Italian Treaties of 1847, which are peculiarly obnoxious to the feelings of this country, inasmuch as the IIIrd Article of that between Austria, Modena, and Parma, lay the former under an obligation to interfere with and suppress any popular expression of opinion in the latter State.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that every Govern-

ment has an undoubted right to make Treaties, offensive and defensive, with another Power, and even to invite or grant, upon invitation, assistance against internal enemies; but, under such circumstances, the Power invited has the discretion to judge whether such invitation be justified, or whether the adverse party may not be in the right. It can therefore refuse, as well as consent to, the call for aid. But in this case, however much wronged the Modenese or Parmesans may be, Austria has bound herself by Treaty, when called upon by their rulers, under any eventualities whatever, to march against and subdue these populations.

Her Majesty's Government cannot imagine a more degrading obligation than this to a great and independent Empire; and your Excellency will not scruple to express that opinion to Count Buol, and press upon him the expediency of relieving Austria from this position by finding a modification or a substitute for these odious compacts.

I shall only remind your Excellency that we agreed that your Excellency's mission should be perfectly confidential, and not official; that you have no proposals to originate, but that cognizant as you are of the French opinions, and of those of Her Majesty's Government on the state of Italy, you will communicate them to the Austrian Government, and ascertain from Count Buol how far his own are reconcileable with these. You will then judge what probability there is of our being able to place the relations of Austria and France on a better footing.

You will not, I feel sure, neglect to impress upon the Emperor and his Minister that this is the sole object of your mission; that no officious wish to interfere with the acts of foreign Powers is the motive which has prompted it, but that Her Majesty's Government is moved by a sincere desire to avert the war which all Europe at this moment believes to be impending.

These observations contain the spirit of the conversations which have passed between your Excellency and the Queen's Ministers, and render all further instructions to your Excellency unnecessary.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 71. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Viscount Chelsea.*

Foreign Office, February 26, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE French Ambassador called upon me this morning, and informed me that the French Government would withdraw their troops from the Roman States, in consequence of the request to that effect which had been made to them by the Papal Government.

I have to instruct your Lordship to express to Count Walewski the lively satisfaction which this communication has afforded to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 72. *Sir J. Crampton to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 28.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, January 26, 1859.

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 12th ultimo,* I took an early opportunity of putting Prince Gortchakoff in possession of the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the unsatisfactory state of the relations between France and Austria, as made known to me by that despatch and its inclosures.

I have had several conversations with his Excellency upon this subject, both before and after I had received your Lordship's official instructions.

After making his Excellency fully acquainted with the motives and considerations which have induced Her Majesty's Government to address the Governments of France, Austria, and Sardinia at the present conjuncture, I told his Excellency that your Lordship, putting confidence in the declarations he had made to me of his constant desire to maintain the peace of Europe, had directed me to ascertain how far the Russian Government would be disposed to assist England in recommending prudence and temper to those Governments. The policy of Her Majesty's Government, I said, was simply the preservation of peace by a faithful maintenance of the Treaties now in force; and Her Majesty's Government trusted that Russia, laying aside any feeling, favourable or unfavourable, which she might entertain towards either of the two Great Powers in question, would join England in effecting an object which it is the interest of all to secure.

Prince Gortchakoff listened with attention to all the observations which I ventured to offer to him on this subject, and replied to the following effect:—

“You have certainly not misrepresented me in reporting to your Government that I wish to see peace maintained. Russia desires peace, and even requires it, for the development of the great measures of internal improvement in which she is engaged. But I remarked that you used the phrase, ‘throwing aside all feeling, favourable or unfavourable, towards the parties in question;’ and I should be departing altogether from the frankness which you invite, were I to allow you to suppose that we could associate ourselves in any course of action in which this was to be a condition. In a word, we cannot weigh France and Austria in the same balance. Our relations with the former are cordial—with the latter they are far from being so; nor do I see any prospect of an improvement of them. This could only result from an entire change of system on the part of the Austrian Government, and of such a change I see neither the commencement nor the probability.”

Prince Gortchakoff then proceeded, at some length, to enu-

* No. 9.

merate the grievances of which Russia conceives she has reason to complain on the part of Austria ; but as your Lordship is, doubtless, well acquainted with these, it would serve no good purpose to record them here. It will suffice to say, that his Excellency's language seemed to preclude any prospect of a renewal of the intimacy which formerly subsisted between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Prince Gortchakoff, in conclusion, said : " Russia was formerly in the habit of offering friendly advice to such of the Cabinets of Europe as she had reason to hope would have appreciated her motives in doing so ; but it is a policy in which she has not found her account ; she has, consequently, now none to offer. If her opinion is asked, however, it will be freely given, and it will be in favour of peace. So far we can go, but no further. Recollect, however, that although sincerely desirous that peace should be maintained, I do not tell you that, should it unfortunately be otherwise, we should under no circumstances take part in the contest. We reserve to ourselves entire liberty of action in this respect."

No. 73. *Sir J. Crampton to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 28.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, February 15, 1859.

ALTHOUGH we must regret the position which Russia, as one of the Great Powers of Europe, has chosen to assume on the present occasion, and perhaps still more the motives which she has assigned for assuming it, we cannot charge Prince Gortchakoff or His Imperial Majesty with want of frankness in their manner of evincing their real feelings.

The motive for standing aloof at the present conjuncture of the affairs of Europe is a fact not concealed, and is avowedly the necessity of husbanding her resources, and repairing her recent losses, while the rest of Europe is engaged in war. But another motive still less creditable to her is scarcely dissimulated by her Government, while it is loudly proclaimed by the public, namely, the hope that the expected war may result in the thorough humiliation of Austria.

The neutrality promised by Russia is one of an avowedly hostile nature, as far as Austria is concerned, and consequently scarcely deserves the name ; and the liberty of action which she reserves to herself clearly refers to the contingency of her aid being required to bring about that result.

It is true that Prince Gortchakoff has invariably declared that the Russian Government is desirous that the peace of Europe should be maintained ; but I should be misleading your Lordship if I represented him as urging Her Majesty's Government to take measures to prevent its being disturbed. Prince Gortchakoff did not, as indeed he could not, question the policy or motives of Her

Majesty's Government, as communicated to him by me, but he confined himself to a justification of Russia, under the peculiar circumstances in which she stands, for not actively associating herself with that policy.

It is with satisfaction that I observe that my language to Prince Gortchakoff, given hitherto, of course as the expression of my personal opinion only, has been similar to that used by your Lordship to Baron Brunnow, in regard to the position of Her Majesty's Government in the event of a rupture of peace in Italy or elsewhere.

No. 74. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 28.)

Vienna, February 23, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 12th instant,* in which your Lordship tenders, and instructs me to convey to Count Buol, the advice of Her Majesty's Government to profit by the opportunity offered by the late circular despatch of Count Cavour to the Sardinian Ministers at foreign Courts, wherein certain allegations are put forth, explanatory of the military armaments making by Sardinia, to dispel the unfounded apprehensions under which that Government rests, of being attacked by Austria.

I have not failed, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, to submit to Count Buol the advice of Her Majesty's Government, and to express their earnest hope that Austria will find it consistent with her dignity, as it is unquestionably for her advantage, to give effect to the suggestions which Her Majesty's Government have offered in a spirit of the sincerest friendship.

I stated, likewise, to Count Buol, how desirable it was that Austria should not allow the allegation put forth by Count Cavour to pass by unnoticed, as her silence might justly be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the facts therein exposed. It was further desirable, in the interests of peace, and with a view, if possible, to remove all causes of misunderstanding between Austria and Piedmont, that Austria should frankly and openly dispel all the fears and apprehensions which Count Cavour apparently entertained.

Count Buol thanked me for this communication, and recognised therein the good and friendly intentions of Her Majesty's Government, and their laudable efforts for the maintenance of peace.

His Excellency again repeated to me what he had previously assured me, namely, that Austria had no intention of attacking Piedmont, if Piedmont did not attack her; and he was ready at that moment to give me, in writing, this positive assurance. His Excellency admitted, however, that an attack by Sardinia on Parma, Modena, or any of the smaller independent States in

* No. 57.

alliance with Austria, would be considered as an attack on her, and that, in such case, Austria must take the line prescribed to her. Some conversation then ensued on the subject of the assistance which Austria was bound by Treaty to afford to certain of the minor Italian States. Count Buol remarked, that the right of concluding offensive and defensive Treaties with independent States was a sovereign right which could not be contested. If, for instance, France (as he had reason to suppose had been the case) should propose an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, he might regret it—he might consider it as unpalatable to Austria, but he should have no right to protest against it, or to view it as an infringement of international law. Again, Count Buol remarked, he was not informed as to whether any engagement had been entered into between France and Sardinia, but if France considered herself as rightly entitled to go to the defence of Sardinia, surely Austria, on the same principle, might consider herself entitled to succour those whom she is bound by Treaty to assist in the hour of need.

I replied to his Excellency, that it was not so much a question of the right, as of the expediency of exercising that right at a moment and in a manner which might endanger the peace of Europe, more especially if the objects for which that right would be exercised could be equally obtained by pacific means. Thus, I remarked, why could you not represent to those States that, out of motives of delicacy, and from a wish to prevent a more serious complication, Austria, while recognizing her obligations, considered that it would be for the advantage of all parties to abstain from fulfilling her obligations? And could you not, on such grounds, expose to those Sovereigns the expediency, in an European light, of their appealing to the European Powers for the restitution of their rights, and for protection in the event of a revolution forcing them to quit their country?

“To this course,” Count Buol said, “we can never agree. It would be lowering to the dignity of Austria to make any such representation. There is,” said his Excellency, “this difference and distinction between a ‘right’ and an ‘obligation;’ a right may be ceded, or it may be possible to forego, temporarily, its exercise: but it is not so with an obligation; it must be honourably and strictly fulfilled.”

He added, that he did not apprehend that there would be any necessity, on the part of the Italian States, to demand Austria’s succour, as they felt themselves in sufficient force to be able to maintain tranquillity in their respective States.

To revert back to the subject of your Lordship’s despatch, his Excellency informed me that he gratefully accepted, and would unhesitatingly respond to, the advice which your Lordship had tendered in so friendly a manner, and in the wisdom of which he entirely concurred. He said that, as he had, of course no official

knowledge of Count Cavour's circular, he could not reply to it as an official document, but that he should address a despatch to Count Apponyi for communication to your Lordship, and of which copies should be transmitted for communication to the European Powers (mainly answering the end of a circular), in which he would (responding to your Lordship's appeal) refute the groundless allegations put forth by Count Cavour, and would convey the most positive assurance that Austria had no intention of attacking Piedmont, unless previously attacked by her.

His Excellency further added, that he should profit of this opportunity to expose the views of Austria generally with respect to Italian affairs, declaring that Austria was ready to withdraw her troops from Central Italy, with the assent of the Pope, and that she was willing to co-operate, in as far as she was able, in recommending those reforms in the government of the Italian States which may tend to ameliorate their conditions.

Count Buol stated that he should send this to Count Apponyi on Friday next, so that your Lordship will probably receive an early communication of it.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 75. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Feb. 28.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, February 24, 1859.

I HAD the honour to receive, late on the night of the 20th instant, your Lordship's telegram of that date, acquainting me with the proposal of Her Majesty's Government to send Earl Cowley on a confidential mission to Vienna; and stating that, should this course meet with the approval of the Austrian Cabinet, his Excellency was prepared to leave London on the receipt of a favourable reply.

I lost no time in communicating to Count Buol, on the following morning, the proposal of Her Majesty's Government. I stated to his Excellency that it was the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to exert all their efforts for the maintenance of peace; that, in view of the general anxiety and alarm which pervaded Europe, they felt that they should leave no means untried to save Europe from the calamities of war; and that, animated by these sentiments, they were desirous of making a fresh attempt to ascertain whether, by the assistance of England, a better understanding could be brought about between Austria and France. It was with this aim that Her Majesty's Government now proposed to send Earl Cowley on this confidential mission; and I was confident that his Excellency would heartily and cordially recognize with me that this delicate and important charge could not have been committed to abler hands. The high esteem in which Lord Cowley was held by the Emperor of the French, and the great confidence His Imperial Majesty reposed

in him, added to his great abilities and intimate knowledge of European affairs, pre-eminently designated him as the fittest person for this important mission, and would enable him, I most sincerely hoped, successfully to attain the ends which Her Majesty's Government had so much at heart.

His Excellency expressed to me, in the warmest and sincerest manner, the high respect and regard he entertained for Lord Cowley. He likewise expressed his due appreciation of this mark of friendly interest on the part of Her Majesty's Government towards Austria, and the sincere pleasure with which he should welcome Lord Cowley at Vienna.

With respect to the object of Earl Cowley's mission, his Excellency at first observed to me that, desirous as were the Imperial Government for the renewal of a cordial understanding with France, and grateful as they were to Her Majesty's Government for the friendly interest thus evinced towards Austria, they could not, however, purchase this understanding with France at a cost of personal sacrifices; and that the Austrian Government would never abandon those principles which they had publicly proclaimed. If, therefore, Earl Cowley should be charged to make proposals to the Imperial Cabinet of a nature inconsistent or at variance with those principles, the Austrian Cabinet would most deeply regret not to be able to accept them.

His Excellency promised to inform the Emperor of the proposed mission of Earl Cowley, and to communicate to me His Majesty's reply without delay.

On the following morning I waited on his Excellency, when he stated that His Imperial Majesty had expressed his great satisfaction at this proof which Her Majesty's Government had given of their friendly interest, and that His Imperial Majesty would be extremely glad to see Earl Cowley. The Emperor considered that, on his return to Paris, Lord Cowley might perhaps be enabled to produce a salutary effect on the mind of the Emperor of the French by reporting to His Majesty the friendly and pacific disposition of Austria towards France, and His Majesty's anxious wish for peace, and for a good understanding between the two countries; and His Majesty considered likewise that Lord Cowley, on returning from Vienna, will be likewise enabled to bear witness to the firm resolution of Austria to hold steadfastly to those principles which form the basis of her policy, and that, however anxious for the maintenance of peace, she is prepared to accept war should such an eventuality be forced upon her.

Count Buol was evidently anxious that Her Majesty's Government and Lord Cowley should not entertain any delusive hopes that Austria would be induced to grant concessions to France which she had till now resisted. His Excellency said, "There are certain limits beyond which we cannot go. We shall be ready, with the concurrence of the Pope, to withdraw our troops from

the Roman States at any moment. We shall be willing to co-operate in recommending those reforms in the Governments of the minor Italian States which may be deemed advisable, but we will never assent to impose them by force. We shall never permit any foreign interference with our internal affairs, and, on principles of consistency, we cannot therefore agree to any forcible interference in the internal affairs of others. We are in alliance with two States in Italy which are 'Absolutist' in their form of government, namely, Naples and Modena; and we are in alliance with two other States where Constitutional government is established, namely Tuscany and Parma. We are neither opposed to liberal institutions nor to liberal reforms, but we must respect the independence of those Sovereign States.

"If, however," continued Count Buol, "as I must presume to be the case, it is sought to deprive Austria of the influence which she possesses in Italy, in order to give it over into other hands, such attempts we shall persistently resist. If France were once to acquire sway over Italy, she would soon command likewise in Germany. It was against this very danger that the Treaty of Vienna wisely intended that Piedmont should act as a barrier; and see how short-sighted is man! This very Piedmont is now linked with France, and is seeking to frustrate the very object for which she was called into existence in 1815.

"Nor again," said Count Buol, "shall we agree to enter into any Conference on Italian affairs. We have no need to negotiate with France for the withdrawal of our troops from the Roman States. Our compact was with the Pope. We entered those States without any previous arrangement with France, and we can leave them in like manner.

"Within these limits," said Count Buol, "we shall be ready to extend the hand of friendship towards France. Beyond them we cannot go."

No. 76. *Visct. Chelsea to the Earl of Malmesbury*.—(Rec. March 1.)
(Extract.)

Paris, February 28, 1859.

THE announcement of the contemplated evacuation of the Roman territory by the French and Austrian troops, made by your Lordship and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on Friday last, in either House of Parliament, and which was confirmed by the article that appeared in yesterday's "Moniteur," and of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, has created general satisfaction.

The fresh evidence afforded by the moderate and pacific tone of the declarations made on the above occasion by Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell; of the unanimous approval with which all great parties in the State view the steps that have been taken by Her Majesty's Government, and are still in progress, to avert a collision between France and Austria, has done much to

allay the fears of, and restore confidence to, those who desire, as the most effectual guarantee for the continuation of peace in Europe, to see the hands of Her Majesty's advisers strengthened, in the arduous and delicate task they have undertaken, by the whole weight of undivided public opinion.

On the other hand, the hopes of those who looked to our party dissensions as a means of eliciting some difference of opinion on the vital question of peace or war, and thereby of neutralising, to a certain extent, the influence which Her Majesty's Government could bring to bear on the Councils of the conflicting Powers have, to a corresponding degree, been damped.

Inclosure. *Extract from the Moniteur of February 27, 1859.*

(Translation.)

Paris, February 26, 1859.

His Eminence Cardinal Antonelli announced, by order of His Holiness, on the 22nd instant, to their Excellencies the Ambassadors of France and Austria at the Court of Rome, that the Holy Father, full of gratitude for the succour which their Majesties the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria had given him up to that day, thought it his duty to announce to them that his Government would, in future, be strong enough to suffice for its own security, and for the maintenance of peace in his States, and that, consequently, the Pope declared himself ready to enter into an arrangement with the two Powers for concerting the simultaneous evacuation of his territory by the French and Austrian armies with as little delay as possible.

No. 77. *Count Buol to Count Apponyi.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by Count Apponyi, March 2.)

(Translation.)

Vienna, February 25, 1859.

M. LE COMTE,—YOUR Excellency will find annexed, for your private information, a copy of the despatch of Lord Malmesbury, which has given rise to the communication with which you are charged.

Our statement, I hope, will answer the benevolent and friendly views which have inspired the British Cabinet with the advice which it has given us to enter into frank explanations on the actual state of things. We intend to address, by way of a circular to our Missions abroad, copy of the despatch which your Excellency will communicate to Lord Malmesbury. Nevertheless, before giving a greater publicity to that document through the public journals, we should attach a value to knowing, if it would not suit Lord Malmesbury better to see its publication delayed until the time when it will be able to make our declaration useful in the interest of the maintenance of peace. Be so good, M. le Comte, to consult his Lordship on this point, and inform us by telegram of the opinion which he had pronounced.

I hastened, M. le Comte, to put you in possession of a document which marks clearly the line of principles from which Austria cannot deviate. It is my duty to confine myself at present to transmitting to you this profession of our faith, reserving myself to return to the practical side of the question, when I shall have been able to discuss thoroughly the matter with Lord Cowley, whom we expect, with an impatience equal to the satisfaction which we experience from the Mission entrusted to that distinguished statesman.

Accept, &c.

BUOL.

No. 78. *Count Buol to Count Apponyi*.—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by Count Apponyi, March 2.)

(Translation)

Vienna, February 25, 1859.

M. LE COMTE,—LORD A. LOFTUS has confidentially read to me a despatch, by which the Earl of Malmesbury asserts that the British Government is, to its great regret, unable to consider the fears of war, spread about since the commencement of the year, as dissipated, and that it will, consequently, consider itself obliged not to slacken its efforts tending to obviate a conflagration which certainly would not remain confined to Italy.

The circular despatch addressed by Count Cavour to the Sardinian Missions on the subject of the loan which the Piedmontese Government desires to contract with a view to military preparations, would offer, in Lord Malmesbury's opinion, a propitious opportunity for renewing his friendly counsels to both parties.

The British Cabinet, without adopting the starting point of this circular, which tends to justify the loan by the menacing attitude which Austria has assumed on the Piedmontese frontiers, appears to attach some importance to the knowledge of the view which we take of this document, and to the attainment of the conviction, that it is not our intention to attack Sardinia, and that we should be disposed to acquiesce in an understanding with the Piedmontese Government, which would allow both parties to withdraw their troops from the respective frontiers.

We are well able to appreciate the sentiments which have inspired these friendly overtures, and we willingly unite ourselves with the Britannic Government in its desire to spare the world, if it is possible, the horrors of a general conflagration. We willingly seize this opportunity of entering into some explanations on this subject, which will, I hope, make our pacific intentions perfectly clear.

What are the grievances enunciated against us in the circular of Count Cavour? They are summed up in the protest made by this minister against the preponderating influence which Austria, according to him, exercises in Italy, beyond the limits assigned to her by Treaties, and which constitutes a permanent menace towards Sardinia.

Let us examine more closely this strange accusation. Either I am mistaken, or it is in the nature of things that great political bodies will be always called on to exercise a certain influence over the States that are adjacent to them. What concerns the general interest is, that this influence should never be usurped, nor wielded detrimentally to the independence of another State.

Austria has more than once been in a position to offer a helping hand to the Italian Governments overthrown by revolution. This assistance has never been thrust upon any one ; on the contrary, it has only been granted at the request of the legitimate authorities, with perfect disinterestedness, with a view to order, peace, and public tranquillity. Our troops have been withdrawn as soon as the legitimate authority has become re-established with sufficient firmness to enable it to dispense with their assistance. Count Cavour need not go far back in the history of his country to find an example of services like these rendered by Austria to the dynasty of Savoy. At that time, indeed, the modern theories of public right, which Count Cavour has introduced, had not yet taken root in Piedmont.

We will not stop to examine in detail all the absurdity of the reproach that has been made against us as to the confidence which our political principles and the integrity of our intentions inspires in our neighbours. What has been said against the Treaties of Alliance which exist between ourselves and certain Italian States, does not appear to us to be at all more serious.

What can be more inoffensive, or what can be more unassailable on the score of popular right, or more in conformity with the universal interest in the maintenance of order and peace than treaties of alliance concluded between Legitimate States exclusively directed to the maintenance of peace, imposing reciprocal obligations on both the Contracting Powers, and not influencing in the slightest degree the rights of any third Power ? But although these Treaties are not in any way opposed to the principle of public right, we can well understand that they are of a nature to impede the action and the ambitious views of a Government which, not content with being absolute within its own dominions, sets itself up as the privileged organ of the pretended griefs of Italy, and attributes to itself the mission loudly disavowed by the other Italian sovereigns, of speaking in the name of the whole Peninsula. Count Cavour, whilst admitting the right of calling in foreign aid when that aid is invoked in the interest of discord, denies it to Legitimate Governments which, however, have a mission to watch over public tranquillity, and guard the interests of their peaceable subjects. And these strange principles are proclaimed by the Cabinet of Turin at a moment when it allows the opinion to be believed that it can count, in the pursuit of these aggressive projects, on the help of a great neighbouring Power.

These contradictions are too palpable to admit of the slightest doubt that the complaints raised against the influence asserted to be used by Austria contrary to Treaties are only vain and futile pretexts. Here is what there is of truth at the bottom of these declamations. In 1848, the King of Sardinia invaded Lombardy with an armed force, without previous declaration of war, and without being able to justify this rupture of the peace save by the national sentiment that urged him, he said, to come to the assistance of his oppressed fellow-countrymen. The unjust aggressor was repulsed in two victorious campaigns. Austria only profited by the fruits of her victory with a moderation to which Europe has rendered justice. As for the peace, being once signed, we treated it as serious. In return, the taking of the field for the third time has never ceased to form a part of the programme of the Cabinet of Turin. Whilst waiting for a favourable moment to wage open war, Piedmont carried on a secret war against us, by giving free rein, whether to the calumnies and insults which a licentious press lavished on us daily, or to appeals to revolt that it made to the inhabitants of other Italian countries, or, lastly, to hostile demonstrations of every kind. When, only two years ago, our august master, the Emperor, visited his Italian dominions, marking his way by acts of grace and benevolence, the Piedmontese press redoubled its violence, and pushed madness so far as to defend regicide, it was then that we asked of the Turin Government the simple question, what guarantees could it offer us against the indefinite duration of a state of things so destructive to the good feeling which we wished to subsist between the two Governments. This is what Count Cavour, in his language, calls exacting modifications in the institutions of his country.

The Emperor's *Chargé d'Affaires* was recalled from Turin, that he might no longer be an eye-witness of an abnormal situation, to which the Piedmontese Government was unwilling to apply a remedy. But this suspension of diplomatic relations did not prevent our continuing as before to combine and concert with the Piedmontese authorities whatever was of a nature to favour and develop the communications, commercial relations, in a word, good neighbourship between the inhabitants of the two countries.

Despite this constant good will and moderation, despite our inexhaustible patience, phrenzied cries of war have been uttered beyond the Ticino, especially since the beginning of this year.

In consequence of the agitation produced by this warlike ardour, which the Royal Speech on the opening of the Piedmontese Parliament and the subsequent ministerial explanations were certainly not calculated to allay—the Imperial Government at last decided upon sending reinforcements into the Lombardo-Venetian provinces. This measure, dictated by the most common prudence, was one of a purely defensive nature. The assertion of

Count Cavour that it was a hostile movement directed against Sardinia has as little foundation as his assertion that the garrisons of Bologna and Ancona had been reinforced.

Such is the position of affairs, reduced to its most simple terms. In all honour, what could we do to alleviate and improve it?

Would it be possible to carry moderation and forbearance further? And would not the Powers, such as Great Britain, who devote to the maintenance of peace a solicitude as just as it is honourable, feel themselves called upon to undertake the task of exhausting the source of the evil, by bringing Piedmont to a more moderate appreciation of her international rights and duties? Let the Cabinet of Turin be prevented, by their united efforts, from continuing her policy of provocation, in which, abusing the advantages of her position and the tolerance of Europe, it has persisted for years, and we shall see, we doubt not, arise again in the rest of the Peninsula the moral tranquillity and peace which the continual agitation of the Cabinet of Turin tends to banish from it.

Let us hasten to anticipate an objection which we foresee. The discontent of a portion of the inhabitants, especially in Central and Southern Italy, it will be said, arises principally from the defective administration of the Governments.

Whilst censuring the thousand calumnies by which it is endeavoured to excite public opinion against these Governments, we do not feel ourselves called upon to maintain the thesis that everything is perfect in the organisation and administrative system of their country. Even where the most excellent institutions exist we must make large allowances for the imperfections of the instruments. For half a century Italy has been delivered up to every kind of political experiments. By turns, the most different systems have been introduced there. In consequence of the introduction of institutions that work admirably where they have been developed and matured by ages, but which do not seem adapted by their nature to the genius, traditions, and social conditions of the Italians, we have seen deplorable catastrophes succeeding each other in the Peninsula, scenes of disorder and sanguinary anarchy. It is not the advice of Austria which has brought on these unhappy days of the modern history of Italy. On the contrary, we have always applauded every wholesome practical improvement; we have constantly welcomed with satisfaction, and favoured with what influence we had, all *bonâ fide* progress. If consulted, we have conscientiously given our opinion after a mature examination of the facts of the case.

These measures may not always have produced the good which might have been expected from them. But who would venture to throw the responsibility of this upon the action of the governments? What may truly be asserted is, that all States, large or small, have in our days to struggle against powerful obstacles.

We have already demonstrated that liberty, as it is understood in Piedmont—a liberty which is almost license, and which is free from any scrupulous respect for the rights of others—is productive of the most serious inconvenience to neighbouring States. We acknowledge none the less that the Piedmontese Government itself is above all the judge of the internal administration which suits its country. But, however much we respect its independence in this point, we do not, on this account, consider ourselves authorised to impose a Constitution on other Italian States, and to point out the opportuneness of the moment to introduce the improvements of which this Constitution might be susceptible.

However this may be, the great argument brought forward against the Papal Government is, that it can only support itself by foreign assistance. To this we simply reply, that the Cabinet of the Vatican has already entered into negotiations with both Austria and France, with a view to the evacuation of the Papal States by the troops of their countries, and the gradual regeneration of the Pontifical army.

In affording to the Sovereign Pontiff, despoiled by the revolution, the succour of their arms, Austria and France have promoted the great interest of social order. The temporal sovereignty of the Holy Father is one of the guarantees for the free exercise of his apostolic ministry, and for the independence of the spiritual chief of catholicity. Nevertheless, on the day that the Pontifical Government shall declare that the re-organization of its armed force has made sufficient progress to be enabled by itself to suffice for the wants of order and internal security, the Emperor, our august master, will be happy at being able to withdraw his troops, because he will see in this result a new pledge of the paternal solicitude, which the Holy Father will equally devote to the successive amelioration of other branches of the public service.

Do not let us disguise from ourselves that the difficulties which the Papal Government meets with, in the accomplishment of this task, arise much less from the interior than from the revolutionary elements, the influences and excitements which incessantly come from abroad. In order to have hopes on this soil of quick and prosperous results, nothing is more indispensable, I repeat, than to induce Piedmont to respect the independence of the other Italian States, just as her independence is respected by them and by us, within the limits which Treaties have assigned to her.

It is only when this result has been obtained that the Papal Government, and the other Italian Governments, can efficaciously apply themselves to the introduction of the improvements which their internal administration allows of. Then, too, the well intended advice of Austria, who, more than any other power, is interested in the well-being and prosperity of the peninsula, will not fail them in this direction.

I trust to your Excellency to submit these arguments to the

enlightened consideration of the British Cabinet. We are too much impressed with the immense responsibility which, before God and men, will rest on those who, without a legitimate motive, may disturb the peace of Europe, not to attach the highest importance to a friendly and allied Government such as Great Britain, being fully informed of our pacific intentions.

Austria does not meditate any hostile project against Piedmont. She will abstain, notwithstanding the just complaints which she could bring forward, from all aggressive action to the same extent that the Government of Sardinia, on its side, will respect the inviolability of the Imperial territory and that of its Allies.

The Emperor, our august master—your Excellency is authorized to give this assurance to Lord Malmesbury—will draw the sword only for the defence of his incontestable rights, and for the maintenance of Treaties, which we consider equally with the British Government as the only solid guarantee of political order.

You will be so good, M. le Comte, as to read this despatch to Lord Malmesbury, and to give a copy to his Lordship, if he shows a desire for it.

Receive, &c.

BUOL.

No. 79. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Viscount Chelsea.*
(Extract.) Foreign Office, March 3, 1859.

THE accounts of the French armaments, both by sea and land, are so alarming that I have thought it my duty to invite the Duc de Malakoff to call upon me that I might ask his Excellency if they were correct. His Excellency came at 5 p.m., after the Council, this afternoon; and I informed him accordingly that Her Majesty's Government had information that no less than seventeen line-of-battle ships, many frigates, and sixty transports were ready for sea at Toulon; that all the magazines of provisions were being replenished, and a concentration of troops made at Lyons and in the south-east of France.

The Marshal said he would refer to his Government, and ask for an explanation which would enable me to reply to the questions which I had told him I expected would be put to me in Parliament. He said that he knew nothing of the naval movements, but that as far as those of the army were concerned, he had followed them attentively, and could pronounce upon his honour that he saw nothing in them beyond the usual changes and reliefs, that no furloughs were refused or called in, and that, in his opinion, the French Government had no army ready to take the field for a campaign.

I pointed out to his Excellency that, inasmuch as we had the most positive assurances from Austria that she would not attack Piedmont or any other State, such armaments, if correctly described, appeared to us unaccountable.

No. 80. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury*.—(Rec. March 4.)

(Extract.)

Turin, February 18, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to report that this morning I called upon Count Cavour, and communicated to him *in extenso* the contents of your Lordship's despatch of the 12th instant* (received by messenger Grant from Marseilles on the 15th instant).

His Excellency expressed his surprise that your Lordship should not have received at the date of that despatch either a report of the speech which he delivered on the 9th instant on the loan for 50,000,000, or a copy of his circular to the Diplomatic Agents of Sardinia at foreign Courts, a copy of which was sent to the Marquis d'Azeglio on the 6th instant.

To this I replied, that as I desired to report to your Lordship an authentic version of his Excellency's speech, I had been obliged to wait till the shorthand writers had sent in their notes to the official "Gazette," so that it was not until the morning of the 10th that I could possibly obtain the proof sheets from that office, but his speech was translated and dispatched to your Lordship by the post of that day. As, however, despatches from this Mission pass through Her Majesty's Embassy at Paris, a day's post might have been lost in that way, and, consequently, his speech would not have reached your Lordship till the 14th.

Count Cavour then said, he presumed that your Lordship had judged of his speech on the loan, from a telegraph version of it. He could conscientiously declare that the Sardinian Government had ever studied how best to meet the views of British Cabinets; that he regretted that recent events had contributed to raise an opinion in the minds of Her Majesty's Government that the Sardinian Government had modified its policy, whereas he must repeat that they had been ever animated by sentiments of friendship to England, and of deference to her opinions; and whilst he must regret the form of the communication which I made to him by your Lordship's order, he was not the less grateful for the demand which I was instructed to address to him, and which he accepted as a proof of the sympathy of Her Majesty's Government, and of the value which it appeared to attach to the opinion of the King's Government on the present situation of Italy; that he had no difficulty in complying with your Lordship's desire "that the Sardinian Government should specify in detail the evils" which he had considered it his duty to point out both with regard to the Austrian and the Papal States in Italy.

But as, in order to do this, he must draw up a formal Memorandum, he conceived it his duty to require that I should make that demand, for the opinion of the Sardinian Cabinet, either by a written communication, or by placing your Lordship's in his hands, or by giving him a copy of it; that as far as it was your

* No. 58.

Lordship's desire that I should make known the wishes and opinions of Her Majesty's Government to his colleagues and to his Sovereign, he would, if I desired it, read your Lordship's despatch both to the King and to them. He repeated his thanks for the interest taken by Her Majesty's Government in the condition of Italy, and he expressed his conviction that Her Majesty's Government knew Italy too well not to be aware that it was not one man, or one Minister, nor any particular set of men in office, who could set that question at rest.

As for himself, supposing he retired from office, or died this night, nothing would be changed by that; the question would still remain to be dealt with by statesmen as best they might. But he desired me particularly to note it as his opinion, that at this particular moment there does exist a chance of securing peace to Europe, and tranquillity to Italy, by carrying out such reforms as would enable the Italians in the Legations and in Lombardy to live; that to grant those reforms would be to ensure peace; and that he should feel no difficulty in pointing them out upon an official demand to that effect.

To this I replied, that I had no instructions to give him a copy of your Lordship's despatch, nor to leave it with him; that I had possessed him fully with its contents; and that I conceived that I had fulfilled your Lordship's instructions in having made verbally the demand I was instructed to make, that he should specify in detail the evils which he had signalized, both with regard to the Austrian and Papal States in Italy.

But finding his Excellency not disposed to concur in my opinion, I told him, that without positive instructions from your Lordship I could not yield to him upon that point, and that I would therefore communicate with your Lordship by telegraph.

I shall not therefore take any further steps until I am honoured with your Lordship's instructions on this point.

No. 81. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. March 4.)

Turin, February 21, 1859.

MY LORD,—WITH reference to my despatch of the 18th instant,* and to the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 19th instant, I have the honour to inclose the copy of a note which, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions I addressed to Count Cavour, requesting him to specify in detail the evils which he had signalized in Italy, and the remedies which the Sardinian Government would propose to apply to them.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

* No. 80.

Inclosure. *Sir J. Hudson to Count Cavour.*

Turin, February 20, 1859.

SIR,—WITH reference to the communication which I held with your Excellency the day before yesterday, and to the wish which you then expressed, that I should state the points upon which Her Majesty's Government desire to be informed respecting Italy, I have now the honour to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government will be glad to receive from the Sardinian Government a specification, in detail, of the evils which, upon recent occasions, you have signalized, both with regard to the Austrian and the Papal States in Italy, and what are the practical remedies which the Sardinian Government would propose to apply to them.

I avail, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 82. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. March 4.)

Turin, February 26, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE to call your Lordship's attention to a political demonstration, adverse to Austria, which has taken place at Milan and Turin.

Count Emilio Dandolo died a few days ago at Milan. He was a young man (of Venetian extraction) of twenty-nine years of age, who served as a volunteer in 1848-49 with distinction, then travelled, then volunteered for the Crimea, published some works, political and geographical, and was greatly respected and looked up to as a leader of the Moderate Liberal party. His funeral was attended at Milan by at least 10,000 persons; and to-day, at Turin, a funeral service was performed in his memory, headed by Count Cavour, who attended in person, with about 500 others, most of them of the Liberal party.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 83. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. March 4.)

Turin, February 27, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to report, that up to this date, the total number of Italians who have volunteered from other States for the Piedmontese army amounts to 5,000 and upwards.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 84. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. March 4.)

(Extract.)

Turin, February 27, 1859.

THE Prince de la Tour, who returned to his post the day before yesterday, called upon me this morning, and spoke with great frankness upon the Italian question. He said the Emperor desired peace beyond all things; that he hoped for a peaceable solution of the present difficulty with Austria; had great hopes

that the mission of Lord Cowley would induce Austria to consent to sound and wholesome reforms in the Legations, and spoke of the withdrawal of the French and Austrian troops as a matter settled. But, I asked, supposing Count Cavour's notion that their withdrawal, unless those reforms were guaranteed, would lead to a Mazzinian revolution, and that to a fresh demand on the part of the Pope for a fresh occupation, what would France do? He admitted that probably France would be forced to interfere too; and that would lead us back into that enchanted circle of Italian revolution, occupation, intervention, out of which it seemed impossible to escape. He seemed also quite convinced that to withdraw those troops without a sufficient guarantee for the honesty and efficiency of the reforms to be applied, would be to expose Europe to fresh complications and fresh danger. His hope, therefore, seemed to be in the moderation at Vienna, and in the happy issue of Lord Cowley's mission.

No. 85. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. March 4.)
(Extract.)

Turin, February 27, 1859.

WITH reference to the general question put by your Lordship's telegram of the 25th instant: "Does Piedmont mean to attack Austria?" Count Cavour declined to meet that question on any ground. It is embarrassing for many reasons. He would not like to be obliged to say what I know to be the case: that he is not in a position, that he has not the material means of making war upon Austria. He cannot put 50,000 men in line: the Austrians can put 120,000 men in line. He cannot bring more than 120 guns into the field: the Austrians can bring 400. He cannot mount six Cavalry regiments: the Austrians have twenty complete regiments of Cavalry in Italy. The Sardinian reserve would be used up in one campaign: Austria can recruit from 40,000,000 of inhabitants. To declare war upon Austria is, therefore, simply to bring the Austrians to Turin.

The loan of 50,000,000 francs, when it is raised, will not do more than cover the extraordinary expenditure up to this time: consequently, M. de Cavour must find more ways and means even to commence a campaign. He certainly would not like to admit this, and yet he must have admitted this if he had answered your Lordship's question. These are the two principal reasons, therefore, why he would not answer.

No. 86. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. March 4.)

Turin, February 28, 1859.

MY LORD,—A REPORT has reached Turin, this morning, that General Giulay has assumed the military command at Milan, and, as was expected, has commenced by arresting some of the persons who took part in the funeral of Count Dandolo.

Several young nobles have fled from Milan to Turin in consequence, and will, of course, add, by their representations, to the excitement here.

It is also reported that Austria is about to march two other corps-d'armée into Lombardy, and that General Hess has been named Marshal commanding-in-chief of the Austrian forces in Italy.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 87. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Hudson.*

Foreign Office, March 4, 1859.

SIR,—I RECEIVED this morning your despatch of the 18th of February,* reporting your conversation with Count Cavour, on communicating to his Excellency my despatch of the 12th of that month.†

Count Cavour appears to feel himself aggrieved at the language used in that despatch, and at the doubts which it seemed to imply as to the policy of Sardinia at the present juncture, though he expressed himself grateful for the demand of explanation which it contained, and declared that he was ready to afford it.

You will state to Count Cavour that you were not instructed by Her Majesty's Government to put before him the suggestions and the questions contained in that despatch, from any desire of officially interfering in the matters to which they referred, but because, as being in a position impartially to judge of matters bearing on the present crisis, and as being anxious to contribute, to the utmost of their ability, to avert the misery of a war in any part of Europe, Her Majesty's Government felt that they might justly offer a suggestion by which the present state of distrust prevailing between Austria and Sardinia might be remedied, and ask questions which Count Cavour himself appeared to invite.

The wrongs of Italy had been loudly and prominently spoken of by His Sardinian Majesty, and by his Minister in the Chambers, as tending directly to the breaking out of war in that country; and surely it was not for the Sardinian Government to take exception against a request that he would state, in detail, what were the grievances which appeared likely to lead to such a catastrophe, and what were the measures by which, in the opinion of the Sardinian Government, those grievances could be remedied.

Her Majesty's Government have waited anxiously for Count Cavour's promised Memorandum on these matters, and they are at a loss to account for the delay which has occurred in forwarding the statement which, from your telegram of the 26th of

* No. 80.

* No. 58.

February, they were led to suppose would, on the following day, have been placed in your hands, but which, as far as Her Majesty's Government are aware, has not yet been so.

With reference to Count Cavour's expressed surprise that the Marquis d'Azeglio had not given me a copy of the report of his Excellency's speech of the 9th of February, or of the Sardinian Circular which was sent to him on the 6th of February, I think it right to state that the Marquis d'Azeglio informed me, when he received the latter paper, that he had no instructions to give me a copy, and he referred me to the "Globe" newspaper as containing an accurate report of it. A week afterwards he offered to read to me the report of the speech, but as I had already perused it, I thought it unnecessary to give him the trouble.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 88. *Viscount Chelsea to the Earl of Malmesbury*.—(Rec. Mar. 6.)

Paris, March 5, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE tone, as well as the substance of the official disavowal of all warlike intentions on the part of the Emperor, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, has produced a most satisfactory impression among all classes in Paris, and afforded a welcome as well as unexpected relief to the state of settled depression into which public feeling was gradually subsiding.

An immediate and very considerable rise took place in the value of public securities, as soon as the nature of this important document became generally known, and, as far as I am aware, nothing has occurred up to a late hour in the day to diminish the feelings of what may be called exultation with which the Imperial message of peace has been received.

I have, &c.

CHELSEA.

Inclosure. *Extract from the Moniteur*.

(Translation.)

THE state of things in Italy, though already of old date, has, in these latter times, assumed in the eyes of all a character of importance which must naturally have impressed the mind of the Emperor; for it is not permitted the chief of a great Power like France to isolate himself from questions which affect European order. Animated by a spirit of prudence, which it would have been culpable not to have possessed, he occupies himself in the most loyal manner with the reasonable and equitable solution which these delicate and difficult problems may receive.

The Emperor has nothing to conceal, nothing to disavow, either in the objects of his anxious deliberations or in his alliances. The interests of France guide his policy and justify his vigilance.

In presence of the disquietudes—we hope ill-founded—which

have agitated public opinion in Piedmont, the Emperor has promised the King of Sardinia to defend him against all aggression on the part of Austria ; he has promised nothing more, and it is well known that he will keep his word.

Are these dreams of war ? Since when has it not been more in conformity with the rules of prudence to foresee difficulties, more or less near, and to weigh all their consequences ?

We have just shown what is real in the thoughts, in the duties, and the dispositions of the Emperor ; all that the exaggerations of the press have added thereto is imagination, falsehood, and madness.

France, it is said, is making considerable warlike preparations. It is a completely gratuitous imputation. The regular effective force on the peace footing, adopted two years ago by the Emperor, has not been exceeded. The Artillery is purchasing 4,000 horses to attain this regulation limit. The Infantry regiments are 2,000 strong, and the Cavalry 900.

It is said also that the French arsenals have received an extraordinary impulse. It is forgotten that we have all our artillery to change and all our fleet to transform. This last undertaking, long since decided on in order to restore our fleet to its normal state, is sanctioned by the annual votes of the Legislative Body ; and, notwithstanding the most praiseworthy activity, several years will still be necessary for the accomplishment of these works.

Lastly, uneasiness is felt at the preparations in our navy. All these preparations, however, may be reduced to the fitting out of our frigates for the transport of troops from France to Algeria and from Algeria to France, and of four screw transports destined to provide for different eventualities, especially for the service of Civita Vecchia, and for the revictualling, by Alexandria, of our Cochin-China expedition.

Such are the facts. They should fully reassure sincere minds as to the projects ascribed to the Emperor, and to treat as they deserve the allegations of those who are interested in casting doubts on the most loyal measures and over the clearest situations.

It is not time to ask when these vague and absurd rumours will end which are spread by the press from one end of Europe to the other, showing up everywhere to public credulity the Emperor of the French as exciting to war, and throwing on him alone the responsibility of the anxiety and warlike preparations of Europe ? Who, then, can have a right to mislead public opinion so outrageously, to alarm interests so gratuitously ?

Where are the words, where the diplomatic rôles, where the acts which imply the desire to provoke war for the passions which it satisfies, or for the glory which it procures ? Who has seen the soldiers, who has counted the cannon, who has estimated the supplies which are said to have been added with so much cost and haste to the ordinary and regular state of a peace footing in France ?

Where are the extraordinary levies, the anticipated calling out of soldiers? On what day were recalled to service the men now absent on renewable furloughs? Who, in short, can show the elements, however slight they may be, of the general accusations which malevolence invents, which credulity hawks about, and which stupidity accepts?

No doubt, as we said, the Emperor watches over the various causes of complication which may show themselves on the horizon. It is the duty of all prudent policy to endeavour to conjure away events or questions which are of a nature to trouble that order without which there is neither peace nor business transactions. It is not a respite which real business requires; it is security and a safe future.

Such foresight is neither agitation nor provocation. To study questions is not to create them, and to turn from them one's regards and attention would be neither to suppress nor solve them.

Besides, the examination of those questions has become a diplomatic one; and nothing warrants the belief that the issue of it will not be favourable to the consolidation of public peace.

No. 89. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. March 6.)

Turin, March 3, 1859.

MY LORD,—WITH reference to my despatch of the 18th ultimo,* transmitting to your Lordship the copy of a note which, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I addressed to Count Cavour, desiring him to specify in detail the evils which upon recent occasions, he had signalized, in regard both to the Austrian and Papal States in Italy, and what are the practical remedies which the Sardinian Government would propose to apply to them, I have the honour to inclose herewith the reply which Count Cavour has returned to my note, and to which he has annexed a Memorandum containing the ideas and the convictions which the Cabinet of Turin has come to upon those evils and their remedies.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure 1. *Count Cavour to Sir J. Hudson.*

(Translation.)

Turin, March 2, 1859.

IN answer to the note which you did me the honour to address to me on the 20th February, by order of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, I hasten to communicate to you the inclosed memorandum on the Italian question and on the Austrian dominion in Italy.

I have developed, in this paper, the ideas and convictions of the King's Government with the greatest frankness. I thought that this was the best means of responding to the confidence of the

* No. 80.

English Government, and of showing my gratitude to the eminent men who direct its policy, and who have given, on this occasion, a fresh proof of the interest which they have not ceased to feel in the fate of Italy, and particularly of Sardinia.

I should, M. le Ministre, have returned an answer to you sooner, but the telegraph having announced that the Pope had demanded the withdrawal of the Austrian and French troops, I had necessarily to modify that part of the memorandum which relates to that question.

I beg of you, M. le Ministre, to forward this document to the Earl of Malmesbury, and at the same time to thank him for his kind communication which he has addressed to me through you.

I seize, &c.

CAVOUR.

Inclosure. *Memorandum.*

(Translation.)

Turin, March 1, 1859.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty, animated by a benevolent solicitude for the fate of Italy, with a view to avoid the causes which might bring serious disturbances on Europe, has invited the Government of His Majesty the King of Sardinia to make known to them what, in its opinion, are the complaints which the Italians have to make good against Austria; whether on account of her dominion over the provinces which she holds by right of Treaties, or in consequence of her relations with the States of Central Italy, whose abnormal condition is acknowledged by all the Cabinets.

To answer this appeal in a clear and precise manner, the Cabinet of Turin thinks it necessary to treat separately the two questions which are addressed to it, by explaining, in the first place, the condition of Lombardy and Venice; and next, the results of Austrian policy with respect to Central Italy.

Whatever have been the results of the cession in 1814 of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom to Austria, no one can dispute that their possession by that Power is in conformity with Treaties, because in those Treaties scarcely a thought was given to the fate of the people which they disposed of. We should not, in consequence, have raised a question which cannot be resolved without a modification of existing Treaties, had not the English Government requested us to disclose all our thoughts on this point as well as on the others.

We acknowledge that the Austrian dominion over the countries situated between the Ticino, the Po, and the Adriatic is legal; but that does not prevent its having produced deplorable consequences, and brought on a state of things which has no analogy in modern history.

It is a fact that the Austrian dominion inspires an unconquerable repugnance to the immense majority of the Italians who are



subject to it ; that the only sentiments which they feel towards those who govern them are antipathy and hatred.

Whence comes this ? The mode of government of Austria has, without doubt, contributed to it. Her bureaucratic pedantry, the molestations of her police, the overwhelming taxes which she has established, her system of recruitment, more harsh than any other in Europe, her rigours and her violence, even towards women, have exercised the worst effect on her Italian subjects ; but it is not the principal cause of the facts which have been indicated.

History affords us few examples of Governments, worse than that of Austria, less universally detested than hers. The true cause of the deep discontentment of the Lombardo-Venetians is the being governed and ruled over by strangers ; by a people with whom they have no analogy either of race, manners, tastes, or tongue.

In proportion, as the Austrian Government has applied in a more complete manner the system of administrative centralization, these feelings have increased. Now that this system has attained its height, that the system of centralization has become more absolute in Austria than in France herself ; now, that all local action having been extinguished, the most humble citizen is brought into contact for the slightest thing with the public functionaries whom he neither likes nor respects, the repugnance and antipathy to the Government have become universal.

The advance of knowledge, the diffusion of instruction, which Austria cannot altogether prevent, have served to render these populations more sensible to their sad lot.

The Milanese and Venetians, who return to their country after having visited the people who enjoy a national Government, feel more intensely the humiliation and weight of the foreign yoke.

For a certain time, the firm and independent conduct of the Austrian Government towards the Court of Rome soothed the bad effects of foreign dominion.

The Lombardo-Venetians felt themselves freed from the rule which the Church exercises in other parts of the Peninsula over the actions of civil life, even in the sanctuary of a family. It was a compensation to them to which they attached great value.

This has been taken away by the last Concordat, which, as is notorious, assures to the Clergy a greater influence, greater privileges than in any other country, even in Italy, the Papal States excepted.

The destruction of the wise principles introduced in the relations of the State with the Church by Maria Theresa and Joseph II. has completed the loss by the Austrian Government of all moral power over the minds of the Italians.

In consequence of the reasons which have been stated, the Lombardo-Venetian provinces present a very sad spectacle, and

one which, as has been observed above, has no analogy in history.

It is that of an entire people who have taken, in opposition to those who govern them, an attitude openly hostile, which neither menaces nor caresses subdue or diminish.

It is enough to pass through Lombardy and Venice to convince one's self that the Austrians are not established, but encamped, in these provinces. All houses, from the poorest cottage to the most sumptuous palace, are closed to the agents of the Government. In public places—at the theatres, in the cafés, in the streets—there is an absolute separation between them and the inhabitants of the country, and one would think it a country which has been invaded by a hostile army, hated for its insolence and arrogance.

This state of things is not a transitory fact produced by exceptional circumstances of which one can perceive an end more or less near. It has lasted, and become worse and worse, for half a century, and it is certain that if the civilizing movement of Europe does not halt, it will continue to become still worse.

Such a condition is not contrary to Treaties, as I have above said; but it is contrary to the great principles of equity and justice on which social order rests. It is in opposition to the precept which modern civilization proclaims, that there is no legitimate Government but that which the people accept, if not with gratitude, at least with resignation.

Now, if we are asked what remedy diplomacy can bring to such a state of things, we will answer with frankness that if Austria cannot be brought to modify the Treaties, no definitive and lasting solution will be arrived at, and we shall have to content ourselves with palliatives. Europe must resign herself to assist impassively in the sad spectacle which Lombardy and Venice now present, until the revolution which smoulders incessantly under the ashes in these countries, availing itself of favourable circumstances, breaks violently the yoke which conquest and war has imposed upon them.

This spectacle, nevertheless, would become less dolorous, and the state of the Lombard-Venetians more tolerable, if Austria was faithful to the promises which she made to the Italians, when, in 1814, she urged them to rise against French dominion, and if in conformity with the proclamation of the Commander-in-chief of her armies, General Bellegarde, she established on this side of the Alps, if not a Government, at least an Administration entirely national, with a native army cantoned in Italy, and commanded by Italian officers, and institutions founded on the representative principle. It would be a palliative, but a palliative which might cause populations accustomed to suffer, to have patience, and which would remove the dangers which so justly occupy public opinion in Europe.

Diplomacy, in advising the Cabinet of Vienna to follow the course which has been indicated, will accomplish a prudent and meritorious work, although we can scarcely hope that it will obtain the proposed results.

The experience of forty-five years has proved it too plainly, Austria reckons only on force to maintain her dominion in Italy.

Passing on to the second question which is addressed to it, the effects of Austrian policy on Central Italy, the Government of the King will limit itself to the circle which Treaties and the public right of Europe trace for diplomacy, and, placed on this ground, it will not confine itself to point out the illegal acts of Austria; it will invoke in its turn the European diplomatic arrangements violated by Austria, and will demand the execution of the measures necessary to remedy the evils which have been the consequence of that violation. It is its right, it is its duty.

The Treaty of Vienna has given Austria a large share in Italy. In nearly quadrupling the number of her ancient subjects; in adding to the Duchy of Milan, which belonged to her before the revolution, the Valtelline, the Papal possessions situated on the left bank of the Po, and all the States of the Republic of Venice, it destroyed the balance which existed in the last century. Piedmont, notwithstanding the annexation of Genoa, has been no longer in a state, as formerly, to form a counterpoise to the Empire, which, master of the course of the Po, of the Adige, of the principal rivers of Northern Italy, had succeeded in joining her Italian possessions to her hereditary States. It finds itself in presence of a Power numbering more subjects in Italy than hers, and having at its disposal forces infinitely more considerable than her own.

Nevertheless, had Austria kept herself within the limits which the Treaties assigned to her, the rest of Italy might have shared the progress which has been realized in Europe since the cessation of the wars of the Empire, and might have formed, with Piedmont, an efficient barrier against foreign influences in the Peninsula. But Austria has exerted herself since the first years of the restoration, by all the means in her power, to acquire a preponderating influence in the Peninsula.

By placing herself in the position of declared defender of all Italian Governments, however bad they might be, by interfering with irresistible force whenever a people endeavoured to obtain ameliorations and reforms from their own Government, she has succeeded in establishing her moral dominion far beyond her frontiers.

We will not go back to the history of the last forty years. It is too well known. We will confine ourselves to confirming the actual state of things, due to the persevering action of Austrian policy.

The Duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, have become veritable fiefs of the Empire. The dominion of Austria over the two former is established by the Convention of the 24th December, 1847.* That Convention, by giving her the right to occupy the Duchies with her troops, not only when the interests of Parma and Modena demanded it, but also on all occasions when it might be useful for her military operations, renders Austria absolute mistress of all the eastern frontier of Sardinia, from the Alps to the Mediterranean ; and let people not say that it was a vain threat, an imaginary danger, for it is scarcely three years ago, when the Congress of Paris still resounded with protests formally recorded by England against foreign interference in Italy, that we have seen Austrian troops, under a futile pretext, occupy not only Parma but the most distant parts of the Duchy, and sent to the summit of the Apennines, a point which commands the shore of the sea belonging to Sardinia.

To such a degree does Austria consider herself mistress to do what she likes in Parma, that despite of Treaties, which give her only the right to garrison the citadel of Piacenza, she has caused to be constructed and armed, detached forts in the neighbourhood of the city, with the intention to transform Piacenza into a vast entrenched camp, capable of sheltering a formidable army.

The tie which binds Tuscany to Austria, though less apparent, is neither less real nor less strong. It is not known whether a Secret Treaty exists between the two States, but it is certain that, on the one hand, the Tuscan Government knows that it can reckon, at all times and under all circumstances, on the armed support of Austria, to restrain its people ; and that, on the other, Austria is certain to be able to occupy Tuscany, if by chance some strategical interest advised her to do so.

With regard to the Roman States, the way of proceeding on the part of Austria has been more simple. She has occupied them whenever political troubles have furnished her with a pretext to do so.

Since 1831 she has thrice crossed the Po, and put garrisons into the towns of the Romagna.

The last occupation, more complete than the preceding ones, since it extended to Ancona, has lasted for ten years. Although, at this moment, the Papal Government has demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops, we do not believe that this measure will be able to put an end to the anormal condition of the States of the Holy See.

The withdrawal of these troops, if it is not preceded by radical reforms in all the branches of the administration, will leave the field open to revolution. Anarchy would be substituted for

* Blue Book of 1848, page 78.

foreign occupation, only, immediately and necessarily, to have recourse to the latter.

Thus the intervention of Austria in this country has such a character of permanence, that we are borne out in saying that provinces which ought to belong to an independent State have, in fact, passed under Austrian dominion.

So great an extension of Austrian power in Italy, beyond the stipulations of Treaties, constitutes a serious danger for Piedmont, against which her Government has a right to protest. Austria, absolute mistress of the whole length of the Po, from Pavia to the Adriatic, forming on our frontiers a stronghold of the first order, with liberty to occupy, when she likes, the mountains which ought to serve us as ramparts, menacing us on all sides, obliges us to maintain our forces on a ruinous footing, out of proportion with our financial resources.

It will be remarked, perhaps, that the presence of French troops at Rome neutralizes the forces of Austria, and diminishes the danger to Piedmont. Nothing is less exact. In a political point of view, the occupation of Rome by France can have a great importance: in a military point of view, it has none, especially as regards Sardinia.

If, in the case of an attack, we should apply to France for support, the troops which that Power has in Provence and at the foot of the Alps would be of much greater assistance to us than those which, isolated at Rome, could hardly act in our favour, unless they were to embark at Civita Vecchia.

We therefore think that the presence of the French at Rome, which, moreover, we heartily wish to see at an end, does not at all diminish the worth of the demands which Sardinia brings forward against the encroaching policy of Austria.

If Austria, doing justice to these just demands, recognized the absolute independence of the other States of the Peninsula, the condition of Central Italy would not delay to be considerably ameliorated.

The Governments of these countries, being no longer backed by Austrian armies, would necessarily be brought to give satisfaction to the most legitimate desires of the populations.

But in the interest of order, and of the principle of authority, and in order that these inevitable concessions should not be snatched from them in consequence of disorders and popular movements, it is necessary that, at the same time that the principle of the non-interference of Austria is proclaimed, the Sovereigns of Central Italy should greatly modify the political system which they have followed for so long a period, under cover of foreign bayonets.

The Cabinet of Turin is convinced that all danger of revolution would be avoided in the Duchies of Parma and Modena, if

they were endowed with institutions similar to those which Piedmont has enjoyed during eleven years.

The experience of this country proves that a system wisely liberal, applied with sincerity, can operate in Italy in a most satisfactory manner, assuring at the same time public tranquillity, and the regular development of civilization.

As regards Tuscany, it is considered necessary to re-establish the Constitution of 1848, to which the Grand Duke has sworn, and which, founding itself on the institutions which it consecrated, was revoked at the very moment when the Grand Duke was restored to his Throne, which had been overthrown by a revolutionary movement.

As regards the States of the Holy See, the Cabinet of Turin cannot conceal from itself that the question presents very great difficulties.

The twofold character which invests the Sovereign Pontiff as Head of the Catholic Church and Temporal Prince, renders almost impossible, in his States, the establishment of the Constitutional system. He could not accept it, without incurring the danger of finding himself often in contradiction with himself, and being obliged to choose between his duties as Pontiff, and his duties as Constitutional Sovereign.

Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging that the idea of insuring tranquillity to the Papal States by means of Constitutional institutions must be renounced, the Cabinet of Turin thinks that the same object might be gained by adopting the project which the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, at the Congress of Paris, have developed in the note of the 27th of March, 1856, addressed to the Ministers of France and of England. This project, which received the entire approbation of Lord Clarendon, rests on the complete administrative separation of the Provinces of the Roman States situated between the Adriatic, the Po, and the Apennines, and the development in them of the Municipal and Provincial institutions which were established in principle, if not put into practice by the Pope himself on his return from Gaeta. This project ought now to be completed by the establishment at Rome of a Consultà, appointed by the Provincial Councils, to which the questions relative to the general interests of the State should be submitted.

The ideas which have been set forth are a clear and precise answer to the interpellation which the British Government has addressed to the Cabinet at Turin. In summing them up, it results that in its opinion the dangers of a war or of a revolution would be avoided, and the Italian question temporarily quieted, by the following conditions :—

By obtaining from Austria, not by virtue of Treaties, but in the name of the principles of humanity and of eternal justice, a separate national Government for Lombardy and Venice. In re-

quiring that, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Vienna, the Austrian dominion over the States of Central Italy should cease, and, in consequence, that the detached forts constructed without the *enceinte* of Piacenza should be destroyed; that the Convention of the 24th December, 1847, should be annulled; that the occupation of the Romagna should cease; that the principle of non-interference should be proclaimed and respected:

By inviting the Dukes of Modena and Parma to bestow on their country institutions similar to those which exist in Piedmont, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany to restore the Constitution which he had freely consented to in 1848.

By obtaining from the Sovereign Pontiff the administrative separation of the provinces on this side the Apennines, in conformity with the propositions communicated in 1856 to the Cabinets of London and of Paris.

Would that England could obtain the realization of these conditions! Italy, relieved and pacified, will bless her; and Sardinia, who has so often invoked her concurrence and her help in behalf of her unhappy citizens, will vow to her an imperishable gratitude.

No. 90. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Hudson.*

Foreign Office, March 7, 1859.

SIR,—I RECEIVED, yesterday morning, your despatch of the 3rd instant,* inclosing Count Cavour's Memorandum explaining the view taken by the Sardinian Government of the grievances of Italy, and of the remedies which might be applied to them.

Her Majesty's Government are ready to admit, with Count Cavour, that many of the grievances which he has pointed out have a real existence, and they will readily contribute their best efforts, both at Paris and at Vienna, to alleviate, if it may not be possible wholly to remove, them. They acknowledge the frankness with which Count Cavour has pointed out those grievances to their attention, in answer to the inquiry that you were directed to address to his Excellency, and they have no fault to find with the earnestness of the tone which he has employed in depicting them.

But in searching for the remedies to be applied, Her Majesty's Government consider that the endeavours of Powers wishing well to Italy should be directed to the attainment of what is really practicable, rather than what, however desirable, may be looked upon as impossible, without such a general subversion of the existing state of things as might produce the very confusion which it is sought to avoid: and in the choice of means Her Majesty's Government consider that care must be taken not

* No. 89.

to have recourse to expedients which would even, if possible, produce greater evils than those which it is sought to remedy.

If Count Cavour is right in his estimate of the state of national feeling in Austria with respect to her Italian Possessions, it would obviously be hopeless to attempt to obtain from the Cabinet of Vienna the substitution of a purely Italian Administration, civil and military, in the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, in the place of that which is now established; and the endeavour to do so would effectually indispose Austria to any joint co-operation with foreign Powers for the amelioration of the administrative system in other parts of Italy.

As regards the means by which improvement may be brought about, Her Majesty's Government are more than ever convinced that the exertion of peaceful diplomacy can alone effect reforms, and lead to beneficial changes in the administration of the countries to which the attention of Europe is now directed. The attempt to bring about those reforms and changes by war, would plunge Italy into more serious evils than those by which it is now oppressed, and the political grievances of the people would be as nothing when weighed against the miseries of an European contest.

You will not, however, disguise from Count Cavour that, although taking this view of the suggestions contained in his Memorandum, Her Majesty's Government are much disappointed by his Excellency's refusal to comply with their invitation, that Sardinia should disclaim any hostile intention, under any circumstances, against Austrian territory. His conduct, in this respect, presents an unfavourable contrast with that of Count Buol, who, in reply to a similar invitation addressed to him by Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, frankly and at once declared that Austria was ready, by the most formal diplomatic engagement, to disclaim publicly any intention to attack Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government cannot assume that, having this fact brought to its knowledge, the Sardinian Government will any longer hesitate to reply to the inquiry which you were directed to make to his Excellency.

Her Majesty's Government cannot be supposed to have any other object in view than to preserve the general peace; and, as a Great European Power, England has a right to endeavour to ascertain from her allies whether rumours and acts threatening to involve Europe in war, and therefore bearing directly on the material interests of this country, rest upon any sure foundation, or whether they are to be disregarded as affording no just cause for apprehension.

You will read this despatch to Count Cavour.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 91. *Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Malmesbury.* — (Rec. Mar. 7.)
(Extract.) Stuttgart, February 26, 1859.

I CALLED on Baron de Hügel to-day, when his Excellency expressed great anxiety for the success of Lord Cowley's efforts, adding, that he believed Austria to be strongly disposed towards conciliation (the Austrian Minister had just left him), and that he was not without hopes of a satisfactory arrangement, unless the Emperor of the French had determined upon war, which, however, he appeared rather to apprehend.

I told his Excellency that the copies of your Lordship's despatches which had been sent to me, proved that Her Majesty's Government had done their utmost to promote proper sentiments both at Paris, Vienna, and Turin, but that the time had clearly arrived when the preservation of peace required earnest efforts on the part of Austria to bring about reforms in Central Italy. To this Baron de Hügel raised no objection, but he observed that he thought Austria had been very unfairly attacked, regarding her system of Italian occupation, which he defended at some length.

Baron de Hügel said that the Wurtemberg Government had decided upon taking no steps respecting the possibility of war, which could give umbrage to the French Government, confining themselves merely to acts of passive prudence; that there was apparently no present need of forbidding the exportation of horses, since it was less now than last year, though any excessive exportation later on would of course be met accordingly; and that it was not true, as stated in the newspapers, that the permanent Committee of the Chambers had called upon the Government to make a demonstration at Frankfort, since it had merely recommended precautions suited to the crisis.

His Excellency said that he had reason to believe that the Prussian Government was not without hopes of a peaceful solution.

It is thought in well-informed quarters that Prussia would be neutral, were France merely to attack Austria in Italy, and not to threaten Germany.

The Liberal party here are very anxious for Italian reforms, but not to the extent of Austria's cession of her Italian provinces.

Baron de Neurath, President of the Privy Council and formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs, has told me that Germany had not been more excited for fifty years than by the present attitude of France. War would immensely injure the rising prosperity of Germany.

Few or none appear to think that the war would be confined to Italy, but, on the contrary, that the second French Empire, if flushed by victory, would soon expand into the pretensions of the first.

No. 92. *Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. March 7.)
(Extract.) Frankfort, March 2, 1859.

I GATHER from various conversations with Count de Barral, the Sardinian Minister here, that his Government entirely rely on the aid of France to assist them in the effort which Sardinia on her part seems resolutely determined on making to drive the Austrians out of Italy.

M. de Barral is quite deaf to my reasoning against the perilous nature of the attempt, and thinks the risks to be run present such favourable chances that they are to be encountered at all hazards.

M. de Barral's position here, at the present moment, cannot be agreeable, as the reflections made on the conduct of M. de Cavour, as well as on that of his Sovereign, are by no means measured in their severity.

It is, no doubt, a matter of much interest for his Government to be informed of the state of public opinion in Germany, and though a true report of opinions in this part of Germany cannot be encouraging to Sardinian views, M. de Barral very correctly observed, from the commencement of the present agitation, that the knot of the question lay at Berlin.

Your Lordship is, no doubt, well-informed how far positive engagements have been entered into between France and Sardinia, in view of the eventualities of war.

Although unable to affirm that M. de Barral has made any positive admissions of knowledge that such engagements exist, it has escaped him that there are prospects of great advantages for Sardinia in the way of territorial acquisition and exchanges: the acquisition, to be composed of the portion of Northern Italy to the Tessin; and the exchange, the cession to France of Savoy and the county of Nice. The difference being, as M. de Barral estimates it, that Sardinia would give up a country with a revenue of 1,500,000 francs, for a territory yielding above 5,000,000.

No. 93. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 7.)
Vienna, March 3, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship the arrival here of Earl Cowley on the morning of the 27th February.

I accompanied his Excellency, on the same day, to Count Buol, by whom he was received with the warmest welcome.

During Earl Cowley's stay, I have deemed it advisable, and considered that it would be in conformity with your Lordship's wishes, to leave in his Excellency's hands the treatment of the important questions which are now in negotiation, and to which his Excellency's mission more particularly refers. I have placed myself at his Excellency's disposal, and have requested him to command my services in any way which may be useful to him.

I beg further to express the sincere pleasure which I have derived from his Excellency's visit, and my appreciation of the advantages which may result on his return to Paris from his mission to Vienna.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 94. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 7.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, March 3, 1859.

At this moment, when the public are so much occupied with discussing certain separate Treaties existing between Austria and the minor Italian States, I think it may be of importance to call your Lordship's attention to a Treaty which was not long since entered into between Austria and Sardinia, and which appears to have escaped attention, or may possibly have been wilfully overlooked. On the death of the Empress Maria Louisa, the Duchy of Lucca reverted to Tuscany, and the Duke of Lucca succeeded to the Duchies of Parma and Placentia.

At that period the Austrian and Sardinian Governments thought it advisable to come to an understanding with respect to the possible eventuality of the extinction of the reigning line; and it was agreed that the Duchy of Parma should revert to Austria, and the Duchy of Placentia to Sardinia.

At the same time Sardinia found it desirable to make a further arrangement with Austria, concerning the fortress of Placentia, the right of garrisoning which, by the Treaty of Vienna, was accorded to Austria, but the occupation was strictly confined to the fortress.

A Treaty was accordingly signed between Austria and Sardinia, bearing date of 1846, by which, in the eventuality of the reversion, Austria agreed to compensate Sardinia for the full possession of the town of Placentia by an equivalent of territory on the Parmese frontier.

A guarantee was given by France in the Treaty of 1735 to Tuscany (which Treaty was expressly renewed in Article C of the Treaty of Vienna), on the occasion of the cession of Lorraine to France, and the transfer of the Tuscan throne to the then reigning family of Lorraine.

No. 95. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 7.)

Vienna, March 3, 1859.

MY LORD,—In reply to my inquiry of Count Buol, this day, whether the Papal Government had addressed any official communication to the Austrian Government, with reference to the evacuation of the Papal States by the foreign troops, his Excellency replied that Cardinal Antonelli had verbally stated to Count Colloredo that an official communication would be made to him to inform his Excellency that the Pope, feeling that he no longer re-

quired foreign support in his dominions, would request the simultaneous withdrawal of the Austrian and French troops as soon as possible.

This information was transmitted to Count Buol by telegraph ; but his Excellency has received no written official announcement as yet, nor has there been time for any such information to reach this from Rome.

His Excellency stated that as the Austrian troops had entered the Papal dominions at the request and with the sanction of the Pope, they were at any time ready to evacuate those dominions at the solicitation of His Holiness.

Count Buol referred to a report from the "Constitutionnel" of this morning, that the French troops had already retired from Rome to Civita Vecchia, preparatory to their embarkation ; but his Excellency did not believe the rumour.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 96. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 7.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, March 3, 1859.

At a ball given at the Palace on Sunday last, His Imperial Majesty was graciously pleased to address me, and to express the gratification which Earl Cowley's mission afforded him, and the pleasure with which he should receive his Excellency on the following day.

I was extremely cautious not to enter on any particular points of the questions which now absorb attention, in order that Earl Cowley should have the initiative in conversing with His Majesty on those subjects.

I therefore judged it advisable to confine myself to stating generally that Her Majesty's Government were deeply imbued with the gravity of present affairs, and of the danger which threatened the peace of Europe, and that they were desirous of using their best efforts to avert so dire a calamity as war. It was, I observed, with this object that Her Majesty's Government had charged Earl Cowley with a confidential mission in order to bring about, if possible, a better understanding between the Imperial Courts of Austria and France.

His Imperial Majesty replied, with great sincerity, that he deeply appreciated the motives of Her Majesty's Government, and this act of friendly disposition towards Austria ; that he most anxiously and cordially desired the maintenance of peace, and that he hoped that Earl Cowley's efforts would have a successful result ; adding, however, that this result could not be obtained at a sacrifice by His Imperial Majesty of just rights, of principles, or of honour.

I observed in reply that too much irritation had been unfortunately produced by the exaggerated reports in daily circulation,

and the evil influence which they had exercised on public opinion. I considered and hoped, therefore, that on a calm consideration and investigation of the causes of any differences, they would be found to be more imaginary than real, and that consequently by frank explanations some basis might be found for a mutual and harmonious agreement.

His Majesty admitted this, and partook of the hope which I expressed; but His Majesty evidently considered that the reports of the great military preparations are not overdrawn. His Majesty referred to the vast armaments making, both in France and Sardinia, citing them as proofs that something more than an "imaginary" danger really existed.

The conversation then turned to other subjects, amongst which I must not fail to report that His Imperial Majesty inquired with considerable interest as to the latest accounts from India, and evinced great satisfaction at learning from me that the insurrection there might be considered as entirely quelled.

No. 97. *Consul-General Ward to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—
(Rec. March 7.)

(Extract.)

Leipsic, March 3, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to report that the feelings of fear and dislike of France prevailing in Germany seem to have rather increased than otherwise, and there are many indications from which it may be inferred that a war of the German States in the cause of Austria against France, would be by no means unpopular, and that recent events have revived the spirit which animated the German people during their arduous struggle against the domination of Napoleon I, during the years 1812 to 1815.

The large purchases of horses made by the French Government in the south-western parts of Germany could not fail to excite public attention. The Bavarian Chamber of Deputies, now sitting at Munich, resolved, on the 23rd of February, unanimously and by acclamation, to prohibit the exportation of horses, on which occasion very strong speeches were delivered against the supposed designs of France, and war was pronounced to be inevitable. A similar feeling has shown itself in the Diet of Hanover, where a resolution was passed, on the 24th of February, requiring the Government to be upon the defensive, and to take measures for resisting any attack upon Austria by the combined forces of the Confederation. At Stuttgardt, thirty-nine Deputies have lately published a requisition to the Standing Committee, which sits during the vacation of the Diet, urging, in rather violent language, the necessity of the Würtemberg Government taking immediate steps for the protection of the Germanic territory against the danger manifest in the French armaments. At Wiesbaden, the military budget for 1859 has, contrary to custom, been

voted without discussion, and in the midst of acclamation, by the Diet of Nassau. In the Diet of Weimar, now sitting, strong sentiments have also been expressed against the French pretensions, and for the adoption of defensive measures by the German States.

These indications appear the more deserving of attention when combined with the fact that the whole newspaper press of Germany, with scarcely an exception, has ranged itself on the side of Austria, in respect of the difference between that Power and France. The feeling that France is disposed to violate the faith of Treaties, and that Austria has the legal right with her, prevails over all other considerations; and even the Liberal party seem, in the present conjuncture, to have quite forgotten their old grudges against Austria; and to view her no longer in the light of a Power which has displeased them by its settled antipathy to political reforms in Germany.

In these circumstances, your Lordship will easily perceive how probable it is that, if the efforts for mediation should unfortunately fail, and the preparations for war proceed, the Germanic Diet will eventually pass a Resolution adopting the cause of Austria as its own against France. This may be done without waiting for an aggression upon the Federal territory, according to Article XLVII of the Vienna Final Act of June 8, 1820, which provides that if a Federal State is threatened or attacked in its non-German possessions, the Confederation is obliged to take part with and assist, or defend, such State, provided that a majority of the Diet recognizes danger to the Federal territory. Now, in the actual state of public opinion in Germany, the Diet at Frankfort will find little difficulty in resolving that danger exists for the Confederation in consequence of the Austrian dominions in Italy being menaced by France; and in this way Austria may count upon the substantial aid of the forces of Prussia, and of the other members of the Germanic body.

I may add, that even here in Leipsic, where commercial views usually supersede all others, and where considerable losses have been sustained by the fall of stocks and shares since the rumour of war began to prevail, the feeling is strongly against making any undue concessions to France. At a public dinner lately given here to the General Commandant of the garrison, on the occasion of his being removed to another post, some rather enthusiastic speeches were made for maintaining the rights of Austria in Italy; and the memory of the late Field-Marshal Radetsky, and of his successful campaigns in Lombardy, was toasted with great applause.

I take the liberty of mentioning such incidents to your Lordship merely because they serve to show which way public opinion sets in Germany in the actual political crisis.

Of course all moderate men, especially those in trade, must

wish for a successful result to the negotiation now understood to be going on at Vienna; but if that result should unhappily not be attainable, then I think it cannot be doubted that Austria will command the sympathy and assistance of all the other German States in any war into which she may be driven by France.

P.S.—With respect to prohibiting the exportation of horses, I should explain that, although that measure has been recommended by a Resolution of the Bavarian Chamber, and by wishes expressed in the Diets of other States, it has not yet been actually adopted either by Bavaria or any other German Government, being a measure which ought properly to emanate from the Zollverein as a body, and not separately from any particular State.

No. 98. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Scarlett.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 7, 1859.

I INSTRUCTED you by telegram of the 6th instant to proceed immediately to Modena and Parma.

The object which Her Majesty's Government have in view, is to relieve Austria from the difficulty and embarrassment which she might feel in proposing to the Governments of Modena and Parma to abrogate, either in whole or in part, the Conventions into which she had entered with those Governments for mutual defence and support, more especially at a time when Austria might be supposed to be influenced, in so doing, by the selfish motive of averting a war of which her own Italian possessions would very soon be the theatre.

Her Majesty's Government make every allowance for such a feeling on the part of Austria, as it is with her a question of honour, and with that no foreign Government has any pretension or right to interfere. But they consider that if the Governments of Modena and Parma were themselves to propose to Austria to rescind the Conventions, Austria might honourably defer to such request, and in all probability the two Governments would obtain more than equivalent advantage for the voluntary sacrifice of engagements which, though nominally intended for their protection, do, in fact, at the present moment, offer a pretext for overrunning their territories with foreign armies.

The engagements of the Conventions in question are twofold, and relate to mutual co-operation and assistance against foreign aggression, and to unilateral support against intestine troubles.

Now it cannot be denied that the mere existence of such engagements is a source of jealousy in Italy, and is a pretext for cavil and objection abroad. Austria, it is alleged, obtains by them a greater hold on Italy than by Treaty she should possess, while Modena and Parma are represented as relying upon the support of Austria in any emergency, however provoked, that

may arise, and therefore less heedful of their obligations to govern with justice and forbearance their respective subjects.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that if the Governments of Modena and of Parma could be brought to take a just estimate of the difficulties of the present moment, they would scarcely hesitate to adopt the course which you are instructed to recommend to them.

Unquestionably the most effectual means of allaying the present dissatisfaction connected with the existence of these Treaties would be, that the Governments of Modena and Parma should announce to the Court of Vienna that, looking to the jealousy with which the existence of them is viewed in other quarters, and to the dangerous consequences to the peace of Italy which such jealousy, if suffered to remain unabated, can scarcely fail to produce in the present excited state of the public mind on both sides of the Alps, they are prepared, with the assent of the Austrian Government, to put an end to the conventions in question altogether.

But if the apprehensions of foreign invasion are too strong to be successfully combated by any arguments that you can adduce, Her Majesty's Government hope that you will, at all events, be able to satisfy the Governments of Modena and Parma that the Conventions afford no real security against domestic troubles, or, at all events, against the inevitable results of such troubles, if sought to be compressed by the enforcement of Article III of the Conventions. It cannot be doubted that the entrance of an Austrian force into the Duchies at the present moment, for the suppression of disturbance, would be the immediate signal for foreign war ; and the Governments of Modena and Parma would scarcely find their account in such a state of things.

It may not, indeed, be too much to say that, as matters now stand, the existence of Article III is more likely to produce than to avert internal troubles in the Duchies. The undisguised object of the Revolutionary party in Italy is to deprive Austria of her Italian possessions ; but those possessions are secured by Treaty to Austria, and therefore the measures to effect that object must be indirect, in order to avoid exciting, in favour of Austria, the feelings of all Powers who reverence the sanctity of Treaties.

But many of the Powers of Europe, who would deprecate any attempt wantonly to despoil Austria of her legitimate possessions, deprecate, with no less vehemence, the interference of foreign Powers in the internal affairs of another independent State, and would look with little favour or sympathy on Austria, if a war in Italy were provoked by her entrance into the Duchies for such a purpose.

It is, consequently, the obvious policy of the enemies of Austrian occupation in Italy, to excite civil commotion in the

Duchies, and so to make it obligatory on Austria, in pursuance of her Treaty engagements, to interfere in their internal affairs; and whatever respect Austria may be bound to show for her own engagements, no such respect is due to them from any third Power, who may take advantage of a state of things assumed to be repugnant to its political principles, and precipitate a war in Italy, for which it would allege Austria, and not itself, was responsible.

It seems to Her Majesty's Government, therefore, that on these grounds it would be for the interest of Modena and Parma that the Article in question should, at all events, be expunged from the Conventions; but Her Majesty's Government would fain hope that, even on the higher ground of confidence in her subjects, the Duchess of Parma would be willing to relieve not only them, but herself also, from the standing opprobrium of the Article in question. It implies the existence of disaffection on the part of the people, and of distrust on the part of the Sovereign. The Duchess, Her Majesty's Government believe, is most anxious to give no occasion for the one, and, if that does not exist, she herself has certainly no occasion for the other.

I have thus given you a general outline of the language that you may use in endeavouring to induce the Governments of Modena and Parma to offer to release Austria from the obligations of the Conventions of 1847, and by doing so to contribute, as far as possible, to averting from Europe the calamity with which it is now threatened. Her Majesty's Government see, in the course which they propose to the Duchies, nothing but benefit to them—at all events no chance of evil which is not immeasurably less than that which would inevitably befall them if the north of Italy were to become the scene either of insurrectionary or foreign warfare.

The mission which is entrusted to you is one of extreme delicacy: Her Majesty's Government are aware that, at first sight, the propositions which you have to offer may be looked at with little favour by those to whom they are addressed; but Her Majesty's Government are content to expose themselves to the risk of a refusal of the advice which they tender, in consideration of the great interests now at stake, and of the obligation incumbent on every nation to exert itself to the utmost for the maintenance of the general peace.

No. 99. *Capt. Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 7.)
(Extract.)

Berne, March 4, 1859.

IN my despatch of the 18th ultimo,* I had the honour to inform your Lordship of the substance of a conversation which I

* No. 69.

had held with the President of the Swiss Confederation, in which he had announced to me that, in the event of a war between neighbouring Powers, the Federal Council had determined to maintain the strictest neutrality.

Within the last week a question, I understand, has come under the discussion of the Federal Council, and has also been agitated by the public press, which is rather of a delicate nature, and respecting which I should be glad to have your Lordship's instructions in the event of my opinion and advice being appealed to.

The question relates to the action of Switzerland with reference to the neutral territory guaranteed by the Treaties of Vienna and Paris in 1815.

A great deal of nonsense has been written in the Swiss papers about it, and a certain pressure has been exercised on the Federal Council, who, at the same time that they purpose to observe the strictest neutrality, are, I am informed, undecided whether they shall, or not, in the event of war in which France and Piedmont shall be engaged, occupy the neutral territory with their troops, according to the 2nd paragraph of Article XCII of the Treaty of Vienna which leaves it optional with them, by the use of the words "*Confédération Suisse jugerait à propos.*"

It is evident that this Article contemplated the hostile invasion of Piedmont by France, since it provides for the retreat of the Sardinian troops through the Valais. But, at the same time, according to the letter of the Article, Switzerland is, in the event of open or imminent hostilities between neighbouring powers, authorized to occupy the districts of Chablais and Faucigny with her troops, if she think proper, and there are many who, from different motives, urge this course upon the Swiss Government.

There is another portion of this Article which I think is likely to raise a more serious difficulty. It runs thus: "*Aucunes autres troupes armées d'aucune autre Puissance ne pourront traverser ni stationner dans les provinces et territoires susdits.*"

The Victor Emmanuel Railway, branching from the Lyons and Geneva line at Culoz on its way to Mondana, Mont Cenis, and Turin, passes through a portion of the neutral territory.

A paragraph in a Genevese paper which I inclose, states that a contract had been entered into by the French Government with the Victor Emmanuel Railway for the conveyance of troops.

In conversations with the President and Federal Councilors on these subjects, I have confined myself to recommending the strictest neutrality to the Executive Government, and the employment of their influence in the several Cantons to the same end. I said that if this strict neutrality were observed, in the event of a war unfortunately occurring between Austria and France, the non-belligerent Powers, parties to the Treaties of

1815, would doubtless use their utmost influence to maintain the position secured to Switzerland by those Treaties.

My Sardinian colleague tells me that he has had friendly conversations with the President on the subject of occupation by Swiss troops of the neutral territory, that no mode of action had been determined on, but that he anticipated no serious difficulties.

(Inclosure.) *Extract from the Journal de Genève of March 2, 1858.*

Paris, February 8, 1859.

THEY assure me that the Swiss Confederation knows what opinion to entertain ("à quoi s'en tenir") of the projects of the Emperor on the subject of Piedmont, and that, among other things, the Federal Council must have been advised of the provisional agreement which had been entered into between the Victor Emmanuel Railway and France, for the transportation of 6,000 troops daily, during ten days, from Culoz to Modane.

No. 100. *Visct. Chelsea to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 8.)

Paris, March 7, 1859.

MY LORD,—IN accordance with your Lordship's instructions contained in your despatch of the 26th February,* I called upon Count Walewski this morning, not having had a previous opportunity of seeing his Excellency, and communicated to him the lively satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had received from the Duc de Malakoff the assurance that it was the intention of His Imperial Majesty's Government to withdraw their troops from the Roman States in consequence of the request to that effect which had been made to them by the Papal Government.

I have, &c.

CHELSEA.

No. 101. *Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 10.)

Munich, March 7, 1859.

MY LORD,—PRUSSIA having at length yielded to the pressure of the other Zollverein States for the prohibition of the export of horses, measures were at once taken here to give effect to the common resolution by the publication, under date of the 5th instant, of a Royal Ordinance forbidding the export of horses across the Zollverein frontiers, but allowing some latitude to the Minister of Commerce to make, in certain cases, such exceptions as might afford facilities to the frontier trade. As this prohibition is decreed for the whole Zollverein frontier, it of course applies as much to Austria as France, and I believe the principal

* No. 71.

object of it is to prevent the withdrawal from the south of Germany of the better description of horses, which, under possible eventualities, might be required for military purposes within the Zollverein States themselves. From all I can collect, however, I am justified in stating that the accounts of the numbers already sent across the frontiers have been greatly exaggerated.

I have, &c.

J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 102. *Captain Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury*,—(Rec. Mar. 10.)

Berne, March 7, 1859.

MY LORD,—I SENT to your Lordship, by telegraph, this morning, at 9 A.M., the Declaration which was published last night by the Federal Government in a supplement to the "Suisse" newspaper.

I have now the honour to inclose two copies of that supplement, containing the announcement of their decision respecting neutrality in the event of a war, and the occupation of part of Savoy by Swiss troops, according to Article XCII of the Treaty of Vienna, extended in the Protocol dated November 3, 1815, at Paris.

I have just returned from an interview with the President of the Confederation, who informed me that it was not the intention of his Government to prevent the passage of troops by that portion of the Victor Emmanuel Railway which traverses the neutral territory, since they considered that the Contracting Parties to the Treaties of Vienna and Paris did not intend to cut off that communication, otherwise they would have included in the neutral territory the then existing road to Chambery; that the object in view was to give an efficient military frontier to the Canton of Geneva and to the Valais; that the line of occupation by the Swiss troops, if required, would be to the northward, where a chain of mountains forms a good military frontier, starting from Mount Vuache near the Rhone.

The President showed me a map on which the proposed line had been traced, according to the counsel of the military advisers of his Government. He declined giving me a copy of that map, for the present. However, from a momentary glance which I obtained of it, I have drawn a pencil-mark on the inclosed map of the proposed line of occupation, which may give your Lordship a general, though, of course, not quite a correct, idea of the frontier which it is proposed to take up.

I confined myself to saying that, when the intentions of the Federal Council were officially announced to Her Majesty's Government, the latter would, doubtless, give their opinion on the matter; that I thought it would be well to come to some arrangement with the Contracting Parties of the Treaties of

Vienna and Paris on the subject, in time to avert any sudden complication.

Your Lordship will observe that, throughout, the Swiss Government consider that, according to the terms of the Treaty of Vienna, it is optional with them whether they shall occupy any, and what, part of the neutral territory they think proper, in the event of a war in which the neighbouring Powers are engaged.

I have, &c.

E. A. J. HARRIS.

Inclosure. *Extract from the Supplément de la Suisse of March 6, 1859.*

(Translation.) Berne, March 6, 1859.

THE Federal Council addresses to us the following communication:—

“The Federal Council took into consideration, in yesterday’s session, the actual political situation (‘situation politique’).

“It was unanimous in resolving to defend, by every means in its power, the integrity and the neutrality of the Swiss territory.

“It has, besides, determined upon extending, should the case require it, the measures for the defence of the country, as empowered by the Treaties, over such a portion of Savoy as would be necessary to maintain the neutrality and integrity of the Swiss territory.

“Communications in this sense will be made to the European Governments.

“It is unnecessary to state that the War Department and the Department of Finance are instructed to make all the proper preliminary arrangements.

“In case the indications of war should increase, the Federal Assembly would be convoked.”

No. 103. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 12.)
(Extract.)

Turin, March 5, 1859.

AT a dinner which Count Cavour gave Mr. Gladstone yesterday, his Excellency told me that he had learnt with surprise, considering Lord Cowley’s mission of peace, that Austria had determined to place her Italian army upon a war footing; and he regretted this the more, as it would oblige Piedmont to call out her contingents.

I said I hoped he would take time to consider this measure, which would probably only increase still further the present unhappy excitement, and diminish by so much the chances of an amicable settlement of present difficulties at Vienna. To this the Count replied by saying, that this country would expect protection, and he appealed to the Minister of War as to the number of men now under arms in Sardinia.

General La Marmora told me that the King's troops did not amount at this present time to more than 42,000.

He had not horsed any more field-guns than he had last year, though he had horsed the caissons, and had bought 300 mules for the train. "Consequently," said he, "Austria has no reason to place her army in Italy on a war footing as far as we are concerned; for at this moment she has 80,000 men, and will have, under this present measure, 150,000 men to place in line."

To this I repeated that to call out the contingents would only still further complicate matters, and I hoped it might still be unnecessary. Count Cavour said he had a heavy responsibility upon his shoulders, but would delay the measure for a week in the hope that Lord Cowley's mission might lead to a better state of things.

No.104. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar.11.)

Turin, March 8, 1859.

MY LORD,—LORD COWLEY having informed me last night that I might take his word for it that Austria had no intention of attacking Sardinia, and consequently that there is no real necessity for the Sardinian Government calling out their contingents, I conceived it my duty to convey this intelligence immediately to Count Cavour, stating my readiness to call upon his Excellency, and to give him this assurance at once if he wished it, leaving to him the choice (always under your Lordship's instructions) of the mode in which the communication should be made to him, officially or officiously.

This morning Count Cavour sent a message to me thanking me for the above communication, but adding that it was unnecessary that I should wait upon him, as the Decree for calling out the contingents was already signed, and the Sardinian Cabinet was resolved to put the measure in execution.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 105. *Mr. Scarlett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 12.)

(Extract.)

Florence, March 3, 1859.

IN consequence of the indisposition of Chevalier Lenzoni, the Tuscan Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have not had an opportunity of placing myself personally in relation with him since my arrival.

In the meantime I have had interviews both with the Prime Minister, Signor Baldasseroni, and with Signor Landucci, the Minister of the Interior, as well as with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Signor Fornetti.

Signor Baldasseroni entered fully into conversation with me about Italian affairs. He appeared to me to hold reasonable and

moderate opinions on that subject, and I see no grounds for dissenting from the language he held.

Adverting to Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna, I asked whether he thought the Austrian Government would object to sanctioning such liberal changes and modifications in the Papal States as were really practicable and likely to ameliorate the administration of affairs, and if so, whether a similar course of policy might not be tried by other Sovereigns in Italy without danger. To this Signor Baldasseroni replied, in substance, that he did not think the Austrian Government would interpose any obstacle to such an experiment; and that if merely improving the forms of government, without granting constitutions or a free press, was meant, such a course might safely be tried: but I understood him to say that no one could with reason call upon the Sovereigns of Italy to take this step, unless England and France agreed at the same time to give some assurance that the territorial possessions of those Sovereigns should be maintained. This sentiment, I think, can hardly be wondered at, when so many public men and writers in Piedmont have openly avowed ambitious projects for aggrandizing that country at the expense of other Italian States.

Signor Baldasseroni observed to me that in spite of the rumours of war and revolution in Italy, the Italians generally appeared very tranquil, and that the exaggerations of the foreign press had lately misled public opinion. In the conversation I had subsequently on the same subject with Signor Landucci, that Minister accounted for the apathy displayed by the Italian people generally in another way. He said that the Mazzinian leaders, whilst they defy the moderate Constitutionalists to produce any improvement in Italian Government without first exciting the lower orders to rebellion, abstain, themselves, at this moment, from giving the "mot d'ordre" to the masses to rise, on account of the fear they entertain that if Napoleon III. makes war against Austria, the Liberal party in Piedmont will be put down, and no other change ensue in other States of Italy than the change from Austrian to French influence.

Signor Fornetti, whom I saw afterwards, was of opinion that the withdrawal of French and Austrian troops from Rome and the Legations was a dangerous experiment, and would probably give rise to disturbances.

On the other hand, Cardinal Antonelli appears to be satisfied that he will be able to maintain order with the native troops.

No. 106. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 12.)

Vienna, March 9, 1859.

MY LORD,—BEING on the eve of leaving Vienna on my return to England, I am about to give your Lordship in this despatch a general summary of the results of the confidential mission with

which I have been charged, under the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd ultimo.*

I reached Vienna early on the 27th ultimo. I had an interview with Count Buol on the same day, and on the following day had the honour to be received by the Emperor of Austria. Hardly a day has intervened since in which I have not had long conversations with Count Buol. I do not propose entering into any details of what passed on these occasions, but shall confine myself to stating that the friendly overtures of Her Majesty's Government were received in the same spirit in which they were made, and that Count Buol has shown throughout the discussions which I have had with him a sincere desire to avoid the extremities of war, and to meet the wishes and advice of Her Majesty's Government, as far as he thought he might do so without compromising the national honour of Austria. I may add that similar feelings were evinced by the Emperor.

The delicate task entrusted to me by the confidence of Her Majesty's Government was rendered somewhat easier by the intelligence which reached your Lordship a few hours before I left London, to the effect that the Pope had himself requested the withdrawal, within the year, of the Austrian and French forces now occupying the Papal territory; and although Count Buol has been, and is, up to this moment, without other information respecting His Holiness's wishes, except the meagre announcement of the telegraph, he declared without hesitation, from the first, the readiness of the Emperor to comply with the Pope's request. He is of opinion, however, that caution will be necessary in withdrawing the troops of occupation, that insurrections might follow their sudden removal, and that it will be advisable that they should be withdrawn, in the first instance, reciprocally to Ancona and to Civita Vecchia, and that their final departure should take place some months later, when the Papal Government will have had time to organize in their stead a military and police force sufficient to insure the maintenance of public tranquillity. Count Buol suggests that the Austrian, French, and Papal Commanders-in-chief should meet at Rome, in order to settle matters connected with this point.

With respect to the reforms of administration to be introduced into the Roman States, Count Buol expresses himself willing either to resume the negotiation which had been commenced with the French Government upon that subject in 1857, but afterwards allowed to drop by that Government and not by him, or to fall back upon the recommendations made by the Five Powers to the Pope in 1831-32. He prefers the latter measure, because he thinks it more likely to be attended with success. He would not, however, object to the former, but, in that case, the proposal must come from the French Government. The matter stands thus:

France had made certain propositions to Austria, to which counter propositions had been offered ; but Austria had never been able to obtain the opinion of the French Government upon these latter. She had, more than once, asked for that opinion, and it remained with the French Government to take the next step.

Upon the third point mentioned in your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd ultimo, namely, a security for the better relations between the Governments of Austria and Sardinia, Count Buol says that your Lordship must address yourself to Turin. It is not, he maintains, from the conduct of Austria that the present critical state of affairs has arisen, but from the ambitious and encroaching policy of Sardinia. Austria desires no better than to renew those amicable relations which had for so many years united the two Governments, but it could only be done on one condition,—a complete change of external policy on the part of the Sardinian Government. With the internal policy of Sardinia, Austria has nothing to do, and has no desire to interfere. Count Buol gives the further assurance that Austria, notwithstanding the provocations which she has received, has no intention of attacking Sardinia, so long as the Sardinian troops keep within their own territory ; but he insists that as long as Sardinia remains armed there can be no security for peace.

I come now to the fourth point mentioned in your Lordship's instructions, namely, the abrogation or modification of the Austro-Italian Treaties of 1847. Even on this point, on which Austria is naturally more sensitive than any other, I leave Count Buol not only prepared to act with moderation and forbearance, with regard to the actual execution of those Treaties, but disposed to examine whether they may be replaced, with the consent of the other Contracting Parties, by some other combination, which, while relieving Austria from the necessity of an interference the responsibility of which is fully felt, would not risk the chance of the Duchies becoming a prey to revolution and anarchy.

In discussing this question, with a view to its practical solution, it was absolutely necessary to take into consideration the dominant feeling in Count Buol's mind, that the only real dangers of revolution to which the Duchies would be exposed, would have its source in, and would be supported by, Sardinia. Any scheme, therefore, for replacing the Treaties in question, to have a chance of being accepted by Austria, must take this feeling into account. Two plans presented themselves, and were subjects of cursory conversation between Count Buol and myself ; the first, to which I avow a strong preference, should it be pursued further and found practicable, is the recognition by the Great Powers, or by Austria and France alone, of the neutrality of the territory of Sardinia ; the second, is a league among the smaller

States of Italy for their mutual succour in case of internal disorder. Count Buol seemed favourably inclined to take into his consideration any proposal, having for its object the modifications of the Treaties of 1847, based on either of these plans.

The first of these appeared to me to have the great advantage, not only, if fairly carried into execution, of satisfying the Austrian Government that the Duchies would not be exposed to future danger, but of cutting at once at the root of the existing mischief. For what, in fact, is the apparent cause of the present crisis in Italy? Sardinia has taken the alarm at what she considers the menacing attitude assumed by Austria. She declares herself to be in danger of invasion. She has, consequently, armed beyond her financial means, and she has obtained from the Emperor of the French a qualified promise of assistance, which has, in turn, similarly alarmed Austria, and caused that Power to take military precautions of a most costly and formidable character. But if Sardinia had been a neutral territory, none of these evils could have happened. Safe from any attack from either of her great neighbours, Sardinia would have no occasion to keep on foot an army ruinous to her finances. She could pursue, in peace and tranquillity, the development of her commerce and industry under those free institutions which she has chosen; and, it might be hoped, would become a pattern and example for the rest of Italy to follow. Austria and the Governments of Central Italy, on the other hand, relieved from all anxiety as to the aggressive policy of Sardinia, might consent to give up those Treaties which have been the cause of so much irritation.

It may be said that Sardinia would never consent to such an arrangement; but I submit that such consent, although desirable, is not necessary: all that is required being, that others should agree to respect her territory.

The other idea, of a League among the Italian States for their mutual defence against revolution, seems to me more difficult of accomplishment, though, nevertheless, worthy of consideration, should it be preferred by the parties most interested in the question.

Before quitting altogether the subject of the Separate Treaties, I may mention that Count Buol considers the Secret Article in the Austro-Neapolitan Treaty of 1815, which binds the King of Naples not to alter the institutions of the kingdom without the permission of Austria, to be a dead letter.

But, while insisting principally on the four points especially recommended to me by your Lordship's instructions, I have ascertained Count Buol's sentiments on the other matters suggested to me by Count Walewski. I will take them in the order in which they are stated in my despatch of the 16th of February:—

1. The adoption by all the States of Italy of a system of govern-

ment which would admit of the taxes being voted by an Assembly of some sort.

Without making any proposal of this nature, I intimated to Count Buol the expediency of reforms in the administration of these States.

Count Buol said that the Austrian Government had been much maligned by those who supposed that Austria was opposed to reforms, or had used her influence to prevent them. On the contrary, he could assure me that her advice had ever tended to encourage real ameliorations. He was not, however, one of those who imagined that sweeping measures suited the nature of the Italian people. Austria respected the right of all sovereigns and nations to model their own institutions. There was much of which he could not approve in the Constitution of Sardinia, but he had never attempted to interfere with it. On the same principle, he had refrained, and would still continue to refrain, from all intervention in the internal affairs of other Italian States, who, however, were not so ill-governed as it pleased Sardinia to represent them to be.

2. Pecuniary aid from all the Roman Catholic States to the Pope, for religious purposes, and the consequent reduction of the taxes levied in the Papal States.

Count Buol did not evince the least disposition to entertain any proposal of the kind.

Before closing this despatch, I will beg your Lordship's permission to refer briefly to some of the difficulties with which I have had to contend, in carrying out your Lordship's instructions.

In the first place, I had to encounter a fixed idea that France was determined on war with Austria, and that to make concessions was but to put off the evil day. I hope that I have succeeded in partially removing this impression.

2ndly. The pride of Austria naturally revolts at being constituted the object of attack, and being called upon to make concessions instigated by the animosity and ambition of Sardinia.

3rdly. The attitude assumed by Germany towards France, of which the Austrian Government is naturally anxious to profit.

And lastly, There being no real question at issue between Austria and France which can fairly be assumed to involve a *casus belli*.

I have the satisfaction of adding, in conclusion, that great as is the irritation which, it cannot be denied, exists at this moment against the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of Austria and his Government render full justice to the services which have been rendered to Europe by the former sovereign; nor can I doubt that the Austrian Government would accept, with a sincere desire to bring them to an honest conclusion, any overtures for a

reconciliation with France, the acceptance of which would not be incompatible with their honour. But as long as Sardinia is allowed to remain armed, I doubt whether Austria will enter into negotiations, since she looks upon the Sardinian army as the advanced guard of France, permitting the latter to take her own time to arm, and will feel no security that peace is intended so long as that advanced guard is in existence. The disarmament of Sardinia is, therefore, to Austria, the gage of the sincerity of France. I need hardly add that, upon Sardinia disarming, Austria will take a similar course.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 107. *Mr. Russell to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 14.)
(Extract.)

Rome, March 8, 1859.

YOUR Lordship learnt from my telegrams of the 22nd and 24th ultimo, that the Papal Government had demanded the early and complete evacuation of the Papal States by the French and Austrian troops, and it is well known that the two Imperial Governments have declared their readiness to comply with the wishes of the Pope.

Although the propriety of taking the above-mentioned step had often been considered and discussed by the Cardinal Secretary of State, and that the Pope had written an autograph letter from Bologna last year to the Emperor of the French about it, the demand for the withdrawal of the troops of occupation had never been made officially.

The French Ambassador asked whether he was to consider the Cardinal's language as an official request for the recall of the troops.

The Cardinal begged his Excellency to do so, and added that a similar request would be made to the Austrian Ambassador that very day.

The laity in general seem anxiously to desire the withdrawal of the troops of occupation, and the only party that shows signs of fear and apprehension is that portion of the clergy most hostile to the Cardinal's Government, and the pleasure-seeking members of the Roman aristocracy.

Your Lordship knows best how desirable it is, and more especially at this moment, to free Italy from foreign occupation. With every desire for peace, the principal object of disgust to public opinion in Europe is the long-protracted presence of French and Austrian troops in the Papal States.

It would be idle in me to dwell upon the subject.

No. 108. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 14.)

Vienna, March 9, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that

Earl Cowley will leave this to-morrow morning for London direct.

His Excellency has been received by their Imperial Majesties in the most gracious manner, and with every mark of respect and attention. The most cordial welcome has been also evinced to his Excellency by Count Buol and the society, most of whom had been the friends of his early youth.

Whatever may be the ultimate result of his Excellency's mission,—and I anticipate a most favourable one,—I cannot refrain from expressing to your Lordship my humble opinion that his presence here, and the weight of his opinions and wise counsels, cannot fail of producing a most beneficial effect on this Cabinet; and I most earnestly hope that the unceasing and ardent efforts of Her Majesty's Government for the maintenance of peace, and for the re-establishment of a better understanding between the two Imperial Governments, will be finally crowned with success.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No.109. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec.Mar.14.)
(Extract.)

Berlin, March 12, 1859.

BARON SCHLEINITZ mentioned to me to-day that he had received a copy of Count Cavour's memorandum, explaining the views taken by the Sardinian Government of the grievances of Italy, and the remedies that might be applied to them. His Excellency said that he could not find fault with the whole contents of this paper; but it appeared to him that the main object of Count Cavour's suggestions was nothing less than the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy.

No. 110. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 14.)

London, March 14, 1859.

MY LORD,—IN my despatch from Vienna, dated the 9th instant,* I gave your Lordship a summary of the results attending my confidential mission to that capital. Having now had time for reflection I am disposed to think that the declarations of Austria contain matter which, compared with the professed wishes of France, may be made the basis of an arrangement between the two Imperial Governments.

It appears to me, however, that, before any proposals can be made to them by Her Majesty's Government, it is necessary that I should return to Paris and ascertain the effect which the communication I can make may have upon the French Government. Your Lordship will then be in a better position to judge how far you can interfere with a hope of success, to replace the relations

* No. 106.

of Austria and France on an amicable footing, and thus avert those chances of a conflict which threaten not only them, but, through them, the whole of Europe.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 111. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 15, 1859.

MY LORD,—I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 9th of March,* containing a report of your proceedings at Vienna, and your subsequent despatch of yesterday, suggesting that you should immediately return to Paris and endeavour to ascertain what impression could be made on the French Government by the communication of what had passed between your Excellency and the Austrian Government during your stay at Vienna.

It is my duty, in the first place, to convey to your Excellency, by command of the Queen, Her Majesty's entire approbation of the able manner in which you acquitted yourself during your residence at Vienna; and Her Majesty is satisfied that, whatever may be the result of the present crisis, everything that could avert from Europe the calamities of war was most ably urged by your Excellency on the Cabinet of Vienna.

Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with your Excellency's proposal that you should immediately return to Paris, in order to lay before the Emperor and the French Government the result of your communications with the Government of Austria, and they would fain hope that your Excellency may succeed in inducing His Imperial Majesty to see, in the disposition now entertained by the Cabinet of Vienna to lend itself to a settlement of the affairs of Italy, an opening which, if duly turned to account, may prevent the peace of Europe from being disturbed.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 112. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 15.)

Turin, March 9, 1859.

MY LORD,—WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date,† reporting to your Lordship that the Sardinian Government had decided to call out the contingents of the regular army, I have now the honour to inclose herewith the translation of an article which has appeared in the Piedmontese official "Gazette" of this day, congratulating the public on the decision of the King.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure. *Extract from the Gazzetta Piemontese of March 9, 1859.*

(Translation.)

As the recall of all soldiers on furlough belonging to the regi-

* No. 103.

* No. 104.

ments of the Austrian army in Italy will have the effect of placing that army on a war footing. His Majesty the King has considered it necessary to give orders for the calling out of the contingents.

The country, which within the last few days has responded with so much eagerness to the call made upon it on the occasion of the loan, will see with satisfaction its soldiers flock to their colours for the defence of the independence and honour of their country.

No. 113. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 15.)

Turin, March 12, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE contingents referred to in my despatch of the 8th instant* are composed of the classes of 1828, 1829, 1830, 1831, 1832, and each class may be taken, in the average, to represent 6,000 men, in all 30,000 men; bringing the grand total of the Sardinian army up to 72,000 of all arms.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 114. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 15.)

Turin, March 12, 1859.

MY LORD,—CAPTAIN COX, R.E., delivered to me yesterday your Lordship's despatch marked of the 7th instant,† and, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I this morning read it to Count Cavour, who listened to it very attentively, and then requested me to allow him to peruse it, which he did very carefully, and then said that the question was a difficult one to reply to verbally; that his answer ought to be accompanied by an explanation; that the question might be brought up in Parliament; that he had no wish to avoid it; on the contrary, he was ready to meet it, but he considered it due to all parties that the question should be put, and the answer given, in writing; and that if your Lordship would authorise me to address a public note to him which should contain that question, he would reply to it officially.

His Excellency's language, I was happy to find, was conciliatory, and he spoke hopefully of the efforts now making for the settlement of the Italian question.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 115. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Captain Harris.*

Foreign Office, March 16, 1859.

SIR,—WITH reference to your despatch of the 7th instant,‡ upon the subject of the arrangement proposed to be made by Switzerland with regard to the stationing of Swiss troops in the neutral territory in the event of war, I have to state to you, that as it appears the Swiss Government, by the provisions of the

* No. 104.

† No. 90.

‡ No. 102.

Treaty of Vienna, have the option of exclusively occupying any part of the neutral territory they may consider advisable, and as they seem disposed to act satisfactorily, Her Majesty's Government consider that it would be more expedient to leave this matter to their own discretion, rather than to seek to commit them to any particular course.

The Swiss Government have informed the Austrian Government of their intentions in this matter.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 116. *Visct. Chelsea to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 16.)

Paris, March 15, 1859.

MY LORD,—AT 11 A.M. this day, I had the honour to address to your Lordship a telegraphic despatch containing the enclosed article from the "Moniteur" of this day, relative to the apprehension of war at present existing in Germany.

I have, &c.

CHELSEA.

(Inclosure.) *Extract from the Moniteur of March 15, 1859.*

(Translation.)

Paris, March 14, 1859.

A PORTION of Germany presents, at the present moment, a spectacle which saddens and astonishes us.

A vague, indefinite question, which touches upon the most delicate problems as well as upon the highest interests, suddenly arises in the political world. The French Government sees therein a subject worthy of examination and the duty of vigilance. It only occupies itself with the alarming situation of Italy, with a view to its solution in concert with its allies, and in the interest of the peace of Europe. It is possible to show a more sincere desire to unravel the difficulties pacifically, and to anticipate the complications which always result from a want of foresight and decision?

Yet a portion of Germany responds to this most calm attitude by the most inconsiderate alarm. On a simple presumption, which nothing justifies and everything rejects, prejudices are awakened, mistrust is propagated, passions are unchained, a sort of crusade against France is commenced in the Chambers and in the press of some of the States of the Confederation. They accuse her of entertaining ambitious views which she has disavowed, of preparing for conquest of which she does not stand in need; and attempts are made by these calumnies to frighten Europe by imaginary aggressions, of which not even an idea ever existed.

The men who mislead German patriotism in this manner are out of date. Of them it may truly be said they have forgotten nothing and learnt nothing. They went to sleep in 1813, and they awake after a slumber of half a century, with sentiments

and passions wrapped up in history, and which are a contradiction to the present time ; they are visionaries who wish absolutely to defend what no one dreams of attacking.

If the French Government was not convinced that its acts, its principles, and the sentiments of the majority of the German people gave a denial to the suspicions of which it is wished to make her the object, it might reasonably feel hurt ; it might see therein not only an act of injustice, but an attempt against the independence of its policy. In fact, the whole movement which is attempted to be got up on the Rhine, on a question which does not threaten Germany, but in which France is interested as a European Power, would tend to nothing less than to contest her right of making her influence felt in Europe and of defending her own interests, even with the most extreme moderation. This is a pretension which would be insulting if it could be looked upon as serious. The life of a great nation like France is not confined to its own frontiers ; it manifests itself throughout the whole world by the salutary action which it exercises to the advantage of its national power, as well as at the same time to the advantage of civilization. When a nation gives up this part it abdicates its rank.

Thus, then, to challenge this legitimate influence, which everywhere protects good faith, or to confound it with the ambitious views which threaten it, is to disavow at the same time the task which belongs to France and the moderation of which the Emperor has given so many proofs since the French people raised him to the responsibility of the supreme power.

The Emperor, who has known how to overcome all prejudices, might have expected that they would not have been invoked against him. What would have happened if, on ascending the throne, he had taken along with him the narrow views and sore remembrances which are now appealed to, to throw suspicion upon him ? Instead of making himself the intimate ally of England, as the interests of civilization counselled him to do, he would have become her rival, as the ancient rivalries of the two nations seemed to command him. Instead of giving a welcome to men of every party, he would have rejected with distrust the servants of former dynasties. Instead of reassuring and calming Europe, he would have shaken it by redeeming, at the price of its safety and independence, the revolutions of 1814 and 1815.

If the Emperor, giving way to such suggestions, had thought fit without a reason to renew in an era of peace and civilization the wars and conquests of the first Empire, he would not have been a man of his time, and would have thus incurred the severest censure that can fall upon the head of a Government. A man cannot reign with glory if he obeys the impulses of resentment and hatred. There is no true glory for a Sovereign except that which is founded on the generous appreciation of the wants of his

country and upon the enlightened guarantee of the interests of society.

We simply state here a question brought to light by so many decisive acts of the Emperor's policy. Considering this frank and clearly defined situation, Europe will feel strengthened in her security, and those who endeavour to alarm and deceive her may feel somewhat embarrassed.

As regards France, she has not as yet paid any attention to these vague rumours and unjust attacks; she does not make the whole of Germany responsible for the error or ill-will of a few manifestations which must be described rather as petty resentment than serious alarm. German patriotism, when not blinded by prejudice, knows very well how to distinguish between the duties it has to fulfill and the misrepresentations which would lead it astray. Germany has nothing to fear from us for its independence; we have a right to expect from it as much justice for our intentions as we entertain sympathy for its nationality. It is by showing its impartiality that it will display its foresight and best serve the cause of peace.

Prussia has understood this, and she has joined England in giving good advice at Vienna at the very moment that some agitators were endeavouring to arouse the temper of the German Confederation, and make it form a coalition against us. This reserved attitude of the Berlin Cabinet is certainly more advantageous to Germany than the recklessness of those who, by appealing to the resentments and prejudices of 1813, run the risk of irritating the national sentiments of France. The French people are susceptible of their honour at the same time as to moderation in their strength, and, if menaces excite them, conciliation calms them.

No. 117. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 18, 1859.

MY LORD,—HER Majesty's Government think it desirable that your Excellency should, if possible, ascertain whether, in the event of the affairs of Italy being discussed in a meeting of the Great Powers which the French Government has proposed, it would undertake that, as far as they were concerned, the discussion should be strictly confined to Italian questions properly so called, and to the Treaties between Austria and the Italian Duchies, to the exclusion of all questions connected with the Treaties of 1815, or bearing on the Austrian possessions in Italy.

If circumstances should lead to any such meeting being held, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that it would be better that it should be so in some neutral place, such as the Hague or Brussels.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 118. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 19, 1859.

MY LORD,—THE French Ambassador called upon me yesterday morning, and informed me that he was instructed by the Imperial Government to propose that a Congress should be held by the Five Powers in some neutral town, to take into consideration, with a view to remedying, the present state of affairs as regards Italy; and his Excellency added, that the suggestion came from Russia.

I have desired Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna by telegrams, of which your Excellency will find a record in the accompanying copy of my despatch to him,* to ascertain the views of the Austrian Government on this proposal; but I wish your Excellency, as I have already apprized you by telegraph, to ascertain from Count Walewski whether France will consent to call upon Sardinia to disarm, in return for a guarantee on the part of England and France against the invasion of Sardinia by Austria for the space of five years; Sardinia confining herself to her own territory, if Austria should accept the Congress, or rather a Conference on Italian matters, one of the questions for discussion being the substitution of some other arrangement for her Treaties with Parma and Modena.

Her Majesty's Government think that, for many reasons, the meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers, if it is to take place, would be better designated as a Conference than as a Congress; and they think, too, that the exclusion of Sardinia from such a Conference could be justified by the fact, that if Sardinia were admitted, all the other States of Italy would have an equal right to be represented in it, which would give an undue preponderance to Austria.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 119. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, March 19, 1859.

MY LORD,—I ACQUAINTED your Lordship by telegraph yesterday that the French Government proposed that a Congress should be held in some neutral town by the five Great Powers, and that the proposal was approved by Prussia and Russia, from the latter of which, indeed, the suggestion had originated.

I apprized your Lordship at the same time that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of ascertaining whether the Government of Austria would consent to such a Congress, supposing it were understood beforehand that no question directly affecting the Austrian possessions in Italy should be brought under review, and that the only matters to be discussed by the Plenipotentiaries, should be the evacuation of the Papal territories, the reformation of the internal system of administration in the Pope's dominions,

* No. 119.

and other parts of Italy, and the mode by which a substitute could be devised for the Treaties now existing between Austria on the one hand, and Parma and Modena on the other, with the object of their internal defence.

I added that the Emperor of the French had thrown out to Lord Cowley the idea that a league among the smaller Italian States, having for its object their internal security, might prove a substitute for the Treaties in question; and that His Imperial Majesty was prepared, in the event of his proposal for a Congress being acquiesced in by the other Powers, to call upon Sardinia to disarm.

In the further telegram which I have sent to you to-day, I directed your Lordship to ascertain whether Austria would consent to the proposed Congress, or rather to a Conference, which Her Majesty's Government considered might be the more appropriate character of the proposed meeting, if France would call upon Sardinia to disarm, under a guarantee for five years on the part of England and France, that Sardinia should not be invaded by Austria so long as Sardinia confined herself to her own territory.

It appears from your telegram of last night that Count Buol, while reserving to himself to take the Emperor's directions in regard to the proposed Conference, directed your Lordship's attention to the engagement taken by the Five Powers in the year 1818, and recorded in the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, of November 15, in the following words: "Que dans le cas où ces réunions auraient pour objet des affaires spécialement liées aux intérêts des autres Etats de l'Europe, elles n'auront lieu qu'à la suite d'une invitation formelle de la part de ceux de ces Etats que les dites affaires concernaient, et sous la réserve expresse de leur droit d'y participer directement, ou par leurs Plénipotentiaires;" and Count Buol suggested that the Pope should himself invite a Congress.

I explained to your Lordship, however, in my telegram of to-day, that if other Italian States are admitted to take part in the proposed Congress, it would not be possible to exclude Sardinia; and the only ground on which that exclusion can be justified is, that the Congress is strictly confined to the five Great Powers, and your Lordship will at once perceive that if Sardinia is admitted, all the other Italian States must also be received, which would give an undue preponderance to Austria.

Your Lordship will not disguise from Count Boul that, as stated in my telegram, the Emperor of the French is described by Lord Cowley as being much moved by the attitude assumed by Germany, and that a feeling in favour of war is getting up in France, from which circumstances it may not be difficult to infer, that the only chance of averting war depends on the acceptance by Austria of the proposed Conference.

Her Majesty's Government have, as yet, pronounced no final

decision on the proposal made by the French Government, but they are most anxious to learn the conclusion at which the Cabinet of Vienna may arrive on the subject.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 120. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, March 19, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR telegram of this morning* arrived as the Cabinet was assembling, and Her Majesty's confidential servants had therefore an opportunity of at once taking it into consideration, together with your previous telegram of yesterday.

We were informed by your telegram of to-day that Austria agrees to a meeting of the Five Powers at Rome for the purposes of effecting the evacuation of the Papal States, and of advising the Pope as to the reforms to be introduced therein, and that she will further agree to the question of an arrangement to be substituted for the existing Treaties between herself and Parma and Modena being considered in the same Congress, provided that such arrangement shall involve no territorial change; that previously to the assembling of the Conference Sardinia shall disarm, and engage to respect territorial Treaties as well as those with the great neighbouring Powers; and thirdly, that the conditions of the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818, referred to in my despatch of this day,† shall be observed, and, as a consequence, that the Italian Powers shall be admitted to take part in the Congress.

On such conditions, it seems that Austria will not object to an union of the minor Italian States for their internal security, and to a modification of her Treaties with them.

The result of the deliberations of Her Majesty's servants has been conveyed to you in my telegram of this afternoon. Your Lordship will have learnt by it that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be better that a Conference should be held, and not a Congress, and that the seat of such Conference should be Aix-la-Chapelle, and that the decisions which the Plenipotentiaries may arrive at should be conveyed to the Italian States for their consideration.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be unjust, and therefore impossible, to exclude Sardinia from taking part in the Conference if the other Italian States were admitted to be represented in it.

Her Majesty's Government consider that Rome would not be a convenient place for such a Conference, in consequence of its distance from London and from St. Petersburg, which would make any references to those capitals a cause of delay in its proceedings, and that it would be, for other obvious reasons, objectionable to meet in any town of Italy. Her Majesty's Government

* No. 171.

† No. 119.

are much gratified with your Lordship's statement of the conciliatory spirit shown by the Emperor and Count Buol, and with the account which his Excellency gave you of the pleasure expressed by the Emperor at the friendly nature and form of the proposal which Her Majesty's Government had directed you to lay before the Cabinet of Vienna, and your Lordship will say that Her Majesty's Government are much satisfied with the manner in which that proposal has been received by the Austrian Government. You will add, however, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the course which they recommend will not be inconsistent with the spirit of the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, to which Count Buol has referred.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 121. *The Earl of Malmesbury to the Duke of Malakoff.*

(Translation.)

Foreign Office, March 19, 1859, 5.30 P.M.

My dear Marshal,—THE Cabinet has just risen. We accept the Congress in a neutral town, but we prefer a Conference; it being well understood that no question shall be raised respecting the territorial possessions of Austria in Italy, but that the discussions shall be confined to four points, viz.:—

Evacuation.

Reform.

Security of Sardinia against Austrian attack.

Substitution of a plan for the internal security of the small States, in place of the Treaties with Austria of 1847.

Yours ever,

MALMESBURY.

No. 122. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 19, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Excellency will find, in the inclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus,* a statement of the answer returned by the Austrian Government to the proposal for a Conference on Italian affairs, and the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of it.

Your Excellency will ascertain what are the opinions of the French Government on the several points adverted to by the Austrian Government.

I have already informed you, by my telegram of this afternoon, that Her Majesty's Government are inclined to think that Rome would be too far for the Conference to be held there, and that Aix-la-Chapelle would be a better place for that purpose. They think, too, that it would be desirable that all the Italian States should be excluded from the Conference, whose recommendations in respect to the questions of reform, and of the union

* No. 120.

of the minor States, would subsequently be submitted to those several States for their consideration. It seems to Her Majesty's Government that Sardinia cannot be justly excluded from taking part in the Conference, if the other Italian States are admitted, and Her Majesty's Government could not consent to such a course.

Your Excellency will make the French Government clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to any discussion respecting the Austrian territory, as given to her by the Treaties of 1815; and that the only questions which they can entertain are, the evacuation of the Roman States, reform, guarantees of peace between Austria and Sardinia, and an arrangement to be substituted for the Treaties of 1847, between Austria and Parma and Modena.

Such, your Excellency will understand, is the deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's confidential servants who met this day to consider the French proposal.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 123. *M. Staempfli to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 20.)

(Translation.)

Berne, March 14, 1859.

ALTHOUGH the States of Europe at the present time, enjoy fully the benefits of peace, it cannot be disguised that confidence in the stability of this state of things has undergone a shock, and that there exist motives for admitting that the general tranquillity may be troubled by the possibility of grave events. In such a conjuncture, Switzerland owes it to her dignity, to her character as an independent and free State, as well as to her political constitution and her organization, to pronounce herself in time, and without evasion, as to the attitude which she proposes to observe with regard to certain eventualities, according to the position which is given her by her situation, her history, her internal wants, and her relations with foreign States.

The Federal Council, therefore, declares in the most formal manner, that, if the peace of Europe should be disturbed, the Swiss Confederation will defend and maintain, by all means at her disposal, the integrity and neutrality of its territory, to which she has a right in her character as an independent State, and which has been solemnly recognized and guaranteed to her by the European Treaties of 1815. She will loyally accomplish this mission equally towards all.

The Treaties of 1815 declare, besides, that certain portions of the territory of Savoy, which form an integral part of the States of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, are comprised in the Swiss neutrality.

It results, in effect, from these Treaties—that is, the Declara-

tion of the High Powers of the 29th March, 1815; the Act of Accession of the Swiss Diet of the 12th of August, 1815; the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of the 9th June, 1815 (Article XCII); the Peace of the 20th November, 1815 (Article III); and the Act of the same day, recognizing and guaranteeing the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of her territory; that the parts of Savoy designated in these Acts are entitled to the benefit of the same neutrality as Switzerland, with the special clause "that every time that the Powers bordering on Switzerland shall find themselves in a state of open and imminent hostility, the troops of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, which may find themselves in the neutral provinces, shall retire, and will, for that purpose, be enabled to pass by the Valais, if it should become necessary; that no other armed troops, of whatever Power, will be allowed to station themselves there, or to traverse them, with the exception of those which the Swiss Confederation would think proper to place there.

The beforementioned dispositions of the general Treaties have been expressly confirmed, in all points, by the special Treaty which was concluded the 16th of March, 1816, between the Confederation and His Majesty the King of Sardinia. If henceforth circumstances should require it, and in as far as the measure shall be necessary to secure and defend the neutrality and integrity of its territory, the Swiss Confederation will make use of the right which has been conferred on it by the European Treaties to occupy the neutral parts of Savoy; but it is well understood that if the Confederation has recourse to this measure, it will respect scrupulously, and in all its bearings, the stipulations of the Treaties; and, amongst others, that which says that the Swiss military occupation will not cause any prejudice to the administration established by His Sardinian Majesty in the said Provinces. The Federal Council declares that it will endeavour to come to an understanding with the Government of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, with regard to the special conditions of such an occupation.

Finally, the Federal Council entertains the hope that these declarations, which are as frank as they are loyal, will be favourably received, and that the High Powers will know fully how to appreciate the position in which it has thought it to be its duty to place itself, in the actual political situation and in anticipation of eventualities which may arise.

He seizes, &c.

STAEMPFLI.

No. 124. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 21.)

(Extract.)

Turin, March 17, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that a corps of

Pontoniers was forwarded from Turin this morning to Alexandria. Some batteries of Field Artillery have also been despatched in the same direction.

No. 125. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Hudson.*

Foreign Office, March 21, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE received your telegram of this morning, acquainting me that Count Cavour had informed you that the Sardinian Government had accepted, as offering the means of arranging a great part of the present difficulties, the proposal for a Congress or Conference on Italian questions, which the Russian Minister at Turin had represented to him as having been suggested by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg; and that the Sardinian Government hoped that Her Majesty's Government would consent to Piedmont taking part in such a meeting as a means of allaying present and future excitement in the Italian dominions.

I explained to you, in my reply by telegraph this afternoon, that Her Majesty's Government consented to take part in a Conference of the Five Great Powers, from which Sardinia would be excluded; since, if Sardinia were admitted, Austria would insist on the five other Italian States being equally represented in it, and would thereby secure for herself five more votes; whereas, if Sardinia were not admitted, Austria could not require that the rest should be so. I need scarcely say that it would be impossible, with any hope of practical results, to carry on a Conference in which the Representatives of the six Italian States should take part with those of the Five Great Powers.

I stated to you at the same time that Her Majesty's Government would be glad to see both Sardinia and Austria disarm; Austria engaging not to attack Sardinia, and England and France guaranteeing Sardinia against invasion on the part of Austria.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 126. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 21, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government received with much satisfaction the information contained in your telegram of the 19th instant, that the French Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna had been assured by Count Buol that Austria would at once disarm, if the Sardinian Government on their side would disband the contingents which they had called out, and send back to their usual quarters the different garrisons which had been brought together.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 127. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1859.

I HAVE received your Lordship's telegram of yesterday,* reporting the result of your communications with Count Buol, under the instructions which I sent to you by telegraph on the 19th, and repeated in my despatch of the same day.†

In the answer which I have returned to you by telegraph this afternoon, I have stated to your Lordship that there is no desire in any quarter to force Austria to adopt any given course; but I have desired you, nevertheless, to make Count Buol clearly understand that no statesman in this country, to whatever party he may belong, would allow Sardinia to be excluded from a Conference to which other Italian States were admitted.

I do not clearly understand from your telegram, and should wish to be informed, whether Austria refuses to consider in Congress the questions of the evacuation of the Roman States, and reform in their administration and that of the Duchies. These projects of reform would be submitted by the Conference for the approbation of the several States, and it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the spirit of the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle would be fulfilled if the reforms laid down by the Conference were then submitted for approval to the States to which they were considered applicable.

No. 128. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1859.

I RECEIVED this morning from Lord Augustus Loftus his report ‡ of the answer returned by Count Buol to the representation which he was directed by my telegram§ of that day to make to the Austrian Minister on the question of a Conference on Italian affairs.

It appears from this report that Austria prefers a Conference to a Congress, but adheres to her opinion that such Conference cannot discuss questions relating to Italian States, without the participation of such States; that she adheres to the designation given by Her Majesty's Government of the three subjects to be deliberated on by the Conference, under the reserve, however, that the Treaties for which a substitute is to be sought, and which she considers to be the sole matter of discussion for the Conference, are those only with Parma and Modena; but that, consistently with the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, Austria cannot discuss those Treaties in Conference without the presence of Parma and Modena.

Count Buol further says that, as no Treaties to which Sardinia is a party are to come under discussion, there can be no question of her taking part in the Conference.

* See No. 172 for report in detail.

† No. 120.

‡ No. 172.

§ No. 119.

Count Buol seems to have intimated to Lord Augustus Loftus that, strictly speaking, the proposal for a Conference should have emanated from Austria; but, notwithstanding, Austria would agree to the Conference, subject to the conditions stated in Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram of the 19th, and repeated in my despatch to his Lordship of that day.* Austria, however, will not hear of a Conference on the affairs of Italy in general, and requires, as the condition of her acceptance of a Conference, that it shall be strictly confined to seeking for a substitute for Treaties.

Count Buol said further, with reference to the place at which the Conference should meet, that your Excellency had proposed Rome, and that the facilities for communication afforded by the electric telegraph would obviate the objections felt by Her Majesty's Government to the selection of that place, on the ground of its distance from London and St. Petersburg.

Your Excellency will see by the inclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus,† the language which I have instructed him to hold to Count Buol.

I have already apprized your Excellency by telegraph of the nature of the language held by Count Buol; and that, as regards the refusal of Austria to admit Sardinia at all to the Conference, Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to the exclusion of that Power if the other Italian States are admitted.

Your Excellency will, in conjunction with Count Walewski, endeavour to press upon the Austrian Minister at Paris the views of Her Majesty's Government; and you will intimate to him that the persistence of Austria in her present objections, will tend to alienate from her the goodwill of Her Majesty's Government.

I should wish your Excellency to ascertain, and report to me, whether the French Government agrees to confining the deliberations of the Conference to the points suggested by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 129. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 21, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Excellency, in your telegram received this afternoon, informs me that Count Walewski is of opinion that whatever the Emperor of the French may do after the Conferences are over, His Imperial Majesty will not consent to join, under present circumstances, in giving for five years a guarantee to Sardinia, on the part of England and France, against invasion by Austria so long as she remains within her own territories; but that, when the convocation of a Conference is agreed to, His Imperial Majesty will be prepared, in conjunction with Her

* No. 119.

† No. 127.

Majesty's Government, to call upon Sardinia at once to disarm as a preliminary to negotiation.

Your Excellency will not have been unprepared for the expression of surprise with which this communication from Count Walewski was received by Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that in calling upon Sardinia to disarm, it was reasonable to offer to her the proposed guarantee as an inducement to comply with the demands of England and France ; but they do not see what object there could be for giving a guarantee to Sardinia after she has done gratuitously what it was supposed she would require such an inducement to engage her to do ; and Her Majesty's Government would, probably, no longer see, under such circumstances, any occasion for giving any guarantee at all.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 130. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 21, 1859.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that you should state to Count Walewski, in an official note, the points to which Her Majesty's Government consider the deliberations of the proposed Conference should be confined.

Those points are :—

1. How evacuation of the Roman States by the armies of Austria and France can best be accomplished.
2. Whether any, and, if any, what, reforms can be made in the internal administration of those States, and of the Duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany.
3. The means by which peace may be preserved between Austria and Sardinia.
4. The substitution for the Treaties of 1847 between Austria and the Duchies of Parma and Modena, of an union of the minor States of Italy among themselves.

Your Excellency will include in the same note, an inquiry whether France will consent to calling upon Sardinia to disarm, in return for a guarantee for five years by England and France, against the invasion of the Sardinian territories by Austria, so long as Sardinia confines herself within her own frontier.

Your Excellency stated in your telegram of yesterday, that the French Government did not consider itself to have made any proposal for a Congress, but merely to have accepted the proposal made by Russia.

It appears, however, to Her Majesty's Government that the French Government would do well at once to cut short all intrigues, by itself proposing that a Conference should be held to

deliberate upon the four points that I have now specified ; and that the question of disarmament, which, after all, is the main point, might at once be pressed on Sardinia, on the Conference being so proposed by France, without reference to any other Powers. This would secure the principal object to be aimed at, namely, the preservation of peace ; and, therefore, your Excellency should do your utmost to obtain it immediately. The arrangements for the meeting of the Conference might be settled hereafter.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 131. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—
(Rec. Mar. 21.)

(Translation.)

London, March 21, 1859.

M. le Comte,—By order of my Government, I hasten to send you herewith copy of the despatch from Count Walewski which I had the honour to read to your Excellency on Friday last, the 18th instant.

Accept, &c.

MAL. PELISSIER.

(Inclosure.) *Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff.*

(Translation.)

Paris, March 17, 1859.

M. le Duc,—THE Russian Government, impressed with the grave complications to which the situation of things in Italy may give rise, proposes to the Five Great Powers the immediate meeting of a Congress, in a neutral city, in order that an understanding may be come to, as to the means most fitting to ward off the chance of a conflict. The Government of the Emperor did not, for its part, think that it ought to refuse the appeal made by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, desiring thereby to give a new proof of the sentiments of moderation with which it is animated.

Lord Cowley has been good enough to acquaint me with the impressions which he has brought back from Vienna. The conciliatory language of Count Buol appears to me to be of a nature to cause one to hope that an understanding between the Five Great Powers of Europe is not impossible, if all the Governments bring, with a view to realize it, dispositions as frank and as sincere as ours.

The proposition of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg will, without doubt, be transmitted immediately to the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty, if it has not been so already, by the Minister of Russia in London.

I have made it a point that Lord Malmesbury should be informed, without delay, by you, M. le Maréchal, of the reception which the Government of the Emperor thought itself bound to give this step, and I hope that his Lordship will appreciate at their just value the motives which have determined us, under

these circumstances, to accede to the meeting of an European Congress.

I have, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 132. *The Earl of Malmesbury to the Duke of Malakoff.*

Foreign Office, March 22, 1859.

M. le Maréchal,—I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 21st instant, inclosing to me, by order of your Government, a copy of the despatch from Count Walewski, which your Excellency read to me on the 18th instant, and which stated that the Government of Russia, apprehensive of the consequences which might result from the state of affairs in Italy, proposed to the Five Great Powers immediately to hold a Congress in some neutral town, with the view of arriving at an understanding as to the means of averting a war, and that the Government of the Emperor of the French considered that it could not refuse this invitation.

I have the honour to state to your Excellency in reply, that this morning such a proposal has been made to Her Majesty's Government on the part of the Emperor of Russia; and that Her Majesty's Government is likewise disposed to agree to it, provided that the deliberations of the Congress are confined to the following four points, namely:—

1. The means by which peace may be preserved between Austria and Sardinia.

2. How the evacuation of the Roman States by the armies of Austria and France can best be accomplished.

3. Whether any, and, if any, what, reforms can be made in the internal administration of those and other Italian States, whose present administrative defects may obviously tend to permanent and dangerous discontent and disorder.

4. The substitution for the Treaties between Austria and the Duchies of a confederation of the minor States of Italy among themselves for their mutual internal and external protection.

Her Majesty's Government further require, as a condition of their acceptance of the Russian proposal, that it shall be distinctly understood that the Congress will not entertain any question of interference with the actual state of territorial possession in Italy, nor in any way disturb the Treaties of 1815.

Her Majesty's Government suggest that Aix-la-Chapelle should be the place of meeting, as being on the general line of railways and telegraphs, and a convenient residence at this early season of the year.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 133. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 22.)
(Extract)

Paris, March 18, 1859.

My time has been so entirely occupied since I arrived in Paris

on the night of the 16th instant, that I have not found leisure until now to place before your Lordship, in a connected form, an account of the proceedings in which I have been engaged.

I saw Count Walewski early on the 17th. His Excellency, before alluding in any manner to the visit which I had paid to Vienna, said that he thought it right to acquaint me with the present position of affairs in France. He then gave me a general summary of what had occurred since I had left Paris: of the resolution taken by the Imperial Government to give the true colour of their policy by the articles inserted in the "Moniteur" of the 5th instant, of the resignation of Prince Napoleon in consequence, and of the determination of the Emperor to await my return from Vienna before taking any decisive step for the solution of the Italian crisis. But, Count Walewski continued, another element for disquietude had manifested itself. Germany had adopted a tone of hostility towards France; preparations for arming were making in the German States. France had until now looked on, if not with indifference, at all events with forbearance; but this state of things, his Excellency said, must have an end. Public opinion in France was already displaying great irritation at the proceedings of Germany: in another month this irritation might expand into a desire or even a demand for war. If the armaments of Austria and Germany continued, France would be obliged to arm also; and when armed forces were everywhere in the field, inflamed by reciprocal animosity, who could say how soon a collision might take place? For this reason Count Walewski considered the state of affairs to be more unsatisfactory than when he had last conversed with me.

He must further inform me, though for the moment confidentially, that the Russian Government had come forward with a proposal of considerable importance. The Russian Ambassador had, two days previously to my return, at an audience of the Emperor, read to His Majesty a despatch stating that, although Russia had declined, so long as the present critical state of affairs seemed likely to be confined to Italy alone, to interfere, either by advice or otherwise, she could not maintain the same attitude of reserve, now that she had become convinced that a war originating in Italy might ere long become general. The position assumed by Germany had completely altered the aspect of affairs, and did not permit Russia to remain any longer indifferent. She therefore suggested that France should propose a Congress of the Five Great Powers, with a view of devising means for settling the affairs of Italy, and preventing the possibility of war; but she gave it distinctly to be understood that if this suggestion should not be acted upon, she would herself address the other Four Powers and make the proposal which she had recommended should be made by France.

The Emperor, Count Walewski continued, had positively re-

fused to take the initiative in making this proposal, nor had His Majesty, he said, been disposed to agree to it, even if it were to be made by any other Power, inasmuch as Sardinia would not be represented in the projected Congress. Count Walewski, however, having shown that if Sardinia were to be represented, the other Italian States could not be excluded, His Majesty had decided, in the event of not seeing, in the communication which I might have to make, any tangible means of arriving at an understanding with Austria, to contribute as far as possible to the peaceable solution of the present crisis by acquiescing however reluctantly, in the proposal of a Congress, if made to His Majesty by Russia.

Before taking any decision, however, His Majesty wished to hear the result of my visit to Vienna, and this led Count Walewski to make inquiries upon the subject.

I recounted to Count Walewski succinctly the general results of my visit to the Austrian capital. I reminded his Excellency that I had not been the bearer of any proposals to the Austrian Government. I had done no more than converse with Count Buol, as I had previously conversed with his Excellency, on the present critical state of affairs in Italy. I thought, from what I had heard on both sides, that a better understanding might be established between the Governments of Austria and France with respect to that country. Austria was willing to concert with France the gradual evacuation of the Papal States by their respective troops. She was ready to resume with France the negotiations relative to reforms in the Papal Government which had commenced in 1857, but had been allowed to drop by France, or, if it should be deemed preferable, she would address to the Pope, conjointly with the other Four Great Powers of Europe, recommendations in the sense of those which emanated from the Representatives of the said Powers, assembled in Conference at Rome as far back as 1831. Austria, furthermore, declared that she had no intention of attacking Sardinia, maintaining that it was to Sardinia and not to Austria that England should address herself for the preservation of peace, since it was the restless ambition of Sardinia that was compromising the tranquillity of Europe. So long as Sardinia remained armed there could, in the opinion of the Austrian Cabinet, be no security for peace. With regard to the separate Treaties which Austria had at different times contracted with the smaller States of Italy, I stated that Austria could not be brought to consent to their abrogation, since she could not with honour renounce obligations into which she had voluntarily entered; but I had heard enough, I said, to have obtained the conviction that those Treaties were likely to remain so many dead letters. Furthermore, I should not despair of Her Majesty's Government being enabled to propose some substitute for them, which would satisfy both the smaller States and the Austrian Government. I thought it right to add, that although

the language of the Austrian Government had evinced a sincere desire for the maintenance of peace, they appeared to entertain but little hopes of realising that blessing even at the expense of concessions. A fixed idea prevailed not only with the Government, but with the public, that France was determined on war, either now or later. It was for the French Government, therefore, if they intended peace, to prove it by their acts, and, as an earnest of their intentions, to insist on the immediate disarmament of Sardinia. Such, I said, was the general feeling prevalent at Vienna.

On my waiting on his Excellency at the hour appointed, he said that he had been desired by the Emperor, who would receive me immediately afterwards, and to whom he had recounted the conversation which had taken place between us in the morning, to communicate to me, officially, the proposal which had been made by Russia, and to add that His Majesty was disposed to accept it.

As there was no doubt that General Kisseleff would immediately act upon this decision, and inform his colleague in London, Count Walewski manifested the hope that Her Majesty's Government would, whenever the proposal was made to them, consent to accept it. He expressed his firm conviction that no other means remained of overcoming the difficulties of the present situation.

I replied that I would lose no time in reporting to your Lordship the statement which his Excellency had just made to me. I did not think it right, however, to encourage him to hope that Her Majesty's Government would willingly enter into the course proposed. I said that a Congress was not a word very agreeable to English ears, and that Her Majesty's Government would probably not consent to enter into one, unless under the firm persuasion that the results were not to be illusory, and that it was not to be a plausible means for gaining time. Furthermore, they would probably insist on some definition of the objects for which the Congress was to be assembled.

Count Walewski rejoined that he could give me the most positive assurances that the intention of the French Government was to settle the Italian question once for all, but he gave me distinctly to understand that no settlement could be effected, if Austria persisted in not making a sacrifice of her separate Treaties. His Excellency then said that he had imagined a League among the smaller States of Italy for their mutual protection from internal insurrections, and he asked me whether I thought there would be any hope of Austria accepting some plan of the kind as a substitute for the protection which she now afforded those States. Your Lordship will recollect that the possibility of some such arrangement had been discussed between Count Buol and myself at Vienna. I therefore considered myself justified in saying to Count Walewski that I should not despair of the acquiescence of the Austrian Government if the States of Italy were themselves

satisfied of the advantage of making the change ; but it is right that I should remind your Lordship that my conversations with Count Buol had reference only to the interference of Austria in insurrectionary movements which might occur in Modena and Parma, whereas, I believe, the hope of the French Government is to see set aside the defensive alliances which exist between Austria and all the minor States of Italy, except, I believe, Rome and Sardinia.

From Count Walewski I went straight to the Emperor. His Majesty said that Count Walewski had shortly told him what had passed between us, and he invited me to go into greater details, which I did. I need not repeat them. Having heard me, His Majesty said that he could not exaggerate the critical state of Europe. He admitted that that critical state had arisen from a series of faults which no one, perhaps, was exempt ; but it was useless now, he observed, to inquire into the past. We were in presence of facts, and with those facts we had to deal. Sardinia was armed to the teeth, Austria equally so, Germany had taken the alarm ; and, although he could conscientiously assert that up to this time he had made no armaments, he must declare that if means were not found, and that immediately, for restoring Europe to its natural equilibrium, he must at once put the French army on the war footing. Already France began to show symptoms of dissatisfaction at the haughty tone assumed by Germany. Within a month the whole country would demand war. His Majesty read me letters from the interior to prove the truth of his words, and I believe that he is correct in his assertions, and that the demonstrations in Germany have had the contrary effect to what, perhaps, was expected of them, and have, to a certain extent, excited the indignation of the French nation.

The Emperor then adverted to the state of Italy. I asked His Majesty to define what it was of which he and Sardinia had to complain ; what was the question they desired to see solved. At present there was nothing tangible before us. The Emperor admitted this ; but he said that if matters were left in Italy in their present state, it was his conviction that nothing could prevent a terrible explosion. It was on this account, whatever might be the cause of the present crisis, that it should be profited by to introduce ameliorations in the Government of the smaller States. His Majesty then touched on the proposal of Russia for a Congress. He said that it was repugnant to him on account of the exclusion of Sardinia, but that he saw no other hope of putting a satisfactory end to the crisis which menaces Europe, and he was ready, therefore, to adopt it. His Majesty asked me what I thought of the proposal. I answered much in the same manner as I had answered Count Walewski.

The impression left on my mind, after a lengthened conversation, is that the Emperor is desirous of maintaining peace ; that

His Majesty is not ready for war, which is, perhaps, the best proof of his pacific intentions ; that he has no other engagement with Sardinia than to go to her assistance, if she is attacked by Austria ; that he does not contemplate any modifications of the Treaties of 1815 ; but that, on the other hand, he is jealous of the preponderance which Austria exercises over the Italian Peninsula, and which the Powers, parties to those Treaties, did not intend to confer upon her ; and that to diminish it he is ready to accept war, but hardly to provoke it ; that he has great sympathy for the Italian populations, and wishes to do something for their benefit ; that he sees all the difficulties inherent in this question, and how little the result is likely to be satisfactory ; and that he does not like to bear the sole responsibility of negotiations for this object, and prefers, therefore, to direct negotiation with Austria, a Congress, by which the liability of any arrangements which might be made would be partaken by the other Great Powers of Europe as well as by himself.

His Majesty, in dismissing me, expressed the desire to receive an early intimation from Her Majesty's Government of the view which they might take of the Russian proposal, signifying at the same time the hope that it would be a favourable one. I promised to lose no time in communicating with your Lordship upon the subject. I observed, however, that even if it were found possible to induce Austria to enter into negotiations while Sardinia remained armed, discussions between armed Powers were not likely to be conducted with that calm and moderation which would afford the best assurance for success. I asked His Majesty, therefore, whether, if the proposal of a Congress should be accepted, His Majesty would join Her Majesty's Government in pressing for the disarmament of Sardinia, it being, of, course, understood that the disarmament of Sardinia should be followed by that of Austria. His Majesty expressed his willingness to adopt this suggestion.

I should state further, that Prince Gortchakoff's proposal, as represented to me, is, that the Congress should be composed of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Five Great Powers, assisted by other Plenipotentiaries. Now, from a Congress so constituted, greater results will be expected, than are likely, I am apprehensive, to be obtained. Some interval also must elapse before such a Congress could meet, while time, under present circumstances, is precious. I have, therefore, submitted both to the Emperor and to Count Walewski, whether, if the Italian question is to become the subject of consideration for the Five Powers, it would not be more advantageous that a Conference of their Representatives already accredited to some neutral Court, such as London or Berlin, should be established, than that an Extraordinary Congress, such as that proposed by Russia, should be convoked. Neither the Emperor nor Count Walewski showed any disincli-

nation to adopt this suggestion, should it be approved of by the other Powers.

With regard to the proposal that the Five Powers should take the Italian question in hand, whether through a Congress or a Conference, I cannot hesitate in recommending Her Majesty's Government to agree to it. Although I do not expect as favourable results from it as would attend the continuation of the good offices of Her Majesty's Government between France and Austria, it may be hoped that it will at all events insure the maintenance of peace. On the other hand, should Her Majesty's Government decline the Russian proposal, their conduct will be attributed to interested motives, and should direct negotiation fail, and war be the consequence, the responsibility of that war will be thrown, however undeservedly, upon Her Majesty's advisers.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 134. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 22.)
(Extract.) Paris, March 21, 1859.

I HAVE communicated to Count Walewski the substance of your Lordship's despatch of the 19th instant.* in which your Lordship states that "the French Ambassador in London had proposed that a Congress should be held by the Five Powers in some neutral town to take into consideration, with a view to remedying the present state of affairs as regards Italy, and that his Excellency had added that the suggestion came from Russia."

Count Walewski said that the French Ambassador had not been authorized to make any proposal to your Lordship; but he had been instructed to inform you that a proposal of the nature described by your Lordship had been made by the Russian to the French Government, and had been accepted by the latter. Count Walewski had been unwilling that Her Majesty's Government should remain in ignorance of this occurrence, and the Duke of Malakoff had been desired in consequence to communicate it to your Lordship.

The real facts of the case, Count Walewski said, were these:—The Russian Government had, a few days ago, desired General Kisseleff to call the attention of the French Government to the perilous state of affairs in Italy, and to say that Russia could no longer remain an idle spectator of the danger to which all Europe was thereby exposed. She suggested, therefore, that France should propose a Congress of the great Powers, to take into consideration this critical state of matters, with a view of applying a remedy; but she declared further, that if France declined to act upon her suggestion, Russia would think it necessary, for her own interests, herself to propose a Congress of the Five Powers. The French Government, Count Walewski continued, had refused to

* No. 118.

take the initiative, because they could not, consistently with their known opinions, propose a Congress from which Sardinia would be excluded ; and the Russian Ambassador, having been informed of this decision, addressed a note to him explanatory of the views of his Government, and formally proposing a Congress of the Five Powers. To this proposal the French Government had given their acquiescence, and this was the fact which the Duke of Malakoff had been charged to notify to your Lordship. It remains, therefore, with Russia, added Count Walewski, to follow this matter up with her other allies.

Count Walewski took objection also to the Treaties of Austria with Parma and Modena being alone alluded to. France equally desired the abrogation of those with Naples and Tuscany. I observed that the Treaties with these latter States were purely defensive (with the exception of the Secret Article annexed to the Naples Treaty), and that other Powers had no valid right to object to them. I think that Count Walewski will eventually coincide in this view, if difficulties are made in the Conference to rescind the Treaties in question.

Finally, his Excellency acquiesces in your Lordship's reasoning for the exclusion of Sardinia from the Congress or Conferences. He does not mind which term is employed.

No. 135. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 22, 1859.

My Lord,—LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS, in a further telegram which I received from him this morning, explains, more clearly than before, Count Buol's views as to the proposed Conference. The Austrian Minister, it appears, considers that the question of the evacuation of the Roman States, and of the reform of the internal administration of those States, to which he seems to limit the latter question, are not subjects to be treated of in Conference ; and that the only question on which he agrees to accept the proposal either of a Congress or of a Conference, is that of the substitute to be found for the Treaties between Austria and the Duchies, to the discussion of which question he requires that the Duchies should themselves be parties.

As regards the reforms to be introduced into the Papal States, Austria, Count Buol seems to have said, would agree to an immediate meeting of the Five Powers at Rome, to negotiate with the Papal Government on the bases proposed in 1831, but that the Pope would not consent to treating those questions, and, indeed, they could not be treated, elsewhere ; but Count Buol did not intend that the Congress itself should meet at Rome.

In acquainting your Excellency, by telegraph, this afternoon, with the foregoing statement, I added that I had just seen Count Apponyi, who confirmed Lord Augustus Loftus's report of Count

Buol's language, and further stated that Austria attached another condition to her acceptance of the proposed Conference, namely, that, besides disarming, Sardinia should give up deserters.

I took occasion, from this, to point out to your Excellency the importance of the disarmament being at once effected; but I said, at the same time, that your Excellency should not consent, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to guarantee, unless in conjunction with France, Sardinia against attack on the part of Austria, or to guarantee her against any other Power but Austria.

The reason for this latter reserve is obvious. A general guarantee of Sardinia might, some day or other, place this country in the position of having to interfere, whether circumstances made it convenient to us or not, to prevent a combined attack against the territorial integrity of Sardinia by a different combination of parties from the present.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 136. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I TRANSMIT herewith, for your Excellency's information, copy of a note from the French Ambassador at this Court,* inclosing a copy of a despatch addressed to his Excellency by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon the subject of the proposal made by Russia that a Congress should assemble for the consideration of the Italian question.

I also inclose a copy of the reply which I have returned to the Duc de Malakoff.†

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 137.‡ *Sir J. Crampton to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—

(Rec. March 29.)

St. Petersburg, March 21, 1859.

My Lord,—PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF has just informed me that he has to-day addressed to the Cabinets of Great Britain, France, Austria and Prussia, an official proposal on the part of the Russian Government for the assembling of a Congress for the consideration of the affairs of Italy.

His Excellency remarked that he entirely concurred in the propriety of the four bases or points for consideration alluded to by your Lordship in a conversation with Baron Brunnow: namely,—

1. The evacuation by France and Austria of the Ecclesiastical States.

2. The adoption of measures of administrative reform in those and, perhaps, other Italian States.

* No. 131.

† No. 132.

‡ The substance of this and the following despatch was received by telegraph.

3. The prevention of any aggressive measure on the part of Austria or Sardinia.

4. The modification of the separate Treaties between Austria and certain Italian States.

The maintenance of the present territorial delimitations of the States of Italy, as settled by the Treaties of 1815, was, Prince Gortchakoff said, of course understood to be admitted as a general basis of the deliberations of the proposed Congress.

With regard to the place of meeting, Prince Gortchakoff observed, that Russia would concur in the choice of any neutral town. Her Majesty's Government had excluded London and Rome; Russia would content herself with excluding Vienna.

Prince Gortchakoff added, that he was of opinion that the proposed assembly of the Representatives of the Great Powers should be considered to be, and termed, a Congress, in preference to a Conference, as more appropriate to the gravity of the circumstances under which it was called together.

He also said, that the Russian Government desired that this Congress should be composed of Cabinet Ministers from the different Governments, and not of Diplomatic Agents, for the same reason, and also in order to save the time which would otherwise be inevitably lost by the frequent references of the latter class of Representatives to their Cabinets.

The above information has been conveyed to your Lordship briefly by my telegram of this day's date.

I have, &c.

JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

No. 138. *Sir J. Crampton to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—

(Rec. March 29.)

St. Petersburg, March 22, 1859.

My Lord,—PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF this morning informed me, that he had just received a telegram from Berlin, containing a statement of certain counter-propositions on the part of Austria to the proposal made by Russia for the assembly of a Congress of the Great Powers for the consideration of the state of Italy. These counter-propositions have been communicated to M. de Schleinitz by Baron Werther, from Vienna, as the result of a conversation he had with Count Buol.

Prince Gortchakoff communicated them to me briefly as follows:—

1. Maintenance of the present territorial limits in Italy as fixed by Treaties.

2. Congress of the Italian States at Rome, for the purpose of adopting measures of administrative reform.

3. Disarmament of Sardinia.

4. Maintenance of the separate Treaties between Austria and the Italian States.

His Excellency stated to me, that with the exception of the first, in which Russia concurred, all these counter-propositions were considered totally inadmissible by the Russian Government. With regard to the fourth, he remarked, "c'est la guerre." He added, that he regarded these propositions of Count Buol as the expressions of his first impressions only, and that he still hoped that Austria, when she found that France, Great Britain, and Russia, and, as he had every reason to expect, Prussia, were united in opinion as to the proper bases for the deliberations of the proposed Congress, would end by adopting them.

Prince Gortchakoff then recurred to the consideration of the place at which it would be expedient to assemble the Congress, if determined upon, and said that Russia would propose that Geneva should be selected for the purpose.

He then observed, that the proposal of Russia for a Congress had been confined to France, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, as being four of the Great Powers of Europe. There were, however, other Powers, who might wish to take part in the deliberations; for instance, Sardinia. He thought, however, that there were good reasons why Sardinia should, in her own interest, lay aside any such wish on the present occasion, and he had consequently addressed no communication on the subject to the Sardinian Government.

Prince Gortchakoff concluded by begging of me to press upon your Lordship the expediency of a speedy termination of the labours of the Conference at Paris on the affairs of the Principalities. This, as a matter of public order, he thought demanded immediate consideration, and he was of opinion that it would be very undesirable that its consideration should in any way be mixed up with that of the affairs of Italy, which it was now proposed to confide to a Congress of European Powers.

I have, &c.

JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

No. 139. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I HEARD from Sir John Crampton yesterday evening that the Russian Minister at this Court was instructed to propose to Her Majesty's Government a Congress on Italian affairs, and that the Russian Representatives at Berlin, Paris, and Vienna, would receive corresponding instructions. The Russian Government are ready to agree to any place but Vienna as the seat of the Congress, and acquiesce in the four points stated by Her Majesty's Government. They desire, however, that, considering the importance of the affair, the meeting should bear the character of a Congress, rather than of a Conference, and be composed of the chiefs of the Cabinets of the several countries represented in it.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 140. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.**

Foreign Office, March 22, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Russian Minister called on me this morning, and, as I have informed your Lordship by telegraph, made to me, though only verbally, the proposition on the part of his Court for the meeting of a Congress, for which Sir John Crampton had prepared me. He stated to me at the same time that the Russian Government accepted as the bases for the deliberations of the Conference the four points previously laid down by Her Majesty's Government.†

I have had some conversation with Count Apponyi on the subject of the Congress, and I expressed to him the regret I felt at the view taken by Austria of the question. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that Austria would do well to adopt at once their views on this matter, or, if she will not do so, she might propose certain modifications that should have the effect of admitting all the States of Italy equally to be heard, although excluded from sitting in the Congress.

When once the Congress shall have determined that the evacuation of the Roman States by the Austrian and French troops shall be effected within a given time, the mode in which that evacuation shall be carried out might be referred to the Austrian and French Ambassadors at Rome; and in the same manner when the Congress shall have agreed upon the points of reform suitable to the occasion, those points may be recommended for adoption to the Roman Government, and to those of other Italian States.

By the process which I have thus sketched out the right of the Italian States in the first place to contribute their advice as to the reforms required, and then to oppose their adoption when formally recommended to them by the Congress, would be recognized and respected.

Under such an arrangement Sardinia, as an Italian State, would be admitted, like the rest, to lay her opinions upon the matters in discussion before the Congress; but, like them also, would take no part in the deliberations of the Congress.

Your Lordship has been informed by me that Austria has insisted that all the Italian States, with the exception of Sardinia, should be admitted to the Congress; but it would be impossible to exclude Sardinia if the rest were admitted.

Your Lordship will urge the Prussian Government to support the views of that of Her Majesty, as explained in this despatch.

As regards the place at which the Congress should meet, it appears to Her Majesty's Government, and Baron Brunnow agrees, that Aix-la-Chapelle would be the best place; and Earl Cowley or myself will attend the Congress on the part of England. Geneva, which is the locality proposed by Russia, would

* A similar despatch, *mutatis mutandis*, was addressed on the same day to Lord A. Loftus.

† No. 145.

be most inconvenient to the Ministers of State attending the Congress in consequence of its great comparative distance from the European capitals.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 141. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 23.)

Turin, March 19, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Austrian military authorities in Lombardy have armed the fort of Laveno, opposite Nitra, on the Lago Maggiore, and they have commenced mining the piers of the bridge on the Tessin, near Buffalora, but I understand that they have since suspended that operation.

The Sardinian Minister of War yesterday ordered three batteries field-guns to march to Alessandria, but it was remarked that they went by road and not by rail.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 142. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 23.)

Turin, March 20, 1859.

My Lord,—IT has been reported to this Government that an Austrian serjeant and eleven men entered the Piedmontese territory last night at Limido, a short distance to the north-west of Pavia, and returned to Lombardy by that town. This Government has addressed the Prussian Legation here on the subject, protesting against this act.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 143. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 23.)

Paris, March 22, 1859.

My Lord,—THE inclosed notice of Russia having proposed a Congress of the Five Powers, in order to prevent the complications to which the present state of Italy might give rise, and of the acceptance of that proposal by France, appeared in the "Moniteur" of this morning.

Count Walewski informed me that, as soon as he was made aware that Russia had addressed herself to the Cabinets of London, Vienna, and Berlin, he had taken this step in order to put a stop to the intrigues of Count Cavour whose efforts were unceasingly employed to obtain the admission of Sardinia to the Congress.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

(Inclosure.) *Extract from the Moniteur of March 22, 1859.*

(Translation.)

RUSSIA has proposed the assembly of a Congress, with a view to prevent the complications that may arise from the state

of Italy, and which would be of a nature to disturb the repose of Europe.

This Congress, composed of the Plenipotentiaries of France, of Austria, of England, of Prussia, and of Russia, should assemble in a neutral town.

The Government of the Emperor has acceded to the proposition of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The Cabinets of London, of Vienna, and of Berlin, have not yet answered officially.

No. 144. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield and Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 23, 1859.

I HAVE already informed your Lordship, by telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government object to the counter-proposals of the Austrian Government,* except in so far as they relate to a participation of the Italian States, in some form or other, in the proposed Congress.

Her Majesty's Government consider that the precedent of the Belgian Conferences might be turned to account on the present occasion, and that, as in 1831 and the following years the Representatives of the Netherlands and of Belgium appeared before the Congress, although they were not admitted to take part in the deliberations, so, on the present occasion, the Representatives of such of the Italian States as may think proper, should be allowed to appear before the Congress under the same restrictions, and be at liberty to submit to the members of the Congress any points to which they may think it desirable to call attention; the results of the deliberations of the Congress in regard to reforms, and to a Confederation of Italian States, being eventually presented to the several States on whose interests such results might bear.

The effect of this arrangement would be, that while the Congress would decide on the fact, and on the time that the evacuation of the Roman States by the Austrian and French troops shall take place, the detailed military arrangements for carrying that decision into execution would be left to be settled by Austria and France; and, in the same manner, the Congress would form its own conclusions as to the reforms to be recommended in any of the States, and as to the bases on which a Confederation could be established between them, but the manner in which any such reforms, and any such plan of Confederation could be adopted by the respective States would be left for their decision.

Her Majesty's Government are desirous of knowing, as soon as possible whether ^{Prussia}_{Austria} coincides in this course, and whether, at all events, she agrees to the proposed Congress. If she does not accept the Congress, it is impossible for Great Britain and France to call upon Sardinia to disarm.

* See No. 120.

No. 145. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, March 23, 1859.

Sir,—I REQUESTED Baron Brunnow to call upon me on Sunday, the 20th instant, and on his arrival I asked him whether he had received instructions from his Government to propose to Her Majesty's Government a Congress on the affairs of Italy.

He said that he had no such instructions; and I then mentioned to him that the French Government had, on the 18th instant, stated, through the Duke of Malakoff, that they had agreed with Russia that a Congress should be proposed; but I did not clearly understand whether it was to originate from France or Russia; and I gave to him in writing the four points to which Her Majesty's Government considered the deliberations of a Congress should be confined,—namely, evacuation, reform, substitutes for Treaties, and security of Sardinia against attack from Austria.

Baron Brunnow said he had no instructions on this point, but he called on me again yesterday, the 22nd instant, and gave me the memorandum of which I inclose a copy,* recording the acceptance by Russia of the four points, but he still made no formal or official proposal for a Congress, though he mentioned it verbally.

This morning, the 23rd, he brought me the note, dated yesterday, of which I inclose a copy,† formally proposing a Congress, and I have since returned to him the answer, of which a copy is also inclosed.‡

I had already informed you by my telegram of the 19th, that Her Majesty's Government had accepted an overture on the part of the French Government for a discussion in a Congress or Conference of the questions relating to Italy, provided that there should be no question of interfering with the Treaties or territorial arrangements of 1815.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 146. *Memorandum communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury, by Baron Brunnow, March 22, 1859.*

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Cabinet accept the four points indicated by Lord Malmesbury, as the basis for their deliberations.

They are of opinion that to bring these deliberations to a prompt and satisfactory result, the presence of the different heads of Cabinets will be essential.

Their meeting, which should be of short duration, would form the Congress.

The neutral town in which the Congress shall sit, has yet to be

* No. 146.

† No. 147.

‡ No. 148.

fixed upon. The Imperial Cabinet leaves the selection to common agreement.

The Imperial Cabinet, recognizing the importance of hastening the commencement of the deliberations, and yielding to the desire of France in this respect, have thought it their duty, for the general interest of the preservation of peace, to take the initiative in calling together this diplomatic meeting.

No. 147. *Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 23.)
(Translation.) London, March $\frac{1}{2}$, 1859.

M. le Comte,—THE Imperial Cabinet, taking into serious consideration the affairs in Italy, of which the complication is becoming aggravated, regards the union of the Five Great Powers of Europe as the most effectual means for bring this question of general interest to a solution, in conformity with the unanimous desire for the continuance of peace.

With this object, I have been directed to propose to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty a deliberation of the Representatives of the Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, assembled in congress in a neutral town.

In performing this duty, I have the honour to request your Excellency to have the goodness to inform me as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the proposal which forms the object of the present communication.

Accept, &c.

BRUNNOW.

No. 148. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Baron Brunnow.*

Foreign Office, March 23, 1859.

M. le Baron,—I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, acquainting me that, taking into consideration the state of affairs of Italy, which is becoming still more complicated, the Imperial Cabinet considers that an understanding among the Five Great Powers of Europe offers the most effectual means of solving this question, which is one of general interest, in a manner conformable with the wish unanimously entertained for the maintenance of peace; and you had, accordingly, been ordered to propose to Her Majesty's Government that the Representatives of the Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, assembled in Congress, should deliberate upon the matter in a neutral town.

I have the honour to state to you, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government are disposed to agree to this proposal of the Imperial Cabinet, provided that the deliberations of the Congress are confined to the following four points, namely:—

1st. The means by which peace may be preserved between Austria and Sardinia;

2nd. How the evacuation of the Roman States by the armies of Austria and France can best be accomplished ;

3rd. Whether any, and, if any, what, reforms can be made in the internal administration of those and other Italian States whose present administrative defects may obviously tend to permanent and dangerous discontent and disorder ;

4th. The substitution for the Treaties between Austria and the Duchies of a Confederation of the minor states of Italy among themselves, for their mutual internal and external protection.

Her Majesty's Government further require, as a condition of their acceptance of the proposal of the Imperial Cabinet, that it shall be distinctly understood that the Congress will not entertain any question of interference with the actual state of territorial possession in Italy, nor in any way disturb the Treaties of 1815.

Her Majesty's Government suggest that Aix-la-Chapelle should be the place of meeting, as being on the general line of railways and telegraphs, and a convenient residence at this early season of the year.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 149. *The Earl of Malmesbury to M. Staempfli.*

Foreign Office, March 23, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE had the honour to receive the note which your Excellency addressed to me on the 14th instant,* explaining the course which, in the event of the peace of Europe being disturbed, the Swiss Confederation will deem it proper to pursue, in conformity with the stipulations of Treaties, with a view to secure and defend its neutrality, and the integrity of its territory.

In thanking your Excellency for this communication, I beg to express to you the entire confidence of Her Majesty's Government that the attitude and conduct of the Swiss Confederation in any such deplorable contingency will be, in every respect, conformable to the Treaty engagements to which you refer ; and that every precaution will be taken by the Federal Government, with a view to prevent its peaceful relations with neighbouring Powers from being disturbed.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 150. *Mr. Russell to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 24.)
(Extract.)

Rome, March 15, 1859.

I CALLED this morning on Cardinal Antonelli, and said, your Eminence is already aware that Lord Cowley was sent to Vienna by Her Majesty's Government—who earnestly desire the mainte-

* No. 123.

nance of peace in Europe—to ascertain whether the relations between France and Austria could be put on a better footing. Now Her Majesty's Government consider three points essential to the maintenance of peace in Italy, the execution of which would, in their opinion, remove all pretexts for war. These points are:—

1st. That Austria should bind herself not to attack Sardinia ; and—

2ndly. That she should concert with France on the best and safest manner of evacuating the Pope's territory.

Here the Cardinal interrupted me, and said, "Austria can have no difficulty in agreeing to the first point, for she never had the slightest intention or desire to attack Sardinia. Respecting the second point, she has no choice. I have, as you already know, addressed an official note to the Ambassadors of France and Austria, in which I ask for the withdrawal of the troops of occupation, in the name of the Pope, and I have requested they would do so in the course of the present year."

"And at what season," I asked, "will the Papal Government be prepared to let them withdraw ; in what manner are they to commence ; and what forces will be substituted for the maintenance of order when they are gone ?"

The Cardinal replied, "They will be able to leave us before the close of the year—the sooner the better, I think ; I cannot myself say exactly in what month, but my plan is now to request the two Governments to cause their troops to be gradually withdrawn, so that we may get accustomed to do with smaller garrisons ; it is a bad system, in my opinion, to habituate populations to a larger number of troops than are really needed, and, by a gradual reduction of the garrisons, the contrast will be less felt when we are left to our own resources. Their place will be supplied by our own troops, and by a new battalion of riflemen which I am organising. Orders have been sent to recruit in Switzerland, and knowing the love those mountaineers bear to the rifle, I have myself chosen that arm for the new corps, so as to ensure success. They will be stationed at Sinigaglia, in the first instance, there to be instructed and organised. Our army, when complete, is to consist of nearly 18,000 men."

I said, "As your Eminence has anticipated Austria, and agreed to the first two points, I now come to the third—that Austria should advise and support reforms in the Papal States, on the basis she proposed in 1831 and 1857. Her Majesty's Government have told Austria, France, and Sardinia, that they are persuaded that reforms would tend both to the benefit of the Roman people, and to the security of the Papal authority ; but as a Protestant Power, England does not desire to take the initiative, or to appear in the first line : still for the sake of peace and, consequently, as your Eminence must yourself admit, for the sake of Conservative

principles, Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope to see the Papal Government adopt such measures as will ensure the full support of public opinion in Europe, and remove all causes or pretexts for revolution and war."

His Eminence said, "We have our laws, and it is our duty to maintain and execute those laws. The promises made by the Pope at Gaeta will be strictly carried out. It is true that the municipal elections, and certain administrative subdivisions in the Legations are not yet in force; and the cause of this delay must be sought in the past state of the country and the presence of foreign troops. Everything, I repeat it, granted by the Pope at Gaeta will be executed as soon as our hands are free to act. The first step towards that end was taken, you know it, by our request for the withdrawal of the foreign garrisons: the rest will follow gradually, according to the state of the country."

No. 151. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury*.—(Rec. Mar. 24.)

Turin, March 21, 1859.

My Lord,—On the occasion of the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, on the 9th ultimo, on the loan, two Deputies of Savoy—Messrs. Costa de Beauregard and Deviry, of the Right—opposed it as unnecessary, and denounced the policy of the Sardinian Government, as certain to lead to war, and end in misfortune to the House of Savoy.

The semi-official paper, the "Gazette de Savoie," published an article, reflecting injuriously on those gentlemen; and the Avocat Fiscal, instructed by the Government, condemned the editor in 150 francs' fine, and five days' arrest.

But Messrs. Costa and Deviry, not being satisfied with this decision, brought an action for damages against the editor, who was condemned by the Tribunal of Chambery, to three months' imprisonment, and 1,000 francs' fine.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 152. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury*.—(Rec. Mar. 24.)
(Extract.)

Paris, March 23, 1859.

A VERY marked alteration seems to have taken place in the policy of Russia within the last fortnight.

Up to the beginning of this month the official language of Russia, with regard to the affairs of Italy, was, to say the least, very reserved. She refused to give any advice; she was but lukewarm in her protestations in favour of peace; she would maintain a strict neutrality; her sympathies, she declared, were entirely with France, though she could not promise her any active support; her agents did not see why a war, if war there was to be, should not be confined to the Italian peninsula, while the rest of Europe remained neutral.

A sudden change, however, occurs. The advice which Russia refused to give to France and Austria she now tenders to all Europe. Europe is threatened with a general war. Peace must be maintained for the general interests of the world. The Great Powers can alone solve the complicated questions which agitate the public mind. At the eleventh hour, then, Russia proposes that the Five Great Powers shall meet in Congress to prevent the complications to which the state of Italy threatens to give rise.

The steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to place the relations of France and Austria on a more amicable footing, supported as they were by Prussia, left Russia, should they succeed, in an isolated position. Therefore, before the result of those steps could be known, a Congress of the Five Powers is proposed.

I have my doubts whether the issue of this Congress will be as satisfactory as if the negotiations had remained in the hands of Her Majesty's Government; but the proposal once made by Russia, and accepted by France, it appeared to me to be a duty to assist willingly and cheerfully in the course selected by France to bring her differences with Austria to a peaceable conclusion.

No. 153. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 25.)

Paris, March 24, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a note, which, in pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 21st instant,* I addressed yesterday to Count Walewski, stating the conditions on which Her Majesty's Government were prepared to enter into Conferences on the affairs of Italy.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

Inclosure. *Earl Cowley to Count Walewski.*

Paris, March 23, 1859.

M. le Ministre,—ON the 18th instant the Duke of Malakoff called upon the Earl of Malmesbury, and informed him that he had received instructions from his Government to propose that a Congress should be held by the Five Powers in some neutral town, to take into consideration the present state of affairs as regards Italy, with a view to remedying them; and his Excellency added that the suggestion came from Russia.

I am instructed by the Earl of Malmesbury to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are ready to agree to this proposal on certain conditions.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that nothing would be more useless, and less likely to lead to a practical result, than a

* No. 136.

meeting of the Five Powers, without any defined object of deliberation, and they are therefore anxious to come to a clear understanding with the Imperial Government concerning the points which the Representatives at the proposed Congress or Conference (Her Majesty's Government would prefer the latter term) should be instructed to discuss.

Her Majesty's Government cannot be parties to any revision of the general Treaties on which the present territorial distribution of Europe reposes ; nor could they call upon Austria to submit to the discussion by her allies of the measures which she may think necessary to take for the administration of the government of any part of her dominions. But Her Majesty's Government agree that there are questions arising out of the relations of that Power with Italy, which may be conveniently and usefully inquired into, and they do not doubt the goodwill of the Austrian Government to aid in placing those relations on a more normal footing.

The occupation of the Papal dominions by Austrian and French troops has long been felt to be a serious evil. The Pope having himself requested that they may be withdrawn, the mode and time of the evacuation will form a fit subject for the consideration of a Conference.

The necessity of reforming the whole system of government in the Papal dominions needs no fresh comment. As far back as 1831 the Great Powers of Europe thought themselves called upon to address recommendations to the Pope for the amelioration of the laws under which the Roman States were then administered. Little, if anything, has since been done to give effect to those recommendations ; and nothing would be more proper or natural than that this matter should again be urged on His Holiness, after deliberation among the Five Powers.

The separate Treaties which Austria has contracted with some of the smaller Italian States, have given rise to an ill-feeling towards, and a jealousy of, that Power, which it is most desirable to allay. Her Majesty's Government, however, make a great distinction between the Articles of those Treaties which bear a purely defensive character, and those which impress on Austria the obligation of interfering between a Sovereign and his subjects, whensoever she may be asked by that Sovereign to come to his assistance. Austria has, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a right to make Treaties, offensive and defensive, with any independent States, if she pleases so to do ; but, nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government hope that she may be induced to expunge those Articles from the Treaties in question, which oblige her to assist Sovereigns as against their own subjects. It may be expected, however, that the Sovereigns themselves will be unwilling to forego the protection thus assured to them, unless security can be

given to them under some other arrangement ; and Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the solution of this difficult and delicate question may well form a subject of deliberation by the Five Powers.

Lastly, Her Majesty's Government consider that some steps should be taken to allay the apprehensions felt by Sardinia of becoming the object of attack to Austria. However much Her Majesty's Government may be convinced of the fallacy of these apprehensions, they cannot but see that so long as they are entertained, there will be little chance of continued tranquillity in Northern Italy.

Such are the points which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss in Conference with Her Majesty's allies. They entertain the confident hope that, these points settled, the uneasiness and irritation which have brought Europe to the verge of war will gradually subside, and that peace will be maintained. It will give Her Majesty's Government sincere satisfaction to find that their views and hopes are participated in by the Government of His Imperial Majesty.

But in order that negotiations may be commenced with any chance of success, it is, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, imperative to operate a disarmament of the large armies now on foot. Her Majesty's Government have received the most positive assurances from the Government of the Emperor of Austria, that there exists no intention of attacking Sardinia, and that the increased armaments which have lately taken place in Austria are solely for defensive purposes. Her Majesty's Government, on the faith of these assurances, have instructed me to propose to the Imperial Government, that the two Governments should at once call upon Sardinia to disarm, offering in return their joint guarantee against any attack from Austria ; Sardinia engaging to confine herself within her own territory. On Sardinia's disarming, Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe that Austria would withdraw a part of her troops now occupying her Italian possessions, but Her Majesty's Government would be prepared, if necessary, to urge the necessity of this measure on the Austrian Government.

I have the honour to request your Excellency's early consideration of this proposal, the necessity of operating a disarmament being, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, paramount to all other objects.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 154. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 25.)

(Extract.)

Paris, March 24, 1859.

I INFORMED your Lordship by telegraph this morning, that I had learnt that the Emperor had requested Count Cavour's

presence in Paris. Your Lordship will have learnt from Turin, that the Sardinian Prime Minister leaves Turin for Paris to-night.

No. 155. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 25, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Excellency's application for instructions as to the language that you may hold to the French Government, with reference to the circumstance that Austria insists, as a preliminary to Conference, that Sardinia should disarm; and I have to state to your Excellency, in reply, that you may inform Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government cannot proceed with the Congress unless France joins with them in insisting that Sardinia shall previously disarm, England and France guaranteeing Sardinia against an attack on the part of Austria. But Her Majesty's Government equally require as a condition for their insisting on the disarmament of Sardinia, that Austria shall formally agree to the Congress, accepting the four points stated by them as the bases, and their proposal respecting the representation of the Italian States at the Conferences, and act upon the assurance conveyed by Count Buol to the French Chargé d'Affaires,* that she would at once disarm, if the Sardinian Government, on their side, would disband the contingents which they had called out.

I have desired Lord Augustus Loftus to make to Count Buol a communication to the above effect, as far as regards what we require that Austria shall do.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 156. *Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Duke of Malakoff, March 25.)

(Translation.)

Paris, March 24, 1859.

M. le Maréchal,—I HAVE received the despatch which you did me the honour to write to me, under No. 34, as well as the Earl of Malmesbury's letter in answer to my communication of the 17th of March, respecting the proposition made by Russia to assemble an European Congress.

The Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty thinks it useful to circumscribe beforehand the deliberations of the Congress, by explicitly determining the different questions submitted to its examination. I hasten to let you know that the Government of the Emperor shares in this respect the opinion of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and also that it appears to them that the four points laid down by the Earl of Malmesbury include all the subjects upon which it would be desirable to come to an

* No. 126.

understanding with a view to obtain a solution in accordance with the true interests of Europe. I should add that the Government of the Emperor, for their part, has no intention of raising questions which would affect the territorial limits determined by the Treaties.

As to the choice of Aix-la-Chapelle, I do not think that it answers absolutely to the terms of the proposition, which, in fixing a neutral town, had it in view to designate a town which should not be situated in the territory of any one of the High Contracting Parties. Geneva, or any other town of Switzerland, Belgium, or Germany, would seem to us to fulfil more exactly the desired conditions.

I authorize you, M. le Maréchal, to read this despatch to the Earl of Malmesbury, and to leave him a copy of it, if his Lordship should express such a desire.

Accept, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 157. *Count Corti to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 25.)
(Translation) 23, Park Lane, March 25, 1859.

My Lord,—The Marquis d'Azeglio instructed me, on his departure for Paris, to send you a copy of the despatch from his Excellency Count Cavour, which he had the honour of reading to you yesterday. I have the honour of transmitting it to you herewith, and I have, &c.

L. CORTI.

Inclosure. *Count Cavour to the Marquis d'Azeglio.*
(Translation.) Turin, March 17, 1859.

M. le Marquis,—SIR JAMES HUDSON in a note dated the 14th of this month, a copy of which you will find inclosed, has asked me in the name of his Government, whether Sardinia would be disposed to follow the example of Austria, and declare in a formal manner, as Count Buol has done in his despatch to Count Apponyi of the 25th of February, that Sardinia has no intention of attacking her powerful neighbour.

Appreciating the feelings which have inspired such a course on the part of the Cabinet of St. James's, we do not hesitate to answer with the most perfect frankness, as we have done a few days since, when asked by it to draw up a Memorandum, clear and precise, of the complaints of Italy against Austria, and to indicate the means of applying a remedy.

In pursuance of aggressive acts (what other name can we give them ?) committed by Austria by the concentration of imposing forces on the Sardinian frontier ; by placing on a war footing her army of Italy ; by the construction and occupation of new fortifications on ground which does not belong to her ; by ten years' occupation of the Legations ; and by the violation of public

Treaties—the Government of the King, according to the law of nations, has a right to prepare to defend herself against Austria, even by means of arms. England implicitly acknowledged such a right when, a short time since, through the medium of her Minister of Foreign Affairs—by the weight of her great authority, by the solemn means of diplomatic action—she condemned the unjust measures employed by Austria in sequestering the estates of Sardinian subjects, and agreed that if under such circumstances the dangers of war were prevented, it resulted from the great moderation of the Sardinian Government.*

Nevertheless, as Her Britannic Majesty's Government has acknowledged the abnormal state of Italy, and promised to Sardinia that England would endeavour to find a remedy for the evils complained of, the Sardinian Government, availing itself of such promises, and reserving its liberty of action in case Austria should not abstain for the future from committing aggressive acts, is ready to give its assurance that it is not Sardinia's intention to attack Austria. And she agrees on this subject to make a declaration the same as that contained in the above-mentioned despatch of Count Buol, which, in reality, is nothing but a long and bitter accusation against Sardinia and the policy of the Cabinet over which I have the honour to preside.

The speeches delivered in Parliament explaining our policy, the despatches and circulars which you have communicated to the Cabinet of St. James's, and particularly the Memorandum addressed to England and Prussia, in the justice of which Lord Malmesbury entirely agrees, explain and justify our conduct so completely, that I think I need not on the present occasion refute one by one the arguments which Count Buol employs in his despatch, wherein he represents Sardinia as the real cause of the abnormal condition of Italy.

Such arguments cannot have any value with any impartial person who preserves an exact remembrance of the events which have succeeded each other from the commencement of the present year.

The military preparations continually taken by Austria, and pointed out in my despatch of March 13, have all preceded the justifiable action of the Sardinian Government. The speech from the Throne at the opening of the Sardinian Parliament was only pronounced on the 10th of January, and yet on the 3rd of the same month a new *corps d'armée* was suddenly sent to Italy.

Our loan did not take place until long after Austria had endeavoured to negotiate a much larger loan in London.

Finally, if we have called out our contingent, leaving our reserves at their homes, it was not until Austria had ordered her Italian army to be placed on a complete war footing, that we

* See despatch of Lord Clarendon to the Marquis d'Azeglio, in answer to the communication of the Memorandum on Sequestrations, May 16, 1853.

were convinced that we should find ourselves ere long in the face of one of the largest armies that ever crowded the soil of Italy.

These facts form a strange commentary on the pacific protestations which close the Austrian despatch, and it would be difficult to reconcile them, if, in the diplomatic note in question, we did not fathom the views of Austria on the Italian question.

Count Buol, after having rapidly retraced, from his point of view, the events which have succeeded each other since 1848, finishes by declaring that if Italy is profoundly agitated, if the people are discontented, if the Governments have done nothing to satisfy the legitimate desires of their subjects, the fault arises from the views and spirit of turbulence which liberty has developed in Piedmont ; and, to use Count Buol's very words, " through the introduction in that country (Piedmont) of institutions, which work admirably when they have been developed and matured by ages, but which do not seem to be in accordance with the genius, traditions, and social condition of the Italians."

Count Buol also points out, as a principal remedy to such a state of things (the gravity of which he does not attempt to hide), the united action of the Great Powers, to be exercised on Sardinia with the object of forcing her to modify her institutions ; in fact, by stifling the liberty of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venice, and the other States of the Peninsula would become again tranquil.

Without admitting such a conclusion, and being altogether convinced that the destruction of the liberal institutions of Piedmont, instead of insuring peace, would, in effect, throw back into the paths of revolution the Italians reduced to despair, still we do not hesitate to acknowledge there is much truth in the thought which inspired this part of the despatch of the Austrian Minister.

The contrast presented by Piedmont with the Provinces under the dominion of Austria and the other States of the Peninsula is too striking not to produce a profound irritation in Austria. The example of this country, by proving, contrary to the assertions of Count Buol, that the Italians are susceptible of a liberal and progressive government, makes more odious to the people of the Peninsula, that system which supports itself on the military *régime*, and of which the results are, corporal punishments, overwhelming taxation, disastrous measures of finance, and the abandonment to the Church of the most sacred rights of the State and its citizens.

We acknowledge, therefore, that the liberty of Piedmont is a danger and a menace to Austria. To ward it off she has but two courses to take—to destroy the liberal institutions of Sardinia, or extend her dominion over all Italy, in order to prevent contagion from spreading over the other States of the Peninsula which have not enough strength at their disposal for suppressing the voice of the people. The second course Austria has embraced, waiting to

arrive later, and by an indirect way, at the realization of the first indicated means.

Austria, up to the present moment, has succeeded, by Secret Treaties with Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, and by the indefinite occupation of the Romagna (which, by the confession of the Courts of Vienna and of Rome, is not about to cease even now), and by the considerable fortifications she has constructed, in making herself mistress of Central Italy, and thus binding Piedmont with a circle of iron.

It is against such a state of things, which is not justified in any way by the Treaties of Vienna, that Sardinia has not ceased to protest for many years, calling for the intervention and support of the great Powers who signed those Treaties.

Such a state of things has for a long time constituted a threatening danger to Piedmont, aggravated of late by extraordinary armaments and other aggressive acts on the part of Austria, which have forced the Government of the King to adopt defensive measures, and call the contingent under arms.

Let this state of things cease ; let Austrian dominion in Italy enter within the limits formerly stipulated by Treaties ; let Austria disarm, and Sardinia, whilst deploring the unhappy fate of the populations on the other side of the Ticino, will confine her efforts, as England has often recommended her to do, towards a pacific propaganda calculated more and more to enlighten public opinion in Europe on the Italian question, and thus to prepare the elements for a future solution.

But, so long as our neighbour groups round him and against us all the States of Italy which border on us, and whilst he can freely march his troops from the banks of the Po up to the summit of the Apennines ; so long as he can hold Piacenza (transformed into a fortress of the first order), continually threatening our frontier, it will be impossible for us, upholding in every respect the declaration contained in the first part of this despatch, not to remain in arms, not to preserve our just mistrust of Austria, in the face of her provoking and armed attitude.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty is too enlightened and too loyal not to admit that we cannot pursue any other line of conduct without betraying our rights, without offending our honour, whatever may be our desire to dissipate the clouds which threaten the peace of the world, and to accede to the pressing requests of a Power such as England, for whom we entertain as great a respect as we do friendship.

I request you, M. le Marquis, to read and give a copy of this despatch to Lord Malmesbury, and I avail myself, &c.

C. CAVOUR.

No. 158. *Count Cavour to the Marquis d'Azeglio*.—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Marquis d'Azeglio, March 25.) (Translation.)

Turin, March 21, 1859.

M. le Marquis,—THE Government of Russia has just made the formal proposition to submit the Italian question to a Congress of the Great Powers.

I hasten, M. le Marquis, to make known to you the views of the Government of the King in this respect.

Sardinia has no objection to make against the meeting of a Congress which, taking into consideration the interests and the just complaints of the peninsula, would take upon itself to give a pacific and satisfactory solution of the difficulties which justly attract the serious attention of Europe. But the Cabinet of Turin believes, at the same time, that Piedmont ought to be represented at this Congress, and it is persuaded that its intervention would be useful, not to say indispensable, if the Powers which show a proved sympathy for Italy, and those which desire to avert the danger of the abnormal state of the peninsula, think they can render prevalent a system more conformable to justice by obtaining concessions and guarantees of a nature to calm the public mind.

Sardinia enjoys the confidence of the unhappy populations whose fate is about to be decided; she has already raised her voice in their favour at the Congress of Paris, and that voice was not only listened to by the most enlightened Governments of Europe, but it has succeeded in calming irritation and anger ready to burst forth; it has disarmed revolution, substituting for it the regular and legal action of diplomacy.

Sardinia, in taking the lead of the national movement, has always exercised the influence it had acquired to combat openly revolutionary passions; instead of exciting minds soured by suffering and deceptions, it did its utmost to keep them within bounds, and to lead them to a more healthy appreciation of the events and obstacles which delayed the fulfilment of their legitimate desires. We may openly declare it: If Italy has not been the theatre of insane popular movements, followed by sanguinary reaction, it is to the salutary action and prudent attitude of Piedmont that it must, in a great measure, be attributed.

As regards the question which ought to form the object of the deliberations of the Congress, the Cabinet of London is cognizant of the view taken of them by the Government of the King. In the memorandum of the 1st of March it has frankly explained its views, it has pointed out the grievances of the peninsula, it has indicated the reparations they require. That explanation has been communicated to the Court of London, and it met with a favourable reception. Lord Malmesbury has admitted the moderation of Sardinia, and has rendered homage to her good

faith. Thus, whether by its general conduct since the affairs of Italy have taken the first place in the cares of Europe, whether by its declarations clearly recorded as regards the points which now appear to render an immediate solution necessary, the British Government ought to be convinced that the Court of Sardinia will lend a sincere support to all measures which the High Plenipotentiaries assembled in Congress may propose in the interest of Italy.

I venture to flatter myself, therefore, that the Cabinet of London will, without difficulty, admit the propriety that Sardinia should be represented in the Congress proposed by Russia.

For this purpose, I beg of you, M. le Marquis, to submit the above observations to Lord Malmesbury, reading to him and leaving with him a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.

C. CAVOUR.

No. 159. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 26.)

Paris, March 25, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT WALEWSKI informed me this morning that he was about to address a despatch* to the Duke of Malakoff, expressing the consent of the French Government to take the four points mentioned in your Lordship's note of the 19th instant,† to the Duke of Malakoff, as the bases of discussion in the approaching Congress on Italian affairs.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 160. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 26.)

Paris, March 25, 1859.

My Lord,—M. DE HUBNER communicated, last night, to Count Walewski the official answer‡ of the Austrian Government to the proposal emanating from Russia, that the Five Powers should meet in Congress.

Your Lordship knows the tenour of this answer.

With regard to the reserves made by Austria, Count Walewski told M. de Hubner that France accepted the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government as the basis for the deliberations of the Congress. The French Government would, he added, themselves make a proposition to the Congress founded on the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Count Walewski acquiesced, also, in the necessity of Sardinia disarming before the Congress should meet. He intimated that a demand to this effect might be made by the Five Powers.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

* No. 156.

† No. 121.

‡ No. 173 and No. 197.

No. 161. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 26, 1859.

My Lord,—I ENCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, the accompanying copy of a despatch* from Count Cavour to the Marquis d'Azeglio, which the latter has communicated to me, being the reply of the Sardinian Government to a note which Her Majesty's Minister at Turin was instructed to address to that Government, inquiring whether Sardinia was prepared to make a formal declaration that she had no intention of attacking Austria.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 162. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 26, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 25th instant,† I have to instruct your Excellency to make the French Government clearly understand that the approaching Congress on Italian affairs must confine their discussions to the four points mentioned in my despatch to your Excellency of the 21st instant.‡

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 163. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 26, 1859.

WHATEVER may have been the confidential communications on the subject between the French and Russian Governments, it was not until the success which had attended your Excellency's efforts at Vienna had become patent and notorious, that the propositions of the Court of St. Petersburg assumed any definite shape.

Your Excellency reached Paris on the evening of the 16th. and saw Count Walewski on the following morning, and the Emperor later in the day; and the despatch from Count Walewski to the Duc de Malakoff, dated on the 17th, and communicated to me on Friday the 18th, showed pretty clearly the disposition of the Imperial Cabinet to accept the Russian overture, when formally made.

A Cabinet met on Saturday, and an hour after I communicated to the Marshal the conditions under which Her Majesty's Government would accept the proposal, should it be made. They were the four points, of which your Excellency is cognisant.

Having, by Sunday the 20th, received no intimation from Baron Brunnow, I begged him to call, and I found on his arrival that he had no instructions, and apparently no knowledge of the subject. I informed him of the French statement, and writing down the same conditions which I had given to the Duc de

* Inclosure in No. 157.

† No. 159.

‡ No. 130.

Malakoff, I requested he would submit them by telegraph to his Court, as being the only ones under which we could accept the overture which had been announced by Count Walewski as forthcoming. On the next day, the 21st, I received from Sir John Crampton, by telegram, the notice that, that same morning, Prince Gortchakoff had sent his proposal to Baron Brunnow, and also that he accepted the four points which Her Majesty's Government had submitted by his Minister.

On the 22nd. the Baron called and informed me by a memorandum, that the four points were accepted by his Government; but he still did not give me any proposal, being apparently uncertain whether it was to originate from France or Russia. However this may be, it was not till the 23rd that he came again, at my request, and presented his official proposal for a Congress of the Five Powers.

Thus you will observe, that I only received on the 23rd from Baron Brunnow the formal and official proposal for a Congress, and that proposal proceeded, as your Excellency will have seen, from St. Petersburg, after the Russian Government had become acquainted with the conditions on which alone Her Majesty's Government consented to take part in the Conference, and which Sir John Crampton acquainted me, on the 21st, were accepted by the Russian Government.

It is clear from this statement, that the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government as the result of what had passed between your Excellency and the Austrian Government, were the bases on which the Russian Government made the formal and official proposal of a Congress; and it is equally clear that if any peaceable solution of the existing difficulties is arrived at, Europe will be indebted for that result to the ability displayed by your Excellency at Vienna, in carrying out the views of Her Majesty's Government, and to the favourable impression which your Excellency was able to make on the counsels of the Austrian Government during your stay in that capital.

No. 164. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, March 26, 1859.

Sir,—I RECEIVED this morning your telegram of yesterday afternoon, acquainting me that although Prince Gortchakoff concurred in the view of Her Majesty's Government as to the propriety of the Italian States being heard before the Congress by their Representatives in regard to reform and confederation, yet he would not himself make a proposal to that effect, and that such an arrangement must be subject to the condition that any Conference of Italian States for this purpose should be held after, not before, the Great Powers had agreed in Congress upon general principles of action.

In regard to this condition, I have explained to you that Her Majesty's Government, in suggesting the admission of the Representatives of the Italian States to be heard before the Congress, had in view the course observed in the Conferences on the affairs of Belgium, where the Belgium and Dutch Agents, when called upon, were admitted to lay before the Conference such observations as they wished to offer on any points under the consideration of the Conference, before such points were finally determined upon by the Plenipotentiaries; and Her Majesty's Government consider that in the same manner the Representatives of the Italian States will on the present occasion be invited, during the deliberations of the Congress, to lay before it any statements which they may deem calculated to assist the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers in determining upon the recommendations to be eventually made to the Governments of those States respectively.

This course, Her Majesty's Government conceive, will be consistent with the spirit of the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, which provides for the participation of interested Power in deliberations affecting them, and Her Majesty's Government cannot be a party to decisions in regard to reforms and confederations to take effect in Italian States, unless the States which might be affected thereby shall have the opportunity of being previously heard by their Representatives on the subject.

I learn from a subsequent telegram which I have received from you, that the Russian Government, while agreeing with Her Majesty's Government that the Congress may meet at Baden on the 30th of April, concurs also in the admission of the Italian States, Naples included, before the Congress, with a consultative voice in regard to points affecting their individual interests, and that the Russian Minister at this Court is authorized, without further reference to St. Petersburg, to agree to the terms in which the invitation should be made to the Italian States, and to forward such invitations through the Russian Ministers accredited to them.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 165. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, March 26, 1859.

Sir,—It appears from the telegram which I have received from you, that the Russian Government objects to the answer returned by the Court of Vienna to the proposal for a Congress, on the ground that it makes the acceptance of the proposal by Austria subject to conditions inconsistent with the bases proposed by the British and adopted by the Russian Government; that it assumes that the object of the Conference is to maintain Treaties generally, and not only those of 1815; that it demands that Sardinia should disarm, without referring to disarmament of Austria also, whereas Russia does not consider that either party should be

asked, as a preliminary, to disarm ; that it requires certain principles to be fixed beforehand, whereas Russia contends that the bases proposed by England establish such principles as far as they can now be laid down ; and, lastly, that it appeals to what was settled at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, whereas, in the opinion of Russia, the principles in regard to Italy laid down at that Congress, are inapplicable at the present time, and the principles of the Holy Alliance, if those are alluded to by Austria, can no longer be invoked, as that Alliance is extinct.

Her Majesty's Government, as I have informed you, agree generally with the answer returned by Prince Gortchakoff to Austria, but they are of opinion that as the Conference cannot assemble before the 1st of May, the disarmament should precede its meeting, since, if in this interval the armies of Austria and Sardinia are allowed to remain assembled on either side of the Ticino, events might occur which would render a meeting of the Congress ineffectual for the purpose which is contemplated by it.

Her Majesty's Government on this ground have, as I have informed you by telegraph, offered to invite Sardinia to disband the contingents which she has lately called out, and to withdraw her forces to their ordinary stations, in return for a guarantee, on the part of England and France, that Austria shall not attack Sardinia. In the present state of Italy war may break out at any time, if the two armies are not made to retire ; but as a condition of this course on the part of Her Majesty's Government, they would expect Austria to accept the Congress and the four points which they propose as subjects of deliberation, and also promise to withdraw her troops from the Piedmontese frontier.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 166. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Scarlett.*

Foreign Office, March 26, 1859.

Sir,—You will have learnt by my telegram of this afternoon that, at the request of France, Russia had proposed that a Congress of the Five Great Powers should be held for the settlement of Italian affairs, and that the proposal had been generally accepted ; and further, that Her Majesty's Government had suggested as the bases on which the Congress should proceed :—

1st. The prevention of war between Austria and Sardinia ;
2ndly. The evacuation of the Papal States by the Austrian and French troops ;

3rdly. The reformation of the internal administration of the Papal States on the principles enunciated in 1831 and 1857 ; and,

4thly. The substitution of some other arrangement for the special Treaties subsisting between Austria and certain of the Italian States.

It has further been considered that as in the case of the Conferences of 1831 and the following years respecting the separation of Belgium from Holland the Representatives of those Powers were admitted to be heard before the Conference, so also, on the present occasion, the Italian States should be invited to appear, on the same footing, by their Representatives, if they should desire to do so.

Her Majesty's Government have offered to join with France in a guarantee of Sardinia against Austrian attack, if she will disband the contingents which she has lately called into the field; but at present the decision of France on this point has not been made known to them.

On the other hand, Austria requires that Sardinia shall be excluded from the Congress, while the other Italian States are admitted; but I need scarcely say that such an arrangement cannot be listened to by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 167. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, March 27, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government have learnt with some surprise, by your Lordship's telegram of yesterday afternoon, that Count Buol states that he has received no official notification of the four points put forward by Her Majesty's Government, as the basis for the deliberations of the Congress, and that the only formal communication in regard to the Congress is that which has been made to him by Russia. It appears from your report that Count Buol requires that any communication in regard to the four points should be made to him officially and in writing, and that his Excellency adheres to the conditions that he has specified in his answer, accepting the proposal of Russia, namely, that the subjects to be treated of by the Congress should be defined beforehand, and that Sardinia should disarm.

I cannot look upon the course pursued by Count Buol in this respect, otherwise than as an expedient to gain time. I communicated officially to Count Apponyi, as well as to your Lordship, the four points which Her Majesty's Government insisted upon as conditions to their assenting to take part in a Congress on Italian affairs; and I equally acquainted the Austrian Minister and yourself with the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, that all the Italian States should be admitted to be heard before the Congress in a consultative capacity, in the same manner as Belgium and Holland were admitted to be heard before the Conference of 1831 and the following years.

I cannot doubt that your Lordship stated all this officially to Count Buol, but if his Excellency still requires that it should be conveyed to him in an official note, your Lordship will address

such a note to him, and in it your Lordship will set forth the following as the points to which Her Majesty's Government consider that the deliberations of the Congress should be directed, namely,—

1st. The means of securing peace between Austria and Sardinia.

2ndly. The evacuation of the Roman States.

3rdly. The reforms that may be introduced into the internal administration of the Italian States.

4thly. The substitution of some other arrangements for the Treaties between Austria and the Italian States.

Your Lordship will further say that Her Majesty's Government consider that no questions affecting the territorial arrangements, or the Treaties of 1815, are to be mooted in the Congress.

Your Lordship will add that Her Majesty's Government will urge the Government of the Emperor of the French to insist on the immediate disarmament of Sardinia, and as an inducement to her to comply, they will be ready to join France in giving a guarantee to Sardinia that Austria will faithfully observe her engagement not to attack her, on condition that Austria will accept the Congress as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, both in respect of the subjects to be discussed, and the composition of the Congress itself, and will promise to withdraw her troops from the Piedmontese frontier.

Her Majesty's Government are aware that Count Buol holds to the exclusion of Sardinia from being, like other Italian States, admitted even indirectly to the Conference; but your Lordship will tell Count Buol that no English Minister could assent to such exclusion, if other Italian States were admitted; and if Count Buol will not give way on this point, Her Majesty's Government will be obliged to renounce all participation in the proposed Congress.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 168. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, March 27, 1859.

Sir,—In an interview which I have had this day with the Russian Minister, I called his attention to the critical state of affairs on the frontier between Piedmont and Lombardy, where the concentration, on either side, of large bodies of troops might at any moment give occasion for a collision; and I suggested that England, France, and Russia, might offer Austria, in return for her consenting to a Congress on the terms already placed before her, coupled with a declaration that she would not attack Sardinia, and would withdraw her forces from the frontier, to summon Sardinia to disarm, England and France guaranteeing Sardinia for a time against an attack on the part of Austria.

I have desired you, by telegraph, to make a similar suggestion

to Prince Gortchakoff, and to urge him, if he concurs in it, to press its adoption on the French Government.

Her Majesty's Government are very apprehensive that if some measure of the kind is not taken speedily, a conflict will ensue between the forces now so immediately in presence of each other. Indeed, only a few days ago, such a conflict was nearly brought on by a party of Austrian soldiers who overstepped the frontier, and entered on the territory of Sardinia.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 169. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Hudson.*

Foreign Office, March 27, 1859.

Sir,—I ACQUAINTED you, by telegraph, last night, that Her Majesty's Government had proposed that Sardinia, in common with the other Italian States, should be invited to attend at the proposed Congress on Italian affairs, in order that, as was the case in the Belgian Conferences of 1830 and following years, their Representatives might lay before the Plenipotentiaries any statements which, as consultative Powers, they might desire to make. I also informed you that if Sardinia would dismiss her contingents and the free corps that she has enrolled, and would withdraw her troops into their ordinary quarters, Her Majesty's Government would be ready, in conjunction with France, to guarantee Sardinia, for a certain time, against an attack by Austria; and I said that Austria, on her side, would declare that she would not attack Sardinia, and would withdraw her forces from the frontier.

I considered that during M. Cavour's absence at Paris, you might find an opportunity of stating this directly to the King of Sardinia.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 170. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 28.)

Turin, March 19, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul for Venice.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure. *Consul-General James to Sir J. Hudson.*

Venice, March 8, 1859.

Sir,—I SHOULD have written to you before, and also sent despatches to you for the Foreign Office, if I had had anything of importance to communicate; but the daily routine has been unvaried, and the preparations nothing more than is justified by the menacing attitude of France.

Some fresh bodies of troops have been poured into the Lombardo-Venetian territory ; additions made to the fortifications round Venice ; and some new stockaded forts, formidable, by their position, to a hostile fleet, have been erected on some of the islands at the head of the Adriatic. These constructions have been worked at with great assiduity ; and I am informed that not less than 2,000 men have been employed upon them constantly.

The conscription is going on here, which always produces much discontent ; but there seems to be not much more agitation than usual : and the tendency to riot, which characterized the commencement of the year, has subsided, perhaps in the expectation of speedy French support.

Pray, if you should think that this meagre information can be at all useful to the Earl of Malmesbury, forward it to him by the first opportunity ; and believe, &c.

G. P. R. JAMES.

No. 171. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 28.)*

(Extract.)

Vienna, March 19, 1859.

I HAD the honour to receive, late on the evening of the 18th instant, your Lordship's telegram of that date,† informing me of the proposal of the French Emperor and Government for a Congress of the Five Powers, to be held in a neutral town, and desiring to be informed whether the Austrian Cabinet would accept this proposal on the following conditions, viz., that no allusion should be made to her territory ; that the subject to be treated by the Congress should be confined to the evacuation of the Roman States by the foreign armies ; to the reforms to be proposed to the Roman and other Italian Governments ; and, lastly, to the question of agreeing upon some substitution for the Treaties between Austria and the Italian Duchies.

In order to meet your Lordship's desire to receive, if possible, a reply on the following day, previous to the meeting of the Cabinet at 3 o'clock, I lost no time in requesting an interview with Count Buol, and his Excellency was good enough to receive me at a late hour on the same night.

On my communicating to his Excellency the substance of my instructions, he did not appear unprepared for such a communication, for he at once stated to me that he had learnt that a proposal of this nature had emanated from Russia, and had been accepted by France.

In referring to the subjects laid down in your Lordship's telegram, to be brought before the Congress (and with reference more especially to reforms to be proposed to Italian States), Count

* No. 120 is the reply to the telegram on which this despatch was founded:

† See No. 119.

Buol called my attention to the Protocol attached to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818, in which the Contracting Parties agreed, that "meetings or Congresses on affairs specially connected with other of the European States, could only take place on a formal invitation on the part of those States to whom these affairs related, and on the express reserve of their right to participate therein, directly or indirectly, by their Plenipotentiaries."

I replied to his Excellency, that no one would for a moment contest the validity of this Protocol, but that many, if not all, would, under present circumstances, consider its application inappropriate and inapplicable. Vital interests were now at stake. The question at issue was that of peace or war. The Great Powers, ever watchful for the common interest of Europe, were ardently desirous of maintaining the former, and of averting from mankind the miseries of the latter.

It was, therefore, paradoxical to raise from the dust, after the lapse of forty years, an Article from a Protocol, the very object of which, when agreed to, was for the purpose of consolidating good amity and friendship between all States, and to use it now as an element of obstruction to the laudable efforts of those who were labouring in the cause of peace. I reminded him that very large holes had been made in the Treaties of 1815, without rendering those Treaties less efficacious as a whole ; and that Austria was not free from this charge.

"How so ?" said his Excellency. I replied, that the incorporation of Cracow was of too much importance, and of too modern a date, to have escaped my memory. This allusion, made in the form of earnest reasoning rather than in an invective tone, was received by his Excellency in the spirit in which it was offered, and seemed to produce its effect.

I expressed to his Excellency my anxious hope that the Austrian Government would not reject the proposals for a Congress, as the most serious and prejudicial effect would be produced if Austria should be the only one of the Great Powers adverse to it.

I further observed to his Excellency that a Congress was not a tribunal, and that Austria, by accepting a Congress, did not undertake any binding engagement ; on the contrary, by acceding to the general wish of the Great Powers cordially and with good grace, Austria would afford to Europe the strongest proof of her desire for peace, and would thereby gain for herself the respect and esteem which is universally accorded to a Power whose policy is actuated by principles of right, and not of might.

Count Buol said he had seen Lord Cowley with great pleasure. "But he should have gone to Turin ; it is at Turin that you can render eminent service to the cause of peace ; it is there that you ought to urge your peaceful efforts. It is Piedmont that is agitating and preparing for war. We are not aggressive. We have positively assured you that we shall not attack Sardinia, nor

anybody else. Have you received the same pacific assurance from Turin?"

I replied to Count Buol that Earl Cowley's mission had been one of confidential and friendly interest for Austria, but that we had not confined our peaceful efforts to Vienna. Her Majesty's Government had been equally and energetically active in the cause of peace at Turin.

His Excellency informed me that he would, on the following morning, submit to the Emperor the communication which I had been instructed to make, and would inform me of His Imperial Majesty's decision at the earliest moment on the following morning.

On taking leave of his Excellency I could plainly perceive that the Austrian Government would, under conditions and with reserves, accept the proposals offered by Her Majesty's Government for a pacific solution of the Italian complications.

No. 172. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 28.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, March 21, 1859.

I WAITED by invitation on Count Buol, on the 19th instant, at 10 A.M.,* when his Excellency informed me that he had just left the Emperor, and that His Majesty had charged him to acquaint me with the following decision he had taken on the subject of the proposals for a Congress:—

Austria will agree to enter at once, conjointly with the other Great Powers, into negotiations with the Papal Government at Rome, through the ordinary diplomatic channel, on the subject of the evacuation of the Roman States by the foreign armies, and on the reforms which it may be deemed advisable to recommend to the Pope. The Austrian Government will be ready to take the project drawn up in 1831, as the basis, or starting-point for their deliberations.

Count Buol considers that these two questions are not of a nature which can be discussed by an European Congress, at which the Pope was not represented; and he is confident that His Holiness would not consent to take part in a Congress assembled for the discussion of his internal affairs out of the limits of his States.

The Austrian Government, therefore, propose to separate these two questions, and to eliminate them from the subjects to be discussed by the proposed Congress. The Austrian Cabinet were, however, willing, at the same time, to lend their co-operation for their satisfactory arrangement by ordinary diplomatic negotiations at Rome, in the same manner, and on the basis, in which they were conducted in 1831.

* No. 127 is the reply to the telegram on which this despatch is founded.

There only then remained the fourth point of your Lordship's conditions to be submitted to an European Congress ; namely, "the substitution for the Treaties which Austria had entered into with the Duchies of Modena and Parma in 1847 ;" and the Austrian Government declare themselves ready to agree to the proposed Congress, on condition that—

1. There shall be no question of any territorial changes.
2. That, previous to the Congress meeting, Sardinia shall disarm, and shall give an engagement to respect the existing territorial Treaties, and also those with her neighbours.
3. Austria will require a strict observance of the terms of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818, which virtually implies a participation in the Congress on the part of those Italian States whose affairs are to be treated of.

If these conditions are complied with, Austria will not object to an arrangement by which the internal safety of the minor Italian States may be secured, and which will no longer render necessary the maintenance of the Treaties of 1847 with the Duchies.

Count Buol, in communicating to me this reply to your Lordship's proposals, stated that there was evidently a desire at Paris to make a retreat, and that the Austrian Cabinet were willing to meet that desire in a spirit of conciliation and moderation.

In reference to the Protocol of 1818, Count Buol stated, at an interview I had with him on the following day, that Count Walewski, on a previous occasion, had fully recognized the validity of this Protocol, when some allusion was made to it at Paris (I think) in 1856 or 1857 ; and his Excellency read me part of a despatch from M. Hübner, testifying to the fact.

Basing his argument on this Protocol, Count Buol said that he could not discuss in a Congress the affairs of independent foreign States, unless they were therein represented.

I observed to him that if the Duchies were to be represented in the Congress, it was an impossibility to exclude Sardinia.

His Excellency replied that the only two Treaties lately referred to, were those with the Duchies ; consequently, according to the Protocol of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, they had a right to be represented, but that as no Treaties with Sardinia were to be discussed, she could not claim a participation in the Congress.

I observed to him that this might be logical, but that it was impracticable, and that Sardinia could not be excluded if the others were admitted.

"If," replied Count Buol, "Sardinia were to apply to the European Powers for a Congress to aid her with their advice and counsels to rid herself of the propagandism which had taken possession of the country, I should be the first to accept and to render her every assistance."

His Excellency then cited the Congresses of Laybach and

Verona, both of which had been respectively summoned on the express invitation of the Kings of Naples and Spain.

I represented to his Excellency that time and circumstances changed very much the character of political situations, and that what was applicable, and even necessary, at one moment, might become totally different at another.

In the present case political necessity urged on Austria the frank acceptation of a Congress, and that if she raised trivial difficulties to its realization they would later fall on her own head, and she alone would be responsible for the consequences which might result therefrom.

I communicated to Count Buol the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 19th. He was, on this occasion, less favourably disposed than he had been on the previous day, and appeared to entertain great suspicions with respect to a Congress, fearing that the Emperor of the French was not sincere, and that his sole object was to gain time.

On leaving his Excellency I was less hopeful than I had been on the previous day, that the proposals for a Congress would be accepted on such terms as would meet the end desired, and the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

No. 173. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 28.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, March 24, 1859.

In my previous despatches of the 19th and 21st instant,* I have endeavoured to give your Lordship a general and consecutive report of my different interviews, and their results, with Count Buol, since the receipt of your Lordship's instructions of the 18th instant, and of which my various telegrams have been the precursors.

I must not fail to inform your Lordship that I took an opportunity, in conversation with Count Buol, to throw out the idea that Austria should accept a Congress on Italian questions conditionally upon France calling on Sardinia to disarm under guarantee for a certain period, by England and France, against the invasion of Sardinia by Austria, so long as Sardinia confined herself to her own territory.

Count Buol at once rejected any such idea as impracticable.

I did not think it advisable to press this proposal, more especially as the answer which had been made to your Lordship's proposals appeared to me of fair promise.

On waiting on Count Buol on the 21st instant, his Excellency informed me that the Russian Minister had just communicated to him a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff, instructing him to make a formal proposal of a Congress of the Five Great Powers, for the

* Nos. 171, 172.

adjustment of the complications in Italy, with a view to maintain the peace of Europe.

Count Buol stated that he had expressed to M. de Balabine his thanks and appreciation for the laudable efforts of Russia in the cause of peace, and would submit the proposal to the Emperor his master.

On the 23rd (yesterday) I called on Count Buol, when His Excellency informed me of the reply which he was about to make in the form of an official note (by the orders of the Emperor) to the Russian proposal, of which I forwarded to your Lordship and to Earl Cowley the general substance by telegraph.

This note* is couched in very conciliatory but guarded terms; accepting the proposed Congress on the general invitation expressed by Russia, and conveying the opinion of the Austrian Government that the complications and agitation now existing in Italy are solely to be attributed to the policy and attitude of Sardinia.

It expresses a wish to be informed beforehand of any topics in addition to the above, which it may be intended to submit to the discussion of the Congress.

Count Buol stated to me very frankly, that he had given his bill of fare. He should like to know that of the other Powers. He begged me to repeat to your Lordship that he did not retract anything which he had agreed upon with Lord Cowley, and which he had subsequently recorded in his despatches to Count Apponyi, which have been brought to your Lordship's notice.

He is of opinion that Earl Cowley may make profitable use of the concession to be made by Austria with respect to the modification of her Italian Treaties, and hinted that that point might form the concession to be required by France.

I found his Excellency far more satisfactory and pliable than on the previous occasions. We had some conversation on the questions of evacuation and reforms, and I communicated to his Excellency the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd instant.†

As regards the former, there will not be, I think, any disinclination to adopt the view expressed by your Lordship in that telegram.

On the question of reforms, his Excellency was less easy, repeating the difficulty of these questions being discussed without the participation of the Pope and other Italian Sovereigns, and the certain refusal of the Pope to take part in those discussions.

I think, however, that as matters progress these difficulties may be turned in some way or other, for in reality the question of difference is merely one of form.

The other point to which I would invite your Lordship's attention, and which appears to me the only one on the fulfilment of

* See No. 197.

† No. 140.

which Count Buol might be disposed to insist, is the condition by Austria that, previous to the meeting of the Congress, Sardinia shall disarm.

I said to his Excellency, that your Lordship's primitive proposal distinctly stated that, if Austria accepted the Congress, the Emperor of the French would join England in calling on Sardinia to disarm. Now, I observed to his Excellency that, if this step were taken by England and France, it should be a sufficient guarantee to Austria, and that, consequently, she would do wisely to leave its fulfilment in the hands of England and France, and not to move in it herself.

Although Count Buol did not wholly concur in the view I had expressed, nevertheless I am of opinion that, if pressed, he would not hold out against it. It appeared to me that all Count Buol's calculations are based on a presupposed necessary change of system and policy in Sardinia. If that change should be effected (and it can scarcely be imagined that Count Cavour will be enabled to hold his ground if peace is maintained), the Austrian Government and Count Buol will be ready to extend to Sardinia, at once, the hand of conciliation and peace, and to renew cordial relations with her.

The Russian Minister was waiting to see Count Buol after my interview, when his Excellency was to inform him, verbally, of the reply which the Emperor of Austria had instructed him to make to the Russian proposal. The official note in which it is embodied was to be delivered to M. de Balabine last evening.

No. 174. *Capt. Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 28.)

Berne, March 24, 1859.

My Lord,—REPORTS having appeared in many of the newspapers that the Austrians were concentrating a corps of 15,000 men at Bregenz, on the Lake of Constance, I have made inquiries of the Federal Councillor charged with the War Department, who tells me that there is no truth in these rumours; that there are 600 men at Bregenz, its usual garrison, and that preparations were making for stationing 800 men at Dornbirn, a village a few miles south of Bregenz; that this was for the purpose of keeping up the communications, should it be necessary to send troops from Innsbruck to Ulm, via the Klortter Valley, Feldkirk, and Bregenz.

The Federal Council have increased the tax on the exportation of horses from 5 to 400 francs, which amounts to a prohibition. They have been induced to take this step in consequence of the measures adopted by other European States, and from the increasing scarcity of horses, owing to their disuse on the introduction of railways, and the frequent substitution of cattle in ploughs and waggons; the breed of the latter having received a great

impulse from the large cheese manufactories lately established throughout Switzerland.

I have, &c.

E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 175. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 28.)

Berlin, March 24, 1859.

My Lord,—BARON SCHLEINITZ having expressed his intention of writing to Turin in the sense of your Lordship's despatch to Sir James Hudson of the 7th instant,* on the subject of Count Cavour's Memorandum, I have deemed it advisable to leave your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch in his Excellency's hands.

He has thanked me for this communication, and appeared entirely to approve of the manner in which your Lordship had treated the subject.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 176. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 28.)

Berlin, March 26, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Sardinian Envoy had an interview yesterday with Baron Schleinitz, for the purpose of pressing on his consideration the admission of a Representative of his Government at the approaching Congress. His Excellency replied to Count de Launay that it had been decided that the Congress should be composed of none but the Five Great Powers, and that if Sardinia were admitted, the other Italian States could equally demand admission, which would be to the advantage of Austria, as it would insure to her a majority. He gave Count de Launay further to understand, that it was already settled that Representatives of the Italian States might be heard at the Congress, but would not form part of it. The Sardinian Envoy replied, that the feelings of the population of Italy would not be represented if Sardinia were excluded; and he left Baron Schleinitz much dissatisfied with the reception given to the communication which he had been directed by his Government to make on this subject.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 177. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 28.)

Berlin, March 26, 1859.

My Lord,—BARON SCHLEINITZ having mentioned to me yesterday that he had not yet received communication of the form in which your Lordship had drawn up the four points on which Her Majesty's Government consent to enter on negotiation in the proposed Congress on the affairs of Italy, I have deemed it advisable to read to his Excellency, and I have left with him for his confi-

* No. 90.

dential information, the copies of your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd instant* to Sir John Crampton and its inclosures.

I trust your Lordship will approve of what I have done, particularly as Baron Schleinitz did not possess anything on the subject, beyond a copy of a meagre telegram from Baron Brunnow to Baron Budberg, which contains no details, and runs as follows ;—

“Réformes, évacuation des Etats Pontificaux, sécurité contre agression, arrangement pour dégager l'Autriche des Traités spéciaux. Point de départ, maintien de la circonscription territoriale.”†

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No.178. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec.Mar.28.)

Berlin, March 26, 1859.

My Lord,—THE different telegrams which I have forwarded to your Lordship during this week, will have apprised you of the readiness with which the Prussian Government have agreed to the project of a Congress; and though unprepared for the proposal, which was made to them on the same day from Paris and St. Petersburg, they have long entertained the opinion that a Congress of the Five Great Powers was the only chance left of saving Europe from the dangers of war.

On the first announcement of the proposed Congress, Baron Schleinitz was inclined to attribute the decision taken by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to the late communications which had been made from here to the Imperial Government, which he believes, at all events, contributed to fix their attention on the difficulties and complications that might arise to Europe if the state of Italy were not immediately taken into serious consideration by the Great Courts. He is of opinion that no other Power but Russia could have made the proposal of a Congress acceptable to France, and he trusts that as little time as possible will be lost in fixing a period for its meeting.

I have mentioned to his Excellency that the 30th of April had been spoken of. He thinks it would be well if the Congress could assemble at an earlier period, and he considers that Mannheim would be a very convenient and central spot for its meeting, being as near Paris and London as Baden, nearer Berlin and Vienna by a few hours, and offering every facility of communication, without being exposed to an inconvenient influx of inquisitive visitors.

When I saw Baron Schleinitz yesterday, I read to him the

* No. 145.

† (Translation.)—“Reforms, evacuation of the Papal States, security against aggression, arrangement to relieve Austria from Special Treaties. Point of departure, maintenance of territorial boundaries.”

despatches of the 22nd and 23rd instant,* which your Lordship has done me the honour to address to me respecting the proposed Congress. His Excellency approves generally of everything hitherto done by your Lordship on the subject, and he agrees entirely in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the Italian States should be all heard, but not represented, at the Congress; and above all, he desires that the Congress should not enter too much into details, and avoid everything likely uselessly to prolong its labours.

Baron Schleinitz seemed apprehensive that Austria would object to the substituting for her Treaties with the Duchies the formation of a Confederation for their mutual protection; but he was quite ready, as far as he had been able to examine them, to support the views of Her Majesty's Government, and to press their adoption at Vienna; and he will direct Baron Werther, the new Prussian Minister at that Imperial Court, to place himself in communication with Lord Augustus Loftus.

I have thought it advisable, for the more complete information of Baron Schleinitz, to leave with his Excellency your Lordship's despatches, and I shall report to your Lordship such further observations as he may make on the subject after he has given to it his mature consideration.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 179. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 28, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Excellency, in your telegram of this morning expressed your apprehension that Austria would not be inclined to receive with favour any proposal to withdraw her forces from the Sardinian frontier, before Sardinia had disarmed, more especially if that proposal were made to her by Her Majesty's Government in conjunction with France and Russia; and your Excellency added that, although the hesitation shown by Austria in dealing with the questions now under discussion might justly expose her to blame, still the willingness that she has shown to enter into the views of the British Cabinet on the main questions at issue, would appear to warrant Her Majesty's Government in giving her any fair support. Austria, your Excellency observed, having promised not to attack Sardinia, it might be a question whether she could justly be required to set the example of withdrawing her troops from the frontier; while the offer that Her Majesty's Government have made, however distasteful to Austria, of joining in a guarantee of Sardinia against an attack on the part of Austria, ought, at all events, to satisfy the former.

Her Majesty's Government concur in your Excellency's views; but they only propose that the Governments of Prussia and

* Nos. 140, 144.

Russia should urge upon France and Austria that, as partly suggested in my telegrams to your Excellency and to Lord Augustus Loftus of the 19th instant,* Sardinia should disarm, in return for a guarantee by England and France against Austrian attack ; such disarmament on the part of Sardinia being taken by Austria as sufficient to induce her to withdraw her troops from the Sardinian frontier, and accept the Congress on the terms suggested by Her Majesty's Government both as to subject-matter and composition.

Her Majesty's Government do not propose that Austria should be asked to withdraw her troops from the frontier before the Sardinian contingents are disarmed, but that in pursuance of a mutual understanding with her allies, Austria should engage to withdraw her troops at the same time that Sardinia disbanded her contingents, and should also agree to the Congress as proposed by Her Majesty's Government.

It appeared to Her Majesty's Government that, in proportion to the number of Powers who may be parties to this arrangement, will be the security acquired by Austria and Sardinia against each other. Her Majesty's Government do not require that Austria should be the first to retire ; but the object at which they aim is to affect the disarmament of Sardinia, and the withdrawal of the Austrian troops from the frontier, before the meeting of the Congress, lest, if it were to be deferred until the meeting, collisions should take place between the forces now in presence of each other.

As regards the question of guaranteeing Sardinia against Austrian attack, your Excellency will understand that Her Majesty's Government cannot singly enter into any such guarantee. In the various changes incidental to all political combinations it might be that such a guarantee would place this country under the obligation to defend Sardinia, not only against an isolated attack on the part of Austria, but against an attack directed against her by a combined Austrian and French force. The guarantee, if given, must be for a limited period only.

I have, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 180. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, March 28, 1859.

Sir,—HER Majesty's Government agree with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in the propriety of inviting the Prussian Government to co-operate with the two Governments in recommending to the Austrian and French Governments the suggestion offered by Her Majesty's Government, for the disarmament of Sardinia, and for the withdrawal of the Austrian forces from the Piedmontese frontier ; and I have directed Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin to make a proposal to that effect to the Court of Prussia.

* Nos. 118, 119.

Her Majesty's Government, however, consider that a disarmament cannot be properly asked of Austria, or more required than that she should accept the Congress on the basis proposed, and withdraw her forces from the line of the Ticino. Austria has declared that she will not attack Sardinia; but as Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate offering to Austria a guarantee on the part of England and France that Sardinia will not attack her, they cannot ask her to reduce her forces. The guarantee of England and France to Sardinia is practically a substitute for her disbanded soldiers, far more valuable to her security than the existence of those corps. It is evident, however, that in the present state of her finances Austria will only be too glad to reduce her armaments, when the danger to encounter which they were set on foot shall have passed away.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 181. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, March 28, 1859.

My Lord,—Your Lordship will have learned by my telegram of this day that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that Prussia may, with advantage, act at Vienna in concert with England, France, and Russia, in submitting to Austria that if she would agree to the proposals respecting the composition of the Congress, and to the four points laid down by Her Majesty's Government as the bases by which the deliberations of that body should be regulated, and would further agree to withdraw her troops from the frontier of Piedmont, the four Powers, on their part, would summon Sardinia to disband the contingents that she has recently called out, and to replace her troops in their usual quarters, in return for a guarantee on the part of England and France that Austria will not attack her.

Should the Russian Government observe that Austria ought also to disarm, you will point out that the guarantee is a practical substitute for the disbanded troops, a guarantee which Austria does not obtain.

Her Majesty's Government trust that the Prussian Government will consent to urge this matter strongly on the Cabinets of Vienna and Paris. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg share with that of this country the wish that Prussia should exert herself for this object; the attainment of which is of the more importance, inasmuch as it affords the best chance of averting a disturbance of the general peace, which, while the Austrian and Sardinian armies are in presence of each other on the frontier, may at any moment ensue.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 182. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, March 29, 1859.

Sir,—It would appear from your telegram of yesterday after-

noon that Prince Gortchakoff considers that disarmament was one of the points to which the adhesion of Austria was required : and his Excellency comments upon the absence of any allusion to that matter in the answer given by Count Buol to Lord Augustus Loftus.

Prince Gortchakoff seems also to have expressed his anxiety that no misapprehension should exist on measures to be taken to prevent hostilities between Austria and Sardinia ; and his Excellency suggests that the united pressure of the four Powers should be brought to bear on Austria ; and that if Austria cannot be persuaded to accept the Conference on the terms proposed the other Powers should proceed without her.

I have instructed you by telegraph to explain to Prince Gortchakoff that Count Buol understands and accepts the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government, but those points did not include preliminary disarmament. You will find this clearly stated in my letters to the Duc de Malakoff and to Baron Brunnow, of the 22nd and 23rd of March, of which you will have received copies.

Her Majesty's Government desire, however, that you should make Prince Gortchakoff understand that they are not forming a coalition against Austria, but inviting her to join in giving effect to the views which they entertain ; and Her Majesty's Government see no reason to doubt that Austria will do this if she is treated with proper respect and with the patient courtesy usually observed among great Powers.

You may point out to Prince Gortchakoff that the difficulties which the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, respecting disarmament, has to contend with, are greater at Paris than at Vienna, and that the influence of Russia would be most advantageously brought to bear upon the French Cabinet.

You may add, that as far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, they are content that the place at which the Congress shall meet should be Baden, and the time the 30th of April.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 183. *Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 29.)
(Extract.) Frankfort, March 25, 1859.

THERE is no doubt that the effect of the article in the "Moniteur" referring to Germany, has been to strengthen the tendency to common action already so strongly evinced by a large majority of the Germanic Confederation.

The praise bestowed in that article on Prussia placed that country in a false position, and had precisely a contrary effect to that which the writer probably intended.

Though no public declaration of adhesion to the policy of supporting Austria against an attack upon her Italian provinces has been given by the Berlin Cabinet, the press has been less

reserved. With the exception of the "Cologne Gazette" and the "Elberfeld Journal," most of the organs of public opinion assert vehemently that the cause of Austria, even in Italy, is the cause of the German Confederation.

No. 184. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Mar. 29.)
(Extract.)

Paris, March 28, 1859.

COUNT CAVOUR, who arrived in Paris early on Saturday morning, did me the honour to call upon me yesterday afternoon, when a conversation of some length ensued between us.

Count Cavour, after alluding to the visit which I had lately paid to Vienna, and which I good humouredly said I had him to thank for, said, with equal good temper, that he was sorry to see the impression which prevailed that Sardinia was responsible for the present crisis; and he seemed to invite some expression of opinion on my part. I told him, with complete frankness, that I could not honestly attribute the crisis to any other source, and that I believed my opinion was shared by the greater part both of English statesmen and of the English nation: the consequence was to be seen in the diminution of that sympathy which had for so many years been the characteristic of English policy towards Sardinia.

Count Cavour protested against this being fair, and he proceeded with some warmth of manner and expression, but without exceeding in any way the limits of courtesy, to declare that England was mainly responsible for the present position of Sardinia; that her statesmen, her orators, her agents, and her press, had excited the passions of Italy, and had proclaimed Sardinia to be the representative and leader of Italian liberty. The policy of England, however, had gradually changed since 1856, and in proportion as she had drawn nearer to Austria, she had abandoned Sardinia.

I said that I had often heard this charge brought against England, and particularly against English Diplomatic Agents; that I had had some insight into the correspondence of those Agents, but that nothing in any correspondence that I had seen could justify the charge made against Her Majesty's diplomatic servants.

Count Cavour still persisted in his statement. He asserted that Sardinia had ever been encouraged by England to exercise what he termed a peaceful and moral propaganda against the despotic influence wielded by Austria in Italy, and he asked me whether he was to consider that the cause of civilization and liberty in Italy had lost the sympathies of the British nation.

There could not be a greater mistake, I replied, than to suppose anything of the kind; but what England desired was, that liberty and civilization should progress from conviction and by

example, and should not be enforced at the point of the sword. England asked herself the cause of the present crisis in Italy. Nothing extraordinary had occurred. Austria had not stirred, had not interfered with any other State. But the peace of the world was suddenly threatened by large armaments made against apprehended attacks from that Power, and Europe found herself on the brink of war without seeing cause or reason for hostilities.

Count Cavour gave his own explanation of the measures taken by Sardinia. He said that the country had been so alarmed by the expectation of an attack from Austria, an expectation in which, he admitted, he had not himself participated, that it had been necessary to defer to the general desire, and to call out the contingents of the Sardinian army.

I will not dwell further on this part of our conversation, because your Lordship has received full information from Sir James Hudson on this and other matters connected with the policy of Sardinia.

Count Cavour then asked what he was to expect from England. Had Her Majesty's Government abandoned the former policy of Great Britain, and did they not still impugn the sway which Austria exercised over Central and Southern Italy?

The reply to this question, I said, was to be found in the late proceedings of Her Majesty's Government with the Cabinet of Vienna, and in their acceptance of a Congress with their allies to examine the Italian question. But let me not be misunderstood, I added; Her Majesty Government will remain faithful to the great International Acts which are the public law of Europe, but they are ready to aid in peaceably setting aside any undue influence which those Acts did not contemplate.

Count Cavour replied that he could ask no more. If the Congress succeeded in withdrawing the smaller States of Italy from the overbearing influence of Austria, Italy would be deeply grateful. He did not say that all her aspirations would be gratified, but much would have been effected in that direction.

I rejoined that, in order that these negotiations might be commenced with fair hope of success, it seemed to Her Majesty's Government expedient that Sardinia should disarm. If the Sardinian Government would meet the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, the latter had offered to guarantee, in conjunction with the French Government, Sardinia from any attack from Austria.

Count Cavour replied, that it would be impossible for Sardinia to disarm. He could explain, he said, his position with complete sincerity: Italy, whose hopes and feelings had, as he had already observed been excited by England, looked to Sardinia as her only security. The proposal of a Congress, from which Sardinia was to be excluded, had thrown the peninsula

into dismay, and had destroyed all confidence ; and if Sardinia was to disarm, in face of this nullification of her political existence, her position was completely gone. Supposing that the deliberations of the Congress were to lead to nothing, the situation of Sardinia and of Italy would be much worse than it was now. He assured me, however, that there was no danger of collision. The Sardinian army was not on the frontier, and he had given Her Majesty's Government assurances that Sardinia would not attack Austria. Besides, were Sardinia to disarm, what certainty was there that Austria would do so likewise ?

I replied that we started from different points : I had always understood that Sardinia had armed in consequence of apprehensions which she entertained of an attack from Austria ; if, then, she received a guarantee from France and England against all attack from Austria, she had no further need of her armaments. That guarantee was an equivalent to her disarmament. I expressed, at the same time, the conviction that Austria would disarm as soon as she found that her defensive preparations were no longer necessary.

I pressed strongly upon Count Cavour the advantages which would result to Sardinia by following the advice of Her Majesty's Government. "There was not," I said, "a Government in Europe that did not believe, at this moment, that it was not the well-being of Italy, but her own aggrandizement, that Sardinia was aiming at. By disarming, she would give proof of her disinterestedness, and probably restore that confidence in her intentions which, by her late acts, she had forfeited." I denied that her position would be worse, even if the Conference on Italian affairs led to nothing. On the contrary, I maintained that she would have acquired a fresh title to the future sympathy of Europe.

The conversation continued in this strain for some time, and I cannot but think that, towards the end of it, Count Cavour was less positive in his language against disarmament than he had been at the commencement. He asked me, among other things, whether England would consent to make the request for disarmament, and give a guarantee against any attack from Austria without any reference to France.

On my remarking that the Sardinian Government ought, in their own interests, to prefer the double guarantee, Count Cavour said that the action of two Governments at once looked like pressure, and that there would be less humiliation to Sardinia in accepting the request of one than in deferring to the demand of two Powers. Count Walewski, in one of his conversations with me, made a similar suggestion. I told Count Cavour that I could not hold out any hope to him that Her

Majesty's Government would depart from the proposal of the double guarantee which I had made officially to the French Government.

Another suggestion made by Count Cavour was, that the whole of the Italian States should be admitted to take part in the Congress. I said that Her Majesty's Government considered such a proposal to be inadmissible, but that the Italian States might be heard by their Representatives on matters which immediately regarded them.

Finally, Count Cavour asked whether it would be possible for him to make, on his return to Turin, some declaration to the Chambers respecting the objects of the Congress, in order to satisfy the public mind, and permit him to propose a disarmament. I replied that I could do no more than submit the question to your Lordship.

He left me, saying that he would reflect on what had passed between us, and would see what could be done.

With regard to reforms in Italy, Count Cavour's language was very moderate. He admitted that it was quite impossible to expect that the Pope would grant a constitution to his subjects, and his object seemed confined to obtaining the development of the municipal institutions of the Papal States, and a separate administration for the Legations. He expressed the conviction that if something was not done to satisfy the populations of the Pontifical dominions, the departure of the French and Austrian troops would be followed by a general insurrection.

With regard to the other States of Italy, Count Cavour said that much could not be expected from Naples at this moment, and that it would be better to leave the Neapolitans alone. Tuscany, he thought, could, if left to herself, obtain moderate reforms without a revolution.

No. 185. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, March 30, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government were glad to learn from your Lordship's telegram of yesterday afternoon, that the Prussian Government will urge upon the Austrian and French Governments the specific points respecting the disarmament of Sardinia, and the withdrawal of the Austrian troops from the Piedmontese frontier, which you were instructed by my telegram of the 28th to bring before Baron Schleinitz.

With regard to the report which Baron Schleinitz says has reached him from London, that if Austria should not accede to the proposal of a Congress of the Five Powers, a Congress would nevertheless be held without her participation, I have to state to your Lordship that there has been no question with Her Majesty's Government as to a Congress of Four Powers to the

exclusion of Austria ; and Her Majesty's Government would no more than Prussia, as stated by Baron Schleinitz, consent to such an arrangement.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 186. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, March 30, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government have learned, with great satisfaction, by your Lordships's despatch of the 26th instant,* the views entertained by the Government of Prussia as to the measures to be adopted by the Great Powers with regard to the state of affairs in Italy ; and, in order that it may be fully informed of the nature of the policy which Her Majesty's Government wish to advocate, I enclose a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord A. Loftus,† and which your Lordship may communicate confidentially to Baron Schleinitz. Your Lordship will see that I have, in this despatch, gone very fully into the Italian question, giving the views of Her Majesty's Government upon each of the four points which it is proposed to submit to the Congress, and also upon the composition of the Congress, and the manner in which the several Italian States should be heard by it.

As regards the time for the meeting of the Congress, I have to instruct your Lordship to explain to Baron Schleinitz that, owing to the time at which Passion Week falls, it will be impossible to fix an earlier date than the 30th of April.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 187. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, March 30, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 26th instant,‡ in which you state that Baron Schleinitz informed you that he had not yet been made acquainted with the form in which the four points to be considered by the proposed Congress on the affairs of Italy are laid down by Her Majesty's Government ; and Her Majesty's Government approve your having, in consequence, communicated to his Excellency my despatch to Sir J. Crampton of the 23rd instant.§

In order, however, to prevent the possibility of any misapprehension on the subject, I have to instruct your Lordship to address to Baron Schleinitz an official note, in which you will set forth the following as the points to which Her Majesty's Government consider that the deliberations of the Congress should be directed, namely:—

* No. 178.

† No. 190.

‡ No. 177.

§ No. 145.

1. The means of securing peace between Austria and Sardinia.
2. The evacuation of the Roman States.
3. The reforms that may be introduced into the internal administration of the Italian States.
4. The substitution of some other arrangement for the Treaties between Austria and the Italian States.

Your Lordship will also point out that Her Majesty's Government consider that no questions affecting the territorial arrangements or the Treaties of 1815 are to be mooted in the Congress.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 188. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, March 30, 1859.

Sir,—It would seem from a telegram that I have this afternoon received from your Lordship, that the Cabinet of Berlin approves of the proposal made by Count Buol, that there should be a simultaneous disarmament, considering that if that were adopted, it would be equally applicable to France as to Sardinia.

Baron Schleinitz appears also, from your account, to coincide in Count Buol's views as to the form in which the invitation to the Italian States to appear at the Congress is proposed to be made, being unpalatable to them; and shares in what he apprehends to be the opinion of the Austrian Minister, that the questions to be solved by the Congress partake more of a general European than a merely Italian character.

Her Majesty's Government were under the impression, as I informed you by telegraph, that the Cabinet of Berlin not only agreed to the four points as propounded by England, but concurred also in the mode proposed for the admission of the Representatives of the Italian States to be heard at the Congress; but the account which I have now received from you of Baron Schleinitz's language implies that in his opinion these questions are still open.

I must observe, however, that Her Majesty's Government have not put forward as a fifth point, or indeed as a point involving an indispensable condition to the meeting of the Congress, that Sardinia should disarm under the guarantee of England and France, and that Austria should withdraw her forces from the frontier of Piedmont. But undoubtedly, if those objects could be effected before the meeting of the Congress, which it is on every account most desirable that they should be, the labours of the Congress would be diminished in proportion by the removal from the sphere of its deliberations of one of the most important points enumerated as the subject-matter of their deliberations, namely, the prevention of war between Austria and Sardinia, with which it would, at its outset, have to deal. It is, in fact, one of the

four questions which Her Majesty's Government proposes now to settle before the Congress, instead of at the Congress.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 189. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, March 30, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government, as I have already acquainted you by the telegraph, learned with much satisfaction, by your Lordship's telegram of the 28th, that Count Buol accepted the four points which you were directed to submit to his Excellency as the bases on which the Congress should proceed; and although he seems to consider that the proposal for the admission of the Italian States to be heard before the Congress might be couched in terms likely to be more palatable to the parties interested, yet I trust you will be able to satisfy him that, as I have already explained to you, the dignity of those States cannot be affected by inviting them to do, on the present occasion, what Holland and Belgium did in the year 1831. At that time the question under the deliberation of the Conference was the separation of the Crowns of Holland and Belgium, and yet Holland did not hesitate to plead her rights before the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers, and did not consider her dignity impaired by doing so. Still less, therefore, on the present occasion, should the Italian States demur to the proposal on the score of their dignity, when no such question is at issue; and Her Majesty's Government feel convinced that if Count Buol will accept their proposal in regard to the presence of the Italian Representatives at the Congress, the deliberations of that Assembly will result in useful measures.

Nevertheless, as Count Buol, according to your telegram of this morning, still continues to wish that the proposal in regard to the participation of the Italian States should be separated from those of the four points, inasmuch as the question being still under discussion he cannot give to it an answer in the affirmative, such as he is prepared to give in regard to the acceptance by Austria of the four points, Her Majesty's Government are content that you should erase it from the note that you have already presented, although you will embody it in a separate note, to be simultaneously addressed to the Austrian Minister. The French Government have not yet answered the proposal for the participation of the Italian States, and your Lordship, as I have told you by the telegraph, will do well to press upon Count Buol the advantage which is likely to accrue to Austria in the public opinion of Europe, if she agrees to the proposal on this point, together with those on the other four points.

I perceive, by your Lordship's report, that Count Buol hopes

that, even though confining the acceptance of Austria to the four points, he will still establish a claim on Her Majesty's Government to give effect to the intimation contained in your original note, that England would be prepared to urge the disarmament of Sardinia, if Austria should accept all the proposals that your Lordship was instructed to lay before his Excellency.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that this subject should not be made a preliminary condition to the Congress, but Count Buol may rest assured that if, during its deliberations, Count Buol will moot the question of a general disarmament, Her Majesty's Representatives will earnestly support him in effecting so desirable a consummation.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 190. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, March 30, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to express my regret to your Lordship at what may be called the inevitable misapprehensions arising from a succession of telegraphic despatches; but on this occasion they have been of no consequence. The main features of our communications with Austria should be well understood by the Austrian Cabinet, and I will define them at length to your Lordship in the present despatch.

When Lord Cowley left Vienna, Her Majesty's Government were induced to believe, from his conversations with Count Buol, that should a mediation be carried out through the friendly offices of Great Britain, four subjects would exhaust the Italian question, and if judiciously treated would restore harmony to the relations between Austria and France. Those four subjects were :—

1. Security for peace between Austria and Sardinia.
2. Evacuation of Roman States.
3. Reform of the Italian States.
4. Substitute which might lead to the abrogation or modification of the Austro-Italian Treaties.

Lord Cowley's mission having been made with the full concurrence of France, and with an intimate knowledge by his Lordship of the French views upon the Italian question, which rest upon the same objects, increased the hopes that Her Majesty's Government entertained of a pacific solution.

The position was, however, somewhat changed on the return of Lord Cowley to Paris, on the 16th of March, when he found that communications had taken place between France and Russia which would probably result in an offer by the latter to the Five Powers to hold a Congress in which the Italian question should be discussed.

Although this was announced by both Lord Cowley and the

Duc de Malakoff, on the 18th instant, the proposal was not made officially to Her Majesty's Government by Baron Brunnow till the 23rd ; but Her Majesty's Government had, on the 19th, informed Sir J. Crampton, by telegraph, that they should accept such a proposal provided the Treaties of 1815 and territorial arrangements were not altered. Her Majesty's Government then anticipated the Russian announcement by stating to Baron Brunnow, on the 20th, that this must be the basis of any Congress which might take place in which Her Majesty's Government took a part, and further, that the subject-matter there discussed must be restricted to the four points which I have enumerated above. Russia at once accepted these conditions, and on the 23rd Baron Brunnow made his official proposal of a Congress, which Her Majesty's Government accepted. Her Majesty's Government see no reason for departing from their opinions as to the subject-matter thus deliberately considered by them as containing, on the one hand, the whole pith of the Italian question, from which, if that question is to be discussed at all, there can be no escape, and, on the other, as containing as much as it would be just and politic to ventilate.

Her Majesty's Government submit earnestly to the Cabinet of Vienna, that the first point, namely, the future security against a war between Austria and Sardinia, might, immediately, and previously to the Congress, be solved in the following manner :—

Austria should consent to the four points laid down by Her Majesty's Government being discussed in a Congress, and declare that she would withdraw her troops from the Piedmontese frontier, on the condition that the four Powers would summon Sardinia to disband her contingents, and withdraw her troops to their usual posts ; Sardinia being guaranteed against an attack from Austria by England and France, and Austria declaring that she would not attack her.

The second point, namely, the evacuation of the Roman States, would be treated of in Congress, only as far as to declare it as an act to be performed within a given time ; the details of this military operation being left to Rome, Austria, and France to arrange.

On this point, however, Her Majesty's Government cannot agree with Count Buol, that a Congress has no right to interfere.

The continued presence for ten years of foreign troops in the centre of Italy becomes a permanent occupation never contemplated by any school of statesmen or any category of Treaties, and is visibly a patent grievance, dangerous to the peace of Europe, because absolutely repulsive to the feelings of the whole Italian Peninsula. It is a fair and proper subject for the deliberation of the Great Powers, and it is a duty which they owe to Europe to examine and advise upon it.

The third point is that of reform ; and Her Majesty's Govern-

ment are of opinion that, upon this question, the Congress, having laid down certain principles consolidated from the propositions discussed in 1831 and 1857, would submit them to be carried out in detail by the States which they concerned. Her Majesty's Government cannot be parties to impose any such reforms upon any independent State ; and it would be only with an anxious wish that they might contribute to its security and happiness that they would advise or urge the acceptance of their counsels.

The fourth and last point, namely, a substitute which might tend to abrogate or modify the Austro-Italian Treaties, Her Majesty's Government feel to be one of great delicacy as regards Austria, and would desire to approach it with the deference due to the feelings of that Court. They rejoice that Austria does not advocate its omission in a Congress upon the affairs of Italy, because it is inseparable from the causes of the dissatisfaction and danger which exist in that country. The substitutes which were sketched out as possible in Count Buol's conversations with Lord Cowley, lead Her Majesty's Government to hope that if Austria would take the initiative at the Congress upon this subject, a substitute might easily be discovered, which, far from diminishing the dignity of Austria, or the security of the Duchies, would tend to increase both, by removing unpopular and unnecessary obligations.

Her Majesty's Government, while they admit the undoubted right of independent Powers to make offensive and defensive Treaties with one another as regards external foes, will not conceal from the Austrian Government that Article III of those Treaties of Austria with Parma and Modena is repulsive to the ideas of this country. This Article deprives Austria of the right of judging for herself whether the internal discontent which may break out in these Duchies is justifiable or not, and she appears to Her Majesty's Government to be in the deplorable position of being forced, perhaps against her own convictions and feelings, to become the executioner of an unjust decree.

Such, my Lord, are the views of Her Majesty's Government on the subjects which they propose the Congress should consider, and to which they think it should strictly be confined.

It is now my duty to speak of its composition.

Her Majesty's Government feel most strongly that upon this solely Italian question it is impossible, on every principle both of equity and sound policy, to exclude Italy from the scene and court of deliberations which concern so intimately its political existence and social happiness.

In this country, at least, such a course would meet with universal reprobation, and it is one to which Her Majesty's Government could never give their consent.

But Her Majesty's Government see no difficulty in this matter, and regret that some objections appear to influence Count Buol

with respect to the proposals of Her Majesty's Government on this point.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that all the Italian States should be invited by the Great Powers to attend the Congress by Representatives who should, if so required, be heard before it upon the several points of their deliberations which affect these States respectively. Thus, the Representative of Rome would be heard on the question of evacuation, those of Rome, Modena, Parma, and Tuscany on the subject of a possible confederation of States, should that idea be mooted, or on recommendations of reforms.

But Her Majesty's Government could not consent to exclude from this invitation either Naples or Sardinia, because the whole of Italy must be interested in the fate of its neighbouring States, and its component parts; and Her Majesty's Government consider they would have a right, even if not called in by the Congress, to be permitted to state their views, and declare whether the changes proposed would bear disadvantageously upon their own interests.

This is the equitable view of the subject, and the political one is not less clear to Her Majesty's Government. They are convinced that nothing would be more unwise than to give any Italian Government the right hereafter of declaring that, having had no share, direct or indirect, at a Congress which discussed the political and social state of Italy, it was entirely free from all liens, and irresponsible for all results.

Her Majesty's Government entreat the Austrian Government not to approach this Congress with distrust and reluctance, but to take the lead in its formation, and, when formed, in its deliberations. It will find in Her Majesty's Government a sincere ally, anxious to relieve it from unfair pressure, and to maintain its rights. At the same time, that same sincerity of friendship obliges Her Majesty's Government to point out to the Court of Vienna, that a suspicious repugnance to our propositions, either as regards the subject-matter for the Conference, or its composition, which is not founded on substantial proofs of injustice or danger, will result in fatal delays, alienating from Austria that public sympathy which is felt towards her, and inducing the world to believe that she is little anxious for the attainment of those objects by which a lasting peace may yet be secured.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and if he desires it, give him a copy.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 191. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 30, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her

Majesty's Minister at Vienna has been instructed to invite the Austrian Government to agree to all their proposals in regard to the Congress, and to declare that Austria will not attack Sardinia, and will withdraw her forces from the Sardinian frontier.

Her Majesty's Government cannot, however, call upon Austria to disarm, for in that respect she is not in the same position as Sardinia. If the latter Power should disarm, she would receive, in return, a guarantee on the part of England and France against an attack on the part of Austria, and such a guarantee would afford a greater security to her than the whole of her own army. But Austria, if she were to disarm, would obtain no such guarantee, and that being the case, she cannot be expected to place herself in so defenceless a position.

Your Excellency will inform Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government adhere to their proposal that the Italian States should be allowed to appear before the Congress, on precisely the same footing as Holland and Belgium appeared before the Conferences of 1831. The precedent afforded in that year is strictly applicable to the circumstances of the present case, and Her Majesty's Government consider it would be unwise to depart from it.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 192. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Scarlett.*

Foreign Office, March 30, 1859.

Sir,—I INSTRUCTED you, by telegraph this afternoon, to make known to the Governments of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, the suggestions made by Her Majesty's Government that the Italian States should be at liberty to send to the Congress Representatives who might be consulted by the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers, or might address to them any observations they might desire to make, in regard to matters affecting the interests of those States.

Her Majesty's Government wish that you would ascertain as soon as possible the views of the three Duchies on this point; and you will explain to them that the course proposed by Her Majesty's Government is in conformity with that pursued in the Conferences of 1831 respecting the affairs of Belgium, when the Representatives of Holland and Belgium, although not themselves members of the Conference, were admitted to be heard on matters affecting the interests of their respective Governments.

Her Majesty's Government are most anxious that the Italian States should have an opportunity of being heard at the Congress, and of expressing their opinions upon subjects so interesting to their political and social happiness.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 193. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 31, 1859.

I HAVE instructed your Lordship, by telegraph, to acquaint Count Buol that the language held by the Sardinian Prime Minister at Paris has gone so far as to declare that he will have war in spite of the Congress.

Count Buol would do well to take advantage of this state of things, and, by accepting without further demur the Congress on the conditions proposed, place Austria quite right in the face of Europe.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government to be a matter of indifference under what designation the Representatives of the Italian States appear before the Congress, so long as it is clearly laid down that they do not form part of the Congress, and are only admitted to be heard before it on points affecting their respective interests. The Dutch and Belgian Representatives in 1830 were at first called "Commissaires," and afterwards "Ministres accrédités auprès de la Conférence." Count Buol may feel assured that Sardinia can do much less mischief if she only appears on the same footing with the other States, and subject to the same restriction with them in regard to their relative position towards the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers, who would be alone members of the Congress, than if she were to stand aloof. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that nothing could be more prejudicial now and hereafter to the pacific objects which the Powers have in view than the refusal of Sardinia to accept the invitation which it is proposed to make to her.

Your Lordship will state to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government consider that the question of general disarmament to which his Excellency has adverted had better be postponed until the meeting of Congress; and you may add that, on that question, Austria may then count on the support of Her Majesty's Government, and, as they have reason to believe, of that of Russia also.

No. 194. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, March 31, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government regret to learn from your telegram of yesterday that you have hitherto failed in obtaining from Count Walewski a conclusive answer in regard to the disarmament of Sardinia, and to the footing on which the Representatives of the Italian States shall appear before the Congress.

The proposal which Her Majesty's Government have made in regard to the latter point is not only in conformity with the precedent of the Belgian Conferences of 1831, but is also analogous

to what took place in the Congress at Laybach, when all the Italian States, including Sardinia, though not at first members of the Congress, were finally admitted to make representations to the Congress on matters affecting their interests.

As regards the disarmament of Sardinia, Her Majesty's Government conceive that all the Five Powers should call upon her to disband her contingents on the conditions previously stated to your Excellency.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No 195. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, March 31, 1859.

Sir,—It appears from your reports of yesterday by telegraph, that Prince Gortchakoff does not view with favour the suggestion of Count Buol, as communicated by telegraph from Vienna,* that the meeting of the Congress should be preceded by a general disarmament, inasmuch as any proposal to that effect would not only prejudice, if accepted, one of the points to be decided by the Congress, but would also give rise to objections on the part of some of the Powers who would allege that their armies were already on a peace footing.

Even as regards the more limited question of the disarmament of Austria and Sardinia, Prince Gortchakoff, while admitting that Austria cannot be asked to diminish her forces, contends that neither can Sardinia be required to disband her troops, the internal condition of the country rendering the adoption of such a measure by her at the present time dangerous; and his Excellency expresses his concurrence in an observation which I made to Baron Brunnow, that however desirable it might be to effect disarmament before the meeting of Congress, it could be equally carried out after it had assembled. Nevertheless, Prince Gortchakoff considers that the forces of both parties should be withdrawn from the Ticino.

You will have learnt by my telegram of to-day that I have informed the Austrian Government that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the question of general disarmament should be considered hereafter in the Congress. As regards the partial disarmament at once of Sardinia, I have explained to you that Her Majesty's Government only require that she should disband the contingents which she has lately called under arms, and which amount to about 30,000 men. Their enrolment has not only been unpopular in the country, but has also entailed a ruinous expense on the finances of Sardinia.

Austria stands in a different position from Sardinia, because Her Majesty's Government gives her no guarantee, and Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to give to Sardinia the gua-

* See § 5 page 190.

guarantee against attack from Austria which they are prepared to join with France in giving, unless the contingents are disbanded. It is scarcely necessary to observe that such a guarantee would afford a much more reliable security to Sardinia than she could possibly desire from the maintenance of the contingents under arms.

France has hitherto refrained from giving any answer on the subject of the guarantee, or on the manner in which the Italian States shall be represented at the Congress; and Prince Gortchakoff may be assured that the chief difficulties and delays to be grappled with at the present time are to be found at Paris, where Count Cavour has for some days been vehemently urging the particular interests of Sardinia on the Emperor of the French.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 196. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 1.)

Turin, March 27, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith a despatch which has been addressed to me by Her Majesty's Vice-Consul for Spezia, upon the condition of parties in his district, and in Italy in general.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure. *Vice-Consul Lever to Sir J. Hudson.*

(Extract.)

Spezia, March 22, 1859.

THE actual state of Italy would, perhaps, make of some importance the circumstance of which it is my duty now to inform you.

For several weeks back a considerable immigration has taken place here from the Modenese States, the individuals composing which have been, in some instances, of a class above the common, and, in a few cases, have been persons holding small employments under this Government.

They have come to offer their services in the war with Austria (a struggle which they assume as certain), and the authorities here have as frankly accepted them, and they are enlisted to serve during the war, and for six months after its conclusion.

Looking to the discontent which has so long existed in these countries, and the almost continuous state of siege maintained at Carrara and its neighbourhood, it is little to be wondered at if a disposition should be felt for any change which would promise an end to the present rule.

It is also to be borne in mind that, along the entire coast from Nice to Pietra Santa, a more disturbed population, nor one less amenable to order, does not exist than this of Sarzana and Carrara. In the small towns of Lerici and St. Arenza, Mazzini

has always found adherents and followers, and the wildest opinions of socialism have ever found acceptance there.

To imagine that these people have adopted any of the views of the Piedmontese Government with respect to the anticipated struggle with Austria, would be to credit them with an amount of political knowledge very far above their reach ; and it is to other causes we must look for the influences that move them.

For a considerable time back Italian patriotism has been divided into two sections, as operated upon by the two distinct influences of Austria and France. Where Austria has been deemed the national enemy, as in Sardinia, the whole struggle has assumed the form of an effort for "independence ;" wherever France has been accounted the obstacle, as in Central and Southern Italy, there the efforts have been all in favour of "liberty." The one great object of Sardinian patriotism was to expel the Austrian ; in this view was comprised all that Italy regarded as national. Against France, and French influence, the party of Central Italy was directed, whose object was the overthrow of all existing Governments, and the establishment of the principles of the great revolution in France. Of this latter section M. Mazzini assumed the lead. In his view, the great grievances of Italy were less the "stranger occupation" of the soil, than the misrule of Italian Princes ; and by correcting these he deemed that such a spirit of nationality would be evoked as would render a foreign occupation impossible.

To M. Cavour's apprehension, the whole evil is centered in the presence of the Austrian, and against this he would now direct all the energies of the nation.

Now, if we were to contrast all the abuses attributed to Austrian rule in Lombardy with the excesses and enormities enacted by the Governments of Rome and Naples, we might naturally ask why Sardinia has turned to the redress of the lesser grievances, while the more flagrant misgovernment stands untouched ? Why expend the ingenuity of a casuist in composing State Papers against Austria, when every traveller's hand-book is filled with charges against Rome ? The answer to this question will be found in the necessity of giving to Italian patriotism a different object and end to those proposed by M. Mazzini and his sect.

By addressing the national mind to the cause of independence, without entering upon the vexed question of liberty, M. Cavour avoided the dangers of all the schism that would arise from the different theories men would promulgate on that subject. Independence, besides, as expressed by the expulsion of the Austrian, was an idea easily intelligible, flattering to national pride, and endowed with all those striking and picturesque advantages so attractive to the Italian mind.

Better, however, than all, this independence disturbed nothing,

overthrew nothing in Central Italy. It prejudged nothing as to the various changes that must necessarily ensue in the States of the Pope, and in Naples. In giving Italy to the Italians, it simply cleared the way for the reforms that were to follow, and secured these reforms against the perils of foreign bayonets and stranger interference. There was also another cause, which served to support this project. The Italian is not like the Frenchman, a disturber and a subverter : with him, the first step in improvement is not demolition ; on the contrary, by taste, instinct, and tradition, he is eminently conservative. The very indolence of his disposition inclines him to accept things as they are, and his happiest notions of existence are comprised in a life of unbroken routine and monotony. If the Church of Rome has not made good Catholics of the Italians, it has, however, deeply imbued them with its characteristic love of splendour, and gorgeous display, and attuned the national mind to yield obedience more readily wherever rule is accompanied by pomp and show.

Nothing but a French influence could ever have suggested Republicanism to this people, nor is it easy to conceive anything less accordant to their tastes, lives, or habits. They are, to this very hour, the descendants of that Roman people, who were always to be conciliated by "bread, and the Games."

Notwithstanding all the efforts of the Mazzini faction, and all the temptations held out by the promise of a time of sack and pillage, the views and opinions of that party have not taken deep root in the national mind. The equality so fascinating to French apprehension appeals to no sympathy here. The Italian is a lover of ranks, and respects its gradations ; while in his self-indulgence and desire for ease, are elements which largely contribute to render him easily governed and guided. To understand the separate working of these two sections of Italian liberalism—the party of independence, and the party of liberty—it is only necessary to state, that the latter, as represented by M. Mazzini, has never ceased to thwart and oppose the former.

We have only to recall the events of the last war in Lombardy to remember how the cause of Sardinia was at first jeopardised, and at last destroyed, by the conduct of the Genoese republicans. The same party who then prevented the King's acceptance of the Milanese territory, would, to-morrow if they could, sacrifice national advantage and glory to their own peculiar tenets.

The antagonism of M. Mazzini to Rome and the Papal Government will always secure to him from many in England a certain share of sympathy and support. The Protestantism of England, not always reflecting, will be disposed to accept of even such advocacy as his, against what many will deem the source of all Italian misrule. This would be, however, a very great error, and, if persisted in, the cause of deep injury to Italy.

Before we can hope to win Italian confidence—a task never too easy—we must disabuse the public mind of this impression, and distinctly show them, in desiring a better rule for Italy, we are not influenced by any covert designs against the Church. The indiscretion of some of our journals on this subject has tended to throw much suspicion over the views of England, and even prejudiced against us some who, themselves, were by no means ardent followers of the Catholic Church. If the wane of our influence over the Peninsula was partly ascribable to this cause, another, and very different, reason also contributed to that end—what many called our backwardness and apathy. With the natural suspectfulness of the Italian mind, these opposite states were believed to signify the existence of some deep design and well-planned scheme against Italy.

No. 197. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 1.)

Vienna, March 27, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of the note addressed by Count Buol to the Russian Minister at this Court, in reply to the proposal for the assembling of a Congress of the Great Powers for the settlement of the Italian complications, of which I forwarded to your Lordship the general substance in my telegram of the 23rd instant.

M. de Balabine has received instructions this day, by telegraph, from St. Petersburg, to inform Count Buol that the Russian Cabinet have accepted the proposals of Her Majesty's Government that the Congress should meet at Baden Baden, on the 30th of April, and that the Italian States, inclusive of Naples, should participate in it as a consultative body, on questions in which they may be directly interested.

He is further informed that the Russian Cabinet will insist on the acceptance of the four points which have been laid down by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure. *Count Buol to M. Balabine.*

(Translation.)

Vienna, March 25, 1859.

THE Undersigned has hastened to submit to his august Master the Emperor the overture which M. de Balabine, &c., [has made] to him, in the name of his Court, by communicating to him a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff, dated the $\frac{25}{31}$ instant, in which it is stated that the Emperor Alexander, desiring by a last effort to preserve the maintenance of peace, proposes the meeting of a Congress of the Great Powers, which should attempt to smoothe the Italian complications, and that this proposal has been already accepted by the Governments of France, Great Britain, and Prussia,

In the execution of His Imperial Master's orders, the Undersigned has the honour to make the following answer to M. Balabine, which he requests him to communicate to his Court.

The Emperor Francis Joseph fully appreciating the feelings which have dictated to His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias the overture which he has made to him, and desiring to lend his assistance to a work which would sanction anew the engagements entered into by Treaties, and the preservation of the rights which are derived from them, accepts, on his part, the proposal in question.

In the opinion of the Imperial Cabinet, all the difficulty consists in the political system which Sardinia pursues in her foreign relations.

To put an end to this state of things, which disturbs Europe and to prevent its return, appears to be the task designed for the Powers summoned in the first rank to preserve social order.

If, however, besides this question, which the Undersigned considers as the only one essentially important for the moral pacification of Italy, the Powers should entertain the design of submitting others to discussion, it would be necessary that they should be exactly described beforehand, and in so far as they concerned the internal arrangements of other Sovereign States, the Undersigned would be compelled to insist, above all, that the proceedings should be conducted in this case in conformity with the rules laid down by the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, dated the 15th of November, 1818.

In conclusion, the Undersigned must lay stress upon a last consideration.

To attempt to carry on peaceful deliberations in the presence of the sound of arms and of preparations for war, would be not only materially dangerous, but morally impossible. It is therefore indispensable, in the opinion of the Imperial Cabinet, which opinion the Undersigned doubts not will be shared by all the Powers, that, previously to any Conference, Sardinia should disarm.

The Undersigned, &c.

BUOL.

No. 198. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.**

Foreign Office, April 2, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE acquainted your Lordship that the Marquis d'Azeglio has announced to me, officially, that Count Cavour will consent neither to the disarmament of Sardinia, nor to a Representative of that Power being deputed to attend the Congress on the footing proposed, and further, that he refuses the guarantee offered as the price of disarmament. Those questions must, therefore, be considered settled, as far as Sardinia is concerned ;

* A similar despatch was addressed, on the same day, to Lord Bloomfield.

but it is not the less important, on that account, that the other Italian States should be represented before the Congress, and your Lordship will continue to press that point as the opinion of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 199. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 2, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE informed Baron Brunnow that Her Majesty's Government agree with Prince Gortchakoff, that it is not desirable to delay the invitation to the Italian States to be represented before the Congress on the same footing as Belgium and Holland before the Conference of 1831, until the meeting of the Congress, but that the invitation should at once be addressed to them; and that they also agree that the Congress shall meet on the 30th of this month, and that the place of meeting should be Wiesbaden.

Her Majesty's Government are also prepared to press upon Austria and Sardinia to withdraw their respective troops ten leagues from the frontier of the Ticino, and to declare that they will not attack each other; and I have desired Her Majesty's Ministers at Berlin and at Vienna to acquaint those Courts that Her Majesty's Government, as well as those of France and Russia, agree to the above proposals respecting the representation of the Italian States, and the withdrawal of the Austrian and Sardinian armies, and to urge them to come to a decision to the same effect.

Your Excellency will endeavour to obtain an official answer from the French Government in regard to the place and time at which the Congress should meet. The Duke de Malakoff appears to be unacquainted with the sentiments of his Court on those points, and has intimated nothing to Her Majesty's Government on these subjects.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No 200. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.**

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 2, 1859.

THE Marquis d'Azeglio having returned from Paris, called on me yesterday, to inform me that Count Cavour would not consent either to disarm on the security proposed by Her Majesty's Government, or to send a Representative to the Congress, except on the footing of those of the Great Powers.

On my inquiry whether he would not accept the guarantee of France and England, and the solemn declaration of Austria, as a

* A similar despatch was addressed, on the same day to Sir J. Hudson.

security for Sardinia's disbanding her contingent and free corps, and withdrawing her regular army to their usual quarters, he replied that Count Cavour trusted that the aid of England, without a guarantee, would be given to her, if she went to war with Austria.

I pointed out to the Marquis that, under the present circumstances, the simultaneous refusal to disarm and to take his place at the Congress on the same footing as the other Italian States, displayed, to say the least of it, so much indifference in averting a war, that Count Cavour would completely alienate this country from himself and his policy, and that he, consequently, deceived himself and his master if he relied upon any moral or material aid from Great Britain.

I repeated what I had often impressed upon the Marquis d'Azeglio, namely, that it was not as against Sardinia that this feeling had arisen in England. The greatest sympathy and admiration had been felt here for Sardinia, her institutions, and her Government; but, lately, the apparent determination of Count Cavour to obtain reforms of administration and territory in Italy by force of arms, and by a violent policy which threatened all Europe with war, had made a deep impression in this country. This impression must now be more deeply stamped by his refusal to appear at a Congress of the Great European Powers, which invited him, in common with other Italian States, to bring his opinions upon Italian subjects before its members.

The Marquis assured me he had pressed these remarks already on Count Cavour. He added that the discontent in Italy was daily increasing, and I have every reason to fear that Count Cavour may now prevent the Congress from taking place. He still promises, however, that Sardinia herself shall not be the aggressor.

Her Majesty's Government consider that Sardinia has no right to be admitted to the Congress as a Great Power, but only as an Italian Power, but if she had, the other five States must also become principals in the Congress. Under such circumstances no business would be done, and the ill-blood existing between Sardinia and some of them, would render calm discussion impracticable.

When Russia first proposed a Congress, she had no intention of including Sardinia or any of the Italian States, and Austria positively objected to the admission of the former; but Her Majesty's Government combated these views, and obtained from both, that Sardinia and the other States of the Peninsula should be heard, as Belgium and Holland were in the Conferences of London. Count Cavour has refused this just and friendly proposal, and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt the judgment which all Europe will pronounce on his conduct.

No. 201. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 2, 1859.

Sir,—HER Majesty's Government agree in the opinion expressed by Prince Gortchakoff, and reported in your telegram of yesterday, that the invitation to the Italian States to appear before the Congress, on the footing on which Holland and Belgium appeared before the Conference of 1831, should be forthwith addressed to those States, and not be delayed until the meeting of the Congress ; but I have informed Baron Brunnow that, as regards the questions relating to Sardinia, alluded to in your other telegram of yesterday, those questions are already settled by the refusal of Count Cavour to consent to the disarmament of Sardinia, or to her appearance by her Representative before the Congress on the footing proposed.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 202. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Scarlett.*

Foreign Office, April 2, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday, acquainting me that the decision of the Tuscan Government as to the appearance of a Tuscan Representative before the Congress will depend upon that of the Courts of Rome and Naples, but that the Tuscan Minister wishes to know whether, if all the other Italian States should decline to appear, Sardinia would nevertheless be admitted.

I have stated to you, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government consider it most desirable that all the Italian States should be represented before the Congress. As regards Sardinia, the refusal of Count Cavour either to disarm or to appear before the Congress settles all questions bearing on those matters as far as she is concerned.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 203. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 4, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government have received a telegram from Lord A. Loftus, stating that Count Buol will insist on the disarmament by Sardinia of her contingent and free corps, as a *sine quâ non* of her consent to enter the Conference. Deeply as Her Majesty's Government regret this apparent determination on the part of Austria, they are bound to admit that she has consistently adhered to the disarmament of Sardinia being a preliminary step, necessary to her admission of the Russian proposal.

From the first moment your Excellency heard, after your return from Vienna, of the idea of a Conference, you assured Her Majesty's Government that France would likewise urge this important act, and they accordingly depended upon its accomplishment when they accepted Baron Brunnow's suggestion on the

23rd of March, and during the whole of the negotiations which followed. On the 17th and on the 21st of last month, your Excellency stated in your telegrams that the Emperor himself had promised to insist on the disarmament of Sardinia ; declaring, in the second instance, that his Imperial Majesty would do so as soon as the Congress was agreed to, as a preliminary to its deliberations.

These promises were repeated by Count Walewski on the 21st, and reported by your Excellency. They were, of course, transmitted subsequently by Her Majesty's Government to Vienna, and equally relied upon by that Court. But, on the 1st instant, the Marquis d'Azeglio having returned from Paris, where he went to meet M. de Cavour, informed me that Sardinia refused to disarm.

Her Majesty's Government received this intimation with great surprise, because they believe that if the French Government, upon whom Count Cavour must entirely rely for military and moral support in what appears to Her Majesty's Government the dangerous policy which he has adopted, had frankly declared that, without the disarmament of his contingents, a Congress could not be held, he must have yielded.

If France had said that she considered the meeting of a Congress of paramount importance, that it was the only course by which we might attain both peace and reforms in Italy, and that she would not permit these blessings to be lost by Count Cavour's obstinacy, Her Majesty's Government are convinced that he must have bowed to the combined force and justice of France. But, my Lord, what is the present position for that country ? Austria having from the first laid down this condition, and having accepted the basis of discussion which the other Powers have agreed upon, having further been assured by the British Government that France would insist upon the disarmament of Sardinia, may now justify herself in consistently refusing the Congress altogether, and in stating that she does so because she has been deceived. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, press again the French Government for its consent to the plan formerly proposed by them, viz., that they should together, or with the other Powers, summon Sardinia to disarm, France and England offering at the same time to guarantee her, for a certain time, against any attack from Austria.

You will read this despatch to Count Walewski.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

P.S.—Your Excellency will inform Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government wish to have a reply in writing to the note which you addressed to his Excellency on the 23rd ultimo.

M.

No. 204. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 5.)
Vienna, March 29, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to Count Buol, at his express desire, and in obedience to the instructions of your Lordship's telegram of the 27th instant, submitting to the Austrian Cabinet the four points laid down by Her Majesty's Government, and their proposal for the participation of the Italian States in the form of a consultative body, but without a seat in the Congress, as the conditions on which a Congress of the Great Powers may meet for the purpose of arranging, on a satisfactory basis, the present complications of Italian affairs.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure. *Lord A. Loftus to Count Buol.*

[N.B.—For the amended notes, substituted for this, see the Inclosures in No. 206.]

Vienna, March 28, 1859.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to inform his Excellency Count Buol, His Imperial Majesty's Minister of State and for Foreign Affairs, that he is instructed by the Earl of Malmesbury, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to submit to the Imperial Cabinet the following terms, as the bases and conditions on which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the proposal for the assembling of a Congress of the Great Powers to consider the means of bringing to a general and satisfactory solution the existing complication with respect to Italian affairs:—

1. Security for peace between Austria and Sardinia.
2. The evacuation of the Roman States by foreign armies ; and reforms to be considered for the Italian States.
3. Substitution for the Austro-Italian Treaties.
4. No territorial arrangements or Treaties of 1815 to be touched.

The Undersigned is further instructed by the Earl of Malmesbury to inform the Imperial Cabinet that Her Majesty's Government, participating in the reported views and wishes of the Imperial Government, are of opinion that all the Italian States should be admitted to the Congress as a consultative body, to advise and counsel on questions immediately regarding their special interests, but with the understanding that they shall not be admitted to a seat in the Congress.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that these proposals will meet with the hearty approval and concurrence of the Imperial Cabinet ; and in full reliance thereon, the Undersigned is instructed by the Earl of Malmesbury to state, that if the Imperial Cabinet, as he most ardently hopes, shall consent to a Congress of the Great Powers for the object specified, and on the foregoing terms and conditions, and, further, on a declaration that

Austria will not attack Sardinia, Her Majesty's Government will invite and urge the Imperial Government of France to co-operate with them in insisting on Sardinia disarming at once, and likewise to give Sardinia a joint guarantee for the due fulfilment of the engagement taken towards her.

Her Majesty's Government, animated by the most sincere and friendly feelings towards Austria, and by an anxious desire to use all their influence for the maintenance of peace and for the general welfare of Europe, submit the foregoing proposals to the earnest consideration of the Imperial Cabinet, in the confident hope that they will duly appreciate the motives which have actuated Her Majesty's Government; and they ardently trust that the Imperial Cabinet, reciprocating these sentiments, will not hesitate to accept at once, frankly and cordially, the means now offered for a solution of the existing complications, and for the consolidation of the general peace of Europe.

The Undersigned, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 205. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 5.)

Vienna, March 29, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAD an interview yesterday with Count Buol, when I placed in his Excellency's hands the note, a copy of which is inclosed in my despatch of this day.*

His Excellency, after being made acquainted with its contents, stated that in replying, he should enter into an explanation of each of the points separately; but that, as I should probably be desirous of hearing, without delay, the decision of the Austrian Government, with respect to the four points which Her Majesty's Government had submitted for their acceptance, he would at once inform me that the Imperial Cabinet accepted those points, and he would cursorily give me the general interpretation which he considered each point to bear.

His Excellency stated to me, in referring to No. 1 (security for peace between Austria and Sardinia) that he considered that the Congress will have to devise means to re-establish the relations between Austria and Sardinia, in such a manner, and on such a basis, as will prevent in future a recurrence of similar differences and complications.

On No. 2 (the evacuation of the Roman States by foreign armies, and reforms to be considered for Italian States) Count Buol agrees that the Congress may discuss the question, and is of opinion that they should determine the fact, and the period within which it shall be effected; but that the details should be left for Austria and France to arrange with the Papal Government at Rome. Count Buol further agrees that the question of reforms shall be discussed and deliberated on by the Congress;

* No. 204.

and that the results of their deliberations shall be communicated and recommended to the several Italian States for their consideration.

On No. 3 (substitution for the Austro-Italian Treaties) Count Buol stated, that he could not admit that the right of Austria to contract these Treaties should be called in question, or discussed. He proposes that all Treaties between the Great Powers and Italian States shall be presented to the Congress, not with any expressed intention for their modification or annulment, but rather, I presume, to excuse and palliate the course taken as regards the Austro-Italian Treaties. Count Buol assents to the examination by Congress of these latter, and to their modification, where required and judged useful. With reference to any ulterior changes, or to the idea already put forward of a league between the minor Italian States (Sardinia being excluded), for their internal security, Count Buol stated, that the Congress will have to take into consideration, and to decide on, all proposals of this nature which may be submitted to them, the object of which may be to replace the protection hitherto afforded to these States, by their Treaties with Austria, against internal disorders.

No. 4 (no territorial arrangements, or Treaties of 1815, to be touched) : Count Buol expressed his entire concurrence with this Article.

His Excellency then stated, that in his reply to my note, he should propose a fifth Article, which, he anticipated, would meet with the full approval of Her Majesty's Government, namely : "That an understanding shall be come to by the Congress, for the Great Powers to disarm simultaneously."

His Excellency stated, that he considered that this proposal would greatly facilitate the proposed appeal to Sardinia to disarm, and that it would afford to public opinion the best and surest proof of the pacific dispositions of the Great Powers of Europe.

His Excellency then referred to the question of the participation of the Italian States. He expressed doubts as to the practicability of the proposal made by Her Majesty's Government, and his Excellency is of opinion that none of the Italian States will ever consent to appear at, or before, the Congress, in the manner proposed.

Count Buol observed, with reference to your Lordship's citation of the London Conference on Belgian affairs, as a precedent, that the case in question was not similar. Belgium was at that time a revolted Province of Holland, and had not been recognized as an independent State. Holland was represented in the Conference, and Belgium was occasionally called to appear before it ; but neither the Pope, nor the King of Naples, nor the King of Sardinia, could consent to be represented at a Congress in the manner proposed.

His Excellency informed me that he has written to Count Apponyi very fully on this subject by the Austrian messenger (who is the bearer of this), and that he thinks that the several Italian States should have Agents in communication with the Congress, who can, if called upon, consult and advise the Congress, collectively or separately, on any subjects or points relating to the internal affairs or condition of the State by which he is sent; but that this Agent should not be considered as a Representative who could enter into official correspondence with the Congress as a body, or who could be invited to take part in the Congress on occasions when the affairs of the State which he represented should be under discussion.

This appears to be the only question on which a divergence of opinion exists, or on which any difficulties are likely to be raised.

Count Buol, whilst stating that the Congress must be restricted to five, and that Austria will never assent to the admission of Sardinia, expressed himself with great moderation and conciliation on the subject, and is anxious that the question shall be solved in a manner which will be satisfactory to all parties.

I have, &c. .

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 206. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)
Vienna, March 31, 1859.

My Lord,—On delivering the note which I had addressed to Count Buol, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, submitting formally to the Austrian Cabinet the four points laid down by Her Majesty's Government as the conditions which they affixed to the acceptance of the Congress, and likewise the proposal for a participation of the Italian States at that Congress as a consultative body, without a seat in the Congress, Count Buol observed to me that he much desired that the question of the four points should be separated from the other proposal, as he could at once reply to the former by a full and complete acceptance of the four points, whereas on the other proposal, it being still under discussion, he could not as yet return an equally affirmative reply.

He was extremely anxious to meet the wishes of Her Majesty's Government; but if his reply should be chequered with any doubtful acceptance, as it naturally, under the circumstances, must be, he feared that it might prevent the salutary influence of Her Majesty's Government from being exerted to induce the disarmament of Sardinia.

He, therefore, requested me to ask your Lordship whether it would not be desirable for all parties that the two questions should be kept separate, and be conveyed in two distinct notes, without in any way altering the text of each.

In pursuance, therefore, of your Lordship's sanction to the request I addressed by telegraph, I have been enabled to meet his Excellency's wishes, and I placed, this day, in his hands the two notes of which I enclose copies, to be substituted for that which I had presented to his Excellency on the 28th instant.

I have, therefore, to submit to your Lordship that it may be desirable, to avoid confusion or misapprehension hereafter, that the inclosures hereto annexed should be transferred to the despatch of the 29th instant, and that the original inclosure of that despatch should be cancelled.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1.—*Lord A. Loftus to Count Buol.*

Vienna, March 28, 1859.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to inform his Excellency Count Buol, &c., that he is instructed by the Earl of Malmesbury, &c., to submit to the Imperial Cabinet the following terms as the bases and conditions on which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the proposal for the assembling of a Congress of the Great Powers, to consider the means of bringing to a general and satisfactory solution, the existing complications with respect to Italian affairs.

1. Security for peace between Austria and Sardinia.
2. The evacuation of the Roman States by foreign armies, and reforms to be considered for the Italian States.
3. Substitution for the Austro-Italian Treaties.
4. No territorial arrangements or Treaties of 1815 to be touched.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that these proposals will meet with the hearty approval and concurrence of the Imperial Cabinet; and in full reliance thereon, the Undersigned is instructed by the Earl of Malmesbury to state that, if the Imperial Cabinet, as he most ardently hopes, shall consent to a Congress of the Great Powers for the object specified, and on the foregoing terms and conditions, and, further, on a declaration that Austria will not attack Sardinia, Her Majesty's Government will invite and urge the Imperial Government of France to co-operate with them in insisting on Sardinia disarming at once, and, likewise, to give Sardinia a joint guarantee for the due fulfilment of the engagement taken towards her.

Her Majesty's Government, animated by the most sincere and friendly feelings towards Austria, and by an anxious desire to use all their influence for the maintenance of peace, and for the general welfare of Europe, submit the foregoing proposals to the earnest consideration of the Imperial Cabinet, in the confident hope that they will duly appreciate the motives which have actuated Her Majesty's Government; and they ardently hope that the

Imperial Cabinet, reciprocating these sentiments, will not hesitate to accept at once, frankly and cordially, the means now offered for a solution of the existing complications, and for the consolidation of the general peace of Europe.

The Undersigned, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 2.—Lord A. Loftus to Count Buol.

Vienna, March 28, 1859.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, in referring to the note which he has this day addressed to his Excellency Count Buol, His Imperial Majesty's Minister of State and for Foreign Affairs, has further the honour to inform his Excellency, in conformity with the instructions which he has received from the Earl of Malmesbury, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Her Majesty's Government, participating in the reported views and wishes of the Imperial Cabinet, are of opinion that all the Italian States should be admitted to the proposed Congress of the Five Powers, as a Consultative Body, to advise and counsel on questions immediately regarding their special interests, but with the understanding that they shall not be admitted to a seat in the Congress.

In submitting this proposal, by the orders of his Government, to the consideration of the Imperial Cabinet, the Undersigned, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 207. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

Vienna, March 31, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a translation, by Mr. Dillon, of an Imperial Order, prohibiting the export of arms and munitions of war to the Italian States and Switzerland, or from the Imperial dominions by sea.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure. Ordinance.

(Translation.)

THE "Wiener Zeitung" publishes the two following Ordinances:—

1. The Ministry of Finance, in concert with the Imperial Ministry of the Interior and Commerce, the Central Military Chancery of His Majesty, and the higher police authorities, has forbidden the import, export, and transport of arms, material for arms, munitions, saltpetre, sulphur, and lead, over the frontiers towards the foreign Italian States, Switzerland, and the sea,

except under special permission conferred by the Political District Office, in concert with the General of the District's Office, from time to time.

This Ordinance enters into operation on the day on which it reaches the offices.

No. 208. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

Vienna, March 31, 1859.

My Lord,—BOTH the Emperor and the Imperial Government have been much satisfied and re-assured at the promptitude with which the Italian furlough-men have joined their respective regiments, most, if not all of which, are in garrison in Galicia and the eastern provinces of the empire. The number of those called under arms is, I am told, near 20,000 men, and there have been very few instances of non-compliance.

It had been incorrectly reported in the press that these troops had been withdrawn from Italy on account of their suspected loyalty, but they merely constitute the furlough men, who in time of peace are permitted to remain at their homes, and who are now called upon to join their respective garrisons.

I have the honour to forward to your Lordship, herewith, a translation by Mr. Wodehouse of a letter addressed by the Emperor to the Archduke Maximilian, expressing his satisfaction at the loyal spirit with which the calling of the furlough-men under arms has been carried out.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure.—*The Emperor of Austria to the Archduke Maximilian.*
(Translation.)

Vienna, March 30, 1859.

THE official part of the "Gazetta di Milano" of the 20th announces that His Imperial Royal Apostolic Majesty has been pleased to address the following letter to His Imperial Highness the Archduke, General Governor of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom:—

"Dear Brother Archduke Frederick Maximilian,—The celerity with which the calling in of the soldiers on furlough has been carried into effect, and the cheerful manner in which they have hastened to their standards, has given me the best proof of the spirit which animates them. I express to you with pleasure my satisfaction at your influential and efficacious endeavours which have been directed to the attainment of this so favourable result. All those, also, who in their several capacities have taken part in the speedy execution of this measure, merit my entire approval.

"I empower you to announce publicly this expression of my satisfaction,

FRANZ JOSEPH, Imp.

No. 209. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, March 31, 1859.

FROM a conversation I had to-day with Count Buol, it is clearly the intention of the Imperial Cabinet to insist on the disarmament of Sardinia previous to their taking part in any Congress.

No. 210. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, March 31, 1859.

I HAD the honour to receive, this morning, the telegram reporting your Lordship's speech in the House of Lords.

I immediately repaired to the Foreign Office, and read it *in extenso* to Count Buol.

His Excellency appeared extremely pleased and gratified at the clear and truthful manner in which your Lordship had replied to the Earl of Clarendon's interpellation.

On arriving at that point where your Lordship stated that an agreement had been made by which Austria and Sardinia would not attack each other or commence hostilities, Count Buol observed that he was ignorant of any such arrangement between them, and that no communication had been made to him of such an engagement on the part of Sardinia.

I replied to his Excellency that your Lordship had not stated that any such engagement had been entered into between Austria and Sardinia, but that your Lordship evidently referred to the declaration which Austria had given, in his despatch of the 25th ultimo,* to Her Majesty's Government, that she would not attack Sardinia, and I consequently presumed that the Sardinian Government had now given a similar assurance to Her Majesty's Government.

The conversation then turned on the disarmament of Sardinia, and Count Buol stated that the Austrian Cabinet would regard the disarmament of Sardinia as a *sine quâ non* for their entrance into Congress. "Without that," said his Excellency, with some vehemence, "l'affaire ne serait qu'une comédie."

I replied to his Excellency, that if England and France called on Sardinia to disarm, the Austrian Government would do well to leave the question entirely in their hands; for, whether she disarmed materially or not, that step ought to be considered by Austria at least as a moral disarmament.

I stated that I had heard that orders had already been given at Turin, I could not say on what authority, to withdraw the Piedmontese troops from the Ticino; and, if that report were well founded, I considered it to be of good omen.

Count Buol rejoined that, in so small a country as Piedmont,

* No. 78.

where the frontiers were so near the heart of the country, this measure would be of little import. The disarmament must be of a more demonstrative and extensive nature. Sardinia, he added, could not be regarded in this respect as on a level with Austria.

This point, if not opportunely and judiciously arranged, may create some difficulty. Therein are involved two very serious considerations for Austria, viz.: 1st, that of military honour, which is always of considerable moment, and in formidable ascendancy here; and 2ndly, that of finance. For it is totally impossible that this country can again make the enormous military efforts she has now made; nor can she afford to maintain the expenses of her present war-footing, which occasion her at this moment an expense of half a million of florins per day. Two alternatives are, therefore, presented to her: that of bleeding to death, which would be anything but a slow process; or that of at once incurring all the risks and hazards of war, by accepting an immediate combat.

I am free to confess to your Lordship that there is but little confidence felt here, either in the mind of the Sovereign, of the Government, or of the public, in the eventual maintenance of peace. It is generally suspected that the proposed negotiations are merely undertaken with a view to gain time, and to isolate this country both from England and from Prussia.

If, however, Sardinia should disband her contingents, and restore her army to the peace establishment, I am confident that this Government would then consider that peace was assured, and that they might look forward to the results of the Congress with hopeful prospects of success.

No. 211. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, March 31, 1859.

On the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 25th instant, stating that Her Majesty's Government could not summon Sardinia to disarm unless Austria agreed to their four points, and to their proposal respecting the representation of the Italian States at the Conference, I lost no time in waiting upon Count Buol, and in conveying to his Excellency the substance of the instructions therein contained.

On the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 27th instant, I addressed a note to Count Buol, bearing date the 28th instant, in fulfilment of your Lordship's instructions, of which a copy was forwarded in my despatch of the 29th instant,* transmitted under flying seal to Earl Cowley by the French messenger.

My despatch of the 29th instant,† as also my telegram of the 28th instant,‡ will have already conveyed to your Lordship the satisfactory reply of Count Buol to that communication, and the entire and complete acceptance by the Austrian Cabinet of the

* No. 205.

† No. 206.

‡ See No. 189.

four points which Her Majesty's Government had submitted to them.

Count Buol informed me to-day that he hoped to give me his official reply in the course of to-morrow, in which event I shall lose no time in transmitting it to your Lordship by the ordinary channel of the post.

No. 212. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

Vienna, March 31, 1859.

My Lord,—I AM informed that the Russian Government has made proposals to the Prussian Cabinet concerning the participation of the Italian States at the proposed Congress of the Five Powers, analogous to those submitted by Her Majesty's Government.

Baron Werther has likewise been instructed by his Government to propose to the Austrian Cabinet, that the Italian States, Sardinia and Naples included, shall send Representatives to the Congress, who shall be authorized to address official communications to that body. Count Buol received this proposal favourably, and seemed to think that, with some slight modification, it might offer a practical solution of the question. His Excellency stated that, instead of Representatives, it would be preferable in his opinion that there should be Agents from each Italian State, not having precisely a Representative character, and, therefore, not in official communication with the Congress; but that each Agent should be authorized by his Government to give counsel and advice if required by the Congress, collectively, or by any of its members separately, on questions specially referring to the State whose mandate he held.

Count Buol is of opinion that none of the Italian States would consent to have a Representative who should be separated, as it were, from the Congress by being in an adjoining room, or who should only be called upon to appear before that body, without being an essential member of it.

Count Buol further considers that it will even be necessary to have attached to the Congress, although not a component part of that body, persons who, from their knowledge of the constitution and political organization of the minor Italian States, will be able to give, when required, important information on those points to the Congress.

It must further be borne in mind that the decisions of the Congress, in as far as they will relate to the reforms to be considered for the Italian States, are merely conditional, and will not be conclusive until they have been submitted to the acceptance of the several Italian States. The independence and dignity, therefore, of the Italian Sovereigns will be sufficiently secured.

With reference to the participation of the Italian States in the

proposed Congress ; the mode in which it can be best effected ; the form in which it may be most desirable to address the invitations ; and lastly, the place of meeting for the Congress ; Baron Werther has proposed to Count Buol, by order of his Government, that an understanding shall be come to in London between the Representatives of the Great Powers, and he has moved Count Buol, accordingly, to furnish Count Apponyi with the necessary instructions, in order that there may be as little delay as possible in the assembling of the Congress.

Count Buol, I believe, approved generally of this proposal, and has placed Count Apponyi in full possession of the views and opinions of the Imperial Cabinet on these questions.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 213. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 4, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT APPONYI called upon me yesterday, and informed me that the Austrian Government was resolved to make its assent to the proposed Congress dependent on the previous disarmament of Sardinia.

Your Lordship will inform Count Buol that, if this resolution is persisted in at Vienna, the Congress must fall to the ground ; but you will ask his Excellency whether he can suppose that in such a contingency, war can be averted.

Although Her Majesty's Government are aware that, from the first, Count Buol made the preliminary disarmament of Sardinia a condition to his acceptance of the Congress, and although the French Government has, unfortunately, not redeemed its promises to Lord Cowley to insist on that disarmament, you will submit to his Excellency whether Austria would not place herself in a better position by agreeing that both armies should retire a certain distance from the frontier which separates the Austrian from the Sardinian States. The Sardinian Prime Minister declares that Sardinia will not strike the first blow ; and, in that case, the mere existence under arms of the Sardinian contingents can make no practical difference to Austria. At all events, any evil to be apprehended from the embodiment of the contingents, is not to be weighed in the balance with the amount of good that may possibly result from the Congress. It would be a source of great regret if the Congress were to be abandoned, on the ground that it was not preceded by the disarmament of the contingents ; because such disarmament would necessarily come within the points to be settled by the Plenipotentiaries.

Her Majesty's Government are informed that the Neapolitan and Papal Governments will decline to send Representatives to the Congress, if invited to do so by the Five Powers. But they can hardly persist in their refusal, if the idea of substituting for

the existing relations between Austria and some of the Italian States a Confederation of those States among themselves, should be seriously entertained by the Congress.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 214. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*
(Extract.) Foreign Office, April 4, 1859.

It appears by your telegram of this morning that Austria will not take part in the proposed Congress unless Sardinia disarms, and that her principal motive for standing out on this point is her distrust of the sincerity of France: so much so, indeed, that she could only be induced to retract her refusal, without the disarmament of Sardinia, by an engagement on the part of England and Prussia securing her against France.

Her Majesty's Government assuming as a premise that it is not the intention of the Austrian Government to forestall any aggression by an attack upon Sardinia at an early date, would wish his Excellency to consider whether the position, moral or military, of Austria will be improved by her refusal to take part in the Congress, and by allowing things to remain as they now are, without any attempt to improve them, until the month of June, when France and Sardinia may have completed their preparations for attack.

The acceptance of the Congress as the condition of the mutual withdrawal of the Austrian and Sardinian forces, as suggested in my despatch of this day,* would not impair the military position of Austria, but would add much to her moral influence, as proving her desire to participate in every measure by which the chances of war may possibly be averted.

It would, of course, be understood that the withdrawal of the respective armies to a distance of ten leagues, more or less, from the frontier would not involve any interference with the fortresses which may exist within that space on either side.

Your Lordship will doubtless understand that the proposal above-mentioned, that both armies should withdraw from the frontier, is not put forward as a condition to the meeting of a Congress. Her Majesty's Government, although they are of opinion that the disarmament of Sardinia is most desirable, and this would be, in some degree, an efficient substitute for it, do not consider either of these acts as indispensable either to the honour and safety of Austria, or to the success of diplomatic solution by means of a Congress.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol.

No. 215. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)
Berlin, April 2, 1859.

My Lord,—In compliance with the instructions contained in

* No. 213.

your Lordship's despatch of the 30th ultimo,* I have addressed to Baron Schleinitz the note, copy of which is herewith inclosed, stating, in precise terms, what the four points are to which Her Majesty's Government consider that the deliberations of the Congress should be direct.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure. *Lord Bloomfield to Baron Schleinitz.*

Berlin, April 2, 1859.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, being desirous of preventing the possibility of any misapprehension regarding the form in which the four points to be considered by the proposed Congress on the affairs of Italy is laid down by Her Britannic Majesty's Government, has the honour, in conformity with instructions he has received from the Earl of Malmesbury, to inform his Excellency Baron Schleinitz, &c., that the points to which Her Majesty's Government consider that the deliberations of the Congress should be directed are as follows:—

1. The means of securing peace between Austria and Sardinia.
2. The evacuation of the Roman States.
3. The reforms that may be introduced into the internal administration of the Italian States.
4. The substitution of some other arrangement for the Treaties between Austria and the Italian States.

The Undersigned is further instructed to point out to his Excellency that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, no question affecting the territorial arrangements or the Treaties of 1815 should be mooted in the Congress.

The Undersigned, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 216. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

Berlin, April 2, 1859.

My Lord,—In consequence of the confusion arising from the incessant communications by foreign Ministers of telegrams which have arrived here from different quarters, Baron Schleinitz has just informed me that, with a view to gain time, and to facilitate the negotiations now carrying on, he wished London to become a centre for discussing all the preliminary arrangements connected with the projected Congress, and that he purposes writing in this sense to Count Bernstorff.

Prince Gortchakoff has suggested this idea, and Baron Schleinitz trusts it will be approved of by your Lordship, and be the means of avoiding the necessity of such frequent recourse to the telegraph as has latterly been the case; for the foreign

Ministers in London, according to his opinion, will be able to decide many things on the spot that would otherwise have to be referred to their Governments.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No 217. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

Berlin, April 2, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE just read to Baron Schleinitz your Lordship's despatch of the 28th ultimo,* in which you state that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that Prussia may with advantage act at Vienna in concert with England, France, and Russia, in submitting to Austria that if she would agree to the proposal respecting the composition of the Congress, and to the four points laid down by Her Majesty's Government as the bases by which the deliberations of the Congress should be regulated, and would further agree to withdraw her troops from the frontier of Piedmont, the Four Powers, on their part, would summon Sardinia to disband the contingents that she has recently called out, and to replace her troops in their usual quarters, in return for a guarantee on the part of England and France that Austria will not attack her.

His Excellency did observe, as your Lordship appears to have anticipated, that Austria ought also to disarm; but he said that he had already written to Vienna and Paris in the sense desired by Her Majesty's Government, and considered it an imperative duty at this critical moment to endeavour to prevent a collision on the Austro-Sardinian frontier.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 218. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

Berlin, April 2, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE read to Baron Schleinitz your Lordship's despatch of the 30th ultimo†; and with reference to the last part of it, in which your Lordship refers to the rumour which I had reported by telegraph as having reached Baron Schleinitz from London, of a question of calling a Congress of the Four Powers in the event of Austria declining to accept the four points, his Excellency expressed his satisfaction that Her Majesty's Government would no more than Prussia consent to such an arrangement.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 219. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 4.)

Berlin, April 2, 1859.

My Lord,—WHEN I was with Baron Schleinitz this morning,

* No. 181.

† No. 185.

I inquired if he had not received a copy of Count Buol's answer to your Lordship's proposal of the four points, and was surprised to find that none had reached his hands.

I told his Excellency that a copy of the note to Lord Augustus Loftus, and also of the explanatory despatch to Count Apponyi, would no doubt soon be communicated to him, and I hoped he would bear in mind, if called on to make any observations on these documents, that the four original points suggested by Her Majesty's Government must be kept separate from any other, for they formed the bases of the negotiations, and were the only ones to which your Lordship had agreed. I added, that in order to avoid all chances of a misapprehension on the subject, I had been instructed by your Lordship to address to his Excellency, and should have the honour of doing so in the course of the day, an official note stating the points to which Her Majesty's Government consider that the deliberations of the Congress should be directed.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 220. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, April 4, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government learn, by your telegram of yesterday, that Baron Schleinitz, although willing to join in inviting Austria and Sardinia to withdraw their forces from the Ticino, and to declare that they will not attack each other, desires nevertheless that the invitation should be made by the Five Powers in identical terms; and further that it should not specify any particular distance to which the forces of the two Powers should withdraw, inasmuch as such a specification might be attended with inconvenience with reference to fortified places.

Her Majesty's Government agree with that of Prussia in thinking that the invitation should, for the sake of precision, be identical in terms, though they do not consider it desirable that it should be collective in form. Her Majesty's Government have always wished to avoid giving a character of pressure upon Austria in submitting to her for adoption those measures which they think conducive to the peace of Europe. A collective note would assume that character, and at the same time would apparently take from Her Majesty's Government that independence of judgment and action which they wish to maintain and display during the present negotiations. Her Majesty's Government consider that if Austria will accept the principle of withdrawal, there will be no difficulty in determining the distance; it being, of course, understood that the withdrawal is not to apply to Pavia or to any other fortified post.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 221. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 5.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 4, 1859.

I SAW Count Walewski this afternoon on the subject of your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant,* in which your Lordship informs me that Her Majesty's Government agree with Prince Gortchakoff that it is not desirable to delay the invitation to the Italian States, to be represented before the Congress on the same footing as Belgium and Holland before the Conference of 1831, until the meeting of the Congress, but that the invitations should at once be addressed to them.

Count Walewski informed me that he had received equally pressing notices from St. Petersburg, with reference to the immediate invitation to be sent to the Italian States. His Excellency said that he would not absolutely refuse his consent, though he could not agree in the prudence of the proceeding, and, at all events, that he could not do more than simply address a notice to each of the Governments, stating that the Five Powers were about to meet in Congress, and as the Plenipotentiaries might occupy themselves in matters interesting to the Italian States, the latter were invited to send a Representative to the Congress. His Excellency declines defining the position of those Representatives more particularly, and he still holds to his opinion that it would be better, in the first place, simply to acquaint the different States with the course it is intended to pursue, but not to make the invitation until the Congress shall be assembled. It is impossible, he thinks, to discuss among five different Governments, at different ends of Europe, the exact position to be given to such of the Representatives as might attend. That could only be decided by the Congress. Moreover, what was to be done should the States, one and all, refuse the invitation? This would be of less consequence after the Congress should have met, but could the Five Governments meet on Italian affairs if a preliminary invitation had been made and refused?

These, said Count Walewski, were his opinions, but he could not press them against the opinions of others. If Her Majesty's Government decided on making the invitation forthwith, he should like to have the project sent to him for examination; and he begged to suggest that the day for the arrival of the Italian Representatives should be fixed at least fifteen days later than that of the members of the Congress, who would have many matters to discuss before they would be ready to communicate with the Italian Representatives.

With regard to the day and place of meeting, Count Walewski agrees to the 30th instant, and to any place not within the dominions of the Five Powers, which may be agreed upon.

With reference to the latter part of your Lordship's above-mentioned despatch, stating that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to press upon Austria and Sardinia to withdraw their respective troops ten leagues from the frontier of the Ticino, and to declare that they will not attack each other, Count Walewski said that this measure had been already suggested to him by the Prussian Minister, and that he had no objection to make to it.

I may as well add that I do not think that Count Walewski's hesitation to convoke the Italian Representatives at once, arises from any desire to introduce them into the body of the Congress, but he apprehends that questions will at once be raised by the Governments of the Italian States, as to the position to be given to the Representatives if sent, which it will be impossible to discuss until the Congress shall be assembled; but he distinctly informed me that he considered they should hold a position apart from the Conference. He doubts the possibility of applying to them the character given to the Dutch and Belgian Representatives in the Conference of 1831, and would rather look for a precedent in the Congresses of Troppau and Laybach.

No. 222. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 5.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 4, 1859.

I HAVE not concealed from Count Walewski my conviction that it will be very difficult to persuade the Austrian Government to agree to the Congress, if Sardinia persists in her refusal to disarm; and in furtherance of the suggestions contained in Lord Augustus Loftus' telegram of this morning, I asked him whether France would join in a collective invitation of the Four Powers to Sardinia to disarm. I said that it was useless disguising the truth from him, that Austria suspected the good faith of the French Government, who had not made that effort for the disarmament of Sardinia which had been promised me by the Emperor, and, therefore, she put no confidence in the Emperor's intentions in consenting to a Congress.

Count Walewski stated that France might join in a collective invitation to be addressed both to Austria and Sardinia, and then he said that if your Lordship would draw up the form of invitation to be addressed to Sardinia alone, he would see what could be done with it (meaning, no doubt, that he would submit it for the Emperor's consideration); but, he added, it must not specify the sending away the contingents, and the disbanding of the free corps, but merely give a recommendation in courteous language, grounded, perhaps, on the pacific assurances given by Austria, that the effective of the Sardinian army should be diminished.

No. 223. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 5.)

Paris, April 4, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT WALEWSKI spoke to me this afternoon, on the discrepancy existing between the four points laid down in your Lordship's note to the Duke of Malakoff of the 22nd ultimo,* and the four points stated in Lord Augustus Loftus' note to Count Buol of the 28th ultimo.† In the latter, the matter contained in the second and third points of your Lordship's note to the Duke of Malakoff is united in the third point, while a fourth point is made of the observance of the Treaties of 1815, which is not the case in your Lordship's note.

This discrepancy appears to have arisen from your Lordship having first stated the four subjects which might be discussed by the Congress, while you referred to the conditions on which Her Majesty's Government were disposed to agree to the Congress in a separate paragraph; whereas Lord Augustus Loftus has taken the subjects of discussion and the conditions of entry into the Congress together, and called them the bases and conditions on which Her Majesty's Government had accepted the proposal of Russia. I can hardly suppose that Count Buol would object to the substitution of your Lordship's original text to the Duke of Malakoff, in lieu of the text of Lord Augustus Loftus; but it might be more difficult to induce the French Government to agree to the reading of Lord Augustus Loftus, though, in fact, there is at bottom no real difference between the two versions.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 224. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 5, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 4th instant,‡ that I had already noticed the passage in Lord Augustus Loftus' note to Count Buol, to which Count Walewski has called your attention. In sense, however, the note corresponds with what I stated in my letters to the Duke of Malakoff and to Baron Brunnow of the 22nd and 23rd ultimo:§ but I shall, nevertheless, direct Lord Augustus Loftus to substitute for his note, one couched in the exact terms of my letters above referred to, and I do not anticipate any objection to that course on the part of Count Buol.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 225. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 5, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 4th instant,|| reporting that you had asked Count Walewski

* No. 132.

† No. 206.

‡ No. 223.

§ Nos. 132, 148.

|| No. 222.

whether France would join in a collective invitation on the part of the Four Powers to disarm ; and that his Excellency, while saying that he would consider any form of invitation which might be proposed by Her Majesty's Government, added, that such invitation must be vague in its terms, and must not specify the sending away the Contingents and the disarming of the Free Corps, but merely recommend that the effective force of the Sardinian army should be diminished.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to Count Walewski, that Her Majesty's Government cannot adopt the course suggested by his Excellency without offering to Sardinia a guarantee against an attack by Austria, and such a guarantee Her Majesty's Government cannot offer unless France joins them in doing so.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 226. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.**

Foreign Office, April 5, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to state to your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government are willing to defer to the views severally entertained by Austria and France in regard to the Italian States being invited to attend the Congress, so far as to agree that the invitation should be deferred until the meeting of the Congress, at which time also the position to be occupied by those States, with reference to the Congress, shall be defined.

It is obvious that their presence would not be required during the discussions respecting the evacuation of the Roman States, or the relations between Austria and Sardinia.

In this state of things nothing would remain to be settled but to proceed to the Congress without further conditions, if Austria will yield on the point of Sardinia's disarmament, or of a mutual withdrawal of troops from the frontier.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 227. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 5.)

Vienna, April 1, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copies of the two notes which I have just received from Count Buol, in reply to those which, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I addressed to his Excellency on the 28th ultimo, and of which copies were inclosed in my despatch of the 31st ultimo.†

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

* A similar despatch was addressed on the same day to Lord A. Loftus.

† No. 206.

Inclosure 1. *Count Buol to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Translation.)

Vienna, March 31, 1859.

THE Undersigned, Minister of the Household and of Foreign Affairs of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of Lord A. Loftus, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty, dated the 28th instant, in which he has pointed out, by direction of Lord Malmesbury, that in the opinion of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, all the Italian Governments should be admitted to the Congress projected by the Five Powers, under the title of a Consultative Body, in order to give their opinion on questions directly concerning their own interests, but with this reservation, that they should not have seats at the Congress.

Having submitted the contents of this note to the Emperor his august Master, the Undersigned is authorized to make the following answer:—

The Imperial Government must first of all maintain the principle that the deliberations of the Congress shall be, according to the original propositions, restricted to the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers. Consequently, the Italian States should not be invited either to sit at the Congress, or to send official Delegates with a consultative voice. It seems, however, essential to inform the Governments of these States, in a confidential manner, of the objects which will be treated of in the Congress, leaving it to them to send Agents to the place of meeting, or to take such measures as they shall judge fit to furnish eventually, and if it shall seem good to them, each in the limits of its own interests, explanations to the plenipotentiaries of which the Congress is composed.

Requesting that Lord A. Loftus will bring the preceding to the knowledge of the British Government, the Undersigned, &c.

BUOL.

Inclosure 2. *Count Buol to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Translation.)

Vienna, March 31, 1859.

THE Undersigned, Minister of the Household and of Foreign Affairs of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, hastens to acknowledge the receipt of the note which Lord A. Loftus, &c., has done him the honour to address to him, dated the 28th instant, and which contains the conditions on which the Government of Her Britannic Majesty is ready to accept the proposition of a Congress of the Great Powers, to take into consideration the complications that have arisen in Italy.

The British Government, moreover, having expressed the desire that the Imperial Government will acquiesce in these propo-

sitions, the Undersigned has taken the commands of the Emperor his august Master on this subject.

He is now authorized to inform Lord A. Loftus that the Imperial Government, highly appreciating the motives which guide the British Cabinet, and the sentiments of unbiassed friendship with which they are animated towards Austria, accepts the bases of discussion proposed by the note of his Lordship, in the manner set forth in the inclosed memorandum.

A fifth point for deliberation which it has thought right to add, namely, that of an agreement respecting a simultaneous disarmament of the Great Powers, will be, doubtless, received by all the Powers as a new proof of the pacific intentions of Austria.

It appears from the note of Lord A. Loftus that if the Imperial Government accepts, on the conditions mentioned below, the proposition of a Congress, the British Government will invite that of France in a pressing manner to insist in common with themselves, that Sardinia should disarm immediately, and to give them a collective guarantee for the accomplishment of the engagement made with respect to her.

This step, which the British Cabinet proposes to take in concert with the French Government, is more in conformity with the general interest, inasmuch as it would be morally impossible, as the Imperial Government has already mentioned in its note addressed to M. Balabine, dated the 23rd of this month, to carry on peaceful deliberations in the midst of the clang of arms.

The Undersigned desires the more sincerely that these successive efforts may have their full and entire effect, inasmuch as Austria cannot go to the Congress until Sardinia shall have completed her disarmament, and shall have proceeded to the disbandment of the Free Corps. When these conditions are fulfilled and executed, the Imperial Government declares itself ready to give, in the most formal manner, the assurance that Austria will not attack Sardinia during the duration of the Congress, and so long as Sardinia shall respect the Imperial territory and that of its allies.

Requesting Lord A. Loftus to communicate the contents of this note to his Government, the Undersigned, &c.

BUOL.

Inclosure 3.

(Translation.)

1. Means for assuring the maintenance of peace between Austria and Sardinia. The Congress will examine the means of bringing Sardinia to the accomplishment of her international duties, and will advise the measures to be taken to avoid the recurrence of the present complication.

2. The evacuation of the Roman States by the foreign corps of occupation, and the taking into consideration reforms in the Italian States.

3. Arrangement to be substituted for the Special Treaties between Austria and the Italian States.

4. The territorial arrangements, or Treaties of 1815, must not be dealt with.

The question of the evacuation of the Papal States must be discussed. The Congress will leave to the three Powers directly concerned the details of execution. The question of administrative reforms will be discussed; the members will deliberate on the advice to be given: but its adoption remains subordinate to the decisions of the States directly concerned.

The validity of our Treaties cannot be discussed; but if all the Powers represented in the Congress agree between themselves to produce their political Treaties with the Italian States, Austria will also, on her part, do the same. She will join with the other parties interested, in order that they may be able to present their common Treaties to the Congress, and to examine in what manner their revision can be rendered useful.

It is agreed that there will be no meddling with the existing territorial arrangements, nor with the Treaties of 1815, and those concluded in execution of those Acts.

5. Agreement with regard to a simultaneous disarmament of the Great Powers.

No. 228. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government regret to learn by your telegram of yesterday that Count Buol, acting, as it would seem, under the immediate orders of his Imperial Master, refuses to accept the proposal for the mutual withdrawal of the Austrian and Piedmontese forces from the frontier, and continues to make the disarmament of Sardinia an indispensable condition to the consent of Austria to enter into the Congress.

The predominant feelings in the Austrian mind appear, from

your account, to be distrust of France, and want of confidence as to the results of the Congress.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government, in the present critical state of affairs, that your Lordship should make another and more formal effort to induce the Austrian Cabinet to take a juster view of its own interests.

I have, accordingly, to instruct your Lordship to present a note to Count Buol, in which, starting from the assumption that Austria does not contemplate taking the first step by commencing hostilities against Sardinia, you will point out to his Excellency that not only will the moral position of Austria, in the estimation of Europe, be much improved, but her military one in no degree impaired, if she consents to withdraw her troops from the frontier, the Piedmontese troops being simultaneously withdrawn.

Your Lordship will disclaim any desire or intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to impose conditions upon Austria, but you will at the same time point out to his Excellency that if war should ensue upon the refusal of Austria to agree to the proposal of France and Prussia, public opinion in this country will infallibly turn against Austria.

Your Lordship will state, in conclusion, that Her Majesty's Government consider that Austria cannot have any serious apprehension of the numerical force of Sardinia as compared with her own, and therefore that the only sound reason that Austria could have for refusing the proposal made to her would be that she contemplated an immediate attack on Sardinia for the purpose of anticipating an expected act of aggression on the part of that Power. But Her Majesty's Government will not, after the declaration made by Austria, allow themselves to suppose that such a course can be in the contemplation of the Cabinet of Vienna, and on that assumption they press upon Count Buol that no military advantage can accrue to Austria from her refusal, while her moral position will thereby be greatly deteriorated in the opinion of Europe.

No. 229. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 6.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 5, 1859.

So many reports are current in Paris respecting the Emperor's real wishes and intentions, and there exists such a general belief that His Majesty, notwithstanding his acceptance of the Congress, is, at heart, bent on war, that I thought it a positive duty to speak yesterday to Count Walewski upon the subject. I said to his Excellency that, without paying attention to rumours in general, there were two which had reached me from sources which might be well informed, on which I thought it necessary to ask for some information. The one was that the Emperor had

told M. de Cavour, on taking leave of him, that he must have patience until the month of July; that the French army would not be prepared for war before that period. The other was to the effect that the Emperor regretted having acceded to the idea of a Congress. When I recollected that His Majesty had, on my return from Vienna, requested me to support with Her Majesty's Government the proposal of a Congress, because it would open a door of retreat for him, and would enable him to tell Sardinia that he must be satisfied with that which satisfied Europe, I could hardly suppose that such had not been the genuine sentiment of His Majesty. I still clung to the belief, and I still gave assurances to Her Majesty's Government, that the maintenance of peace was the Emperor's wish; but I could not help feeling the weight of the responsibility that I was incurring.

Count Walewski replied that he could give me the most positive assurance, and never had he spoken with a greater conviction of the truth of his words, that I was in the right (*"dans le vrai"*) in placing confidence in the Emperor's pacific intentions. Not only, said his Excellency, is His Majesty anxious that the Congress should assemble, but he will be sincerely disappointed if anything should occur to prevent its meeting, or to hinder its labours from coming to a satisfactory termination.

Count Cavour's visit to Paris, his Excellency admitted, had done harm, but it had not shaken the Emperor's determination to maintain peace if possible.

I remarked that it was not a transient peace to which Her Majesty's Government looked; that the Congress would effect very little if it merely staved off war for a year or so, until, for instance, as some supposed, France and Russia were better prepared for war: to which observation Count Walewski answered, that if the discussions of the Congress led to the results which the Emperor hoped for, there would be an end of the Italian question.

Your Lordship will naturally expect me to state what are the results hoped for. I can only reply that from the conversations which I have had, both with the Emperor and with Count Walewski, I infer that they are under no illusion as to the difficulties with which they will have to contend in obtaining any great amelioration in the internal administration of the affairs of the different States of Italy. If the Pope can be persuaded to appoint a separate Government for the Legations under a Roman Prince; if an Assembly of some sort, even if named by the Sovereign, was to be instituted in each separate State, without the consent of which no taxes could be voted; and if something like a Confederation was to be formed among all the States, for their mutual internal and external safety—Austria abandoning her separate Treaties; I should hope that the Emperor would declare himself satisfied.

Count Walewski assures me that the confidential reports re-

ceived by the French Government from Italy tend to prove that the Moderate party neither expect nor desire more than I have stated ; and the realization of so moderate a scheme ought not to be impossible.

Count Walewski, however, thinks that two months will at least be required before the business of the Congress will be terminated. Such a length of time hardly appears necessary to discuss the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government.

It may not be irrelevant to state here that, in one of the numerous conversations which I have had with Count Walewski on these matters, his Excellency said that he was occupied upon a scheme for forming an Italian Confederation. The basis of it, he added, was that Naples should, in case of emergency, go to the Pope's assistance ; that Tuscany should augment her army, to be ready, the case arising, to send aid to Modena ; while to Sardinia should be allotted the task of taking care of Parma.

I merely observed to his Excellency, taking care to add that it was a personal opinion, and in no wise compromising Her Majesty's Government, that although British Plenipotentiaries might agree to the theory that the protection exercised by Austria over the Italian States might be advantageously replaced by a protective union among the States themselves, yet that I much doubted whether they would consent to discuss the principles on which such union was to be founded, and still less put their name to any declaration which, for instance, would recognise the occupation of Rome by Neapolitan soldiers. It seemed to me that such matters of detail must be left to the decision of the States themselves.

To revert to the question of the disarmament of Sardinia, Count Walewski said that although it was true the Emperor had not as yet agreed to address, in conjunction with Her Majesty's Government, a summons to Sardinia to disarm, yet that he could assure me that there was no persuasive argument which His Majesty had not employed with Count Cavour during that Minister's late visit to Paris, in order to induce him to consent to the measure. His Majesty had even appealed to his own position, saying that he should be accused of disloyalty, for that nobody, under the circumstances, would believe that Sardinia was acting contrary to his wishes ; but no argument, no entreaty, Count Walewski added, had had the slightest effect on Count Cavour, who had invariably replied that he and his Sovereign would be lost if they were to consent to so humiliating a proposal.

No. 230. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

THE Austrian Minister at this Court has informed me that Count Cavour was promised that, in the event of Austria refusing to agree to the proposal that the Austrian and Sardinian forces

should respectively withdraw ten leagues from the frontier, France would send 60,000 men into the territory of Sardinia, at the invitation of Sardinia.

Your Excellency will endeavour to ascertain whether there is any foundation for this statement.

Count Apponyi has no instructions, but the last advice that I have offered through him to the Cabinet of Vienna is, that even if the disarmament of Sardinia should not take place, and the proposal for the withdrawal of the respective forces should fall to the ground, Austria should, at least, agree to the Congress, as affording the last chance of averting a war, and proving to the world that she has done all she could to obtain that object.

No. 231. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Prussian Minister has informed me that the Cabinet of Berlin is urging the French Government to insist upon the disarmament of Sardinia, and has endeavoured to induce the Russian Government to make a representation to the Court of the Tuileries to the same effect.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 232. *Mr. Russell to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 6.)
(Extract.)

Rome, April 2, 1859.

THE proposed Congress for the settlement of Italian affairs is at present uppermost in every one's mind at Rome; the conditions under which it is to meet, seem more or less known to diplomacy.

I had occasion to speak to the Ambassadors of France and Austria, and to the Ministers of Prussia, Belgium, Naples, and Sardinia, who all agreed in thinking that the Government of the Pope, as well as the King of Naples, would decline the invitations of the Five Powers to send Representatives to the Congress if they were not to have a voice in its decisions.

No. 233. *Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Duke of Malakoff, April 6.)

(Translation.)

Paris, April 5, 1859.

M. le Maréchal,—THE Austrian Ambassador has just placed before me the communication made by Lord A. Loftus to Count Buol, concerning the four bases upon which the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty proposes to found the deliberations of the Congress of the Five Powers.

The text of this communication is not in accordance with the despatch which the Earl of Malmesbury addressed to you, dated

the 22nd of March ; in effect, that despatch holds that the deliberations should be limited to the four following points :—

1. The means by which peace can be maintained between Austria and Sardinia.

2. How the evacuation of the Roman States by the French and Austrian troops can best be effected.

3. If reforms can be introduced into the internal administration of those Italian States whose actual administrative defects may tend to produce discontent, and permanent and dangerous disorder ; and, if such reforms can be introduced, of what they should consist.

4. The substitution for the Treaties between Austria and the Duchies, of a Confederation of the Italian States among themselves, for their mutual protection, internal as well as external.

Lord Malmesbury adds, that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty requires, besides, as a condition to its acceptance of the Russian proposition, that it shall be clearly understood that the Congress shall not occupy itself with any question of interference in the existing state of territorial possession in Italy, and that it shall in no way disturb the Treaties of 1815.

In the note from Lord A. Loftus to Count Buol, the four points are conceived in the following sense :—

1. Means of assuring the maintenance of peace between Austria and Sardinia.

2. Evacuation of the Roman States by the foreign corps of occupation, and the taking into consideration of reforms in the Italian States.

3. Arrangement ("combinaison") to be substituted for the special Treaties between Austria and the Italian States.

4. The territorial arrangements of the Treaties of 1815 shall not be disturbed.

The Government of the Emperor did not hesitate to give its approval to the terms of the despatch which the Earl of Malmesbury addressed to you, dated the 22nd of March, and I instructed you to inform the Principal Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty thereof, authorizing you to give him a copy of my despatch No. 43. I requested you, further, to come to an understanding with the Earl of Malmesbury as to the meaning to be attached to the words "Minor States," the Government of the Emperor being unable to admit that there could be a question of a Confederation which should not include all the Italian States. Lord Malmesbury having given you the assurance that the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty shared entirely, in this respect, the opinion of the Government of the Emperor, I had reason, thenceforth, to consider the understanding as complete. I cannot, therefore, account for the difference which exists on the subject of the four points between the text of Lord Malmesbury's despatch, and the text of Lord A. Loftus's note to Count Buol.

I beg you in consequence, M. le Maréchal, to be so good as to point out this difference to the Principal Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty, and I do not doubt that he will hasten to write to Lord A. Loftus to rectify, without delay, a misunderstanding which might have deplorable consequences.

I authorize you, M. le Maréchal, to read this despatch to the Earl of Malmesbury, and to leave him a copy of it.

Accept, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 234. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant,* inclosing a copy of a note which, in compliance with the instructions contained in my despatch of the 30th ultimo,† you addressed to Baron Schleinitz, embodying the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government for discussion by the proposed Congress on the affairs of Italy.

Your Lordship has stated the four points correctly as to substance ; but as a different form of words has been made use of by Her Majesty's Government in their communications with the other Great Powers, it may be well that your Lordship should amend the note which you addressed to Baron Schleinitz on the 2nd instant, by substituting the following description of the four points :—

1. The means by which peace may be preserved between Austria and Sardinia.

2. How the evacuation of the Roman States by the Armies of Austria and France can best be accomplished.

3. Whether any, and if any, what, reforms can be made in the internal administration of those and other Italian States whose present administrative defects may obviously tend to permanent and dangerous discontent and disorder.

4. The substitution for the Treaties between Austria and the Duchies of a Confederation of the minor States of Italy among themselves for their mutual internal and external protection.

The above are the four points ; but Her Majesty's Government have further stated, that it is to be distinctly understood that the Congress will not entertain any question of interference with the actual state of territorial possession in Italy, nor in any way disturb the Treaties of 1815.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 235. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—IN reply to your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant,‡ relative to the suggestion made to Baron Schleinitz by

* No. 215.

† No. 187.

‡ No. 216.

Prince Gortchakoff, and adopted by the Prussian Government, that the preliminary arrangements relating to the proposed Congress should be settled by the Representatives of the Great Powers in London, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government readily agree to this proposition, and trust that some of the difficulties which have hitherto impeded the arrangements for a Congress may thereby be overcome.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 236. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to the negotiations respecting the constitution of the proposed Congress on Italian affairs, I have to inform your Lordship that the French Government have expressed an opinion that it would be better to postpone any invitation to the Italians in some form or other to share in the proceedings, until the Plenipotentiaries had met, when both the form of invitation, and the status of the Commissioners, could be decided. Her Majesty's Government being most anxious to cut short tedious discussions on matters of form, and desirous to obtain the paramount point, namely, the meeting of a Congress as early as possible, will not object to that proposition.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 237. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.**

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—I INFORMED you by telegraph this afternoon that Her Majesty's Government were prepared, if the Cabinet of Vienna should cease to press for the disarmament of Sardinia, to refrain on their part from any longer urging that Cabinet to consent to the withdrawal of the two armies from the frontier. Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand how Austria, with the large army which she has now collected in the Lombardo-Venetian territories, amounting, as it is supposed, to 150,000 men, can seriously entertain any apprehension in regard to the amount of force kept on foot by Sardinia, which is, probably, not more than one-third of that of Austria.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 238. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo,† reporting the communications between the Prussian and Austrian Governments, as to the representation of the Italian States at the proposed Congress; and I have to state to your

* A similar despatch was addressed, on the same day, to Lord Bloomfield.

† No. 212.

Lordship, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government consider that the titles to be given to the Italian delegates are immaterial to the main question, and that the arrangement of this particular point should be left in the hands of the States to be represented.

Although, however, Her Majesty's Government consider the manner in which Belgium and Holland were represented in the Conferences of 1830, as affording a good precedent, the adoption of which would in no wise derogate from the dignity of the Italian Powers, they still consider that the early meeting of the Congress is of such paramount importance that they are prepared to yield on this point to the wishes of the Austrian Government, if the States interested should give their assent to the position which Count Buol proposes to assign to them.

The great object which Her Majesty's Government have at heart with regard to the proposed deliberations on the affairs of Italy, is the improvement of the political and social position of its inhabitants, and they would, therefore, be the more anxious that the delegates appointed to represent the interests of the several Governments, should be persons who, from their experience of all the details of the political condition of the Peninsula, would be competent to give good practical advice with reference to any reforms which might be recommended.

The French Government have expressed an opinion that it would be better to postpone any invitation to the Italian States, in some form or other, to share in the proceeding of Congress, until the Plenipotentiaries had met, when both the form of invitation, and the status of the Italian Commissioners, could be decided. Her Majesty's Government being most anxious to cut short tedious discussions on matters of form, and desirous to obtain the paramount point, namely, the meeting of a Congress as early as possible, will not object to that proposition.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No 239. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to that part of your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo,* in which you allude to the communication made by Baron Werther to Count Buol, with respect to a suggestion that the preliminary arrangements relating to the proposed Congress should be settled by the Representatives of the Great Powers in London, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government readily agree to this proposition, and trust that some of the difficulties which have hitherto impeded the arrangements for a Congress may thereby be overcome.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

* No. 212.

No. 240. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—I INCLOSE, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a despatch from Count Walewski to the Duc de Malakoff,* pointing out the discrepancy, to which I have also adverted in my despatch of this day's date,† between the description given by your Lordship of the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government for deliberation in the Congress, and that given by Her Majesty's Government in their communications with other Powers.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 241. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo,‡ inclosing copies of the notes which you addressed to Count Buol respecting the deliberations of the proposed Congress.

Your Lordship, however, has misstated the four points, and it is essential that you should immediately rectify the error by writing an amended note on that subject to Count Buol, and by enumerating the points in the following order and manner:—

1. The means by which peace may be preserved between Austria and Sardinia.

2. How the evacuation of the Roman States by the armies of Austria and France can be best accomplished.

3. Whether any, and, if any, what, reforms can be made in the internal administration of those and other Italian States, whose present administrative defects may obviously tend to permanent and dangerous discontent and disorder.

4. The substitution for the Treaties between Austria and the Duchies of a Confederation of the minor States of Italy among themselves, for their mutual internal and external protection.

The above are the four points; but Her Majesty's Government have stated in addition, that it is distinctly to be understood that the Congress will not entertain any question of interference with the actual state of territorial possessions in Italy, nor in any way disturb the Treaties of 1815.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

P.S. Your Lordship will explain that with respect to the fourth point, Her Majesty's Government do not intend that a Confederation should be the only arrangement contemplated; but that it should be considered as one likely to meet the object desired, and which Lord Cowley and Count M. Buol had touched upon at Vienna.

* No. 233.

† No. 246.

‡ 206.

No. 242. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

Sir,—It appears from your telegrams of yesterday, that Prince Gortchakoff declines acceding to the invitation of the Cabinet of Berlin to unite with England and Prussia in an endeavour to persuade France to urge disarmament upon Sardinia; and that his Excellency grounds his refusal on the allegations that such a demand would require Sardinia to do more than Austria is required to do; and further, that neither France nor Sardinia would listen to it.

Her Majesty's Government, however, consider that if the French Government would concur in the suggestion offered by them, that in the event of Sardinia disarming, England and France should guarantee her against Austrian attack, the proposal for which the advocacy of Russia is requested by the Cabinet of Berlin would be fair, and ought to be supported by the Russian Government.

Her Majesty's Government are prepared to enter into such a guarantee jointly with France, but they will not give it alone.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 243. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government are willing to defer to the views severally entertained by Austria and France, in regard to the Italian States being invited to attend the Congress, so far as to agree that the invitation should be deferred until the meeting of the Congress, at which time also the position to be occupied by those States with reference to the Congress shall be defined.

It is obvious that their presence would not be required during the discussions treating of the evacuation of the Roman States, or the relations between Austria and Sardinia.

In this state of things, if Austria will yield on the point of Sardinia's disarmament, or that of a mutual withdrawal of troops from the frontier, nothing would remain to be settled, but to proceed to the Congress without further conditions.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 244. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

Sir,—WITH reference to the suggestion made to Baron Schleinitz by Prince Gortchakoff, and adopted by the Russian Government, that the preliminary arrangements relating to the proposed Congress should be settled by the Representatives of the Great Powers in London, I have to inform you that Her

Majesty's Government readily agree to this proposition, and trust that some of the difficulties which have hitherto impeded the arrangements for a Congress may thereby be overcome.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 245. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859

Sir,—WITH reference to the negotiations respecting the constitution of the proposed Congress on Italian affairs, I have to inform you that the French Government have expressed an opinion that it would be better to postpone any invitation to the Italians, in some form or other to share in the proceedings, until the Plenipotentiaries had met, when both the forms of invitation, and the status of the Commissioners could be decided.

Her Majesty's Government being most anxious to cut short tedious discussions on matters of form, and desirous to obtain the paramount point, namely, the meeting of a Congress as early as possible, will not object to that proposition.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 246. *Circular addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at European Courts.*

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

Sir,—IT is unnecessary that I should furnish you, at your present residence, with copies of the voluminous correspondence which has passed between Her Majesty's Ministers at certain of the Courts of Europe and myself, respecting the present state of Italian affairs; but I will state briefly, for your information, what has passed and is passing on the subject.

You are aware that Earl Cowley proceeded to Vienna in February last, with the concurrence of the Emperors of the French and of Austria, and with the view of ascertaining whether some understanding might not be arrived at between those two Sovereigns in regard to the affairs of Italy, which might obviate the danger of a rupture between them.

Lord Cowley discharged the duty entrusted to him with his usual ability, and succeeded in inducing the Austrian Cabinet to take such a view of the several matters which required to be adjusted, as, it was hoped, if duly appreciated at Paris, might form the basis of a permanent understanding between the two Powers.

In the meantime, however, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg—whether under the influence of apprehension lest the feeling excited in Germany in favour of Austria should lead to the extension to the Rhine of a war begun in Italy, or of some other unexplained motive—suggested that a Congress should be held among the Great Powers. Before any formal proposition to that effect

was made to this country, Her Majesty's Government, hearing that such a thing was in agitation, expressed their willingness to take part in a Congress, provided that its deliberations were restricted to four points, namely : The means of preventing war breaking out between Austria and Sardinia ; of effecting the evacuation of the Papal States by the armies of Austria and France ; of devising and recommending to the several Italian States such measures of internal reform as might ensure their future tranquillity ; and of providing a substitute for the separate Treaties between Austria and certain of the States of Italy which were considered to give to the former Power an undue weight in the affairs of the Peninsula.

Her Majesty's Government made their agreement to a Congress subject to the further condition that all questions touching the Treaties and Territorial arrangements of 1815 should be excluded from its deliberations.

These views of Her Majesty's Government have met with general concurrence, and if no other questions had been raised, there would exist no obstacle to the meeting of the Congress. But other collateral questions have been raised, and still remain unsettled.

One of these questions turns upon the manner in, and the extent to, which the Representatives of the Italian States should be admitted at the Congress, and the time at which the invitation to them should go forth. On the first two points a general understanding has been arrived at among the Powers that the several Italian States, including Sardinia, may be admitted to state their views to the Congress, though they are excluded from any share in the deliberations of that Assembly ; it being understood, moreover, that the conclusions at which the Congress may arrive shall be made known to the several States upon whose interests they may bear in the form of recommendation, not of imposition. But Her Majesty's Government have learnt with regret that even before the invitation has gone forth, some, at least, of the States of Italy, and specifically Rome, Naples, and Sardinia, have announced their determination to refuse it.

The question which has been attended with the greatest perplexity and difficulty is that connected with the mode in which it may be possible to prevent the meeting of the Congress being anticipated by the breaking out of war between Austria and Sardinia.

Her Majesty's Government, at the outset, proposed to that of France to call upon Sardinia to disband her extraordinary levies in return for a guarantee on the part of England and France against an attack on the part of Austria, and in pursuance of a declaration solemnly given by Austria that she would not attack Sardinia ; but I regret to say that up to the present time no answer has been received from France ; while, on her part, Austria

insists on the preliminary disarmament of Sardinia as an indispensable condition to the presence of an Austrian Plenipotentiary at the Congress.

Her Majesty's Government have endeavoured to turn this difficulty, and to effect the paramount object of averting the commencement of hostilities, by proposing to Austria that the Austrian and Sardinian forces should mutually withdraw from the frontier, where they now stand in presence of each other ; but I regret to say that the Cabinet of Vienna has shown no disposition to agree to this proposal.

Whatever may be the issue of the discussions now pending as preliminary to the meeting of the Congress, and their success in preventing immediate war, Her Majesty's Government cannot disguise from themselves that the present aspect of affairs is becoming daily more critical. The recent visit of the Sardinian Prime Minister to Paris, although it has been said that he failed in inducing the French Government to espouse the claim of Sardinia to take place with the Five Great Powers in the proposed Congress, and that he left Paris under the strong influence of resentment at disappointed hopes, has unquestionably been followed by active demonstrations in France of an intention to be prepared for all events in Italy. A considerable French force has been concentrated in the south of France, reinforcements of troops, specially adapted for active service, have been summoned from Algeria, and there is too much reason to apprehend that a decision has been, or at all events is on the eve of being, arrived at, which will render unavailing all the efforts of other Powers to maintain the general peace.

Her Majesty's Government will, nevertheless, not relax their endeavours to bring about a settlement of the Italian question by peaceful means ; and the brief recital which I have thus given will afford you a general notion of the course which they have hitherto pursued.

At the same time I cannot conceal from you that according to present appearances, the exertions which, in conjunction with the Governments of Prussia and Russia, they have so earnestly made, are likely to prove ineffectual to avert a war, which, though it may have its origin in Italy, will, if prolonged, hardly be confined within so narrow a sphere.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 247. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Hudson.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

THE Sardinian Minister at this Court has communicated to me a despatch* addressed to him by Count Cavour, in which he

* No. 158.

expresses the hope that Her Majesty's Government will recognize the necessity of admitting Sardinia to be represented in the Congress which has been proposed by the Russian Government with reference to the present state of Italy, and to which Her Majesty's Government, in common with the other great Powers, has assented.

Count Cavour supports the claim thus advanced on the part of the Sardinian Government, on the ground that that Power possesses the confidence of the populations whose condition will form the subject of the deliberations of the Congress ; and because, in his opinion, it has been owing mainly to the attitude assumed by Sardinia, and to her sympathy for the sufferings of the Italians, as more especially manifested by the course she adopted at the Conferences at Paris, that Italy has not been the scene of disorder and revolution.

Her Majesty's Government are unable to recognize the claim advanced by Count Cavour ; nor can they entirely assent to the opinion that it is mainly owing to the action of Sardinia that difficulties and complications have not arisen in the Peninsula. They have already expressed their belief that it is partly owing to the policy she has pursued, by which, to use the expression of Count Cavour himself, she has placed herself at the head of the national movement, that the danger which now menaces the peace of Europe is, in some degree, to be attributed.

Her Majesty's Government were no sooner informed of the proposal of a Conference, which had been submitted to the Emperor of the French by the Government of Russia, than, even before any formal communication to that effect was addressed to them, they signified their willing assent to the adoption of such a course. That proposal thus made by Russia, and assented to by France, was for a Congress of the Five Great Powers.

Her Majesty's Government, in signifying their willingness to acquiesce in this proposition, enumerated four points which should form the bases of the deliberations of the proposed Congress, and the adoption of which by all the Powers was, in their opinion, an indispensable preliminary to the assembling of the Congress. They also considered it to be necessary that it should be expressly declared that the Congress should be precluded from taking into consideration any question affecting the territorial rights of the various Powers in Italy under the Treaties of 1815. The view, however, which is taken by the Sardinian Government, as expressed in Count Cavour's Memorandum of March 1,* seems in direct opposition to such a course. In the opinion of Count Cavour, the domination of Austria in Lombardy is contrary to those great principles of equity and justice on which social order reposes, and if she cannot be called on to modify the Treaties on which her title to her Italian possessions is founded, she may at

* No. 89.

least be called on to change the system of administration by which those possessions are governed.

In the course which Her Majesty's Government have preferred to adopt, they have acted in strict accordance with the views I expressed in my despatch to you of the 7th of March, but the purport and bearing of which Count Cavour, seems to have misunderstood, when, in his despatch to the Marquis d'Azeglio, he states that I entirely agreed in the justice of the views expressed in his Memorandum addressed to the British and Prussian Governments. I then said, that while I was ready to admit that many of the grievances which he pointed out had a real existence, Her Majesty's Government, in searching for the remedies to be applied, considered that the endeavours of the Powers wishing well to Italy should be directed to the attainment of what was really practicable; that it would be hopeless to attempt to obtain from the Cabinet of Vienna the substitution of a purely Italian Administration, civil and military, in place of that now established, and that the endeavour to do so would effectually indispose Austria to any joint co-operation with foreign Powers for the amelioration of the administrative system in other parts of Italy.

With reference to the four points which Her Majesty's Government laid down as necessary bases for the deliberation of the Congress, Count Cavour cannot but acknowledge that Her Majesty's Government have practically carried out the views of the Sardinian Government with reference to the States of Central Italy, their relations with Austria, and the reforms which may be necessary to secure the happiness and contentment of their people.

The Sardinian Government, however, beyond these points, declare it as their object to introduce questions affecting the internal administration of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, though they characterize the reforms that might be carried out with this view as palliatives, the success of which, if adopted, appears hopeless. In the view of Her Majesty's Government, while it would be impracticable to obtain any such concessions, the attempt to do so would render the work of conciliation in which, in common with the other Great Powers, Her Majesty's Government desire to enter, hopeless; and they therefore consider that the express determination of Sardinia to urge the adoption of such a course would make her presence as a member of the Congress injurious to the attainment of the objects for which the Congress itself is formed.

This is, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, sufficient to indispose them from admitting Sardinia exceptionally as a principal in the deliberations of those Five Great Powers who have now, for half-a-century, had the sole lead in European politics.

Her Majesty's Government conceive that it is beyond the pro-

vince of a Congress to impose the adoption of reforms on any independent State, and they desire, therefore, to see the Italian States assisting the deliberations of the Plenipotentiaries by the presence of Agents, specially named, to advise and give information to them on the subjects affecting the interests of each particular State; but they are unable to recognize the justice of the proposal now made by the Sardinian Government, that Sardinia, which, individually, is not to be affected by the decisions of the Congress, should be represented in it, while the other Italian States, which are to be directly and immediately affected in both their internal and external relations, should be excluded.

Her Majesty's Government believe that the true interests of Italy, and the tranquillity of Europe, will be best secured by an adherence, in its integrity, to the proposal as made, in the first instance, by the Russian Government; and, while they cannot support the claim of Sardinia to be directly represented in the Congress, they invite the Sardinian Government, by doing everything in their power to contribute to its success, to acquire a new title to the confidence of the Italians, and the gratitude of Europe in general.

No. 248. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Excellency will have heard, direct from Lord A. Loftus, by telegraph, that the Austrian Government is prepared, if Sardinia will disband the free corps. to give the most solemn assurance that she will not attack Sardinia, and is further prepared to come to an agreement with the Five Powers for general disarmament previously to the meeting of the Congress, but that the Austrian Government will not consent to the proposal for the withdrawal of her troops, nor desist from her demand for the disarmament of Sardinia, except upon the terms which she specifies.

Her Majesty's Government considers that the offer thus made by the Austrian Government is a fair one, and that a general disarmament by the Great Military Powers and Sardinia would be an inestimable result to obtain.

Her Majesty's Government conclude that an agreement to disarm is all that could be secured before the Congress met, if the 30th of this month is still to be the day of its assembling, and the details in carrying that agreement out would be settled at the Congress. Her Majesty's Government strongly recommend that the disbanding of the free corps should be understood to form part of the general disarmament, but be executed under certain provisions. Nothing, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, would be more dangerous than suddenly disbanding and

letting loose among an inflammable population some thousands of men whose discontent would be aggravated by their dismissal from the service in which they are, at all events, kept quiet by the force of military discipline.

I have to instruct your Excellency to endeavour to ascertain the views of the French Government upon the Austrian proposal for a general disarmament, and you will say that Her Majesty's Government consider that, by making it, Austria displays a sincere wish for peace, and puts herself in the right before public opinion, and that the converse of that position will attach to those who may refuse to accept it.

I need scarcely observe to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate the application of the principle of a disarmament to the comparatively insignificant army maintained in this country for the mere purposes of colonial and home service. Your Excellency may communicate at once with the French Government and Lord A. Loftus on this subject, on the basis which I have here laid down.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 249. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to the opinion expressed by the French Government that it would be better to postpone any invitation to the Italians, in some form or other, to share in the proceedings of the Congress, until the Plenipotentiaries had met, when both the forms of invitation and the status of the Italian Commissioners could be decided, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government being most anxious to cut short tedious discussions on matters of form, and desirous to obtain the paramount point, namely, the meeting of a Congress as early as possible, will not object to that proposition.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 250. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

My Lord,—I TRANSMIT herewith to your Excellency copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin,* relative to a suggestion made to Baron Schleinitz by Prince Gortchakoff and adopted by the Russian Government, that the preliminary arrangements relating to the proposed Congress should be settled by the Representatives of the Great Powers in London. I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government readily agree to this proposition, and trust that some of the diffi-

* No. 216.

culties which have hitherto impeded the arrangements for a Congress may thereby be overcome.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 251. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

I HAVE to acquaint your Lordship, by telegraph, that Austria desires that the Powers should agree, before the meeting of the Congress, to a general disarmament, and that Her Majesty's Government, while approving of such an agreement being come to as to the principle of a general disarmament, are nevertheless of opinion that the details of the measure must be settled and carried out by the Congress itself.

In like manner, Her Majesty's Government, while agreeing in the view of Austria as to the disbanding of the Sardinian Free Corps, are still of opinion that such a measure should form part of the general disarmament, inasmuch as, if those bodies were at once turned loose on the country, they might do incalculable mischief to the cause of order.

As Austria is willing to agree to take part in the Congress on the acceptance of the conditions of the disbanding of the Sardinian Free Corps, and of a general disarmament, Her Majesty's Government conceive that a final arrangement for the assembling of the Congress may be made on those conditions, modified as I have now explained to your Lordship.

No. 252. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 7, 1859.

I HAVE received, by telegraph, your report that Count Buol was willing to enter into the Congress if the Sardinian Free Corps were disbanded, and an arrangement made for a general disarmament previously to the meeting of the Congress, and that on these conditions he would desist from the demand for the disarmament of Sardinia, though he would still refuse to accede to the proposal for the withdrawal of the Austrian army from the frontier.

I have already informed you, by telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government consider that Count Buol's proposal as regards general disarmament is acceptable; but unless the Congress were greatly delayed, it would be impossible to carry it out before the time of its assembling; and, consequently, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that all that can be now done is, that the Powers should agree that a general disarmament shall take place, leaving it to the Congress, after it has assembled, to settle the details of that operation.

Such disarmament would, of course, apply equally to the Sardinian Free Corps, which could be specified, but I have desired

your Lordship to point out to Count Buol that nothing could be more fatal to the peace and tranquillity of Italy than, by disbanding these corps immediately, to let them loose on the country. As long as they are under military discipline, they are comparatively harmless, and Sardinia is responsible for their acts; but that restraint once removed, they might do incalculable mischief.

Your Lordship will see, by the inclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Cowley,* that his Excellency is instructed to submit these considerations to the French Government.

No. 253. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 8, 1859

I HAVE apprized you, by telegraph, that Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna has reported that Austria will accept the Congress if, previously to its meeting, an agreement is come to for a general disarmament, and if the Sardinian Free Corps are disbanded; and that Count Buol holds more to the principle than to the details of disarmament.

You will have seen by my telegram that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that this is all that can be asked of Austria, and that they have desired Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to state to the French Government that they consider the Austrian proposal to be just.

It appears from Lord Augustus Loftus's report that, in consequence of the armaments of France, the Austrian Government have decided on calling out the whole of their war-reserves.

No. 254. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 8, 1859.

YOU will have seen by Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram of last night, that if France does not assent to the last proposals of Austria, namely, that an agreement shall be established for a general disarmament previous to the Congress, and that France shall induce Sardinia to disband her free corps, Austria will not enter the Congress, unless, indeed, she can be secured against a French attack.

Her Majesty's Government informed you yesterday, by my private letter, that they consider the Austrian proposal to be just; and you will so inform Count Walewski, pointing out at the same time to his Excellency that Count Buol observes that he looks to the principle rather than to the details of disarmament. Your Excellency will, moreover, not disguise from Count Walewski that, if the French and Russian Governments do not agree to

* No. 248.

these terms, and if, in consequence, the Congress does not take place, Her Majesty's Government will have the painful conviction that that failure, and all the results that may ensue from it, will be attributable to those Governments alone.

No. 255. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 8, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, reporting that the Austrian Government had decided upon calling out the war reserves, and submitting that, in the altered state of circumstances, it might be inexpedient that you should present to Count Buol the note which, on the 5th instant,* I directed you, by telegraph, to address to his Excellency, the more so as you had already made verbally to him the whole of the observations which could be embodied in the note.

Your Lordship adds that if France does not assent to the last proposals of Austria, and agree to the principle of general disarmament previous to the Congress, and does not induce Sardinia to disband her free corps, Austria will not enter the Congress, unless, indeed, she can be secured against an attack on the part of France.

I have already informed your Lordship by telegraph that Her Majesty's Government concur in the propriety of your not presenting the note; that they consider the last proposal of the Cabinet of Vienna to be just; and that they have desired Lord Cowley to intimate their opinion to the French Government; and I now inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of my despatch to Lord Cowley to that effect.†

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 256. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*(—Rec. April 9.)

Paris, April 7, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT WALEWSKI informed me yesterday that he had thought it necessary to address a despatch to the Duke of Malakoff, remarking upon the discrepancy between the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government to the Imperial Government, and the four points proposed in Lord A. Loftus's note of the 28th to Count Buol.‡

Your Lordship's despatch of the 5th instant,§ which had reached me yesterday morning, enabled me to inform Count Walewski that your Lordship had yourself remarked the discrepancy in question, and had taken measures to remedy it.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

* No. 228.

† No. 254.

‡ No. 206.

§ No. 224.

No. 257. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 9, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE already acquainted your Excellency, by telegraph, in reply to your inquiry what view Her Majesty's Government take of the attempt making by Russia to obtain a Congress of four Powers, from which Austria would be excluded, that there never has been a question of such a Congress, and that Her Majesty's Government could not agree to take part in one so limited.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 258. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 8.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 8, 1859.

I TOOK an opportunity, after the receipt yesterday of Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram of the 6th instant,* of letting Count Walewski know the general nature of its contents. Count Buol's proposal for a general disarmament previous to the meeting of the Congress seemed so reasonable that I did not hesitate to recommend it, observing that the whole question of the exceptional disarming of Sardinia would thereby be avoided. I said that the Imperial Government ought at once to take up this proposal if they were sincerely desirous that the Congress should meet, and that the present crisis should receive a pacific solution.

Count Walewski replied that he had repeated, word for word, to the Emperor the conversation which he had had a few days ago with me respecting the Emperor's real intentions, the details of which are given in my despatch of the 5th instant,† and that His Majesty had ratified every word which he (Count Walewski) had then spoken. There could be no doubt, therefore, of His Majesty's desire that the Congress should meet. But with respect to a general disarmament, how could it be settled before the Congress met, and who were to disarm? Not France, who had not added a man to her army.

I replied that Her Majesty's Government considered the proposal of Austria to be directed towards a general diminution of the large standing armies kept up on the Continent, and that a preliminary Conference might easily be established in London, or elsewhere, to effect this desirable object. But if, as Count Walewski seemed to suppose, the proposal of Austria had merely reference to present circumstances, it ought equally to be entertained. The Powers who had made no extraordinary armaments would declare the fact, while those who had thought it necessary to increase their military forces could diminish them without dishonour or cavil.

Count Walewski said that, perhaps something might be made

* No. 252.

† No. 229.

out of the proposal ; but he did not show much disposition to attempt it.

I understand that Russia expects to be able to persuade the remaining Powers to meet in Congress without Austria. Your Lordship's telegram of 7.15 yesterday* will enable me to counter-act this latter scheme. My Prussian colleague, who is under the same impressions as myself, will not, I believe, consent to any Congress not composed of the Five Powers.

Count Walewski agrees in your Lordship's opinion that it would be dangerous at this moment to disband the free corps taken into Sardinian pay.

No. 259. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 9, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government had understood from your telegram of the 7th instant, that the Austrian Government, although requiring that the Sardinian free corps should be forthwith disbanded, no longer insisted on the immediate disarmament of the Sardinian army, but were content to leave that to form part of the proposed general disarmament, and Her Majesty's Government thereupon instructed you to point out to Count Buol the mischief that might ensue from casting loose the Free Corps at once on Italy.

Under this impression too, Lord Cowley, by my directions, placed the proposal before the Emperor of the French and, although His Imperial Majesty did not give any decided answer, it seems probable that he will decline it, and if he does so, he will, as regards that specific proposal, put Austria in the right and himself in the wrong.

It would seem, however, from a communication made to me to-day by Count Apponyi, that either you must have misunderstood Count Buol, or Her Majesty's Government have not clearly appreciated your meaning. For it seems that Austria still insists, as a preliminary condition, not only that the Sardinian free corps should be disbanded, but that the whole Sardinian army should be placed on a peace footing.

If this be the case the position of Austria as regards France will be inverted, and she will no longer stand in the advantageous light that she would have done if the French Government had refused the proposal such as Her Majesty's Government understood Austria to have made it.

In this state of things Her Majesty's Government will suspend any further proceedings on this point, until they clearly ascertain from you what are the real intentions of Austria on the subject.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

* See No. 257.

No. 260. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 9, 1859.

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday afternoon, from which it appears that Austria is prepared forthwith to cease from her armaments, and solemnly and unconditionally to declare that she will not attack Sardinia, and at once to enter into the Congress, provided that England, in return, will guarantee her against attack by France, or, rather, will ensure the neutrality of the Mediterranean, so that no armed force may be conveyed by sea from France to Italy: but that Austria will not be contented with a guarantee limited to the period during which the Congress is sitting, as she requires to be assured against the possible failure of the Congress.

I have already informed your Lordship by the telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government cannot undertake to guarantee Austria against an attack on the part of France.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 261. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Count Apponyi.*

Foreign Office, April 9, 1859.

M. le Comte,—HER Majesty's Government have anxiously considered the proposal* made to them by the Austrian Government, that England should give to Austria a formal guarantee of security against attack from France, on the condition that Austria would agree to stop armaments; to give a solemn assurance not to attack Sardinia; to abstain from demanding conditions from Sardinia; and to go to the Congress on the basis of the four points.

I have now the honour of stating to you, M. le Comte, that after maturely deliberating on this matter, Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that it will not be possible for them to give such a guarantee on the part of England; but they trust, nevertheless, that the Government of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty will see the expediency, in the interest of Austria, of adhering to the proposal made by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to the Emperor of the French, respecting the principle of a general disarmament, in the sense in which it was understood by Her Majesty's Government, and as explained by me to your Excellency this morning.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 262. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 10, 1859.

My Lord,—IMMEDIATELY on the receipt, by telegraph, of your Excellency's report of this afternoon,† that the French Govern-

* No. 260.

† See No. 281.

ment accepted the principle of a general disarmament, and was willing that a Congress should, if possible, meet even before the day originally mentioned, in order to consider the details of that measure, which should first occupy its attention, I directed Lord Augustus Loftus, by telegraph,* to state to Count Buol that if the Cabinet of Vienna should refuse the proposal of France, it would forfeit the moral support of Her Majesty's Government. I added, however, as I stated also to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government assumed that the disarmament of Sardinia was included in the French proposal, and that Sardinia had agreed or would agree to it. If the case were otherwise, the proposal would be of no value.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 263. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Vienna, April 6. 1859.

My Lord,—IN conformity with your Lordship's instruction, I have read to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo.†

Count Buol received with satisfaction the assurance therein given of the support of Her Majesty's Government on the question of the general disarmament to which his Excellency had adverted, and expressed generally his thanks for the friendly interest which Her Majesty's Government evinced towards Austria.

His Excellency stated that he need not make any fresh observation on the subject of the participation of the Italian States in the Congress, as that subject was no longer under discussion.

His Excellency agreed, however, to the proposal in your Lordship's telegram of the 5th instant,‡ which I communicated to him late this evening, that the invitation to the Italian States should be postponed till the Congress meets.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 264. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Vienna, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE not failed to communicate to Count Buol the substance of your Lordship's various telegrams of the 31st ultimo and 2nd instant,§ the former of which reported the menacing language which Count Cavour was said to have held at Paris, and the second, the announcement made by the Marquis d'Azeglio, that the Sardinian Minister would neither accept an invitation to the Congress nor agree to disarm on anybody's bidding.

His Excellency received this information with great calmness, and with no apparent regret. The impression which he gave me

* See No. 270. † No. 193. ‡ See No. 226. § Nos. 193 and 198.

was that he considers war inevitable, and that consequently the sooner it commences the better it will be for Austria.

In referring to the refusal by Count Cavour of the guarantee offered by Her Majesty's Government, and to disarm, Count Buol observed with some animation that this gave evident proof of the ambitious designs meditated by Sardinia, and he expressed a wish to know what course Her Majesty's Government would now pursue.

I represented to his Excellency that the principal object and effort of Her Majesty's Government was to bring about an agreement between France and Austria, and that the Congress was the means by which this happy result could be obtained. Too much account must not then be taken of the refusal of Count Cavour, or the irritation he had shown ; for, as was natural, he had been deeply wounded by the exclusion of Sardinia from the Congress. His Excellency should consider that the very fact of the Congress being confined to the Five Powers, to the exclusion of Sardinia, constituted a moral triumph for Austria, and was equivalent to the political disarmament of Sardinia. On these grounds, therefore, Austria should not raise any insurmountable obstacle to the meeting of Congress, for on it now depended the vital question to Europe of peace or war.

In conformity with the tenour of your Lordship's telegram of the 3rd instant,* I then stated to Count Buol that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the position of Austria might be greatly benefited were she to agree to the proposal that both armies should retire ten leagues from the frontier.

His Excellency at once replied, that this proposal was quite unacceptable, and that he could not assent to it.

"In the first place," his Excellency remarked, "Austria cannot be placed on a level with Sardinia ; and, secondly, we have already given the assurance that Austria will not attack Sardinia.

"If," said his Excellency, "any such proposal were made to me in writing, I should reply to it very sharply" (*très vertement*).

He has since informed me that the Prussian Minister had made a similar proposal, to which he had given a similar answer, with the additional expression of a hope that no such proposal would be renewed.

With reference to the second point contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 2nd instant,† and your Lordship's despatch of the 27th March,‡ in which your Lordship urges that the admission of the Italian States should take place on the same terms that Belgium and Holland were admitted to Conference, his Excellency stated that that case was not analogous to the present. Belgium was then a revolted province, and had not been recognised as an independent State ; and the Congress had been called by Holland, who had invited the Powers to assemble to adjust her differences

* No. 213.

† See No. 198.

‡ No. 167.

with Belgium. Accordingly, Holland had been a *bonâ fide* member of the Congress, and had signed all the Protocols, with the exception of some few, wherein her position as an interested party precluded her from doing so.

The chief difficulty which his Excellency entertained to the realization of your Lordship's views, existed with the parties themselves; for he knew that not one of the Italian States would accept the position therein assigned to them, and there was no virtual or legal power to force them to do so.

The principal objection which his Excellency entertained to the participation of these States in the Congress by duly-accredited Representatives, bore special reference to Sardinia. He clearly did not wish that there should be a Sardinian who, by having access to the Congress, might be the means of sowing differences, and raising dissensions, with a view to counteract the success of the deliberations. In all other respects, I am of opinion that Count Buol would in no wise object to the participation of the Italian States in any form that might be found desirable, provided always that they were not component parts of the Congress itself.

His Excellency observed to me, however, that this difficulty has solved itself, by the reported refusal of the Italian States to accept any participation in the Congress in the mode in which it is proposed to invite them.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 265. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, April 6, 1859.

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have read to Count Buol and placed in his Excellency's hands a copy of your Lordship's despatch of 30th ultimo.*

His Excellency, in the course of my reading, remarked that I had incorporated in my note two points into one, and had included the reservation of the Treaties of 1815, and of the territorial arrangements, as the fourth point. I explained to his Excellency that I had done this with a view not to create confusion by adding a fifth point, and that I had nevertheless strictly followed your Lordship's instructions. His Excellency said that it was a matter of no consequence; but that in reality the fourth point of my note bore rather the character of a great principle than a condition or basis on which a Congress was to deliberate.

I must here beg leave to observe, that in this despatch your Lordship refers to a condition, of which I only received the first official intimation in your Lordship's telegram of the 2nd instant, namely, that "Austria should withdraw her troops from the Piedmontese frontier."

His Excellency listened to the reading of the despatch with

much interest and attention, and expressed his general satisfaction and concurrence with the views and opinions therein expressed.

No. 266. *Lord A. Loftas to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Vienna, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—HAVING made to Count Buol, on the second instant, the proposal contained in your Lordship's telegram of that day,* that Austria and Sardinia should withdraw their forces ten leagues from the Ticino, and declare that they will not attack each other; and not wishing to take the decided negative with which his Excellency at once met it, I reverted to it again at my interview with his Excellency on Monday last.

His Excellency then stated, that he now awaited a reply to the notes addressed to me,† as he was anxious to know whether Her Majesty's Government, on the acceptation of the Congress and four points by the Austrian Cabinet, had invited the French Government to address, conjointly with them, an invitation to Sardinia to disband the Free Corps, and to disarm; and, if so, what reply had been returned by the Sardinian Government.

He was further waiting to learn whether the four Powers accepted the fifth point which he had proposed, in addition to the four points of Her Majesty's Government; namely, the proposal that the Congress would come to an agreement as to a general disarmament by the Great Powers.

In referring to the condition required by Austria, that Sardinia should disarm previous to their entering into Congress, Count Buol stated that this was in reality the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, and had been evidently made with a view to induce them to agree to the Congress on the bases of the four points; he could not therefore, understand how, having made the offer, we hesitated in its fulfilment.

I replied to his Excellency, that he must not misinterpret or cavil at the friendly efforts which Her Majesty's Government had so energetically displayed for the attainment of peace; but that it would be far more pleasing to us, and satisfactory to the cause we had at heart, if the Austrian Cabinet would aid us somewhat, by evincing a more ready acquiescence with our view, and a greater disposition to adopt our counsels.

It was evident, that if Austria pertinaciously held to the condition she had made, no Congress would take place, and that war must inevitably ensue. On Austria, therefore, would rest this heavy responsibility; on her must rest the consequences of the course she had pursued.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

* No. 213.

† No. 227.

No.267. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Vienna, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—I DID not fail to bring under Count Buol's notice, at the earliest moment possible after its receipt, your Lordship's telegram of the 31st ultimo,* and I urged on his Excellency, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, the great desirableness for Austria to place herself right in the public opinion of Europe, by settling at once the matters under discussion relating to the meeting of the Congress.

His Excellency observed with respect to the participation of the Italian States, that he had reason to know that none of those States would appear at the Congress in the form and manner which has been proposed, and that both the Pope and the King of Naples had already positively expressed their refusal to do so.

With respect to the proposal for a general disarmament, Count Buol stated that he had never intended that it should bear the character of a preliminary condition, but that it should be taken into consideration on the meeting of the Congress; he considered that its acceptance would afford the best proof of the pacific intentions of the Great Powers, and would give a further guarantee that all their efforts would be directed to secure a lasting peace.

I then alluded to the important point, the fulfilment of which the Austrian Cabinet exacted as a *sine quâ non* condition of their entering the Congress, viz., the previous disarmament and disbanding of the Free Corps by Sardinia; and I represented to his Excellency that the imperative form in which this condition was expressed would not produce an impression in Europe favourable to Austria. His Excellency, I stated, must admit that it was never desirable, in negotiations, that any party should advance and lay down a condition the fulfilment of which might be impossible, and in respect to which no means were left for harmonizing dissentient opinions. Such a course was neither likely to conciliate opponents, nor to be acceptable to friends.

His Excellency replied that he could give me no hope that the Austrian Cabinet would yield on this point. It was the condition on which the Emperor, his Master, had accepted the Congress and the four points, submitted by Her Majesty's Government as the basis for deliberation, and His Imperial Majesty would not deviate from it.

I stated to his Excellency that it could be scarcely supposed that a great military Power like Austria should entertain fears of a military attack upon her by a State like Sardinia, although the conditions imposed by Austria would be undoubtedly interpreted in this light, and there could scarcely exist other valid reasons for enforcing such a condition in opposition to the united counsels

of Europe. His Excellency replied, "We are not afraid of Sardinia. We have not armed against Sardinia; but we consider Sardinia to be the advanced guard of France. If France will disarm, and thereby give proof of her pacific intentions, we shall no longer insist on the disarmament of Sardinia. What we require to have is, security against France. We have no confidence in her Emperor, nor in the Government. If," continued his Excellency, "Great Britain and Prussia will sign a defensive Treaty with us, and will secure us against France, we will no longer insist on this condition. But we must know that France is not seeking to gain time by negotiation in order to complete her armaments. If war is to be, we prefer to have it now. We cannot endure this continued suspense, this continued armed peace, which is more prejudicial to the country than war."

I reminded his Excellency that the counsels of Her Majesty's Government were those of friends, who were anxious and most deeply interested for the welfare and security of Austria; but that Her Majesty's Government could not disguise from themselves that, if the conditions now exacted by Austria were insisted on, the failure of the Congress must inevitably result, and that it was evident that the Austrian Cabinet, by such a course, would be playing the game of their adversary. It was patent to all that Count Cavour was anxious that the Congress should not meet, and nothing could facilitate and further his designs more effectively than the refusal of the Austrian Cabinet to enter it. The failure thereof, and the inevitable result, which would be war, would be attributed to Austria. On her would be laid the blame; and this fatal error on her part would, I feared, completely deprive her of the sympathies and moral support which had hitherto been given to her both in England and in Germany.

I entreated, therefore, his Excellency to pause and to reflect before he persisted in a course which would only rejoice his adversaries, and, I feared, alienate his friends.

Count Buol said that he could not change the decision taken. He did not think that either the Parliament or public opinion of England would withdraw their sympathies from Austria on such grounds, for he respected too much the sound reason and impartial judgment of England to entertain these fears. Austria confided in the justice of her cause and in the legality of her sacred rights. If she drew the sword then, it would only be in their defence and for their maintenance.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 268. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Vienna, April 6, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE not the smallest hope that the Austrian Government will agree to any such measure as that of retiring their forces ten leagues from the Piedmontese frontier.

Baron Werther, the new Prussian Minister, has received a direct negative to this proposal, and is not disposed to revert to the subject again.

I had some conversation with Count Buol late this evening (for I was unable to see him during the day), on the subject of the disarmament of Sardinia. It is not necessary, neither will my time permit me (hurried as I am by the forced departure of the messenger to-morrow), to repeat the arguments I brought forward to urge his Excellency to modify this condition of the Austrian Cabinet.

His Excellency replied, "You know what the Emperor told you; I can only repeat it. I could give up my post, but I could not obtain any change of decision in this respect."

I then brought before his Excellency the substance of the telegram I had received from Earl Cowley, requesting to be informed whether he might say that he had been positively assured at Vienna that when Sardinia had disarmed, Austria would do so likewise.

His Excellency said, that Earl Cowley was correct in the statement he made; but that when he (Count Buol) made the declaration referred to, matters were in a different position, and there was no question of a Congress.

After some argumentative discussion, I got his Excellency to state that, if Sardinia would disband the Free Corps, Austria would give the most solemn assurances not to attack her; and that Austria was ready at once, previous to the meeting of the Congress, to come to an agreement for the general disarmament of the Great Powers. If these terms were complied with, Austria would then go into Congress.

"What we require," observed Count Buol, "is security against France. If you and Prussia will give us that security, we will equally go into Congress."

With reference to Lord Cowley's proposal, his Excellency observed that Austria, situated as she was towards France, could not disarm merely because Sardinia did so. But, said Count Buol, if the Emperor Louis Napoleon is really sincere, and will openly and straightforwardly state his desire and intentions of bringing the affairs of Italy to a peaceful solution, and that these intentions should be supported by evident proofs of sincerity, then, said Count Buol, we shall most readily meet him, and reciprocate those assurances. All parties might then disarm, and the difficulties of the present situation would be at once removed.

But it is clear that his Excellency does not entertain any hopes of so peaceful a nature. In his opinion it will be the sword, and not the olive branch, which France will hold out.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 269. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 11, 1859.

My Lord,—I STATED to your Lordship, by telegraph, yesterday, that great anxiety was felt in this country lest the Austrian Government should commit itself by some precipitate act ; and I desired you to use your utmost endeavours to prevent it from undertaking any aggressive movement.

I added, as a further inducement, that Her Majesty's Government were not without hopes that the Chevalier Massimo d'Azeglio, of whose approaching arrival in this country on a special mission an intimation had been given to them, might be charged with some fair proposal on the part of the Sardinian Government which might lead to a solution of the present difficulties.

I stated to you, later in the day, that Her Majesty's Government had declined to accede to a suggestion which had been made to them by France and Russia, that, in consequence of the refusal of Austria to enter into the Congress, the other Four Powers should nevertheless meet without her.

Her Majesty's Government are glad to find, by your telegram of this morning, that Count Buol has assured you that Austria will not renounce her pacific attitude without giving them previous notice of her determination to do so ; and Her Majesty's Government depend upon your Lordship using the most energetic exertions to prevent so fatal a consummation at a moment when the consent of the French Government to accept the principle of a general disarmament opens a door for the introduction of those pacific negotiations which Her Majesty's Government are so anxious to commence, respecting the situation of Italy.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 270. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 11, 1859.

My Lord,—I RECEIVED, yesterday evening, Lord Cowley's report* of the consent of France to the principle of a general disarmament, the details of which should be settled in Congress ; and with reference to the communication made to your Lordship by his Excellency to the same effect, I directed you by telegraph to state to the Austrian Government that if it declined to accede to that proposal, Her Majesty's Government could no longer give her moral support to Austria, as she would by so doing have placed herself in the wrong, and have forfeited the sympathy of this country.

Her Majesty's Government assume, of course, that Sardinia is or will be a consenting party to the disarmament as far as she is

* See No. 262.

herself concerned, whether she takes a minor part in the Congress, or persists in refusing to do so except as a principal.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 271. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 11, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to instruct your Lordship, in reply to your telegram of yesterday, requesting directions on the subject, to present an explanatory note to Count Buol, setting forth the four points, as stated in my despatch to you of the 6th instant.*

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 272. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 11, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to state to your Lordship, that you cannot too seriously urge upon the Cabinet of Vienna the proposal of the French Government for a general disarmament, which Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris made known to you by telegraph yesterday.†

His Excellency informs me that no further concession can be expected from the French Government, and your Lordship will fairly state to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government consider the proposal to be not only just in itself, but to be eminently calculated to enlist in its favour the general sympathy of Europe.

You will point out to Count Buol that if Austria refuses the present proposal, she will forfeit the public opinion in her favour, not only of this country, but also of Europe; and you will say that the pertinacity with which she has hitherto insisted on the previous disarmament of Sardinia, has displeased many who might otherwise be well-disposed to her, and has given rise to considerable criticism in the public journals of this country.

Her Majesty's Government consider that there is now a fair chance of preventing the outbreak of hostilities, and of arranging the questions respecting Italy on the basis of the four points originally proposed by them; but if that chance is thrown away by Austria, that Power will be held responsible in public estimation for all the mischief that may ensue.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 273. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 11, 1859.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant,‡ reporting your conversation with Count Buol on the attitude of

* No. 241.

† No. 281.

‡ No. 267.

Austria in the present crisis, and I approve the language which your Lordship held to his Excellency on that occasion.

It is possible that before this despatch reaches Vienna the Austrian Government may have finally resolved to persevere in a course which no exertion of Her Majesty's Government would be able to control ; but while a hope of peace remains, I cannot avoid urging upon Count Buol the danger of continuing to maintain arguments, and to impose conditions, which must inevitably alter the position of Austria in the estimation of the world.

I have already shown that one of those conditions, namely, the disbanding of the free corps in Sardinia, if assented to by Sardinia, would be more dangerous than allowing them to be enrolled for the present under military discipline ; yet this condition forms a necessary part of the demand made by Austria for the disarmament of Sardinia before Austria consents to enter the Congress.

Independently of the danger to be incurred from acceding to this demand, a perseverance in it will inevitably prevent any meeting of the Congress, and, therefore, any hope of being able to maintain the peace of Europe.

Moreover, Count Buol admitted, in his remarks to your Lordship, that it was not because Austria had any fear of Sardinia that the Emperor, his master, insisted on the condition, but because His Imperial Majesty considered Sardinia only as the advanced guard of France, and that if France would show, by disarming, her desire for peace, Austria could not hesitate to second it.

The efforts of Her Majesty's Government have been directed to this result, and your Lordship has learnt, by telegraph, the success which has attended Lord Cowley's representation to the Emperor Napoleon, who is willing to make the condition of a general disarmament the first matter to be considered in Congress. This seems to Her Majesty's Government to meet all that can immediately be required for the honour of all parties. Austria herself would not consent to disarm before the Congress, and could not expect it from France ; and as Austria couples Sardinia with France, and admits that her fears are, in fact, limited to France, there seems to be no valid reason, now that France consents to take disarmament as a first and immediate point for discussion, why Austria should throw away the last hope of peace.

Count Buol says he depends upon the sympathy of this country and of the British Parliament in supporting the justice of the case of Austria ; but his Excellency would be mistaken in the feelings of England, its Government, its Parliament, and its people, if he entertained the idea that he would meet with sympathy in what will surely be condemned as an unwise tenacity of purpose.

I would, then, again appeal to Count Buol to throw aside every consideration which may prevent a peaceable solution of the present difficulties, and is not necessary to the safety of the Austrian Empire.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and, if he should desire it, you will leave him a copy.

No. 274. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Berlin, April 9, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a note which, in compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant,* I have addressed to Baron Schleinitz, embodying the four points laid down by Her Majesty's Government for discussion by the proposed Congress on the affairs of Italy, and amending the former note which I addressed to his Excellency on the 2nd instant.

I shall lose no time in delivering this note to Baron Schleinitz, whom I was unable to see this morning. His Excellency has already promised to return to me the one of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch of the 2nd instant.†

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

P.S.—Since writing the foregoing, Baron Schleinitz has returned to me the last-mentioned note, and I have forwarded the amended one to his Excellency.

B.

Inclosure. *Lord Bloomfield to Baron Schleinitz.*

Berlin, April 9, 1859.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, has the honour, in conformity with instructions which he has received from the Earl of Malmesbury, to inform his Excellency Baron Schleinitz, His Prussian Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Her Britannic Majesty's Government, being desirous of preventing the possibility of any misapprehension, have laid down the following description of the four points to be considered by the proposed Congress on the affairs of Italy:—

1. The means by which peace may be preserved between Austria and Sardinia.

2. How the evacuation of the Roman States, by the armies of Austria and France, can best be accomplished.

3. Whether any, and, if any, what, reforms can be made in the internal administration of those and other Italian States whose present administrative defects may obviously tend to permanent and dangerous discontent and disorder.

* No. 234.

† No. 215.

4. The substitution for the Treaties between Austria and the Duchies of a Confederation of the minor States of Italy among themselves for their mutual internal and external protection.

The Undersigned is further instructed to point out to his Excellency Baron Schleinitz, that Her Majesty's Government wish it to be distinctly understood that the Congress will not entertain any question of interference with the actual state of territorial possession in Italy, nor in any way disturb the Treaties of 1815.

The Undersigned, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 275. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Berlin, April 9, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE read to Baron Schleinitz your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant,* referring to the official announcement which had reached Her Majesty's Government, that Sardinia refuses to disarm, or to be represented at the Congress, and declines accepting the guarantee offered as the price of disarmament. I have not failed to draw his Excellency's attention to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that though Sardinia refuses to appear before the proposed Congress, it is not the less important that the other Italian States should be represented there.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 276. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Berlin, April 9, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE read to Baron Schleinitz your Lordship's despatch of the 5th instant,† stating that Her Majesty's Government are willing to defer to the views severally entertained by Austria and France, in regard to the Italian States being invited to attend the Congress, so far as to agree that the invitation should be deferred until it meets.

His Excellency is of opinion that the Congress is the only place where this and other questions can properly be discussed and settled.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 277. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Berlin, April 9, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE read to Baron Schleinitz your Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant,‡ upon the subject of a proposed invitation to the Austrian and Sardinian Governments to withdraw their forces from the Ticino, and to declare that they will not attack each other. His Excellency entirely agrees with the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the terms of such

* No. 198.

† No. 226.

‡ No. 220.

invitation should be identical, but not collective ; and he appears surprised that any question could have arisen of a collective note, for his objections to it would have been as strong as those expressed by your Lordship.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 278. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, April 11, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to state to your Lordship, that it appears to Her Majesty's Government that if Austria will agree to a general disarmament, in which Sardinia shall be included, the whole question can now be settled.

It is, therefore, unnecessary for me at present to say more to your Lordship than that Her Majesty's Government will not consent to take part in a Congress which shall consist of only four Powers, although they are not prepared to say that if Austria should not give way, it may not, hereafter, be necessary to hold a Conference to consider whether any means can be adopted to avert the commencement of a war.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 279. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

Paris, April 9, 1859,

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of the reply which I received last night from Count Walewski, to the note which I addressed his Excellency by your Lordship's orders on the 23rd ultimo,* stating the conditions on which Her Majesty's Government were ready to agree to a Congress of the Great Powers, and asking whether the French Government would join that of Her Majesty in inviting Sardinia to disarm, the two Governments guaranteeing her against any attack from Austria.

Your Lordship will see that Count Walewski refers Her Majesty's Government to his despatch to the Duke of Malakoff,† in answer to your Lordship's note of the 22nd ultimo‡ to that Ambassador, with regard to the points to be submitted to the Congress, and that the Imperial Government, having sounded the Government of Sardinia on the subject of disarming, have ascertained that it would be useless to propose it.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

Inclosure. *Count Walewski to Earl Cowley.*

(Translation.)

Paris April 8, 1859.

M. l'Ambassadeur,—I HAVE received the letter which your

* No. 153.

† No. 156.

‡ No. 132.

Excellency did me the honour to address to me on the 25th March.

The understanding which has been established between the Government of the Emperor and that of Her Britannic Majesty, confirmed by the communication which Lord Malmesbury addressed, on the 22nd of last month, to the Duc de Malakoff, as also by the answer that I returned to it, and of which the Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty has left a copy with Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State leaves me nothing to add on the subject of the bases for future negotiations.

Touching the disarmament of Sardinia, the Imperial Government appreciates equally with that of Her Britannic Majesty the advantages of such a measure ; but, having foreseen the dispositions of the Cabinet of Turin, it has become assured that the Sardinian Government is not disposed to defer to the demand which would be made to her on that point by France and England. Now, as without doubt, the Government of Her Britannic Majesty intend no more than that of the Emperor to address an injunction to Sardinia, followed, if necessary, by coercive measures, but simply to make amicable representations to her, the Imperial Government thinks it useless to join in making overtures, which it knows beforehand will be rejected ("repoussées").

I think, M. l'Ambassadeur, that your Government will take our view of this matter, and will not henceforward deem it necessary to give effect to the proposition which your Excellency has communicated to me on its part.

Accept, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 280. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 9, 1859.

I WAS received yesterday by the Emperor.

I stated to His Majesty that I had requested the honour of an audience, with a view of clearing up a misunderstanding which I had learnt from Count Walewski subsisted in His Majesty's mind with regard to a promise which I had conceived His Majesty to have given to me at the first interview I had had with His Majesty on my return from Vienna to Paris, namely, that if the idea of a Congress should be favourably entertained, His Majesty would join Her Majesty's Government in demanding the immediate disarmament of Sardinia. I called to His Majesty's recollection what had passed upon the occasion, and particularly that I had asked His Majesty's permission to repeat to your Lordship the promise which he then gave. I said that I was the more anxious that this matter should be cleared up, as your Lordship had made use of the assurance given to me in order to induce the Austrian Government to consent to the idea of a Congress.

His Majesty replied that my statement was perfectly correct, and that he had faithfully carried out the assurance which he had given me. He had both written to Turin, and had spoken to Count Cavour in the sense suggested by Her Majesty's Government. The difference between us seemed to be that I had expected that some more official step should have been taken, which His Majesty never intended to imply. He regretted very much, His Majesty added, that his advice had not been followed, as he agreed that a disarmament would have been a good measure.

I profited by the opportunity to ask the Emperor whether His Majesty would not help to put an end to this embarrassing question by accepting the last proposal of Austria of a general disarmament before the Congress met. The moment was unfortunately not a propitious one for making the inquiry, as intelligence had just been received that Austria had called out her war reserves, and a copy of an order of the day said to have been issued to the troops at Milan, of which your Lordship will find an analysis in the accompanying telegraphic despatch, had just been sent to the Emperor by the King of Sardinia.

I did not hesitate to express my conviction that this document was spurious, and I think that such was the Emperor's opinion also ; but His Majesty seemed, on the whole, much more inclined to call out the French reserves than to entertain a proposal for disarming. He declared that if Austria wished other Powers to disarm, she must herself set the example.

His Majesty, on my pressing the question, made some further observations in the sense that France had not as yet armed, and could not therefore undertake to disarm.

I replied that Her Majesty's Government considered that the Austrian proposal related to the large standing armies kept up by the Continental Powers.

The Emperor rejoined that it was not only a good thing, but moreover the duty of a Sovereign, to make the military force of the State he governed as little burdensome as possible ; but matters of this kind required consideration, and could not be summarily disposed of, as Her Majesty's Government proposed.

I said that if His Majesty would agree to the principle, I considered it would be sufficient for the present, and the Congress might take the details as the first question for their consideration.

The Emperor, on the contrary, was of opinion that the question of a disarmament should be the last treated by the Congress, since, His Majesty remarked, if nothing was effected by the Congress, matters would then remain as they are.

I need not say that I combatted this idea to the utmost of my power, observing that it would be next to impossible to deliberate with that calmness which the subjects to be treated of required, if some of the parties to the Congress felt that, failing such an

issue to the negotiations as they desired, they would have recourse to arms.

His Majesty said that was the great difficulty which he felt in agreeing to the principle of a disarmament was, that if the intelligence from Vienna and Milan proved correct, he should be obliged himself to arm, and he should then have the appearance of acting in contradiction with his declarations. His Majesty, however, promised to take the matter into consideration.

I mentioned to the Emperor that the Russian and Prussian Governments proposed that certain preliminary questions relating to the meeting of the Congress should be settled in London: and I suggested that the question of disarmament might form one of them.

His Majesty did not pronounce himself either one way or the other.

Inclosure.

Telegraphic Despatch.

(Translation.)

Turin, April 7, 1859.

THEY report from Milan that an order of the day has been publicly exhibited in the Austrian barracks, in which it is said to the soldiers that the Emperor had rallied them under their flags to humble, when necessary, once again the pride of Piedmont, and to drive from their retreats the fanatic disturbers of European tranquillity. If they were forced to march against an enemy over whom Austria had always triumphed, the soldiers had only to remember their victories of 1848 and 1849, and Novara; their watchword should be "Long live the Emperor, and our just right!"

No. 281. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 10, 1859.

I RECEIVED your Lordship's telegram of the 8th instant,* too late to be able to make any personal use of it; but knowing that Count Walewski was to see the Emperor the next morning, I wrote his Excellency a confidential note, in which, while calling his attention to the gravity of the moment, I stated the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the general disarmament proposed by Austria should at once be agreed to, and that if from its being refused, the Congress was not to assemble, the responsibility of the consequences which might ensue would rest with those Governments who declined the just and reasonable proposal of the Austrian Government.

Count Walewski accompanied the Emperor into the country yesterday, and I was unable to see him, but as his Excellency expressed himself to me this afternoon, the day was not lost, for it

* See No. 254.

gave him an opportunity of conversing very seriously with His Majesty upon the present state of affairs. Count Walewski then asked me to repeat to him the proposal which I had made to the Emperor when I saw His Majesty on Friday. I replied that the arrangements which I had proposed was this—that all former proposals with regard to disarmaments should be allowed to drop; that the Powers about to meet in Congress should at once agree to the principle of a general disarmament, in which Sardinia should be included, and that the details of such disarmament should be the first point discussed after the Congress should have met.

Count Walewski replied, that he was authorized by the Emperor to accept that proposal, with this reserve, however: that if it should prove true that Austria had called out her war reserves, France would call out her contingents. To a question which I put to him, Count Walewski answered, that whether the contingents should be called out eventually or not, France would abide by the decision which he had just communicated to me.

Count Walewski added, that France, with a view of settling this important point as soon as possible, would be ready to enter into the Congress at an earlier date than that now fixed, the 30th instant, if the Plenipotentiaries could be assembled sooner, and such a measure were judged advisable.

No. 282. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 11.)
(Extract.) Paris, April 10, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, another article from the "Moniteur," addressed to the German nation.

Inclosure.—*Extract from the "Moniteur" of April 10, 1859.*
(Translation.) Paris, April 9, 1859.

THE French Government, as much as any other, understands and respects national susceptibilities. If, in their intentions or in their conduct, they had given Germany any cause for alarm on account of her independence, far from disdaining the energetic movements, and the alarms of German patriotism, they would have considered them noble and just.

But we cannot easily believe in a deliberate act of injustice against us on the part of those to whom we have given no grounds for suspicion. Our belief in the justice of other States is but the effect of the loyalty of our own policy. When demonstrations broke forth in certain parts of the Germanic Confederation, we heard of them without emotion, because we reckoned that the rational and enlightened portion of Germany would soon perceive that this violence had no real cause.

We were not deceived in this confidence. The agitation, provoked by the press and the Chambers of several German States,

far from increasing, begins to calm down. We confirm this with pleasure.

In order to render the French Government an object of suspicion, they even attached to it an indirect responsibility, in attributing to it a share in opinions inimical to the independence of the German Confederation, and freely published under the protection of a Legislation which does not authorize any preventive control. These opinions, for which only their authors are responsible, have sounded through Germany like a threat; propagated by malevolence, they have spread alarm, and perhaps caused credit to be given to unfortunate errors as to the intentions of the Cabinet of the Tuileries.

Those who only seek for justice do not fear the light. The Government of France has nothing to conceal, because it is certain of having nothing to disavow. The attitude which it has assumed on the Italian question, far from authorizing suspicion on the part of Germany, should, on the contrary, inspire her with the greatest confidence. France would not attack in Germany that which she wishes to preserve in Italy. Her policy, disavowing all ambition of conquest, only seeks such satisfaction and such guarantees as are called for by the latter nations, the happiness of the people and the interests of Europe. In Germany, as in Italy, she wishes that the different nationalities as recognized by Treaties, should be able to maintain, and even strengthen themselves, for she considers them as one of the essential foundations of order in Europe.

To represent France as hostile to German nationality, is not only, then, an error, but an absurdity. The Government of the Emperor has always, for ten years, employed its share of influence to adjust difficulties which have been raised, and to resolve them in accordance with views of equity and justice. In Spain it has constantly upheld the constitutional Throne of the Queen, by exercising a disinterested vigilance over the refugees whom successive revolutions have thrown upon our frontiers. In Switzerland her friendly mediation contributed to arrange the affair of Neuchâtel, which might have brought on complications with Prussia. In Italy itself, her solicitude has preceded the present difficulties, and after having re-established the Pope in his authority, has everywhere inspired moderate councils. At Naples, conjointly with its ally, the Queen of England, it has endeavoured to bring the Government of the Two Sicilies to adopt reforms which would have consolidated it. In Germany, in the delicate question which arose between the Confederation and Denmark, respecting the Duchies, it comprehended, in spite of its sympathies for Denmark, the just susceptibility of German patriotism as regards provinces which are joined to the Germanic body by so many ties, and it only expressed at Copenhagen the most conciliatory advice. In the Danubian Principalities it has endea-

voured to render triumphant the legitimate wishes of those provinces, and thus to secure also in that part of Europe the maintenance of order based on the satisfaction of national interests.

The policy of France cannot have two weights and two measures—she weighs with the same equity the interests of every people. What she seeks to make respected in Italy, she will know herself how to respect in Germany. It is not we who would be menaced by the example of a national Germany which would reconcile its Federal organization with the tendency to unite, of which the principle has been already set forth in the great commercial union of the Zollverein. Everything that develops, in neighbouring countries, the relations created by commerce, industry, and progress, is profitable to civilization, and everything which increases civilization raises the position of France.

No. 283. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 11, 1859.

My Lord,—I ACQUAINTED your Excellency, yesterday afternoon, that Her Majesty's Government had received an intimation that the Chevalier Massimo d'Azeglio was on his way to England on a special mission, and that they were in hopes that he might be charged with some proposal on the part of the Sardinian Government which might lead to a satisfactory solution of existing difficulties.

Nevertheless I did not disguise from your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government were under considerable apprehension lest the Cabinet of Vienna should commit itself by some precipitate act; and I added, that I had instructed Lord Augustus Loftus, by telegraph, to dissuade it from any such conduct.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 284. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 11, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday morning, acquainting me that Prince Gortchakoff considers the demand of Austria for either a partial disarmament of Sardinia, or an agreement for a general disarmament, the details to be considered in the Congress, as a condition to her taking part in a Congress, to be equivalent to a refusal to do so; and that his Excellency is of opinion that in order to induce the Cabinet of Vienna to desist from that demand, the other Powers should distinctly intimate to the Austrian Government, that unless it gave way, they would, without her, enter into deliberation among themselves, and so make a last effort for preventing the peace of Europe from being disturbed.

I lost no time in stating to you in reply, that Her Majesty's Government had not yet abandoned the hope that Austria might be induced to agree to enter into the Congress, provided it were settled that a general disarmament, applicable also to Sardinia, should take place.

Nevertheless, even if Austria were to consent, a difficulty, I said, might still exist in the refusal of Sardinia to agree to such a disarmament, and that it must rest with France and Russia to insist upon her doing so.

But as regards the proposal of Prince Gortchakoff that a Congress should be held without the participation of Austria, I explained to you, that as Austria was one of the antagonistic parties whose interests would more immediately be affected by the Congress, the British Government could take no part in such a meeting, from which Austria, even though by her own act, was excluded.

In that case, Her Majesty's Government, while sincerely deploring the failure of the proposal for a meeting of a general Congress, would nevertheless feel themselves constrained to stand aloof, and to reserve for themselves an entire freedom for independent action.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 285. *Mr. Scarlett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 12.)
(Extract.)

Modena, March 11, 1859.

IN accordance with your Lordship's instructions of the 6th of March,* sent to me by telegraph, I lost no time in coming to Modena, which place I reached on the evening of the 9th instant.

On the following day I had my first interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Forni.

I began by stating that Her Majesty's Government had reason to think that the question of war or peace at this critical juncture depended in a great measure upon the wisdom and discreet conduct of the Sovereigns of Central Italy; that a pretext for war against Austria by Piedmont would be removed if the Treaties of 1847 were annulled, their existence being always a cause of irritation in the public mind, and an excuse for revolution; and that I was desired to urge the Modenese Government to make a spontaneous proposal to Austria for the abrogation of the Convention made between that country and Modena, in December, 1847. I represented that the intimacy between Austria and Modena was, from family relationship, of so friendly a character, that that circumstance alone would always ensure the military assistance of the former, whenever it could be legitimately required; and that, at this moment, I had reason to think that the offer

* See No. 98.

to release Austria from her obligations under the Treaty in question, would not give any offence to her, but contribute to the chances of peace by relieving her from an embarrassing engagement.

Count Forni combatted these arguments by stating that, at this moment, such a step would have the air of weakness, and only lead to further concessions, which would be afterwards demanded ; but he would not commit himself to any positive opinion until he had seen the Duke.

That evening Count Forni saw the Duke, and afterwards called upon me at my hotel.

He stated that His Royal Highness was quite sensible of the good intentions of the Queen's Government, and felt obliged to them for the counsel offered, but that the Duke did not feel at all disposed to adopt the suggestion made to him of abrogating the Treaty of 1847 ; founding his objection to such course on the same grounds as Count Forni had previously explained to me.

I then proposed to Count Forni that, as the Duke objected to the annulling of the whole Treaty, he might, perhaps, be less averse to proposing the abrogation of Article III of that Treaty, which, I observed, had the appearance of extinguishing altogether the independence of Modena in regard to her internal government, and rendering her merely the province of a foreign State.

Admitting there might possibly be reasons for annulling Article III of the Treaty without abrogating the Treaty itself, Count Forni promised, at my request, to submit this more limited suggestion to the Duke.

On the following day I had my audience of the Duke and Duchess, in the usual way, to present my letters of credence.

The Duke on that occasion confined the conversation I had the honour to have with him, entirely to subjects unconnected with my mission, but on the same day I was invited to dine with their Royal Highnesses at the Palace, and after dinner the Duke took me aside, and conversed for some time on the subject of the confidential communication I had made to Count Forni.

After repeating in substance, and enlarging upon what Count Forni had already told me were the Duke's objections to the suggestion I was instructed to make to him, His Royal Highness observed, that he could not believe that the acts of so small a State as Modena could have any real influence on the great question of peace or war. I replied to this, that the policy of the Central States of Italy at this juncture was of the utmost importance ; and that I was of opinion that the abrogation, if not of the whole of the Treaty, at least of Article III, would remove a cause of great public dissatisfaction, without really altering or endangering the

security of Modena ; and that Her Majesty's Government thought that a desire, spontaneously evinced by the Duke, to effect a modification of the Treaty, might be the means of liberating Austria from an unnecessary obligation, and contribute, at the same time, to the maintenance of peace.

The Duke, upon this, observed, that the intrigues of Piedmont obliged him to dispose of a great portion of his small armed force along the frontier, in order to prevent the seduction of his people from their allegiance, many of whom were now daily yielding to the temptations of the Piedmontese revolutionary party, and being enrolled in the corps of Garibaldi, probably with the knowledge, if not with the avowed sanction, of Count Cavour's Government ; that if troubles took place in other parts of his territory, he should be left without defence, unless he had the right to invoke Austrian aid ; and that, moreover, he could not believe that if he really did make to Austria the proposal I had suggested, it would be acceptable to that Power.

In reply, I pointed out to His Royal Highness that the sacrifice he was asked to make would, after all, be one only of form, for it could not be doubted that, if he really required military assistance, Austria would ever be ready to concede to him on his application, and that, in any event, there could be no harm in enabling Austria to do what she might think most desirable, by spontaneously offering to release her from obligations which might, at this moment, be a source of embarrassment to her : that the Italian people must feel that the Treaties of 1847 were a standing proof of the distrust felt towards them by their Sovereigns ; and I ended by expressing the hope that His Royal Highness would, on reflection, think more favourably of the counsel I was instructed by Her Majesty's Government to offer.

The Duke said he felt grateful for the good feeling shown towards him by Her Majesty's Government, and acknowledged the perfect sincerity with which the advice had been given ; but, without entering particularly on the points which I had just touched upon, he went on to say, that he had already sufficiently reflected upon the suggestion I had made to him, and that, consistently with the opinions he had formed, and with his own ideas of what it was advisable for him to do as Duke of Modena and Archduke of Austria, he could not reasonably come to any other determination than that which he had already stated, of declining to acquiesce in the expediency of the course pointed out to him.

His Royal Highness ended the conversation by expressing his apprehension and regret that war might be the ultimate result of the present state of affairs ; and added that, in that event he should be prepared to stand or fall with Austria in the struggle.

Throughout the conversation the Duke spoke with perfect

calmness of manner, and was pleased to compliment me, when I took leave of him, on the mode in which I had made to His Royal Highness the communication with which I was charged.

No. 286. *Mr. Scarlett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 12.)

(Extract.)

Parma, March 18, 1859.

I HAVE informed your Lordship, by telegraph, that I have arrived at Parma.

I was prepared to find the Duchess and her Government more alive to the expediency of following an independent policy than the State of Modena.

Yet, with a manifest wish to separate itself as much as possible from Austrian influence, the Government of Parma is unfortunately the victim of circumstances over which it has so little control, that it is hardly possible for the State of Parma, acting alone at this moment, and without combination with other Italian States, to propose any change in its treaty arrangements with Austria.

However desirable it might be, observed the Marquis Pallavicino, to abrogate all or a part of the Treaty of 1847, between Austria and Parma, the existence of this compact was, he thought, at this juncture, a security against revolt, and operated as a defence against the agitators in Piedmont, who would be ready to join the disaffected in Parma, and raise the standard of insurrection, and the cry of annexation to Sardinia, as soon as it was known that the Duchess had released Austria from the obligations now imposed on that Empire under a special Convention.

The Parmese Minister, however, admitted that, under ordinary circumstances, the Treaty in question operated as a disadvantage to the Government of the Duchess, and he partly suggested himself, and approved entirely of, the communication I informed him that I should make to your Lordship, the substance of which I conveyed in my telegram dated March 16th—viz, that if England, France, and Austria would offer some joint guarantee for the security of her throne and territorial rights, the Duchess would be ready to lend herself to any changes which might be thought expedient by those Powers.

No. 287. *Mr. Scarlett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 12.)

(Extract.)

Florence, March 30, 1859.

ON my return to Florence from Modena, I had an interview with the Chevalier Lenzoni, and submitted to him the four propositions set forth in your Lordship's telegram dated the 22nd

instant,* as the preliminary conditions of the Congress about to assemble for the settlement of Italian affairs.

Chevalier Lenzoni had been already made acquainted with these proposals by a telegram from Paris, and approved of them.

I have addressed two notes containing the proposals referred to, respectively to the Governments of Modena and Parma.

The opinion of the Tuscan Government is opposed to any Italian representation at the Congress; but their intention is to be governed by the determination, in that respect, of Rome and Naples.

I have to-day had a conversation with the French Envoy, Marquis de la Ferrière, who read me, in the course of my visit, an instruction he had received from Paris, approving of his having used language to the leaders of the Liberal party in Tuscany, to undeceive them as to their general belief in the ultimate intention of the Emperor to make war against Austria, and to assure them of His Majesty's intention to respect the present territorial and dynastic arrangements which exist in Italy.

No. 288. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 12.)

Turin, April 3, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that Count Cavour returned to Turin from Paris on Friday morning last, the 1st instant.

Yesterday I called upon his Excellency to communicate to him the intelligence that Her Majesty's Government had not resigned office in consequence of the recent vote of the House of Commons.

He said he was heartily glad to learn this decision, for he thought it would be a public misfortune if the Cabinet of which Lord Derby is the Chief, and which has recently taken so prominent a part in the promotion of a Congress for settling the Italian question, should quit office almost at the moment of commencing the discussion of a question upon which it has pronounced a strong opinion.

He spoke only in general terms of his recent visit to Paris, but his tone was pacific and conciliatory, and he expressed a confident hope that the deliberations of the Congress would go far to allay the present discontent in Italy.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 289. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 12.)

Turin, April 9, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Chevalier Massimo d'Azeglio, who has lately returned from

* See No. 166.

Rome, has been appointed to undertake a special mission to London and Paris.

The Chevalier leaves Turin shortly for Paris.

I have, &c.

L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

No. 290. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. West.*

Foreign Office, April 12, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE to instruct you to inform Count Cavour, that Her Majesty's Government have received with much satisfaction the announcement that the Chevalier Massimo d'Azeglio has been sent to this country by His Sardinian Majesty, on a special mission. The high character which that gentleman bears will ensure him a welcome reception on the part of Her Majesty's Government, who trust that they may interpret this appointment as an indication of a relaxation of its past policy on the part of the Sardinian Government. Her Majesty's Government, indeed, look upon the obstinacy with which Sardinia has hitherto refused to join other Powers in disarming, and to take any share whatever in a Congress by which it was hoped to bring about a settlement of the affairs of Italy without bloodshed, as involving consequences likely to prove disastrous, not only to Italy herself, but also to Europe at large.

If such should ensue, Sardinia cannot be acquitted by public opinion of having deeply contributed to the calamities which it dreads

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 291. *Count Apponyi to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 12.)

(Translation.)

Chandos House, April 12, 1859.

Dear Lord Malmesbury,—ACCORDING to a telegram that I have just received, the Imperial Cabinet positively gives up the previous disarmament of Sardinia, as it lays down the following alternatives :—

Either the previous and complete disarmament of Sardinia, and, at the same time, the adoption by the Five Powers of the principle of general disarmament. the carrying out of which should be the first task of the Congress ;

Or, if it seems impossible to obtain the previous disarmament of Sardinia, a general effective disarmament before the meeting of the Congress ; that is to say, that this general disarmament must be a *fait accompli* before we could take part in a Congress.

This is our last word, and I lose not an instant in having the honour to inform you of it.

I am, &c.

APPONYI.

No. 292. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 12, 1859.

My Lord.—I LEARN by your Lordship's telegram of the 10th instant, that Count Buol is expecting an official answer as to the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the interpretation given by his Excellency, in the memorandum annexed to his note of the 31st of March,* of the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government, and generally accepted by all the Powers as the basis of the deliberations of the Congress on the affairs of Italy.

His Excellency further desires to ascertain the opinion of Her Majesty's Government in regard to what he designates as a fifth point, namely, the question of an understanding being come to for the simultaneous disarmament of the Great Powers, and also the result of the appeal which he assumes to have been made to Sardinia by Her Majesty's Government that she should disarm.

I have already explained to your Lordship that, in stating in your note to Count Buol of the 28th of March,† the points laid down by Her Majesty's Government for the deliberations of the Congress, you included in those points a matter which was specially excluded from those deliberations, namely, the territorial arrangements and Treaties of 1815.

But though it is necessary for the sake of clearness to allude to this misapprehension, on your Lordship's part, of the purport of my instruction of the 27th of March, which being conveyed to you by telegraph, was unfortunately, as communications by that channel not unfrequently are, less explicit than it might have been, the circumstance in itself need make no alteration in the answer which I have now to instruct your Lordship to give to Count Buol's inquiry.

That answer is simple. Her Majesty's Government cannot, in the present stage of the business, accept the interpretation given by Count Buol of the four points, or rather cannot undertake to confine the discussion upon them within the limits which Count Buol seeks to establish. Without saying whether those limits are reasonable or not, it is obvious that the tendency of placing any limits on the deliberations of the Congress in regard to the particular points to be brought under review, and of saying that the deliberations of that Assembly, on each successive point, shall be confined within a circle previously traced out for them, would be to impose a restriction on the freedom of the Plenipotentiaries of a wholly unusual character, and to prejudge their decisions.

All that the most scrupulous Government can reasonably

* No. 227.

† No. 206.

require, is to be made acquainted beforehand with the points to which the attention of the Congress shall be confined, and with those with which it shall be precluded from dealing ; and this Her Majesty's Government have taken care to secure, by laying down distinctly four points for the consideration of the Congress, and by declaring that the Congress shall not be competent to entertain specific questions which might, in a general review of the affairs of Italy, have otherwise been brought into discussion.

This, then, is the answer which your Lordship is instructed to return to Count Buol's inquiry as to whether Her Majesty's Government assent to the interpretation placed by Austria on the four points that they have proposed for the deliberations of the Congress, and on the condition by which those points were accompanied.

As regards the fifth point, brought forward by Count Buol, namely, an understanding for the simultaneous disarmament of the Great Powers, the answer of Her Majesty's Government has been forestalled by the various communications which, since the date of his note, your Lordship has been instructed to make to his Excellency.

Her Majesty's Government, in common now with all the other Powers, including France, concur in the propriety of such a general disarmament being one of the earliest matters to be treated of in the Congress. They agree in the expediency of the measure ; they have urged it successfully upon their allies as the surest means of allaying the general apprehensions of an interruption of peace by which Europe is now disturbed ; and they will be prepared, by the British Plenipotentiaries in Congress, to promote it by every means at their disposal.

As regards the remaining point on which Count Buol desires to be informed, namely, the result of the appeal made by Her Majesty's Government to that of Sardinia, with a view to the disarmament of the latter Power previous to the Congress, your Lordship will say that Her Majesty's Government never contemplated imposing disarmament on Sardinia, but only exhorting her to have recourse to it. They felt, however, that, as an independent Power, and, as such, fully justified in taking due precautions against an hostile attack with which, however erroneously, she conceived herself to be threatened, Sardinia had a right to require some security against the consequences of voluntary disarmament out of deference to the exhortations of a friendly Power. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, always coupled the announcement of their readiness to call upon Sardinia to disarm with a declaration that they were prepared, in return for the compliance of Sardinia with their invitation, to join France in guaranteeing, for a time to be agreed upon, the territory of Sardinia

against aggression on the part of Austria ; but, as the Government of France declined to join in any such guarantee, that proposition fell to the ground.

Austria, it would seem, now, requires that Sardinia should at once disarm. Her Majesty's Government do not concur in the justice of this demand. They conceive that, if the disarmament of Sardinia forms part of the general disarmament, which, in principle, may be admitted before the meeting of the Congress, but which can only be carried out effectually by common agreement among the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers as to the details of the measure, Austria may fairly declare herself satisfied with that security, and desist from a condition which, if she pertinaciously adheres to it, will probably render any meeting of the Congress out of the question, and may lead to the immediate interruption of the peace of Europe.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and furnish his Excellency with a copy of it.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 293. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 12, 1859.

My Lord,—THE latter part of my despatch to your Lordship of this day's date,* will enable your Lordship to answer Count Buol's inquiry reported in your despatch of the 6th instant,† as to the result of the appeal which Her Majesty's Government had contemplated should be made to Sardinia to disarm previously to the Congress ; and as I have instructed you to furnish Count Buol with a copy of my despatch, it is unnecessary for me to give any separate answer to your despatch, the receipt of which I have, therefore, only to acknowledge.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 294. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 12, 1859.

My Lord,—It appears from your telegram of yesterday afternoon, that Count Buol has directed the Representatives of Austria at the Courts of the Great Powers, to declare that Austria requires the disarmament of Sardinia previously to the Congress, and that the Great Powers should come to an understanding that the question of a general disarmament should be discussed in Congress : or, as an alternative, in the event of its being impossible to obtain the disarmament of Sardinia, that the Great Powers should forthwith agree that the general disarmament, namely, that of France, Austria, and Sardinia, should be carried into immediate execution before the meeting of the Congress.

* No. 292.

† No. 266.

It appears, however, from a communication that has been made to me to-day by Count Apponyi, that the instruction that he has received from Count Buol does not altogether agree with what you understood his Excellency to say, namely, that the announcement in the Official Gazettes of the respective countries of a general disarmament would meet the requirements of Austria. From this, your Lordship inferred that Count Buol attached more importance to the acceptance of the principle of disarmament than to the details of that measure.

But Count Buol says, as regards the second alternative, in his telegram to Count Apponyi, which also, though varied in terms, is the second mentioned by your Lordship, that the disarmament to which he there refers must have actually taken place, must be a *fait accompli*, before Austria can take part in the Congress; and Count Apponyi informed me that this was Austria's last word.

In calling your attention, by the telegraph, to this discrepancy, I have instructed you to ascertain immediately whether the last alternative stated to you by Count Buol, and repeated by his Excellency in somewhat different terms to Count Apponyi, applies to Sardinia.

I enclose, for your fuller information, a copy of Count Apponyi's note to me, containing the substance of Count Buol's telegram.*

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 295. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 12, 1859.

My Lord,—It appears from your Excellency's telegram of yesterday, that Count Walewski is of opinion that no proposal should now be made to Sardinia to disarm, but that the question of the disarmament of that Power should be reserved for the period when that of general disarmament comes into discussion among the Great Powers.

Her Majesty's Government, however, see no security for the disarmament of Sardinia being brought about within any given time, unless she, in the first instance, agrees to disarm, or unless France undertakes that she shall disarm, and ensures her doing so by engaging not to support her if she refuses.

It is clear that if, without some such precaution being previously taken, Sardinia, when the Congress meets, should refuse to disarm, Austria would have a right to complain at having been deceived, in being induced to accept the Congress, and would naturally, also, not disarm; while France, as she has done before, would decline to interfere with Sardinia. The inevitable conse-

* No. 291.

quence of such a state of things would be the dissolution of the Congress in a most ignominious manner.

It appears, however, from Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram of yesterday afternoon, that Count Buol has directed the Representatives of Austria at the Courts of the Great Powers to declare that Austria requires the disarmament of Sardinia previously to the Congress, and that the Great Powers should come to an understanding that the question of a general disarmament should be discussed in Congress; or, as an alternative in the event of its being impossible to obtain the disarmament of Sardinia, that the Great Powers should forthwith agree that the general disarmament, namely, that of France, Austria, and Sardinia, should be carried into immediate execution before the meeting of the Congress.

As regards the first alternative offered by Count Buol, Her Majesty's Government have already declared that they cannot press Sardinia to disarm before the meeting of the Congress; but, as regards the second, it rests with France and Sardinia to decide whether they will join with Austria in officially announcing their disarmament before the meeting of the Congress. It would seem from Lord Augustus Loftus's report, that Austria attaches more importance to the declaration of the principle of a disarmament, than to the details by which the measure is to be carried out, as a guarantee that the Congress is one *bonâ fide* for the purpose of peace; and Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the proposal now made by Austria is fair and just.

It is right, however, that I should inform your Excellency that the telegram from Count Buol which has been communicated to me by Count Apponyi this morning, does not altogether agree with Lord Augustus Loftus's report of what he understood it was to contain. For, whereas his Lordship seems to have understood that the announcement in the Official Gazette of the respective countries of a general disarmament, would meet the requirements of Austria, Count Buol's telegram states that the disarmament must have actually taken place, a *fait accompli*, before Austria will enter into Congress.

I have called Lord Augustus Loftus's attention to this discrepancy, and I have desired him to ascertain immediately, whether this statement in the Austrian telegram applies to Sardinia.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 296. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 12, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to state to your Excellency that, in the course of a conversation which I had yesterday with the Duc de Malakoff, I dictated to his Excellency the following proposal,

which had been made on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and which he took down in writing, namely:—

(Translation.)—"The British Cabinet proposed to the Powers on the 10th to decide on a general disarmament at the opening of the meeting of the Congress, which, although absolutely including Sardinia, would spare her a previous disarmament. The details of the disarmament should be arranged at the Congress; they would necessarily form the first question; the four points on which we are agreed would be afterwards discussed.

(Signed) M. PELISSIER."

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 297. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 12, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Duc de Malakoff called on me to-day, and proposed that, in the event of Austria not consenting to a Congress, the four Powers should hold one.

I declined to accede to this suggestion for the same reason which I stated to the Russian Government, namely, that as Austria was one of the antagonistic parties whose interests would more immediately be affected by the Congress, Her Majesty's Government could take no part in such a meeting from which Austria, even though by her own act, was excluded.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 298. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 13.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 12, 1859.

I SAW Count Walewski late yesterday afternoon, and in the course of the conversation which I had with his Excellency, I inquired of him how he proposed that the consent of Sardinia should be obtained to the principle of general disarmament suggested by Her Majesty's Government. Count Walewski replied that he considered that no steps should be taken in regard to Sardinia until the Congress should have met; that any proposal to her at this moment to accept even the principle of disarmament would probably be refused; whereas, if the Congress were once assembled, and Sardinia were told that Austria and France, having agreed to disarm, it was hoped that she would follow their example, she could hardly refuse, or, if she did refuse, she would put herself so entirely in the wrong that the public opinion of Europe would be lost to her. I was, myself, of opinion that it would be advisable not to raise the question of the disarmament of Sardinia at this moment, provided that Austria could be prevailed upon to dispense with it, because the great object being, if I may so express myself, to get into Congress, it seemed desirable to avoid putting forward any demand or proposal, the refusal of

which would prevent the reunion of the Congress, and I so expressed myself to Count Walewski. This morning I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of yesterday's date, and I am bound to say that the reasons given therein for the necessity of knowing the intentions of Sardinia relative to a disarmament before the Congress meets, are so unanswerable that I lost no time in laying them before Count Walewski, not doubting that his Excellency, on being informed of them, would join cordially with Her Majesty's Government in inviting Sardinia to agree to the principle of a general disarmament.

Count Walewski, I regret to say, refused to make any proposal of the kind. He grounded his refusal, first, on the arguments which he had used yesterday: next, on the plea that Sardinia, not forming part of the Congress, could not be asked to assent to a principle the details of which were to be discussed by the Congress; and finally, on the allegation that this disarmament of Sardinia formed no part of the proposal which I had made to him.

To this last declaration I demurred. I recalled to his recollection that I had stated (and I said that I had made use of the same argument with the Emperor) that the object of the proposal was to obtain the disarmament of both Austria and Sardinia, without giving umbrage to the latter by insisting on preliminary proceedings on her part, while Austria obtained by it that security which she required before going into Congress. I regretted now, I added, that I had not made the proposal more formally in writing, since there appeared to be so much misunderstanding on the subject.

Count Walewski rejoined that the proposal I had made to him was this—"that France shall accept the principle of a general disarmament, the execution of which should be settled by Congress;" that he had sent this proposal, with his acceptance of it, to all the Great Courts; and that he should abide by it. I replied that, although his version was not quite correct, I would accept it, provided he would add that I had explained to him that, in the general disarmament, Sardinia was included. Count Walewski said that he had nothing to do with Sardinia—that he had accepted for France and not for Sardinia; though, of course, he could not but admit that a general disarmament must include Sardinia.

Before taking leave of his Excellency I said that my responsibility was so great that I should address your Lordship a very detailed account of all that had taken place, in which I had been concerned, with regard to the question of disarmament, and his Excellency might therefore, if he thought proper, send his own version to the Duke of Malakoff.

No. 299. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 13, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of yesterday,* reporting conversations with Count Walewski with respect to the application to Sardinia of the principle of a general disarmament.

Without adverting to the other points alluded to by his Excellency, which, however, served to show the disinclination of the French Government heartily to co-operate in obtaining the disarmament of Sardinia, I cannot but express the great surprise with which Her Majesty's Government learn that Count Walewski considered that there was no question of the disarmament of Sardinia, whereas that question has always formed one of the principal matters in discussion.

The Cabinet of Vienna has insisted on the previous disarmament of Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that it was, if not indispensable, at all events so desirable, that they were willing to depart from the usual practice of this country, which is opposed to giving guarantees, and to agree, jointly with France, to guarantee Sardinia against the possible, though, after the assurances given by Austria, they might be almost termed improbable, consequences of a compliance with an invitation to disarm; but the French Government declined to join in such a guarantee, and so the proposal fell through.

Her Majesty's Government then offered a suggestion, which involved a general disarmament by the Great Military Powers and by Sardinia, and Her Majesty's Government considered it was a fair one, and, if acted upon, likely to produce the inestimable result of averting the breaking out of war. I allowed the Duc de Malakoff, on the 11th instant, to take down in writing from my lips a statement of that proposal, which I have recorded in my despatch to your Excellency yesterday.†

The French Government, like the Austrian, has accepted for itself the principle of a general disarmament, though it appears from your Excellency's despatch that Count Walewski demurs to the propriety of calling upon Sardinia to accept it likewise. But if Sardinia refuses to accept the principle, no doubt can any longer be entertained that her object is to prevent the meeting of the Congress, and to refer to the chances of war the solution of the Italian question.

I have now to instruct your Excellency formally to ask the French Government whether they will join England and the other Powers in inviting Sardinia, either by a collective or by separate notes, to disarm simultaneously with France and Austria.

If the French Government refuse, Her Majesty's Government are prepared to address the invitation to Sardinia, either in conjunction with any other Powers who may be willing to take the same course, or, if necessary, alone.

England, having no direct interest in the Italian question, has consented to take an active part in negotiations for its settlement, in order thereby to promote the interests of humanity, and to avert from the Peninsula, perhaps from Europe at large, the calamities of a deadly warfare. But Her Majesty's Government are nearly weary of the needless and vexatious difficulties by which all their endeavours to promote those great objects are continually thwarted, and they cannot much longer submit to a position which may ultimately place them in the category of apparent, however unwilling, accessories to calamities which they have laboured so earnestly to avert, but which the conduct of others will alone have caused.

In this state of things, Her Majesty's Government will have but one course to pursue; and if the principal parties involved in these complications will not show a desire, and make up their minds as soon as possible, to refer to a Congress the dangerous questions involved in Italian politics, Great Britain must retire from a scene in which she can no longer act either an useful or a dignified part; and she will leave to those who have refused her friendly services, to answer before God and man, for a war undertaken without a cause, and justified by no principle whatever.

You will read this to Count Walewski.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 300. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 13, 1859.

I STATED to your Excellency, by telegram, last night that Her Majesty's Government did not clearly understand whether the French Government agreed to the Austrian proposal respecting disarmament, as far, at least, as France was concerned; and wished to know whether the French Government would join in a collective invitation to Sardinia to disarm immediately and simultaneously with France and Austria.

I have since explained to your Excellency, in a letter, that the Cabinet of Vienna proposed that a general disarmament should take place previously to the meeting of the Congress, in reply to the proposal advocated by Her Majesty's Government, that the principle of disarmament should be admitted before the meeting, leaving the details of the measure to be settled in the Congress. If France accepted the first-mentioned proposal, she can scarcely refuse the last.

Your Excellency will have seen in my other despatch of this

day, that Her Majesty's Government are prepared, if France refuses singly to ask Sardinia to disarm, to join with other Powers in inviting Sardinia to do so by a collective or by a separate note, or even to act alone in making the request.

I have already furnished your Excellency with a statement taken down by the Duke de Malakoff,* of what I said to him on the 11th instant respecting disarmament, and I understand from his Excellency that he transmitted to his Government a copy of that statement on the same day.

Her Majesty's Government look upon both proposals in the same light, at least in so far as they equally relieve Sardinia from separate previous disarmament.

Your Excellency may read to Count Walewski what I have stated in this despatch.

No. 301. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

Foreign Office, April 13, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Cabinet of Vienna has expressed its willingness to disarm before the meeting of Congress, if Sardinia and France will consent to do so likewise.

The French Government have declared that France will disarm if Austria does so, but they have refused to urge Sardinia to adopt the same course.

Her Majesty's Government desire, therefore, that your Lordship will immediately ascertain from Baron Schleinitz whether the Prussian Government will join them in addressing to Sardinia a formal note inviting her to disarm if Austria and France will, on their part, agree also to disarm.

I have addressed a similar instruction to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 302. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 14, 1859.

I HAVE to state to your Lordship, in reply to Baron Schleinitz's inquiry, reported in your telegram of yesterday, that Her Majesty's Government do not think that the note to be addressed to the Cabinet of Turin by such of the Powers as may agree in the measure, calling upon Sardinia to disarm, need be identical; but if the Prussian Government approves, I shall be prepared to concert with Count Bernstorff as to the terms in which the note shall be framed.

The French Government, as I have informed your Lordship, refuses in any way to ask for the disarmament of Sardinia.

* No. 296.

No. 303. *Count Cavour to the Marquis d'Azeglio.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Marquis d'Azeglio, April 13.) (Translation.)

Turin, April 8, 1859.

M. le Marquis,—THE Imperial Government of Vienna having sought to justify the aggressive measures adopted on our frontier by the existence of a Free Corps in Piedmont, I have addressed a note to Count Brassier de Saint Simon to rebut the imputation made against us.

As it is possible that Austria makes use of the same argument with the Court of England, I think it right to transmit to you, M. le Marquis, a copy of the abovementioned note, in order that you may be able to explain the facts to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Her Britannic Majesty.

Accept &c.

C. CAVOUR.

Inclosure. *Count Cavour to Count de St. Simon.*

(Translation.)

Turin, April 7, 1859.

M. le Comte,—I HAVE received the note of the 5th of this month, by which your Excellency has been so good as to communicate to me the explanations given by Count Buol upon the subject of the violation of territory which formed the subject of the communication which I had the honour to address to your Excellency on the 20th of last month.

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs confirms the fact, and explains it by the inadvertence of the soldiers, who lost their way in the obscurity of the night, and he testifies his regret for what has happened, declaring that the necessary orders have been transmitted to the military authorities in order that a like untoward circumstance may not again occur.

The Government of the King would have considered these explanations and these assurances entirely satisfactory if Count Buol had not thought he could at the same time address an imputation to Sardinia which it is my duty in the name of the Government of the King, to repel.

In bringing the fact in question to the attention of the Cabinet of Vienna, it was my duty to set forth the serious consequences which it might have had if Sardinia had not abstained from placing advanced posts at the further limits of the frontier as the Imperial Government had given her the example.

Count Buol answered that Austria was obliged, by the very attitude of the Piedmontese Government, to keep a watch over her frontiers, exposed as they were, without ceasing, to the armed invasion of her territory by some band of the Free Corps, which were organized in Piedmont in the sight and with the knowledge of the authorities.

It is my duty formally to declare that it is in every respect untrue that the Royal Government has permitted the organization

of Free Corps, or that Free Corps have been organized in Piedmont; but, since the Cabinet of Vienna seems to wish to call by this name the battalions of Italian volunteers who are in the process of organization, I take this occasion to establish the true state of things with respect to this matter.

When the extraordinary armaments of Austria in Lombardy and on the Sardinian frontiers showed that Piedmont was menaced, numerous volunteers arrived from all parts of Italy to offer their arms in defence of their country. The Government accepted this spontaneous gathering. It admitted into the army those who united the conditions established by the law respecting recruitment.

With regard to the others, it was found necessary either to leave them free, and consequently not subjected to a regular military system, or else to embody them. The former alternative was not admissible. It is, therefore, the latter which it has embraced, so that the battalions of volunteers have been subjected to military discipline.

Their conduct is excellent, and there has been no reason to fear any irregular movement on their part, since they are placed under the orders of the Government, as well as all the other armed forces of the Kingdom. For the rest, the Cabinet of Vienna cannot be ignorant that care has been taken to collect these battalions as far as possible from the Austrian frontier, and that their organization is being completed at Coni and at Savigliano—that is, in two towns situated almost at the foot of the Alps.

These observations, which refute peremptorily the allegations of the Cabinet of Vienna, prove that the aggressive measures which it has adopted, and which it acknowledges as being of a nature to provoke disastrous consequences, are not justified.

I have, in consequence, recourse to the wonted kindness of your Excellency in requesting that you will make this despatch known to the Cabinet of Vienna.

I take, &c.

C. CAVOUR.

No. 304. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. West.*

Foreign Office, April 13, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE instructed you by telegraph this afternoon to inform Count Cavour that Austria and France have signified their willingness to disarm, but that the former power has made its consent to enter into Congress to depend on the disarmament of Sardinia.

The Cabinet of Vienna required that the disarmament of Sardinia should precede the meeting of the Congress; but Her Majesty's Government maintained that the question of the disarmament of Sardinia should be placed on the same footing with that of other Powers.

In this state of things you will seek an interview with Count Cavour, and you will point out to him that, if Sardinia refuses to disarm, and by doing so prevents the meeting of the Congress, a heavy responsibility will rest on her.

You will say that Her Majesty's Government will not enter into the Congress unless Sardinia disarms as well as France and Austria; but if by the assent of Sardinia the Congress is enabled to meet, Count Cavour may be assured that no exertion will be wanting on the part of the British Plenipotentiaries to ensure the due carrying out of the four points, by which provision is sought to be made for the interests of Italy.

You will add that time presses; that two days hence Her Majesty's Government must make to Parliament a full statement, not only of the past, but of the present state of the negotiations, and that they would much regret to have on that occasion to declare that Sardinia was an obstacle to the introduction of a better policy and administration in Italy, and also to the general tranquillity of Europe.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 305. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir James Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 13, 1859.

Sir,—THE Cabinet of Vienna has expressed its willingness to disarm before the meeting of Congress, if Sardinia and France will consent to do so likewise.

The French Government have declared that France will disarm, if Austria does so, but they have refused to urge Sardinia to adopt the same course.

Her Majesty's Government desire, therefore, that you will immediately ascertain from Prince Gortchakoff whether the Russian Government will join them in addressing to Sardinia a formal note, inviting her to disarm, if Austria and France will, on their part, agree also to disarm.

I have addressed a similar instruction to Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 306. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 14.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 13, 1859.

AFTER I had closed my despatch of yesterday's date,* I received a note from Count Walewski, stating that, on reflecting on the conversation which I had had with him, he did not understand clearly what Her Majesty's Government desired. He requested me, therefore, to send him, in writing, your Lordship's proposi-

* No. 298.

tion respecting the general disarmament, in order that he might reply to it with full knowledge of the matter.

I replied to him that there had been so much regrettable misunderstanding between himself and me on the subject of the disarmament, that I preferred referring the matter to your Lordship.

I had not intended to allude to the subject with him again, but after the conference this afternoon, his Excellency asked me whether I had received any answer from your Lordship. I replied that I saw, from one of your Lordship's despatches, that your proposal had been given to the Duke of Malakoff, who had taken it down in writing, and I presumed had communicated it to his Excellency. The conversation once begun, I explained to him, in the words of your Lordship's despatch of yesterday's date,* how impossible it was that Her Majesty's Government should go into Congress with the chance of all negotiations being nipped in the bud by an obstinate refusal of the Sardinian Government to consent to disarm, and I asked him (at present, I said, only confidentially), whether, in case the Congress were to meet without the consent of Sardinia having been previously obtained to the principle of disarmament, he would give me the positive assurance that if she should refuse compliance after the Congress should have met and demanded her disarmament, he would declare that, in face of that refusal, Sardinia must expect no further countenance or assistance from France. Count Walewski replied, that without the Emperor's permission he could not reply categorically, but he could say that such must be the case. I said that I wished he would take an early opportunity of putting to the Emperor the question which I had asked him, and inform me of the answer.

No. 307. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 14, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government regret to learn by your telegram of this morning, that upon your communicating to Count Walewski the wish of Her Majesty's Government to be informed whether France would join the other Powers in calling upon Sardinia to disarm, his Excellency replied that he was convinced that His Imperial Majesty would not address such an invitation to the Cabinet of Turin.

Her Majesty's Government consider that the safest, as well as the most, dignified, course for them to take, is simply to refuse to continue a negotiation which they undertook for the cause of humanity, when they find that Sardinia, one of the principal antagonists, declines to disarm simultaneously with Austria and France. In the present state of things, while Austria will stand

* No. 295.

well with Europe, Sardinia will, by her own conduct, incur universal condemnation.

Under these circumstances, as matters now stand, I must press upon your Excellency to be very reserved in your language.

No. 308. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 14, 1859.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 13th instant,* reporting a further conversation with Count Walewski on the subject of disarmament.

It appears that your Excellency having asked Count Walewski whether, in the event of Sardinia refusing to comply with a demand made upon her by the Congress to disarm, the French Government would declare that she must expect no further countenance or assistance from France, his Excellency replied that he could not, without the Emperor's permission, give a categorical answer, but that he could say that such must be the case.

I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government cannot but consider as extremely suspicious the disposition manifested by the French Government to overlook the obligation which is obviously incumbent on Sardinia to disarm simultaneously with other Powers.

From the very commencement of the discussions on these Italian matters, it has always been considered as a matter of course that Sardinia, who was the ostensible antagonist of Austria, should disarm; and the only question has been as to the mode and time of her disarmament.

The Cabinet of Vienna endeavoured to place Sardinia on a different and less advantageous footing as compared with the other Powers, by requiring that she should disarm before the rest; but Her Majesty's Government, looking upon this proposal as unfair to Sardinia, resisted its application. But, on the same principle, Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to allow Sardinia to be placed on a better footing than the other Powers, by leaving her to disarm or not, as she might choose; while other Powers, whether friendly or opposed to her, are required, with reference to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, to reduce their military establishments.

Such an evasion of her duty on the part of Sardinia would be universally condemned by public opinion, and cannot be sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 309. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 15, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg, in a

* No. 306.

telegram which I received from him yesterday, states that Prince Gortchakoff informs him, on the authority of his reports from Paris, that the French Government declares that the army of France is now on a peace footing, and that accordingly the question of disarmament does not apply to it.

Russia, Prince Gortchakoff says, would be ready, if France and Austria were really to disarm, to state her opinion that Sardinia should do so likewise, and he has no doubt that she would follow their example ; but, in the meanwhile, he considers it useless to address to Sardinia a note on the subject, as proposed by Her Majesty's Government.

I hear from Mr. West that the Sardinian Council is to be convened to deliberate upon the representation which I directed him to make to Count Cavour on the subject of the disarmament of Sardinia.

It is time, however, to bring to a close these false negotiations. The proposal which the Austrian Government made on the 11th instant,* and which I communicated to you on the 12th,† is just ; although that which I made to the French Ambassador on the same day, as stated in my despatch to your Excellency of the 12th instant,† was, perhaps, sufficiently safe.

Your Excellency will have seen by Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram of the 14th, that he is of opinion that the Austrian Government will make no further concession.

Your Excellency, therefore, will hold language to that effect, and say that Her Majesty's Government approve and support the proposal that the three Powers that have armed should agree to disarm before the Congress meets.

In the present state of things I have again to express to your Excellency the wish of Her Majesty's Government that you should be very grave and reserved in your general language and demeanour.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 310. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 15, 1859.

My Lord,—It appears from your Excellency's private letter of yesterday, that Count Walewski was about to make to the Emperor of the French a proposition in the following terms, namely :—

“ Admettre le principe d'un désarmement général.

“ Entente sur l'exécution à l'ouverture du Congrès.

“ Engager la Sardaigne, conjointement ou séparément, par dépêche officielle, à adhérer au principe du désarmement, et à en régler l'exécution à l'ouverture du Congrès par l'intermédiaire d'un Représentant.”

* No. 291.

† No. 295.

Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that Austria will not agree to this course, but will insist on the simultaneous disarmament of the three Powers taking place previously to the meeting of the Congress.

I have desired Lord Augustus Loftus, by telegraph, to ascertain immediately what Count Buol means by the expression, in his telegram to Count Apponyi of the 11th, "désarmement général effectif," and what are his views in respect of the proportions, compared with that of the other Powers, which the disarmament of each should assume,—as to the extent to which, compared with their ordinary peace establishments, the several Powers should carry it out,—and as to the mode in which it should be effected.

Her Majesty's Government consider that, if it can be obtained, the previous disarmament, as proposed by Austria, would certainly be the safest course, although they are of opinion that the one which I suggested to the Duc de Malakoff on the 11th instant, and which your Excellency had previously laid before the French Government, would have been more likely to bring about a meeting of the Congress. Under that impression Her Majesty's Government made the suggestion; but if the Cabinet of Vienna insist upon their counter-proposal, a sketch of which is contained in Count Apponyi's note of the 12th instant,* Her Majesty's Government cannot refuse to allow their proposal to give way to that of Austria.

This country not being one of the Powers that have armed, and the question of disarmament, therefore, not being applicable to it, Her Majesty's Government cannot prescribe the exact time at which those Powers to whom it is to be applied should disarm. Her Majesty's Government might, indeed, have said that they would not enter the Congress if Austria did not disarm till after the Congress met; but they cannot assert the converse, and refuse to enter because she offers to disarm before the Congress.

Her Majesty's Government are, however, ready to desist from pressing a point which seems to be peculiarly displeasing to the French Government, and no longer to urge them to invite Sardinia to disarm—on condition, however, that, if France prefers to leave to this country, and to such other Powers as may associate themselves with it for the purpose, the office of directly inviting Sardinia to disarm, she will, on her part, undertake to throw no obstacle in the way of Sardinia's acceptance, and will further engage to assist in inducing Sardinia faithfully to act up to her engagement to disarm, should she enter into the same.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 311. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. West.*

Foreign Office, April 15, 1859.

Sir,—You inform me, in your telegram of yesterday, that, on

* No. 291.

communicating with Count Cavour on the subject of the instruction which I gave you on the 13th instant, his Excellency asked what was the extent to which it was agreed that disarmament should be carried.

You will inform Count Cavour that we require from Sardinia no pledge as to the details, but merely that she will acknowledge and agree to the principle of a general disarmament previously to the Congress, so that the questions in dispute may be referred to diplomacy for settlement, instead of being left to be decided by arms.

Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate inviting Sardinia to do more, either in principle or detail, than Austria; and they have constantly declared to Austria that they would not propose to Sardinia to do anything which Austria was not prepared herself to consent to do.

In the expectation of the arrival of the Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio, Her Majesty's Government have deferred until Monday next, the last day of the session, the communication on the present state of the discussions respecting the affairs of Italy which they have engaged to make to Parliament before it is prorogued; and they trust that, by that time, they may be enabled to make such a statement as may at once allay the apprehensions of Europe, and revive the confidence of this country in Count Cavour's judgment and moderation.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 312. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. West.*

Foreign Office, April 15, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE to acquaint you that the Representative of Prussia at Turin has been instructed to urge the Sardinian Government to accept the principle of a simultaneous disarmament with Austria; and I have to instruct you to communicate with him, and in concert with him to press the point on the Cabinet of Turin.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 313. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 15, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE instructed your Lordship, by telegraph, to point out to Count Buol how important it is for Austria not to be induced to place herself in the wrong; and that the Cabinet of Vienna would do well to adhere to her simple proposal that it should be agreed, before the meeting of the Congress, that the three Powers should disarm, and that the disarmament should be commenced, though not necessarily completed, before that time. This proposal is just; but Her Majesty's Government certainly regret that the Austrian Government is disinclined to be con-

tented with the proposal, not differing very materially from its own, and which they consider would have been sufficient and safe, namely, that the agreement to disarm should alone be entered into before the meeting of the Congress, leaving the details of the measure to be subsequently considered and settled in the Congress.

Her Majesty's Government, however, do not understand what Count Buol means by the term "désarmement général effectif," in his telegram to Count Apponyi, of which the latter communicated to me the substance, in his note on the 12th instant,* of which a copy was transmitted to you in my despatch of the same day.†

Her Majesty's Government, before they enter into Congress, desire to know what are Count Buol's views in respect of the proportions, compared with that of the other Powers, which the disarmament of each should assume—as to the extent to which, compared with their ordinary peace establishments, the several powers should carry it out—and as to the mode in which it should be effected.

Her Majesty's Government further desire to know how the disarmament of Sardinia is to be effected, if she should agree to the principle; and also whether Count Buol would consider a notice in the Gazettes of the several Powers that a disarmament was to be carried out, to meet his requirements as to a "désarmement effectif."

Information on these points is required by Her Majesty's Government to enable them to deal with the proposals of the French Government on the subject.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 314. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 16.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 15, 1859.

I LOST no time after the receipt of your Lordship's telegrams of the 13th instant, and again after the receipt of your Lordship's despatches of the same date,‡ relating to the question of a general disarmament, in seeing Count Walewski, and in urging him to join Her Majesty's Government in making representations to the Sardinian Government, with a view of inducing the latter to agree at once to the principle of a general disarmament.

I gave him, as desired, your Lordship's despatches to read, and I showed him that if the French Government—Austria consenting to disarm—refused to advise that a similar step should be taken by Sardinia, no one would believe that France was sincere in a desire for the maintenance of peace. Now was it possible, I asked, that France could brave the expression of public opinion

* No. 291.

† No. 294.

‡ Nos. 299, 300.

that would be elicited when it was known that the assembly of the Congress had been prevented by the obstinacy of Sardinia in refusing to accept the principle of disarmament, and that France had declined to join Her Majesty's Government in endeavouring to overcome that obstinacy.

His Excellency said that before replying to me, he must take the Emperor's orders, and he accordingly saw His Majesty on the subject yesterday.

The Emperor took until to-day to determine what he would do, and he, this morning, desired Count Walewski to inform me, as I had the honour to apprise your Lordship by telegraph, that His Majesty consented to make to Sardinia the application to disarm, on condition that all the States of Italy should be invited to send Plenipotentiaries to the Congress, who would be placed on exactly the same position as the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the form in which Count Walewski himself wrote down the acceptance and condition of the Imperial Government; he assured me that if it was agreed to by the other Powers, he felt certain of the complete disarmament of Sardinia.

His Excellency stated further that, if it was preferred, the Emperor, under the same proviso, would join England or any other Powers in giving a guarantee to Austria against any attack from Sardinia, for a limited period (say six months); but in that case he stipulated that Sardinia should not be called upon to disarm.

I have informed Her Majesty's Ministers at Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin, of the answer of the French Government, but I have requested them to consider my communication as confidential, until the Governments to which they are accredited receive the intelligence from some other source.

Inclosure. *Memorandum.*

(Translation.)

FRANCE will officially urge Sardinia to adhere to the principle of a general disarmament, of which the execution shall be settled at the opening of the Congress, provided that it is settled that all the Italian States shall be invited to take part in the Congress.

No. 315. *Count Buol to Count Apponyi.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by Count Apponyi, April 16.)

(Translation.) Vienna, April 12, 1859.

M. le Comte,—As soon as the proposal of a Congress of the Great Powers was addressed to us by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, we hastened to accept it, laying stress at the same time on the imperious necessity of the previous disarmament of Sardinia. We stipulated for this condition because it seemed to us

impossible to enter upon peaceful deliberations at the risk of seeing them interrupted at any moment by an expedition of the Free Corps organized in Piedmont, or by an invasion of the Sardinian army, ready prepared to enter upon a campaign.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty considered this condition so well-founded on reason and justice, that in Lord A. Loftus's note of the 28th March last, they themselves adopted the idea, promising, in case we acceded to the conditions of that note, to invite the French Government to insist, in conjunction with them, on the immediate disarmament of Sardinia, offering her at the same time a collective guarantee that she should not be attacked by Austria, according to the assurance voluntarily given by us.

From the reports which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me up to the date of the 9th instant, I have derived the conviction that the French Government refused to unite its efforts to those of Great Britain for obtaining the disarmament of Sardinia, and that the isolated steps taken by Great Britain had no effect but that of producing a categorical refusal on the part of Sardinia.

This refusal appears to us as serious as it is eminently to be regretted on all accounts. We find in it, as Lord Malmesbury will understand, a further motive for persisting in the opinion that a Congress convoked under such auspices might rather be expected to terminate in war than in the consolidation of the peace which was the object of our hopes when we agreed to the project of the Imperial Government of Russia.

If there could have been any doubts as to the intentions by which the Cabinet of Turin was animated, they would have been dispelled by the despatch addressed by Count Cavour to the Marquis d'Azeglio under date of the 17th of March last, and since published. In this paper the Sardinian Minister declares that it would be impossible for Piedmont not to remain armed so long as Austria keeps the fortress of Piacenza as a constant menace on the frontier of Piedmont.

Nothing can be clearer than this declaration, by which the Piedmontese Government takes up a position of permanent aggression against Austria so long as the European Treaties, which gave Austria the right of garrisoning Piacenza in the interest of the system of the defence of Italy, are not torn up.

What more is wanted to prove to a certainty that Sardinia does not intend to lay down her arms, and that she only reserves to herself the choice of the most advantageous moment for turning them effectively against us?

This attitude, so essentially aggressive, imposes upon us serious and imperious duties.

The Emperor, our august Master, owes it to his dignity and to the safety of his Empire to put an end to so intolerable a state of

things, by himself taking in hand the question of the disarmament of Piedmont, which the good offices of the British Government have, unhappily, not succeeded in settling.

With this object, we are about to address direct to the Cabinet of Turin a summons to reduce their army to a peace footing, and to disband the Free Corps, or Italian Volunteers.

If this step should produce no effect, there would be nothing left for us but to lay upon the Cabinet of Turin the whole responsibility of the consequences which its refusal will entail, and to declare that their persistance in an openly aggressive attitude gives us back entire liberty of action by freeing us from the pacific promises which we had previously made to the British Government, in the expectation of a just reciprocity on the part of Sardinia.

In the hope that the English Cabinet, which is so justly solicitous for the maintenance of the general peace, will appreciate the motives which mark out for us this line of conduct, and will, perhaps, even think it right to support it with all their authority, I have the honour to request your Excellency to read this despatch to Lord Malmesbury, and to leave him a copy of it if he wishes for it.

Receive, &c.

BUOL.

No. 316. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 16, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Austrian Minister communicated to me, this morning, the despatch from Count Buol of which I enclose a copy.* It appears from this despatch, which is dated the 12th instant, that the Austrian Government is about to address a direct demand to the Cabinet of Turin to reduce the Sardinian army to the peace establishment, and to disband the free corps; intimating at the same time that if the demand is not complied with, Austria will throw upon Sardinia the responsibility of the consequences that may result from her refusal, and declaring that the perseverance of Sardinia in her plainly aggressive attitude against Austria restores to the latter full liberty of action, and releases her from the pacific promises that she had previously offered to the British Government in anticipation of reciprocity on the part of Sardinia.

I stated to Count Apponyi, on receiving from him this communication, that Her Majesty's Government see no objection to Austria asking Sardinia to disarm, if the demand is combined with a statement of the offer of Austria to admit the principle of a general disarmament, accepted by France, and that the disarmament of Austria, France, and Sardinia is to be simultaneous.

* No. 315.

I pointed out to him, that if the communication was given in the shape of a summons, as drily expressed as in his despatch, it would be offensive, and must be rejected.

The Count looked upon this in the same light as myself, and he seemed to believe that his Government would put the note to Sardinia in the form I recommended. I am, however, very apprehensive that this may not be the case, and I have telegraphed to Lord A. Loftus, to inform Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government would entirely disapprove of an ultimatum which did not convey the statement that the principle of a general disarmament had been adhered to by Austria herself.

I thought it right, at the same time, to call Count Apponyi's attention to what, however, he had himself previously noticed, namely, the attempt made in the commencement of Count Buol's despatch, to treat, as being nearly identic, the demand for the previous disarmament of Sardinia, with which the Cabinet of Vienna coupled its acceptance of the proposal made by Russia for a Congress, and the offer made by Her Majesty's Government, that if Austria would accept the bases laid down by Her Majesty's Government as to the four points, England would ask France to insist on the immediate disarmament of Sardinia, in return for a guarantee to be given to her jointly by England and France against an attack on the part of Austria.

Her Majesty's Government have not, as Count Buol assumes, singly invited Sardinia to disarm, and received a refusal; for, the French Government having declined to be party to the proposal made by Her Majesty's Government to give to Sardinia a joint guarantee against the consequences of her disarmament, the proposal for making a demand on Sardinia to disarm, of which that guarantee was to form a part, necessarily fell to the ground. Her Majesty's Government, not being able to give Sardinia the only equivalent they could offer for the reduction of her forces, namely, the protection of the British and French Empires, have never since ceased to declare that, as regards disarmament, Sardinia must be placed on the same footing as the other Powers in every respect.

Since Count Apponyi left me, I have apprized Mr. West, by telegraph, of the summons about to be addressed by Austria to Sardinia, and have desired him to take advantage of this intelligence to point out to Count Cavour that Sardinia would act wisely to anticipate this summons by at once adopting the principle which your Prussian colleague and yourself are instructed to recommend, namely, that of a general and simultaneous disarmament.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 317. *Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff*.—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Duke of Malakoff, April 16.)

(Translation.)

Paris, April 15, 1859.

M. le Maréchal,—LORD COWLEY has been directed by his Government to invite the Government of the Emperor to unite with England and the other Powers in inviting Sardinia to disarm simultaneously with Austria and France. The English Ambassador added that, whatever the intentions of the other Powers might be in this respect, the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty were determined to address this invitation to the Piedmontese Government, even if they were compelled so do so alone.

I have explained to Lord Cowley all the reasons contained in my despatch No. 52, which seem to me to militate against the course that the Earl of Malmesbury considers it his duty to follow on this occasion. Having found, however, that, as you have informed me, the resolution taken in this matter by the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty was inflexible, I hastened to take the orders of the Emperor as to the answer to be returned to the English Government.

The Emperor, M. le Maréchal, cannot help considering it slightly anomalous to address a formal invitation, on which the meeting of a Congress depends, to a Power which is not invited to take part in it. Nevertheless, to give a fresh proof of the spirit of conciliation with which His Majesty is still animated, he has authorized me to inform Lord Cowley that the Government of the Emperor would urge, by an official despatch, the Cabinet of Turin to adhere to the principle of a general disarmament, the execution of which should be determined at the opening of the Congress, provided that there should be an agreement that all the Italian States should be invited to take part in the Congress, and that, consequently, the Sardinian Plenipotentiary, who will have arranged with the other Plenipotentiaries the measures respecting disarmament, shall continue to take part in the subsequent deliberations in common with the Plenipotentiaries of the other Italian States.

We trust that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty will appreciate the justice and policy of this stipulation. How could one, in fact, demand of Piedmont a thing which, in her idea, is a sacrifice, without clearly establishing the fact that she shall be called to participate in the work which should be the result, the aim, and, in some degree, the compensation for it?

On the other hand, we freely admit with Lord Malmesbury, that a general disarmament would become a dead letter if Piedmont were not to participate in it; but yet, if the Four Powers, or even France and England alone, should consent to guarantee Austria from an attack on the part of Sardinia for a limited space of time, would not this guarantee take the place of an

agreement of the Cabinet of Turin to a disarmament which could hardly be imposed upon them against their will?

The Government of the Emperor fully appreciates, M. le Maréchal, the efforts of England to prevent the complications which might arise from a crisis and would regret extremely that the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty, discouraged by the difficulties that they meet with, should consider it right to desist from the noble duty allotted to them; but in no case, we are confident, can these difficulties be imputed to us. We have never ceased to respond, with the greatest eagerness, to all the offers of conciliation; and in this last case still adhering to the proposition of the English Government, and only making our adhesion subordinate to a condition that must appear just to all eyes, we are giving a new proof of the deference that we feel towards an allied Power, with whom, during all circumstances, we have continually endeavoured to keep up the most friendly relations.

You will read this despatch to the Earl of Malmesbury, and at the same time, if you have not already done so, you will read to his Lordship my despatch No. 52.

Accept, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 318. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 16.)

(Extract.)

Turin, April 12, 1859.

At an interview which I had this day with Count Cavour, I communicated to his Excellency the satisfaction which your Lordship felt at learning that the Chevalier Massimo d'Azeglio had been appointed to a special mission to the Courts of London and Paris, and that your Lordship looked upon such an appointment at such a moment as a good sign. His Excellency said that M. d'Azeglio was decidedly a person who held pacific views; that he was sent, not with any special instructions as regards attending the Congress, but to explain candidly and fairly to the Governments of England and France the Italian question, and the position which, at the present moment, Piedmont occupied in it. For this purpose he was to be considered as placed at the disposition of England and France ("à la disposition de la France et de l'Angleterre").

He said that he had no wish on his part to push matters to extremities; that it was Austria, and not Piedmont, who was doing so; and adduced as proof of this, the fact of a fresh corps d'armée having been ordered into Lombardy; that the position offered to Sardinia, in the approaching Congress, was one which she could not accept with honour to herself; and that the character given to the Dutch and Belgian Representatives in the Conference of 1831, as far as Sardinia was concerned, could not be applied in the present case; and that, as regarded the demand

on the part of Austria that Piedmont should disarm, he considered it as simply impertinent ("impertinent"). "It is impossible for us to disarm," said his Excellency, in a tone which clearly indicated that nothing but the force of circumstances would induce him to do so. He then asked me whether I did not think that your Lordship shared his views as to the necessity of ameliorating the condition of Central Italy and the Papal States, and I replied that his Excellency must know that this question had for some time seriously occupied the attention of Her Majesty's Government. "I am content with that," said his Excellency. But he stopped, and did not give expression to what was evidently in his mind, namely, his wish to be associated on an equality with the Great Powers in Congress, for the purpose of effecting these ameliorations.

I did not pursue the subject further, and his Excellency took leave of me, telling me that M. d'Azeglio would leave Turin for Paris on the 14th instant.

No. 319. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. West.*

Foreign Office, April 16, 1859.

Sir,—I APPRISED you by the telegraph this afternoon that Count Apponyi had communicated to me a despatch from his Court, by which it appeared that the Austrian Government was about to summon Sardinia to disarm; and I observed that it seemed to Her Majesty's Government that the Cabinet of Turin would do well to anticipate that summons, by at once declaring that it was ready to adopt the principle of a general and simultaneous disarmament, which Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of Prussia, had recommended for its acceptance.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 320. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Russell.*

Foreign Office, April 16, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE instructed you, by telegraph, to endeavour to ascertain from the Cardinal Secretary of State whether the Pope would be disposed to send a Representative to the Congress, on the understanding that such Representative would be admitted to take part in the deliberations of the Congress on the same footing with the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 321. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Scarlett.*

Foreign Office, April 16, 1859.

Sir,—My telegram of this afternoon will have apprized you of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to ascertain immediately, through the Tuscan Government, whether the Governments of

Parma and Modena would be disposed to send a Representative to the Congress, on the understanding that such Representatives would be admitted to take part in the deliberations of the Congress on the same footing with the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 322. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 16, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Austrian Minister communicated to me, this morning, the despatch from Count Buol of which I inclose a copy.* It appears from this despatch, which is dated the 12th instant, that the Austrian Government is about to address a direct demand to the Cabinet of Turin to reduce the Sardinian army to the peace establishment, and to disband the free corps; intimating at the same time that if the demand is not complied with, Austria will throw upon Sardinia the responsibility of the consequences that may result from her refusal, and declaring that the perseverance of Sardinia in her plainly aggressive attitude against Austria restores to the latter full liberty of action, and releases her from the pacific promises that she had previously offered to the British Government in anticipation of reciprocity on the part of Sardinia.

I stated to Count Apponyi, on receiving from him this communication, that Her Majesty's Government see no objection to Austria asking Sardinia to disarm, if the demand is combined with a statement of the offer of Austria to admit the principle of a general disarmament, accepted by France, and that the disarmament of Austria, France, and Sardinia is to be simultaneous.

You will repeat this, and observe if any other tone is assumed, and the form employed is that of a haughty summons, Sardinia will infallibly resist the demand, and all further attempt to bring her within the pale of peaceful negotiations will be useless. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, earnestly deprecate such course.

I thought it right at the same time to call Count Apponyi's attention to what, however, he had himself previously noticed, namely, the attempt made, in the commencement of Count Buol's despatch, to treat as being nearly identic the demand for the previous disarmament of Sardinia with which the Cabinet of Vienna coupled its acceptance of the proposal made by Russia for a Congress, and the offer made by Her Majesty's Government that if Austria would accept the bases laid down by Her Majesty's Government as to the points to be included in and excluded from

* No. 315.

the deliberations of the Congress, England would ask France to insist on the immediate disarmament of Sardinia in return for a guarantee to be given to her jointly by England and France, against an attack on the part of Austria.

Her Majesty's Government have not, as Count Buol assumes, singly invited Sardinia to disarm, and received a refusal; for the French Government having declined to be party to the proposal made by Her Majesty's Government, to give to Sardinia a joint guarantee against the consequences of her disarmament, the proposal for making a demand on Sardinia to disarm, of which that guarantee was to form a part, necessarily fell to the ground. Her Majesty's Government not being able to give Sardinia the only equivalent they could offer for the reduction of her force, namely, the protection of the British and French Empires, have never ceased since to declare that, as regards disarmament, Sardinia must be placed on the same footing as the other Powers in every respect.

Since Count Apponyi left me, I have apprized Mr. West, by telegraph, of the summons about to be addressed by Austria to Sardinia, and I have desired him to take advantage of this intelligence to point out to Count Cavour that Sardinia would act wisely to anticipate this summons by at once adopting the principle which your Prussian colleague and yourself are instructed to recommend, namely, that of a general and simultaneous disarmament.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 323. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 16, 1859.

My Lord,—I THINK it right to point out to your Lordship that in your note to Count Buol of the 28th of March,* you gave an interpretation to a passage in my telegram of the previous day very different from the correct one. You state in your note that in the contingency specified "Her Majesty's Government will invite and urge the Imperial Government of France to co-operate with them in insisting on Sardinia disarming at once, and likewise to give Sardinia a joint guarantee for the due fulfilment of the engagement taken towards her;" whereas my telegram said that, in that contingency, "We will urge upon France to insist on her (Sardinia) disarming at once, and to give our joint guarantee to Sardinia for Austria's promise."

The offer, as prescribed by my telegram, which was made by Her Majesty's Government, was not that they would insist jointly with France on the disarmament of Sardinia, but merely

* Inclosure 1 in No. 206.

that they would act jointly with France in guaranteeing Sardinia against Austrian attack in the event of her yielding to the representations of France, and consenting at once to disarm.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 324. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 17, 1859.

My Lord,—I INCLOSE herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a despatch addressed by Count Walewski to the French Ambassador in London,* with reference to the proposal made by Her Majesty's Government that France should join the other Great Powers in calling upon Sardinia to disarm.

Your Lordship will show this paper to Count Buol.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 325. *Memorandum given to Count Apponyi on receiving Count Buol's despatch of April 12, 1859.*

WE see no objection to Austria asking Sardinia to disarm, if the demand is combined with the statement of Austria's offer to admit the principle of a general disarmament accepted by France, and that the disarmament of Austria, France, and Sardinia is to be simultaneous.

No. 326. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*

(Translation.)

April 17, 1859, 8.30.

My dear Count,—THEY answer me from Paris at 7 o'clock only :—

"You can give a copy of No. 54, begging Lord Malmesbury to cause a copy to be sent me of his despatch to Lord Cowley, which contains the proposition to invite Sardinia to adhere to the disarmament."

My copy had been ready for two hours.

Yours, &c.

MAL. PELISSIER.

No. 327. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 17, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Duc de Malakoff has communicated to me a despatch from Count Walewski, of which I enclose a copy,* containing the answer of the French Government to the demand which, by my despatch of the 13th,† you were instructed to make to it as to the disposition of France to join with the other Powers in inviting Sardinia to disarm simultaneously with France and Austria ; and his Excellency having, at the same time, stated to

* No. 317.

† No. 299.

me that the French Government wished to have a copy of my despatch, I have to authorize your Excellency to furnish one to Count Walewski.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 328. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, April 13, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant;* in which your Lordship informs me that, in my notes to Count Buol of the 28th ultimo,† I have mis-stated the four points; and that it is essential that I should immediately rectify the error by writing an amended note on that subject to Count Buol.

I submitted to your Lordship, by telegraph, that I should address an explanatory note, which would embody the four points as enumerated in your Lordship's despatch, and would thus meet the end desired.

On receiving, by telegraph, your Lordship's sanction to this proposal, I addressed an explanatory note to Count Buol, of which I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a copy.

Inclosure. *Lord A. Loftus to Count Buol.*

Vienna, April 11, 1859.

M. le Comte,—WITH reference to the note which, in accordance with the instructions of the Earl of Malmesbury, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I had the honour to address to your Excellency on the 28th ultimo,† submitting to the Imperial Cabinet the terms on which Her Majesty's Government were prepared to accept the proposal for an European Congress to solve the existing complication with respect to Italian affairs, I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that, with a view to define more clearly and precisely the sense and meaning of the terms therein laid down, I have been instructed by the Earl of Malmesbury to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Cabinet the following development and explanation of the four points, as they are interpreted and understood by Her Majesty's Government, and to enumerate them in the following order and manner:—

1. The means by which peace may be preserved between Austria and Sardinia.

2. How the evacuation of the Roman States by the armies of Austria and France can best be accomplished.

3. Whether any, and if any, what, reforms can be made in the

* No. 241.

† Inclosures in No. 206.

internal administration of those and other Italian States whose present administrative defects may obviously tend to permanent and dangerous discontent and disorder.

4. The substitution for the Treaties between Austria and the Duchies of a Confederation of the minor States of Italy among themselves, for their mutual internal and external protection.

The foregoing constitute the four points which form the bases and conditions on which Her Majesty's Government have agreed to accept the proposal for a Congress of the Great Powers; but Her Majesty's Government have stated in addition, that it is distinctly to be understood that the Congress will not entertain any question of interference with the actual state of territorial possession in Italy, nor in any way disturb the Treaties of 1815.

With reference to the fourth point, I am further instructed to state that Her Majesty's Government do not thereby intend that a Confederation should be the only arrangement contemplated, but that it should be considered as being one likely to meet the object desired.

I avail, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOF TUS.

No. 329. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, April 13, 1859.

On repairing to Count Buol, on Monday morning last (the 10th instant), with a view to urge on his Excellency, in conformity with your Lordship's telegram of the 10th instant,* the acceptance of the proposal sent by Lord Cowley, his Excellency at once informed me that, in consequence of a misapprehension of the intention of the Austrian Cabinet, in a telegram from Baron Brunnow to his Government, he had telegraphed to the Great Courts the conditions on which the Austrian Government would enter into Congress. These conditions are as follows:—

Austria, in accordance with the reply to the proposal of Russia for a Congress, requires, previous to entering into Congress, the disarmament of Sardinia, and that an understanding shall be come to between the Great Powers for a general disarmament, the details of which are to form the first subject of deliberation in the Congress. This latter, Count Buol observed, was, in fact, the substance of the fifth point which he had proposed.

Or, should it be found impossible to obtain the disarmament of Sardinia, Austria will be satisfied if an agreement is forthwith taken by the Great Powers to carry into immediate execution a general disarmament (inclusive of Sardinia) previous to Congress.

I inquired of Count Buol to what amount, and in what degree, was this disarmament to be carried out, as time pressed, and it

* No. 270.

was most important, for the interests of all that the Congress should meet at the earliest date.

His Excellency replied that there need be no delay occasioned to the meeting of the Congress, and that, if the proposal and the principle were accepted, the form of execution could easily be agreed upon. "For instance," said his Excellency, "an official announcement in the 'Moniteur,' if only three lines; in the 'Opinione,' and in the 'Oesterreichische Correspondenz,' announcing the disarmament, would be the first step."

I then inquired whether his Excellency would go to Congress on the day on which these official announcements were made. "Le jour même," said he, "est beaucoup dire; mais nous n'attendrons pas que le dernier homme soit renvoyé."

All we require, said Count Buol, is that there should be a frank and sincere proof given of the pacific intentions of France, and the moment that we can be assured of her sincerity all difficulties will be instantly removed.

On waiting on his Excellency this day, I again recurred to the question of a general disarmament, and read to his Excellency the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 11th instant,* in which your Lordship urges on the acceptance of Austria the French proposal of general disarmament. I represented to his Excellency that a heavy responsibility would be incurred, if, after all the efforts which had been made for the maintenance of peace, the Congress were now to be frustrated by a difference as to whether the disarmament was to be three weeks sooner or later.

I trusted that his Excellency would seriously reflect on the grave consequences which might result if Austria persisted in enforcing her condition.

I must frankly confess to your Lordship that I have exhausted every argument and every appeal to induce his Excellency to accept the principle of a general disarmament as proposed from Paris, but without avail. The Prussian Minister, Baron Werther, has been equally assiduous in his efforts to attain the same end, and equally unsuccessful with myself.

Count Buol stated to me very frankly to-day that, even if he wished, he could not succeed in obtaining any further concessions from the Emperor.

"I can hold out no hopes," said his Excellency, "that His Majesty will deviate from the decision taken."

I am inclined, however, to believe that the Austrian Government will not hold to the strict letter of the disarmament, if France and Sardinia accept the principle, and shall officially announce disarmament, and publish the orders necessary for its execution.

My Prussian colleague is also of opinion, from the remarks of

* No. 272.

Count Buol, that, if the last Austrian proposals shall be agreed to by France, the Austrian Government will not raise futile difficulties, or look too closely into the carrying out of their details.

No. 330. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

Vienna, April 13, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE read to Count Buol your Lordship's two despatches of the 5th and of the 6th instant* (in confirmation of your Lordship's telegram of the 5th instant, the substance of which I had privately communicated to his Excellency), relating to the participation of the Italian States at the proposed Congress.

With reference to the former of those despatches, in which your Lordship states that Her Majesty's Government are willing to agree that the invitation to those States shall be deferred until the meeting of the Congress, at which time, also, their position with reference to the Congress shall be defined, Count Buol observed that there could be no objection to this course, but that this difficulty had solved itself, inasmuch as he believed that all the Italian States had expressed their intention to refuse an invitation to Congress. His Excellency further added, that it might even be questionable whether it would be becoming for the Congress to address an invitation to these States, if it were known beforehand that they would refuse it.

He seemed, further, to be of opinion, that the position of these official Agents at the Congress, in the manner proposed, would be extremely difficult and embarrassing to them; and that it will be found, in the end, that each Government will have to obtain, through its own Agents, any information which it may require.

"How," said his Excellency, "can you call upon the Agent of a Government to point out the defects of the administrative system of that Government?"

I can plainly see that his Excellency does not expect that any of the Italian States will agree to depute an Agent or Delegate to appear at the Congress; and that, consequently, the Congress will have mainly to rely upon their own sources of information to guide their counsels.

His Excellency is perfectly ready, however, that this question should be deferred till the Congress meet.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No 331. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, April 13, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Archduke

* No. 226, 228

Albert, Governor of Hungary, has been charged by His Imperial Majesty with a confidential mission to the Regent of Prussia.

His Imperial Highness left this residence on the morning of the 11th, for Berlin, and in addition to his aides-de-camp in ordinary was accompanied by four officers of the Staff.

Although it is generally believed here that the mission of the Archduke is more of a military than of a diplomatic character, it is ardently hoped that the presence of His Imperial Highness at Berlin will be productive of the best results, and will tend to strengthen and confirm the cordial understanding between the two States, so necessary for the protection and safety of Germany if war should unhappily arise out of the present complication.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 332. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

Vienna, April 13, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant,* stating that there was a discrepancy between the proposals of Count Buol, as reported to your Lordship in my telegram of the 7th instant, and those received by Count Apponyi, I have the honour to state that in the proposal, as communicated to me by Count Buol, I certainly understood, and still hold to that opinion, that his Excellency confined his condition to the "disbanding of the free corps;" and that the further disarmament of Sardinia was to be considered as included in the general one, the details of which were to form the first subject of discussion by the Congress.

The circumstances which originated these proposals are as follows:—

At eight o'clock on the evening of the 6th instant, I waited on Count Buol for the purpose of inquiring from his Excellency how far Lord Cowley might be authorized officially to say that, in his conversations with his Excellency at Vienna, he (Count Buol) had frequently avowed that if Sardinia disarmed Austria would do so likewise. It was, therefore, on this occasion, that I used every argument to persuade his Excellency of the impolicy for Austria to demand, and of the impossibility for the other Powers to obtain, the disarmament of Sardinia, and I urged his Excellency seriously to reflect on the results of such a course; on the danger to Austria, if she persisted in a demand unsupported by England and Prussia; and of the risk she would thereby incur, of the forfeiture of the support of public opinion, both in England and Germany.

"You will be," I said, "the party who refuses to listen to the conciliatory councils of Europe, and on you will infallibly rest, therefore, the responsibility, if, in consequence thereof, the Congress is frustrated, and the peace of Europe is disturbed. Is there,

* No 259.

then, nothing that you will do? No conciliatory step which you will take?"

His Excellency at last assented to make the proposals as contained in my telegram of the 7th instant. I immediately transmitted them to your Lordship on returning home, within half-an-hour of receiving them from Count Buol, and it is scarcely possible that my memory could have been at fault on a point of such material importance.

I am inclined to think that, on the occasion to which I allude, when I had pressed his Excellency very hard to make concessions, and not to persist in requiring an impossible condition, his Excellency yielded, but that subsequently his Imperial master was found to be less pliable, and that consequently in the instructions to Count Apponyi the condition of the disarmament of Sardinia was annexed to that of the disbanding of the Free Corps.

From whatever cause this discrepancy may have arisen, I must entirely exculpate Count Buol, in whose word I place the utmost reliance, from any intentional error, although I still hold to the correctness of the proposals as stated by me to your Lordship.

I am further of opinion, that had they not been superseded by fresh propositions, the Austrian Cabinet would have been perfectly contented to have accepted the proposals as they were transmitted by me to your Lordship in my telegram of the 7th instant. The proof thereof is so far given that the Imperial Government have since consented to abandon altogether the demand of the disarmament of Sardinia, provided that a general disarmament of the Great Powers shall be agreed to and put in execution previous to the Congress.

I should not have troubled your Lordship with this explanation, were I not desirous of clearing up what might otherwise have appeared a misconception and error on my part.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 333. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

Vienna, April 13, 1859.

My Lord,—It being currently reported and believed in the public circles here that Austria, having exhausted her patience and forbearance towards Sardinia, was on the eve of taking some decisive step to bring matters to a decision, I sounded Count Buol as delicately as I could on this subject, reminding him of the declaration which he had given to Her Majesty's Government not to attack Sardinia.

Count Buol at once replied to me that, appreciating the friendly acts ("les bons procédés") of Her Majesty's Government towards Austria, no change in the present passive and

pacific attitude of the Austrian Government would take place without such intention being previously notified to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 334. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 13.)

Vienna, April 18, 1859.

My Lord,—In conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I have read to Count Buol your Lordship's despatches of the 4th instant and of the 6th instant,* in which your Lordship urges upon the Austrian Cabinet the policy of entering into Congress on the conditions proposed of a mutual withdrawal of the Austrian and Sardinian forces, as I had previously submitted to his Excellency, and of abandoning their demand for the disarmament of Sardinia.

His Excellency stated that (as I had been already informed) there could be no question of Austria acceding to the withdrawal of her troops. He would not therefore revert to that question.

With respect to the moral advantages which Austria would acquire by entering into Congress without insisting on the disarmament of Sardinia, his Excellency observed that a moral advantage of this nature would scarcely counterbalance the disadvantage to her military frontier, if, despite of the Congress, she were later to be attacked by Sardinia and France.

If, said his Excellency, the Congress is to assemble for the attainment of peaceful objects, the arguments and deliberations within the Congress must not be exposed to be overawed by the clash of arms without the Congress.

Let all parties, then, determine to meet with a security that each and all are sincerely desirous for a peaceable solution, and then, said his Excellency, all the difficulties with respect to the meeting of the Congress will be removed.

His Excellency informed me that he has this day addressed a despatch to Count Apponyi, for communication to your Lordship, which will fully explain the views and motives of the Austrian Cabinet on this subject.

In referring to the free corps lately enrolled in Sardinia, Count Buol informed me that in a reply which he had received through Count Brasier de St. Simon, the Prussian Minister at Turin, who had been charged to explain and excuse, on the part of Austria, an accidental violation of the Piedmontese territory by an Austrian picquet, Count Cavour had entered into a long explanation to prove to Count Buol that the Sardinian Contingents were "Italian volunteers, and not free corps," in the usual acceptation of the term; and that they

* Nos. 213, 214, 237.

were to be considered as forming part of the Sardinian military forces.

I am, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 335. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

Vienna, April 13, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT BUOL informed me, on Monday last, that the Russian Cabinet had proposed a meeting of the Four Powers on Italian affairs, independently of Austria, if she still refused to participate in the proposed Congress, which has been refused at once by the English and Prussian Governments.

His Excellency made no further comment or observation on this subject.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 336. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

Vienna, April 13, 1859.

My Lord,—At my last interview with Count Buol, I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant,* in which your Lordship states that the Marquis d'Azeglio had announced officially to your Lordship that Count Cavour will neither consent to the disarmament of Sardinia, nor to send a Representative to attend the Congress on the footing proposed, and that he had likewise refused the guarantee offered as the price of disarmament.

Count Buol observed, that he had received no answer yet to the replies he had addressed to my notes of the 28th ultimo; and that he was desirous to know whether France had agreed, in conjunction with Her Majesty's Government, to invite Sardinia to disarm, and what answer had been returned by Sardinia.

I observed to his Excellency that, in the despatch I had read to him, I had given him the information he was desirous to have.

His Excellency inquired whether I would leave that despatch in his hands.

This I declined, not being empowered by your Lordship to do so; but I said that I would apply to your Lordship for this permission.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 337. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)

Berlin, April 16, 1859.

My Lord,—Your Lordship will have been informed by my telegram of the 14th instant, that the Prussian Government have unhesitatingly consented to join with Her Majesty's Government

* No. 198.

in urging Sardinia to disarm; and I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I this day read to Baron Schleinitz your despatch of the 13th instant,* on this subject.

His Excellency has just received a telegram from Count Bernstorff by which he learnt with satisfaction that the instructions to Mr. West and Count Brassier de St. Simon had been dispatched from London.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 338. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 18.)
(Extract.)

Berlin, April 16, 1859.

THE Prussian Government entertain the same opinion as your Lordship does of the impossibility of holding a Congress without Austria.

No. 339. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 18, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE already apprized your Lordship that Count Apponyi communicated to me, on the 16th instant, a despatch from Count Buol, announcing that the Austrian Government were about to summon Sardinia to disarm.

I have to instruct your Lordship to lose no time in stating to Count Buol, with reference to that despatch, that if the communication to be made by Austria to the Cabinet of Turin is nothing more than a mere summons to disarm, unaccompanied with any other offer calculated to render its acceptance more palatable to Sardinia, Her Majesty's Government entirely disapprove the course adopted by the Austrian Government in this respect, and consider that it will have an effect on the public opinion of Europe very detrimental to Austria.

If, however, on the other hand, the summons is combined with a statement that the Governments of Austria and France having agreed to disarm, it behoves Sardinia to adopt the same course, that so the settlement of the Italian question may be referred to the peaceful action of diplomacy, Her Majesty's Government consider the course taken by Austria to be fully justified by the circumstances of the case.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 340. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 18, 1859.

My Lord,—I APPRIZED your Lordship, by telegraph, this afternoon, that the Austrian forces were being concentrated between the Adda and the Ticino, and I directed you to make one last

* No. 301.

effort, on the part of Her Majesty's Government to prevent the commencement of the hostilities.

In a private letter which I yesterday wrote to Count Buol, I suggested that Austria, France, and Sardinia, should disarm simultaneously, and previously to the meeting of the Congress; and that all the Italian States should be invited, after the Congress had met, to take part in it, as was the case at the Congress of Laybach.

I have reason to believe that Sardinia would accept such a proposal; but if Austria does not accept it, no course remains open to Her Majesty's Government but to withdraw from the negotiation altogether.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 341. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 18, 1859.

Sir,—THE proposal of the French Government which, in your telegram of the 16th, you state to have been approved by Prince Gortchakoff, is, I conclude, that made by them on the 15th instant, namely, that France would invite Sardinia to disarm, provided that all the Italian States were admitted as substantive members of the Congress; or that France would join any other Power in guaranteeing Austria for a limited time against an attack on the part of Sardinia, who in this case would not be required to disarm.

I have to state to you in reply that Her Majesty's Government are much surprised at finding that after the positive opinion given by Russia against the admission of Sardinia as a principal to the Congress, and the equally positive opinion given by France that the invitation of the Italian States should be deferred till after the meeting of the Congress, those Powers should reopen the questions which Her Majesty's Government considered to have been finally decided in deference to their opinions. If, however, the Powers do not abide by their settled resolutions, it will be impossible for England, who, after all, has no direct interest in the questions at issue, to take part in the negotiations so inconveniently carried on; and you will inform Prince Gortchakoff that Her Majesty's Government consider that he would have acted more in harmony with diplomatic usage, if, instead of at once acceding to this new proposal of France, he had made his consent to do so conditional on the acceptance of it by the other Powers who had agreed in the proposal previously made by Russia in regard to the manner in which the Congress should be composed, and subsequently agreed to and modified by France, when she proposed that the Italian States should be invited, after the Congress had met, to be heard at its deliberations.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 342. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 18, 1859.

My Lord,—It appears from your Excellency's telegram of this afternoon, that the only French proposal to which an answer is due, is that of which a copy is contained in your despatch of the 15th instant,* as having been given you in writing by Count Walewski on that day, namely:—

“La France engagera officiellement la Sardaigne à adhérer au principe d'un désarmement général, dont l'exécution sera réglée à l'ouverture du Congrès, pourvu qu'il soit convenu que tous les Etats Italiens seront invités à faire partie du Congrès.”

It appears, however, from your dispatch that Count Walewski added verbally that, if it was preferred, the Emperor, under the same proviso, would join England or any other Power in giving a guarantee to Austria against any attack from Sardinia for a limited period (say six months); but, in that case, he stipulated that Sardinia should not be called upon to disarm.

I have to state to your Excellency, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government think it better to confine themselves to the proposal of the French Government, as stated in Count Walewski's despatch to the Duke of Malakoff of the 15th instant,† of which the latter gave me a copy on the 16th, and of which a copy is inclosed to your Excellency in my despatch of yesterday,‡ and, in conformity with this opinion, I have to instruct your Excellency to state to Count Walewski that, as this French proposal re-opens entirely the question of the manner in which the Congress should be composed, which question was settled according to his own wishes, and with the unanimous consent of the other Powers, Her Majesty's Government can give no answer to it until they have ascertained the view which the other Powers take of it.

Your Excellency may add that Her Majesty's confidential servants at their meeting on the 16th instant, observed with much regret that the negotiations were again unsettled by this new proposal. The Neapolitan, Papal, and Modenese Governments positively declining to admit even the competency of the Congress to entertain the questions which it has been proposed to submit to it, it is clear that this new proposal, if adopted, would, in the probable event of Tuscany and Parma concurring with the other three, lead to the admission to the Congress of Sardinia alone on the same footing as the Great Powers, a measure which France herself has objected to.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 343. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 18, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE transmitted to your Excellency, in my

* No. 314.

† No. 317.

‡ No. 327.

despatch of the 17th instant,* a despatch from Count Walewski, which had been communicated to me by the Duke of Malakoff on the 16th instant,† and in which his Excellency states that the French Government would, by an official despatch, persuade ("engagerait") the Cabinet of Turin to adhere to the principle of a general disarmament, the execution of which should be regulated at the opening of the Congress, provided that all the Italian States should be invited to be parties to the Congress, and that, consequently, the Sardinian Plenipotentiary who shall have settled with the other Plenipotentiaries the measures relating to the disarmament, shall continue to take part in the subsequent deliberations, conjointly with the Plenipotentiaries of the other Italian States.

Her Majesty's Government appreciate the reluctance of the Government of France to urge disarmament upon Sardinia, and they feel that as France has supported Sardinia throughout these disputes, she is unwilling to press upon the Cabinet of Turin a point which is disagreeable to it. Her Majesty's Government, however, having been only spectators of the events which have passed, and impartial mediators in the controversy, enjoy a greater liberty of action.

Her Majesty's Government must remind that of France of what has passed in the course of these discussions on the particular point of the admission of Sardinia to the Congress, and it cannot be denied that, whatever may be the present opinion of the Emperor of the French as regards the supposed unfairness of requiring Sardinia to disarm when she is not to be admitted to be a principal party to the Congress, yet His Imperial Majesty, in common with Russia and other Powers, declared, a month ago, to your Excellency, that Sardinia ought not to be admitted to the Congress on the same footing as the Five Great Powers.

So little, indeed, did the French Government contemplate a different state of things, that Count Walewski, at a later period, suggested, and the other Powers acquiesced in his Excellency's wishes, that the invitation to the Italian States to send Representatives empowered to plead before the Congress for the interests of their respective Governments, should not go forth until fifteen days after the Representatives of the Five Great Powers had met in Congress, and had discussed among themselves the preliminaries for the settlement of the business which they had in hand.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, considered these points definitively settled, and they would submit to the French Government that if they are now to be reopened as proposed in Count Walewski's despatch, much inconvenience and delay must arise from Austrian opposition, and from the uncertainty as to the

* No. 327.

† No. 317.

course of future proceedings, which this vacillation of purpose at the outset cannot fail to engender.

It would be inconsistent with the real state of the case to say, that by excluding Sardinia from the Congress, and requiring her to subscribe to the results of that meeting, although she has been no party to it, a sacrifice is unjustly imposed upon her ; for it is settled and notorious, that Sardinia will be invited and admitted to be heard, and to speak on all matters respecting Italy ; and that being the case, the question at issue merely turns on a point of form as to the diplomatic position that Sardinia will occupy.

Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government are still as anxious as at first, to assist in finding a peaceable solution of the existing difficulties, and they, therefore, submit to the French Government, and through it to Sardinia, the following plan of arrangement, which is a fusion of the proposals severally made by France and Austria :—

1. That there should be a preliminary, general, effective, and simultaneous disarmament.

2. That such disarmament should be carried out by a Military or Civil Commission, separate from the Congress, of six persons, one to be appointed by each of the Five Powers and by Sardinia.

3. That as soon as this Commission shall have assembled, and have begun their task, the Congress shall meet and proceed to the discussion of the political questions.

4. That the Representatives of the Italian States shall be invited, after the Congress meets, to sit with the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, in precisely the same manner as they did at the Congress of Laybach in 1821.

This is the last effort that Her Majesty's Government can make for the settlement of these questions, and if the four Powers cannot agree in adopting the course thus submitted to them, Her Majesty's Government will consider it no longer consistent with the dignity and interests of Great Britain to continue these fruitless negotiations, and they must in that case abandon them as a hopeless task ; but a serious responsibility, with all its results, will be laid upon the head of the Power, whatever it may be, which, without due provocation, and without the most urgent necessity, seeks for its own ambitious purposes to involve Europe in the calamities of a long and bloody war.

Your Excellency will read this despatch to Count Walewski, and give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 344. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*

(Translation.) Albert-Gate House, April 18, 1859, 3.15.

My dear Count,—I do not wish to trouble you in your serious occupations, at the same time, I owe you two communications.

A telegram which left Paris at noon asks me, with regard to the despatch of which I have given you a copy :—

“Is the answer made by my despatch No. 54 to the English proposition accepted at Vienna?”

An important despatch, which I have this instant received, is thus expressed :—

“The Austrian army in Italy is composed of four corps d’armée of 40,000 men each. Two are between Milan and the Tessin; the other two between Milan and Venice. Two days ago the order was given to move forward the two last corps, so that now nearly 150,000 are assembled between the Adda and the Tessin.

“In presence of these facts, orders have been given to two divisions of the army of Lyons to move towards the Sardinian frontier. Inform the British Government of this, and say, that if they wish to prevent a conflict, it is urgent that they should insist at Vienna that the offensive movements of troops be suspended.”

In expectation of our interview to-morrow, I hasten to acquit myself of this duty.

Yours, &c.

MAL. PELISSIER.

No. 345. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

April 18, 1859, 5.30 o'clock.

THE telegrams succeed each other with rapidity; I receive a despatch of a few minutes past four o'clock, which I transcribe to you here.

“Have the goodness to declare, without delay, to Lord Malmesbury, that if England promises us to insist together with us on the admission of the Italian Powers to the Congress, I will immediately urge, and by the telegraph, Piedmont to adhere to the principle of disarmament, the execution of which can be regulated, if it takes place, even before the meeting of the Congress. If you answer me ‘Yes,’ my telegram for Turin will depart instantly.”

It is you, my dear Count, who can place me in a position to give this laconic and happy answer.

No. 346. *The Earl of Malmesbury to the Duke of Malakoff.*

(Translation.)

House of Lords, April 18, 1859.

My dear Marshal,—I cannot give you a categorical “Yes:” but, to-morrow, I will propose this, as our last effort, to the Four Powers:

1. Preliminary effective simultaneous disarmament.
2. Commission of superior officers to effect this.

3. The Italian States shall be admitted on the same footing as at Laybach in 1821.

It is useless to ask Austria to admit Sardinia on the same footing as us, and having decided with your approbation, and that of the others, that she should not be so, that is the only expedient which we can find, and if it does not succeed, we retire from the strife.

Entirely yours, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 347. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.**

Foreign Office, April 19, 1859.

My Lord,—I STATED to your Excellency, by telegraph yesterday evening, that I had seen the Chevalier Massimo d'Azeglio, and in consequence of what had passed between us I acquainted you that Her Majesty's Government, as a last effort to prevent the interruption of peace, proposed—

1. That Austria, France, and Sardinia should disarm simultaneously, and that such disarmament should be a reality, and should be effected before the meeting of the Congress, and that the details of the measure should be carried out by a Commission composed of six Military or Civil Commissioners, to be named severally by the Five Powers and Sardinia.

2. That the Congress, composed of Five Powers, should meet, and that, having met, it should invite the Italian States to send Representatives to it on the same footing as the Representatives whom they sent to the Congress of Laybach, where they were associated with, and finally sat in Congress, with the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

This proposal, I stated to your Excellency, was the last that Her Majesty's Government had to offer, and I announced their determination, if it were refused, to withdraw from the negotiation.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 348. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 22.)

Turin, April 18, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith, to your Lordship, copies of the "Piedmontese Gazette" of this day, containing Count Cavour's statement, which I telegraphed to your Lordship this morning.

I have, &c.

L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

Inclosure. *Extract from the Piedmontese Gazette of April 18, 1859.* Turin, April 17, 1859.

THE British Government, with the intention of facilitating the

* Similar despatches were sent to Lord A. Loftus, Lord Bloomfield, and Sir J. Crampton.

meeting of the Congress, from which it hopes that decided ameliorations may result for Italy, invited the King's Government to consent to the principle of a general disarmament, and to its immediate application, even before the meeting of Congress, contemporaneously with the disarmament of Austria. To this invitation the Minister of Foreign Affairs, by the King's command, made the following reply, in the shape of a telegraphic despatch :—

If Sardinia had been admitted to the Congress on the footing of the great Powers, she would be able to accept, as France had done, the principle of general disarmament in the hope that her assent would not produce any bad consequences in Italy. Her exclusion from the Congress does not permit her to make such an engagement, and still less that which England demands of her.

Nevertheless, to reconcile as much as possible her desire to second the efforts of England with that which her safety and the maintenance of tranquillity in Italy demand, Sardinia declares that if Austria ceases to send fresh troops to Italy, she engages,

1. Not to call under arms her reserves, as she had decided to do since the calling out of the Austrian reserves.
2. Not to mobilize her army which is not on a war footing.
3. Not to move her troops from the purely defensive positions which they have occupied for three months.

No. 349. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 22.)
(Extract.)

Turin, April 14, 1859.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 13th instant,* I have the honour to state that, immediately upon its receipt, I sought an interview with Count Cavour, but was unable to see his Excellency until the following day at 2 o'clock, when I showed his Excellency your Lordship's telegram.

His Excellency seemed struck at your Lordship's decided language, and almost immediately said, that the intelligence which he had received from the Sardinian Minister at Paris was not in exact accordance with that which I had just conveyed to him.

He said that he had been given to understand that France and Austria had agreed to the principle of general disarmament, which was to be decided upon at the meeting of the Congress; whereas your Lordship's language was to the effect that disarmament should be "préalable" to Congress, since your Lordship stated that you would not enter Congress unless Sardinia disarmed with Austria and France.

I said that, according to the tenour of your Lordship's telegraphic despatch, I conceived that Her Majesty's Government de-

* See No. 304.

sired to see that a *bonâ fide* disarmament was intended and begun upon; and that, as his Excellency had observed, your Lordship would not enter Congress unless this was clearly understood.

Under these circumstances, his Excellency said that he was not prepared to give an answer to a communication of such importance as that which had just been made to him, as he was desirous of ascertaining the exact nature of the agreement which had been come to by France and Austria on this subject, and must, moreover, consult the King, who was at that moment absent from Turin, as well as the other members of the Council of Ministers.

His Excellency then requested me to ask your Lordship, by telegraph, to what extent it was proposed to carry the disarmament.

I said that I conceived that, as far as Sardinia was concerned, disarmament might be considered to consist in the dissolution of the free corps and contingent lately called out.

His Excellency said he wished for certain data upon this point, and again asked me to submit the question to your Lordship.

He then endeavoured to demonstrate that Piedmont had only armed in self-defence, and that the army had not, as yet, been even what is called mobilized; that the reserves had not been called out; that to disarm was a vague term, when no country was at war; and that Austria could very well disband her contingents, and, in a few days, concentrate as large a force as before it was called out.

His Excellency said he must take His Majesty's orders; and I left him, requesting him to inform me as soon as possible of the result of the deliberations.

No. 350. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 22.)

Turin, April 18, 1859.

My Lord,—UPON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 15th instant,* I immediately consulted with my Prussian colleague, who was in the receipt of similar instructions, and at an interview which we had this day with Count Cavour, we put to his Excellency the expediency of accepting simply the principle of a general disarmament. His Excellency said he was aware of the good intentions of the Governments of Prussia and England, and proceeded to use the same arguments against adopting the course we had advised, as he had previously done to myself, as reported in my despatch of the 14th instant.† His Excellency then further alluded to the note of Count Buol to Lord A. Loftus, which had appeared in the public papers, and from which he argued that it was evident that, if Austria had ever adopted the four points, as proposed by your Lordship, as the bases for the Congress, she now

* See No. 312.

† No. 349.

no longer held to them, and that if she entered the Congress upon the conditions set forth in that note, the Italian question, and that portion of it which related to Sardinia, could not possibly be fairly taken into consideration. Under these circumstances Count Cavour said he could entertain no proposition for disarmament until the bases ("les bases") upon which the Congress was to open was definitively decided upon. To an observation on the part of the Prussian Minister as to whether Sardinia would disarm, in the case of the four Powers, England, France, Russia, and Prussia, succeeding in inducing Austria to enter the Congress upon conditions which would ensure the fair and impartial discussion of the Italian question, his Excellency replied that this would certainly change the case, but that, as he considered it almost an impossibility, he would revert to the immediate question before us, which, however, he would no longer discuss, as he had received intelligence from Paris that the French Government had submitted a fresh proposition to Her Majesty's Government, to the effect that the acceptance of the principle of disarmament on the part of Sardinia should be made to depend upon her admission to the Congress on an equality with the Great Powers; and he proceeded to read to us the answer which he had prepared, which he himself then placed in our hands. I have now the honour to inclose this paper,* in original,† written by his Excellency in our presence.

Throughout our interview Count Cavour manifested a fixed determination not to accept the principle of disarmament except on the condition contained in this paper, and said that the answer which he had given yesterday to Her Majesty's Government, and of which I inclosed copy in my despatch† of this day's date, was to be considered decisive as to the acceptation at all of the principle of disarmament. All the arguments we urged were of no avail, his Excellency reverting always to the new phase in the question which had arisen by the last proposition to which he had alluded as having been made to your Lordship by the French Government.

I have, &c.

L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

No. 351. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

Albert-Gate House, April 19, 1859.

I ADDRESS you a telegraphic despatch, which we have just at this instant deciphered.

* See Inclosure in No. 348.

† No. 348.

Inclosure. *Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff.*

(Translation.)

Telegraphic.

Paris, April 19, 1859, 4.30 P.M.

PIEDMONT, according to my counsels, consents to preliminary and simultaneous disarmament. Count Cavour informs M. d'Azeglio, in London, of it.

If Austria consents to invite the Italian States to take part in the Congress, we are ready to assemble in London, to regulate the execution of the disarmament.

No. 352. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 19, 1859

My Lord.—THE French Ambassador announced to me, this morning, that his Government accepts the last proposal of Her Majesty's Government, as set forth in my despatch of yesterday;* and the Sardinian Minister has announced that, although he fears serious discontent will arise in Piedmont, the King submits to the united request of England and France, that he shall accept the principle of a general and preliminary disarmament.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the Commissioners to be named for the settling the details of disarmament should be civilians or military officers, as each Power may think fit.

The French Government have, in the Duc de Malakoff, a Military Commissioner fully qualified for the duties which will devolve upon the members of the Commission; but the Representatives of the other Powers, not being military persons may, perhaps, appear to their respective Governments scarcely competent to deal with questions of a purely military nature.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 353. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*

(Translation.)

Albert-Gate House, April 20, 1859, 11 P.M.

My dear Count,—I HAVE this instant received a telegraphic despatch, dated Paris, 9.15, thus expressed:—

“The Government of the Emperor adheres to the proposition of England, contained in the despatch which Lord Cowley has remitted to me.

“Inform Lord Malmesbury of this.”

Yours, &c.

MAL. PELISSIER.

* No. 343.

No. 354. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 19, 1859.

YOUR Lordship will urge upon the Cabinet of Vienna the acceptance of the proposal which I communicated to you, by telegraph, yesterday evening, and which I have repeated in my despatch of this day.*

That proposal contemplates :—

1. That there shall be a preliminary, general, effective, and simultaneous disarmament of the three Powers.

2. That the details of the disarmament shall be carried out by six Military or Civil Commissioners, to be named severally by the Five Powers, and by Sardinia ; my object in proposing six Commissioners being, that the interests of Austria may be fairly supported.

3. That as soon as the Commissioners shall have assembled, and have begun their task, the Congress shall meet and proceed to the discussion of the political questions.

4. That the Representatives of the Italian States shall be invited after the Congress meets, to sit with the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, in precisely the same manner as they did at the Congress of Laybach in 1821.

I have desired your Lordship to point out to Count Buol that this is a fusion of the proposals severally made by Austria and by France, and it is the last effort that Her Majesty's Government can make for the settlement of those questions.

I have further stated to your Lordship that the Sardinian Minister has informed me that he has received a telegram from his Government announcing that, as France now joins England in pressing previous disarmament upon Sardinia, the Cabinet of Turin, although apprehensive that the consequences of such a step may injuriously affect the tranquillity of Italy, is nevertheless prepared to give way ; and I have directed your Lordship to press upon Count Buol the serious blame to which Austria will expose herself if, under these circumstances, she makes any more difficulties in the way of the meeting of the Congress ; but, as regards the question of disarmament, I have informed your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government solemnly protest against any demand being made by Austria for the immediate disbandment by Sardinia of the free corps. Her Majesty's Government do so on public grounds, and entirely independent of this negotiation, for they conceive that no measure more fatal to the maintenance of public order, and more pregnant with mischief, could be adopted, than suddenly to release from the control of military discipline the class of persons of which those corps are composed.

Your Lordship will have seen, by a further telegram, which I

have sent to you this afternoon, that the French Ambassador has announced to me that the French Government agree to the last proposal of Her Majesty's Government, which I have repeated in this despatch, although they would prefer that the Commissioners by whom the details of disarmament are to be settled, should be the Diplomatic Representatives of the several Powers in London, Her Majesty's Government think that military men would be most competent to deal with the several questions connected with such an operation ; but, after all, this point may well be left to be determined, each for itself, by the several Powers.

The Sardinian Minister has since announced to me the adherence of his Government to the British proposal ; and your Lordship will not fail to urge Count Buol to notify without delay the acceptance of it by Austria, as otherwise she will, in all probability, be left to stand alone.

No. 355. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 20, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Lordship states in your telegram of yesterday evening that Count Buol, on your communicating to his Excellency mine of the 18th instant,* appeared to object to the idea of the Commissioners of Disarmament being military men.

I have informed your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government do not stand out on that point, but consider that it should be left to each Government to decide from what class of persons its own Commissioner should be selected.

The French Government, as I have stated to your Lordship, propose that the Commissioners should sit in London, and should be composed of the Diplomatic Agents of the several Powers at this Court. We have no objection, as regards the former point, and as regards the latter wish to leave the several Governments at liberty to decide as they think fit.

I wish your Lordship again to press on Count Buol, as, indeed, I have directed you by telegraph to do, that Her Majesty's Government, for the reasons that I have already stated, cannot be a consenting party to the immediate disbandment of the free corps lately enrolled in Sardinia. You will further state to his Excellency that as all the Great Powers, except Austria, have signified their adherence to the proposal which I transmitted to you by telegraph on the 18th instant, and which I have stated more at length in my despatch of the 19th instant,* and as Sardinia has also agreed to a general disarmament, Her Majesty's Government feel convinced that the Cabinet of Vienna will not stand alone, but will adhere to the British proposal, and will not incur the obloquy of having declined to come into an arrangement

* No. 354.

which, under other circumstances, would have led to a satisfactory result.

If, however, this should unfortunately not be the case, Her Majesty's Government, as I have already said, will have no other course open to them but to retire altogether from the negotiations, which, in their opinion, will have left the relations between the Great Powers of Europe in regard to each other in a more precarious position than before.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 356. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 20, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Lordship states, in your despatch of the 13th instant,* that, in the course of conversation on the question of admitting Italian Representatives to the Congress, Count Buol observed that the difficulty had solved itself, inasmuch as he believed that all the Italian States had expressed their intention to refuse an invitation. You will, however, point out to his Excellency that the refusal of the Italian States to send Representatives, cannot be given or known till the invitation has officially been made by the Congress; and that, as there is an exact analogy between the proposed Congress and the one held at Laybach in 1821, it is not unreasonable to expect that the Italian States may ultimately decide to be represented.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 357. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 20, 1859.

My Lord,—I INCLOSE, for your Lordship's information, a copy of an instruction which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,† on the subject of the present state of things arising out of the negotiations on the affairs of Italy.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Count Buol, and will give his Excellency a copy of it.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 358. *Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 20.)

Frankfort, April 18, 1859.

My Lord,—As far as my observation has extended in the brief period which has passed since my return to my post, I feel bound

* No. 330.

† No. 343.

to inform your Lordship that no material change of public feeling has taken place in this part of Germany towards France.

The second article, referring to Germany, published in the "Moniteur," with the avowed view of calming and conciliating the popular agitation raised against France, has had, like the former one, an effect precisely the contrary of that which its writer probably intended it to produce, and has been generally replied to in a tone of ironical irritation.

I have, further, the honour to report, that precautionary measures of military preparation are being universally taken by the several States of the Confederation, and though nothing transpires publicly to that effect, I can positively inform your Lordship that the Military Commission of the Diet is actively employed in combining the organisation, and establishing that unity so necessary for effective action.

I have, &c.

A. MALET.

No. 359. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 20.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 19, 1859.

I RECEIVED, yesterday morning, a note from Count Walewski, requesting me to go to him. I found his Excellency anxious for intelligence, having learnt the answer returned by the Sardinian Government to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires respecting the question of disarmament. I said that I was without any information on this matter myself, but that I regretted the decision taken by the Sardinian Government, because it would not satisfy Austria; and I feared that the position of that Power had become such as must force her to bring matters to a conclusion, one way or the other. Count Walewski replied that such were his own apprehensions also; and, indeed, that information had reached Paris the day before that two Austrian divisions were moving from the neighbourhood of Milan towards the Sardinian frontier. Orders had, consequently, been transmitted during the night to several French divisions to approach Lyons. To a question which I had put to him, his Excellency answered, that if it was seen that the Austrians seriously threatened Sardinia, the French reserves, to the number of 120,000 men, would immediately be called out.

His Excellency, in the course of conversation, did not disguise from me the fact that, at the present moment, the French armaments are not sufficiently advanced to enable the Emperor to prevent the Austrians from successfully invading Sardinia.

Count Walewski said that he had pressed the Sardinian Government very strongly, by telegraph, to admit the principle of a general disarmament; and, further, that he had addressed, by the same means, an instruction to the French Ambassador at

St. Petersburg, desiring him to inform the Russian Government that if they intended to assist the French Government in the war which was too likely to occur, they must say so at once ; or, if they wished for peace, they must send instructions to the Russian Minister at Turin to urge the Sardinian Government to disarm. According to the answer which he had received from the Duc de Montebello, Prince Gortchakoff had, without loss of time, desired the Russian Minister at Turin to inform the Sardinian Government that Russia expected she would accept the principle of disarmament in the cause of peace.

Your Lordship will observe that the French and Russian Governments are still reproducing the question of principle only ; whereas, as I told Count Walewski, nothing but actual disarmament would induce Austria to go into Congress.

Later in the day, I received a second invitation from Count Walewski to go to him, when he informed me that he had been for some time with the Emperor, and that he had been charged by His Majesty to write to the Duke of Malakoff to make the following proposal to Her Majesty's Government :—

“ France will consent to urge Sardinia, by telegraph, to adhere to the principle of disarmament, if England will consent to insist with France for the admission into the Congress of Plenipotentiaries of all the Italian States.

“ France will consent, if it is considered necessary, to regulate the execution of a simultaneous disarmament immediately in London.”

Count Walewski added that the Emperor objected to Military Commissioners being employed, and preferred that the disarmament should be determined by the usual Diplomatic Agents residing at some Court to naming special Commissioners. He had, therefore, proposed London.

His Excellency requested me to convey this proposal to your Lordship. To be quite sure that there should be no future misunderstanding, I took it down in writing at his Excellency's dictation, and I do myself the honour of inclosing a copy of the note I made.

I told Count Walewski that I would lose no time in conveying to your Lordship, by telegraph, the substance of what he had stated to me ; but I asked him whether he had taken any steps at Vienna, since it was evidently there and at Turin that he must act. The question was no longer in our hands. It was Austria that must be reassured.

Count Walewski said that he would write directly to M. de Banneville, and I, on my part, sent a copy to Lord A. Loftus of my telegram to your Lordship, in order that he might make such use of it as he might deem advisable.

On my return home, I found your Lordship's telegram of 12.30

yesterday,* giving me the decision of the Cabinet on the French proposal communicated to your Lordship by the Duke of Malakoff on Saturday last. I went back to Count Walewski, and communicated the contents to him. Of course that proposal is now superseded by the one sent to-day.

(Translation.)

Inclosure. *Proposition.*

FRANCE consents to urge Piedmont strongly, by telegraph, to adhere to the principle of disarmament, if England consents to insist, together with France, that the Italian States be invited to form part of the Congress.

France consents, if it is necessary, to regulate the execution of the simultaneous disarmament, immediately at London, by diplomatic means.

No. 360. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 20.)

Paris, April 19, 1859.

My Lord,—WHILE I was with Count Walewski this morning his Excellency received a telegraphic despatch from Turin, announcing the acceptance by Sardinia of a disarmament previous to the meeting of the Congress. The inclosed is a copy of the words in which this resolution was conveyed to the French Government; and Count Walewski remarked to me that the wording was evidently intended to be disagreeable to France.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

Inclosure. *Telegraphic Despatch from Turin.*

(Translation.)

SINCE France unites itself with England in demanding from Piedmont previous disarmament, the Government of the King, while foreseeing this measure might have disagreeable consequences for the tranquillity of Italy, declares itself ready to submit to it.

No. 361. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 20.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 19, 1859.

COUNT WALEWSKI wishes that the invitations to the Italian States to attend the Congress should be issued from London.

* No. 342.

No. 362. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 20.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 19, 1859.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram dated 11 P.M.* yesterday, stating on what conditions Her Majesty's Government would make a last effort to obtain a Congress. On going to Count Walewski I found his Excellency already in possession of the proposal of Her Majesty's Government through the Duke of Malakoff; but I thought it better to leave in his hands a written paper, containing the heads of the proposal of which your Lordship will find a copy inclosed herewith.

I added verbally, that if this effort failed, Her Majesty's Government had determined on withdrawing from the negotiations.

Count Walewski replied, that he had already informed the Duke of Malakoff that the French Government accepted the proposals of Her Majesty's Government, with the exception of one point. The Emperor objected to the appointment of Military Commissioners. It was repugnant to the French feeling of military honour, and Count Walewski hoped, therefore, it would not be pressed; but that the French offer of regulating the details of disarmament by the Representatives of the Great Powers in London would be adopted. I asked Count Walewski how it was possible that civilians should decide on measures that were purely military; but his Excellency would not admit that this ought to be a difficulty.

Inclosure. *Proposition.*

IMMEDIATE acceptance by the three Powers of an effective and simultaneous disarmament, the details to be carried out previous to the meeting of Congress, by six superior officers acting as Commissioners.

Five Powers to meet in Congress and invite Italian Representatives to attend on the same footing as at Laybach, when they joined and sat in Congress at last.

No. 363. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 20, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Excellency's despatches of the 19th instant,† from the first of which it appears that Count Walewski desires that the invitation to the Italian States to attend the Congress should proceed from London, while, from the second, it seems that his Excellency, though agreeing generally in the last English proposal, as contained in my telegram of the night of the 18th,‡ objected, on the part of the Emperor, to the

* No. 347.

† No. 261, 362.

‡ No. 347.

employment of military men as the Commissioners to settle the details of the disarmament.

On the latter point, as your Excellency will have seen by my despatch of yesterday,* Her Majesty's Government propose that it should be left to the respective Governments to determine whether they shall be represented in the Commission of Disarmament by a civil or military man.

With regard to the first point, I have to acquaint your Excellency that the Duc de Malakoff called on me this morning, and read to me a despatch from Count Walewski, explaining the course followed at Troppau and at Laybach.

It is true that the invitations to the Italian States to be present at the Congress of Laybach were issued from Troppau, but the Congress had already held eight sittings before their Representatives were admitted to take part in it, although, when admitted, they were placed on the same footing as the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government, that in order to avoid giving Austria an opportunity to make further difficulties, it would be better that the Congress should first meet, and then send the invitations to the Italian States. The Commissioners, moreover, on whom it will devolve to settle the details of disarmament, could hardly be empowered to address the invitation to those States to depute Representatives to the Congress. For the Commissioners would be a separate body, and would form no part of the Congress, and it would clearly be anomalous that they should invite the attendance of persons at the Congress, of which they themselves would not be members, while their diplomatic character would be inferior to that of the Plenipotentiaries at the Congress.

I have informed your Excellency, by telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government adopt the definition of "general" as applied to disarmament, instead of specifying the three Powers of Austria, France, and Sardinia. It is clear that, as regards Russia and England, disarmament must be a dead letter, inasmuch as I believe the former has reduced her army, as Her Majesty's Government have also done in regard to that of Great Britain.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 364. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*

(Translation.) April 21, 1859, 8 o'Clock in the Morning.

My dear Count,—It has become impossible to understand the proceedings of Austria. A despatch, which left Paris half-an-hour after midnight, reached me this morning before five o'clock;

* No. 352.

I did not wish to have you awoke, and I transmit it to you at a rather more convenient hour.

"Austria has just addressed a summons to Sardinia; Count Buol having communicated it to the English Minister, you will know its exact terms through Lord Malmesbury.

"To answer in such a manner the mediating proposition of England, accepted by France, Russia, and Prussia, is to take the whole responsibility of the war.

"I hope that the Cabinet of London will look upon it in this light. Report to me what they think of it. Public opinion in England will stigmatize, I hope, the conduct of Austria in this circumstance."

I shall have the honour of waiting upon you, my dear Count, as soon as you express the wish.

Yours, truly.

M. PELISSIER.

No. 365. *The Earl of Malmesbury to the Duke of Malakoff.*

Foreign Office, April 21, 1859.

M. l'Ambassadeur,—I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's confidential servants, in their meeting, this day, have decided upon addressing a strong protest to the Austrian Government upon the course which it proposes to adopt towards Sardinia; while, on the other hand, they have recommended the Sardinian Government to reply to the Austrian summons by an appeal to mediation under the 23rd Protocol of Paris, of April 14, 1856.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 366. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—A MEETING of the Cabinet was held as soon as possible after the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday afternoon, announcing that a summons to Sardinia to disarm had been dispatched from Vienna in the previous night; and, on its breaking up, I desired your Lordship, by telegraph, to acquaint Count Buol that Her Majesty's confidential servants had determined to protest, in the strongest manner, against the step taken by Austria, which they looked upon as inevitably involving the early breaking out of war in Italy.

By this precipitate step the Cabinet of Vienna forfeits all claim upon the support or sympathy of England, whatever may be the consequences that may ensue from it; and Her Majesty's Government see only one means of averting the calamities with which Europe is threatened. That result might possibly be attained if the Austrian Government would declare its readiness to act on

the principle to which its Plenipotentiaries acceded in the Conferences of Paris of 1856, and Her Majesty's Government still cherish the hope that Austria may even now be induced, according to the terms of the 23rd Protocol of the 14th of April, to refer her differences with other Powers to the friendly mediation of an impartial and disinterested ally.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 367. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. West.*

Foreign Office, April 21, 1859.

Sir,—I INFORMED you by telegraph, this morning, that Austria had refused the proposals of Her Majesty's Government, and I desired you to tell Count Cavour that, on Tuesday night, a summons was sent from Vienna to Sardinia, through Count Giulay, calling upon her to disarm, and requiring an answer in three days.

I desired you also to advise Count Cavour to reply to the Austrian summons by proposing, in pursuance of the 23rd Protocol of Paris of 1856, to have recourse to the mediation of a friendly Power; and, still later in the day, I apprized you of the decision taken by Her Majesty's confidential servants, to protest in the strongest manner against the step adopted by Austria, to announce that thereby Austria forfeited all claim to the support and sympathy of England, and to express a hope that Austria, on her part, would also have recourse to mediation, according to the terms of the Paris Protocol.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 368. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—I ACQUAINTED your Excellency by telegraph this afternoon that Her Majesty's confidential servants had determined upon protesting against the step taken by the Cabinet of Vienna in peremptorily calling on Sardinia to disarm; and that Her Majesty's Government had learned with indignation the course adopted by Austria, not only on account of the little regard that she had shown for the propositions which they had pressed upon her acceptance, but also because she had brought the negotiations to so abrupt and violent a conclusion.

I have told your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have advised Sardinia to appeal to the 23rd Protocol of the Conferences of Paris of 1856; but that they could go no further, nor advise her as to whether she should resist or comply with the Austrian summons, as it was their purpose in the present state of affairs to maintain a neutral attitude; and for the same reason I

informed your Excellency that they wished you to abstain from any active interference at the present time.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 369. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—On the morning of Monday the 18th, the Chevalier Massimo d'Azeglio called upon me, in company with the Sardinian Envoy, having arrived in this country on a special mission. I had a lengthened conversation with him, from which it appeared that he was not instructed to make any specific proposition to Her Majesty's Government; but that his object was generally to ascertain the feeling of Her Majesty's Government, and learn whether some further means might not be devised to avoid further complications.

At this interview, I informed him that, as a last resource, Her Majesty's Government would make a final proposition, which I explained to you in my despatch of the 18th instant.*

The Marquis has since informed me that he immediately telegraphed to Count Cavour, detailing to him the proposal which Her Majesty's Government has decided finally to make, and received in reply the assent of the Sardinian Government to an immediate disarmament on the terms communicated to you in my telegram of the 19th instant,† and of which he apprized me on the afternoon of Tuesday the 19th instant.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 370. *Count Buol to Count Karolyi.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by Count Apponyi April 21.)

(Translation.)

Vienna, April 16, 1859.

M. le Comte,—M. DE BALABINE has communicated to me the despatch of Prince Gortchakoff, a copy of which I annex for your private information, and which contains the opinion of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg on the subject of the reservations we have made in agreeing to the proposal of the meeting of a Congress of the Great Powers.

Prince Gortchakoff remarks, as to the desire shown by the Imperial Cabinet that the questions for deliberation should be exactly defined beforehand, that this condition is fulfilled by the four bases which England has proposed, and which have been accepted by Russia, France, and Prussia. The annexed copy of our answer to Lord Augustus Loftus's note relating to it, will

* No. 343.

† No. 352.

inform you, M. le Comte, of the extent to which the Imperial Cabinet has made these proposals its own.

With regard to the conclusions which the Russian despatch attempts to draw from the tenor of the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, relatively to its application to the present case, we regret that we cannot participate in the view of the question taken by the Russian Cabinet. We could not admit that the grave nature of the present situation could put aside as null and void, the first condition mentioned in this Protocol, namely, that deliberations on the internal affairs of other States can only take place on a formal invitation on the part of these latter. If the Imperial Cabinet referred to the stipulations of the Protocol, it was to lay down as a principle that the Congress could take no definitive decision in so far as they concerned the sovereign rights of States not represented, and who had not invited the intervention of the Great Powers.

Whilst admitting that this initiative has not been taken by any of the Italian States, the Imperial Cabinet of Russia seems nevertheless to incline towards their participation in the discussions of the Congress. Now on this point also we cannot share in its opinion. Since none of these States have solicited the meeting of the Congress, and since the latter cannot and will not take any decision which would concern their special rights, we cannot recognise their title to participate in it. We must, on the contrary, decide against an admission which would, moreover, completely alter the nature of the invitation which has been addressed to us by the Cabinet of Russia, and which is expressly limited to the meeting of a Congress of the Great Powers. We think it follows from what we have just advanced, that we should have as little right to insist on their participating in deliberations which have not been solicited by them.

Lastly, Prince Gortchakoff considers as just the proposal that a promise should be obtained respectively from Austria and Sardinia, not to attack one another, and to withdraw their troops to equal distances from the frontier during the meeting of the Congress.

I have had to remark on this subject to the Russian Minister, that the position of Austria cannot be compared to that of Piedmont, and that, abandoning all other considerations, it would be sufficient to give in detail the motives which have determined us to take our present position in Italy, and which cannot be compromised in sole eventuality of a conflict with Piedmont.

We must, in consequence, persist in declaring that the previous disarmament of Sardinia, an act which would have to be accompanied or closely followed by an understanding on the subject of a general disarmament, is a condition which is indispensable for attaining, from the meeting of a Congress, results in conformity with the thoughts which suggested its proposal.

Be so good, M. le Comte, as to express yourself towards Prince

Gortchakoff in the sense of the preceding arguments, and to read this despatch to his Excellency, and give him a copy of it.

Receive, &c.

BUOL.

Inclosure.—*Prince Gortchakoff to M. de Balabine.*

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, March 28, 1858.

Monsieur,—I HAVE submitted to the Emperor the note which M. le Comte Buol addressed to you, dated the 23rd instant, in answer to the proposal which you have been instructed to make to him, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, on the subject of the meeting of a Congress of the Great Powers.

This overture, having for its object an attempt to remove the complications which have arisen in Italy, and to ensure the maintenance of peace, is a new proof which our august Master has been pleased to give of the conciliatory disposition which animates him. His Imperial Majesty has experienced a just satisfaction in seeing that they are appreciated by His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph.

Whilst informing you of the adhesion of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to this proposition, M. le Count de Buol has shown the point of view under which the Cabinet of Vienna regards the conditions necessary to its execution.

He has shown a desire that the questions destined to be submitted for discussion should be exactly defined beforehand. They have so been by the four bases proposed by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty. The Imperial Cabinet, and the Governments of France and Prussia, have given their entire adhesion to it.

M. le Comte de Buol has declared, in addition, that, in so far as these questions may concern the internal arrangements of other States, the Cabinet of Vienna would insist on the proceedings being carried on in conformity with the formal Regulations in the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle of the 15th of November, 1818. This Protocol contains, textually, what follows:—

“When these meetings shall have for their object affairs specially concerning other States of Europe, they can only take place in consequence of a formal invitation on the part of those States whom the said affairs affect, and under the express reservation of their right to take part in them directly, or by their Plenipotentiaries.”

The grave nature of the present situation completely puts aside the first condition mentioned in this Protocol, that of a formal invitation on the part of the Italian States; the Powers are not bound to wait for it before attempting to ward off the perils which menace peace; and we are convinced that the Cabinet of

Vienna itself has not fixed its thoughts upon this idea, when citing the stipulations of Aix-la-Chapelle.

As to the second, the only one to which the mention of this Protocol can refer, that is to say, the participation of the Italian States in a discussion in which they are directly interested, it has appeared to us to be too just for us to put any obstacle in its way.

Lastly, M. le Comte de Buol observes that, to attempt to carry on peaceable deliberations in presence of the sound of arms, and of preparations for war, would be materially dangerous and morally impossible.

This consideration is too evident for the Cabinets not to recognize its justice. It has, consequently, been proposed to obtain from His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, the promise not to attack one another, and to withdraw their respective troops to equal distances from the frontier of the Tessin.

This combination removes, in our opinion, the above-mentioned objection sufficiently for the Congress to meet.

As to the disarmament of Sardinia, previously demanded by M. le Comte Buol, and of which your last telegrams inform us that the Cabinet of Vienna makes a *sine quâ non* condition to its entrance into the Congress, we are inclined to believe that, after a more ripe examination, the Government of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty will themselves perceive that such a condition, excluding all reciprocity, would not be in accordance with an equitable appreciation of the respective positions of the two States.

After what I have stated above, Monsieur, we can assert that the different questions indicated in the note of the Austrian Foreign Minister as indispensable preliminaries to the meeting of a Congress, have been sufficiently explained by the conciliatory spirit with which the Cabinets have regarded them.

The four bases of the deliberations have been laid down and accepted.

The stipulations of Aix-la-Chapelle have been complied with as far as concerns the participation of the Italian Courts.

Lastly, the necessary measures of precaution have been pointed out for avoiding the chance of a conflict between the two armies in presence of one another, during the course of the deliberations.

This previous negotiation, therefore, seems to us sufficiently advanced to prevent any of the Cabinets which have taken part in it, from wishing to assume, in the face of the opinion of Europe and its own conscience, the responsibility of causing to fail, by inadmissible exactions, the work of conciliation in which the Imperial Cabinet has taken the initiative.

The greater part of these arguments are already known to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have transmitted them to you by means of the telegraph, which the urgency of the circumstances has forced us to adopt.

Nevertheless, M. le Comte Buol having testified to you a desire to have a written reply to the note which he has addressed to you, you are authorized, by the order of His Majesty the Emperor, to read this dispatch to him, and to leave him a copy of it.

Receive, &c.

GORTCHAKOFF.

No. 371. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. West.*

Foreign Office, April 22, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE instructed you by telegraph to point out to Count Cavour, that when the Austrian summons was dispatched from Vienna on the night of the 12th instant, the Cabinet of Vienna was not apprized of the consent of Sardinia to general disarmament, the intelligence to that effect having been only sent from hence in the afternoon of the same day.

I have endeavoured to turn this circumstance to the best account at Vienna, at the same time that I have directed Her Majesty's Minister strongly to protest against the proceeding of Austria.

You will further state to Count Cavour that Her Majesty's Government consider that he would do well to reply, as shortly as possible, to the Austrian summons, that the Cabinet of Turin had already agreed, at the request of England, France, and Russia, on the 19th instant, to general disarmament previously to the meeting of the Congress, leaving the details of such disarmament to be settled by Commissioners appointed to meet in London.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 372. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 22).

Paris, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 18th instant,* stating the terms on which Her Majesty's Government would make a final effort to arrive at a Congress, I called on Count Walewski, and after giving him the despatch to peruse, I placed a copy of it in his Excellency's hands.

Count Walewski said that I might at once inform your Lordship that he adhered purely and simply ("purement et simple-

* No. 343.

ment") to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government. He presumed, he added, that the Commission of Disarmament would meet in London.

His Excellency then said that he must remind me that the invitations to the Italian States to attend the Congress at Laybach were issued from Troppau, several weeks previously, and that he understood that the same course could be followed now, and that the invitations to attend at Carlsruhe would be sent from London. I requested his Excellency not to raise this point, but to keep to the precise terms of your Lordship's proposal; otherwise we might find ourselves involved in fresh discussions, if, as I sincerely hoped, the other Powers were to accept your Lordship's programme.

Count Walewski replied at once that he would say no more on the subject.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 373. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 22).

(Extract.)

Paris, April 21, 1859.

THE intelligence that the Austrian Government had addressed a summons to the Sardinian Government to disarm, and to disband the free corps in the Sardinian service within a delay of three days, reached Count Walewski last night. I saw his Excellency this morning, when he told me that orders had been immediately sent to Toulon, to embark the troops in that neighbourhood, so as to be ready to put to sea for Genoa at a moment's notice.

Further orders had been sent to concentrate a division in the neighbourhood of Briançon, to be ready to march without delay; but the French Government did not intend, his Excellency added, that the one should sail, or the other should march, until events had assumed a more definite shape.

I put some questions to his Excellency, with the view of ascertaining the state of preparation of the French army, when he stated, that when the orders were once issued, 30,000 men could be at Genoa within two days; and that in less than a fortnight 100,000 men could be in Piedmont. The weather, however, is still so bad in the neighbourhood of Briançon, that no movement can take place there for the present. At this moment, Count Walewski said that there are but five ships at Toulon capable of conveying troops, and he mentioned all these circumstances to show how little truth there was in the reports of French armaments.

I said to his Excellency that small as must now be the hopes of preventing hostilities, it was still our duty, if, as I hoped, he was

yet desirous of peace, to give such advice for the action of the Sardinian Government as would enable Austria to draw back at the last moment rather than push matters to extremities, and that it seemed to me that the Sardinian Government should be recommended to answer Austria that they had, two days ago, expressed to the Representatives of the four Powers, their acquiescence in a disarmament previous to the assembling of the Congress. They should be advised not to discuss any conditions with Austria, but simply to say that the conditions would be settled by the Commission to which they had agreed.

Count Walewski replied that he had already instructed the French Minister at Turin to act in the sense I had suggested.

I ventured, further, to express the hope that Count Walewski would not, by anything like a menace, or by asking explanations at Vienna, increase the excitement and irritation which already prevailed there, and thus diminish the slender chances of an arrangement which yet remained. His Excellency replied that he quite coincided in that opinion.

It does not appear from the telegram sent me by Lord Augustus Loftus, or from that received by Count Walewski from M. de Banneville, whether Count Buol has formally refused your Lordship's last propositions, and Count Walewski has consequently instructed M. de Banneville to ascertain and report how this matter stands.

No. 374. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 22.)

Paris, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Moniteur" of this day, an article containing the proposals made by Her Majesty's Government to the four Powers.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

Inclosure.—*Extract from the Moniteur of April 21, 1859.*

(Translation).

Paris, April 20, 1859.

THE Government of Her Britannic Majesty has made the following propositions to the four Powers:—

1. That, as a preliminary, a general and simultaneous disarmament should be effected.

2. That this disarmament should be arranged by a Military or

Civil Commission, independent of the Congress. This Commission should be composed of six Commissioners; one for each of the Five Powers, and the sixth for Sardinia.

3. That as soon as this Commission should be assembled, and should have commenced its task, the Congress should assemble in its turn, and proceed to the discussion of political questions.

4. That the Representatives of the Italian States should be invited by the Congress, immediately on its assembly, to sit with the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, absolutely in the same manner as at the Congress of Laybach in 1821.

France, Russia, and Prussia have adhered to the propositions of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty.

No. 375. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Apr. 22.)

Paris, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—AN Extraordinary Council was summoned at the Tuileries this afternoon. The question of armaments, and of the measures to be taken to go to the assistance of Sardinia, were discussed, and it was decided that as many troops as possible should be sent by sea, and that 50,000 men should at once be ordered to Genoa.

In this passage the steamers of the Messageries Impériales have been taken up, and it is calculated that in about ten days' time the whole 50,000 will have been landed at Genoa.

If matters are not arranged, it is intended to send two corps d'armée into Piedmont, the one under the command of Marshal Canrobert, the other under that of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers. The Emperor will take the chief command himself.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 376. *Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Duke of Malakoff, April 22.)

(Translation.)

Paris, April 21, 1859.

M. le Maréchal,—THE English Ambassador came yesterday to communicate to me a despatch from Lord Malmesbury having for

its object, as you will see by the inclosed copy, to propose to us the four following points:—

1. There should be effected, as a preliminary, a general and simultaneous disarmament.

2. This disarmament should be arranged by a Military or Civil Commission, independent of the Congress, and composed of six members; one for each of the Five Great Powers, and the sixth for Sardinia.

3. As soon as this Commission should be assembled, and should have commenced its task, the Congress should assemble in its turn, and proceed to the discussion of political questions.

4. The Representatives of the Italian States should be invited by the Congress, as soon as it shall be assembled, to sit with the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, absolutely in the same manner as at the Congress of Laybach in 1821.

As I had the honour to state to you, in begging you to inform thereof the Principal Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Government of the Emperor has not hesitated to adhere to this proposition.

Thus, M. le Maréchal, after having already shown proof of the most conciliatory dispositions in the affair of the disarmament, we have now in deferring to the wish of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, given a new pledge of our sincere desire to facilitate, as far as depends on us, the understanding of the Powers, and the assembly of a Congress. We are informed that the Courts of Prussia and Russia give, likewise, their assent to this arrangement, and there remains to be known only the answer of Austria.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty will appreciate, we cannot doubt, the eagerness we have shown to acquiesce in its proposal, as we ourselves appreciate the new step which it has taken to bring together the Powers, and to hasten the opening of negotiations. In the present state of things, it remains established that difficulties do not come from us; and we can, in all sincerity, join in the sentiment which the Principal Secretary of State expresses at the end of his despatch to the English Ambassador, and of which the Earl of Derby has made himself the organ in the House of Lords. We can say, with the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, that a great responsibility would fall upon the Power who, without provocation, and without absolute necessity, should bring upon Europe the calamities of a long and sanguinary war.

I request you to read this despatch to the Earl of Malmesbury, and to leave him a copy of it.

Accept, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 377. *Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff.*—(*Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Duke of Malakoff, April 22.*)

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, April 22, 1859, 7.50 A.M.

THE "Moniteur" of to-day contains the following article:—

"Paris, April 21.—Austria has not adhered to the proposition made by England, and accepted by France, Russia, and Prussia; furthermore, it would appear that the Cabinet of Vienna has resolved to address a direct communication to the Cabinet of Turin, to obtain the disarmament of Sardinia. In presence of these facts, the Emperor has ordered the concentration of several divisions on the frontier of Piedmont.

No. 378. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 22, 1859.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna.*

You will perceive that I have desired him to ask Count Buol whether Austria will agree to the admission of the Representatives of the Italian States as mere Delegates, and not as Plenipotentiaries, which is a modification of the fourth point proposed by Her Majesty's Government on the 18th instant, and will also accept the first three points in that proposal, relating to disarmament to be effected by Commissioners and to the meeting of the Congress when those Commissioners have commenced their labours.

I wish your Lordship to ascertain whether the Prussian Government would be willing to accept the above-mentioned modification of the fourth point, and would consent that the Italian States should be merely represented by Delegates.

* No. 380.

No. 379. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's Government thinking it important to ascertain whether the Austrian Government, previously to sending off the summons to Sardinia to disarm, were aware of the fact of Sardinia having already consented to do so, I asked your Lordship the question yesterday evening; and it now appears by the telegram that I received from you this morning that they were at the time ignorant of that fact.

It seems, too, that Count Buol has informed the French Chargé d'Affaires that Austria accepted only the first three conditions proposed by Her Majesty's Government, and accepted in their entirety by the other three Powers, which related to general disarmament, the means by which the details of it should be carried out, and the meeting of the Congress when the Commission of Disarmament had entered upon its duties; but refused the last, which provided for the invitation of the Italian Powers to take part in the Congress as they did at Laybach, and it also appears that the summons addressed to Sardinia terminates with a declaration that, if Sardinia refused to comply with it, that refusal would impose upon Austria the painful necessity of having recourse to hostilities.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 380. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE acquainted you by the telegraph with the strong feeling of indignation against Austria which prevails in London, in consequence of its having become known that, at the very time that Austria had summoned Sardinia to disarm under penalty of immediate hostilities in case of refusal, Sardinia had actually agreed unconditionally to disarm. Your Lordship's language, therefore, to Count Buol, cannot be too strong in regard to the course adopted by Austria.

Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to imagine on what grounds the Cabinet of Vienna can justify this menace of invasion of Sardinia, now that she has agreed to disarm. It cannot, surely, be justified on the ground of the admission of the Representatives of Italian States to the Congress; for the Austrian Government was itself a consenting party to the admission of them in a certain character, and it is monstrous to suppose that a change in that character, whatever it might be, even supposing it were insisted upon, could warrant Austria in taking the fatal step of an invasion.

Her Majesty's Government feel, after all that has passed, that they are entitled to expect to be informed on this point; and, in

order to bring the question to an immediate issue, you will ask Count Buol whether Austria will stop the march of her armies, and will agree to the admission of the Representatives of the Italian States as mere Delegates, and not as Plenipotentiaries, and will also accept the first three points in my proposals of the 18th instant, relating to disarmament to be effected by Commissioners, and to the meeting of the Congress when those Commissioners have commenced their labours.

You will give Count Buol clearly to understand that the refusal of Austria will enlist against her the feelings of the Government and of all classes in this country.

You will add that, in making this proposal, Her Majesty's Government assume that if Austria should agree to it, the military operations now in progress in France would at once be arrested.

As regards, however, the question of Sardinian disarmament, I have to observe that Her Majesty's Government still consider it impossible to call upon the Cabinet of Turin at once to disperse the Free Corps, as such a measure would, in all probability, lead to a revolutionary movement in Italy. The wisest course would be to keep them together for awhile under the Alps, and to effect their disbandment gradually.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 381. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I INSTRUCTED your Lordship by my telegram which I sent off early this afternoon, to ascertain from Count Buol whether he would accept the specific modification of the fourth point in the proposals made by Her Majesty's Government on the 18th instant,* which is stated in my telegram, and which I have explained at greater length in my preceding despatch of this day; and I now wish you to inquire whether his Excellency, if he will not accept that modification, will agree to any, and what further modification of the point in question. He has already agreed to the admission of Italian Representatives in some character or other.

Your Lordship will also observe to the Austrian Minister, that as Sardinia has unconditionally accepted general disarmament, it is now, to all intents and purposes, useless and offensive to summon her to disarm.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

* No. 347.

No. 382. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith the draft of a note which you will address immediately to Count Buol, on the subject of the summons which has been sent by Austria to Sardinia, requiring her to disarm under penalty of immediate war.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

Inclosure.—*Draft of Note to be presented to Count Buol by Lord A. Loftus.*

Vienna, April , 1859.

THE Undersigned, &c., having apprized Her Majesty's Government, by the telegraph, of the communication made to him by Count Buol, &c., on the 20th instant, that a formal demand had, on the previous day, been sent through General Giulay to the Cabinet of Turin, requiring that Sardinia should disarm, he has been instructed to address to his Excellency the following observations in reply :—

Her Majesty's Government from the commencement of the painful discussions on the affairs of Italy, in which the Governments of Austria, France, and Sardinia, have for some time been engaged, have earnestly endeavoured to promote a good understanding between the respective parties, and, although having themselves no direct interest in the question at issue, they have spared no pains to avert the consequences of a protracted difference of opinion between Powers with whom Great Britain has long been connected by bonds of amity and alliance.

With this view, Her Majesty's Government did not hesitate, in the month of February last, to depute, on a confidential mission to the Court of Vienna, one of the ablest and most distinguished servants of the British Crown, who, from the position which he occupied as Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of France, no less than from personal acquaintance with the Minister charged with the conduct of the foreign relations of Austria, appeared to be eminently qualified for the delicate commission with which he was entrusted. This task was, to ascertain whether any basis could be established for the settlement of the various points which the existing state of things in Italy invested with peculiar importance.

The Undersigned need not remind Count Buol of the details of what passed between his Excellency and Earl Cowley ; but it is enough for him to say that Her Majesty's Government were much gratified with the disposition shown by the Cabinet of Vienna to lend itself to an amicable settlement of Italian questions, and were induced to hope that the explanations which Her Majesty's

Ambassador, on his return to Paris, would be able to give to the French Government as to the policy of Austria, would much facilitate the resumption of cordial and friendly intercourse between the respective Governments.

It would be equally superfluous for the Undersigned to explain to Count Buol the process by which any good effects that might have arisen directly from Earl Cowley's intervention were apparently neutralized; but Count Buol could not have failed to recognize, in the four points to which Her Majesty's Government proposed to confine the deliberations of the Congress, which the Great Powers were invited by Russia to hold on the affairs of Italy, the same principles which had been in discussion between his Excellency and Count Buol, and which Her Majesty's Government had every reason to suppose were fully acquiesced in by the Cabinet of Vienna.

The Great Powers of Europe, including Austria, successively accepted the bases propounded by Her Majesty's Government. They agreed, moreover, in the principles that the several States of Italy should be admitted to send Representatives to be heard at the Congress, and that a general disarmament should form part of the measures for the settlement of the affairs of Italy.

Count Buol will do Her Majesty's Government the justice to admit that they have shown no indisposition to defer, as far as was compatible with the maintenance of the general principles on which the Congress was convened, to any representations that may have been made by the Austrian Government. It has been only when Austria has insisted upon conditions in respect to the disarmament of Sardinia without any equivalent security, and to the disbandment of the free corps enrolled in that country, which appeared to Her Majesty's Government to be not only unjust in the former case, and in the latter dangerous to the tranquillity of Italy, that Her Majesty's Government expressed themselves decidedly opposed to the demands of Austria, and urged their modification.

The Undersigned is not instructed to enter into details as to the various hues which for some time past the discussions in regard to disarmament have assumed, and as to the unnecessary delays which have been interposed, to the extreme disappointment of Her Majesty's Government, who were anxious that no impediment should exist to the meeting of the Congress on the appointed day.

But the Undersigned is instructed to press upon Count Buol the fact that within the last few days an agreement was arrived at among the Great Powers for a general disarmament, and that on the 19th instant Sardinia expressed her readiness to agree also to disarm, without insisting any longer on the condition that she should be admitted, in common with the Great Powers, to take part in the Congress.

Her Majesty's Government had, however, in the meanwhile, come to the conclusion that some of the difficulties which impeded the meeting of the Congress might be removed if the original understanding as to the position which the Italian States should occupy before the Congress were departed from, and those States should all be invited, as at the Congress of Laybach in 1821, to sit in Congress by their Representatives on the same footing with the Great Powers of Europe.

The Governments of France, Prussia, and Russia coincided in this view of the case; but Austria has declined to adhere to the proposition to that effect which the Undersigned, by order of his Government, has communicated to Count Buol.

Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government have received, with equal disappointment and surprise, the intimation which Count Buol has given to the Undersigned of the peremptory demand which his Excellency appears to have addressed to the Prime Minister of Sardinia for the disarmament of the forces and for the disbandment of the Free Corps recently enrolled in that country.

The Undersigned is instructed to say that Her Majesty's Government look forward with dismay to the consequences of this precipitate measure on the part of Austria, wholly uncalled for as it is by the circumstances of the present time. Sardinia has yielded to the representations made by other Powers, and has agreed to disarm; and this deplorable act on the part of Austria is calculated, by wounding the natural pride of the Sardinian nation, to compel the Cabinet of Turin to retract its consent to a measure which has been insisted upon by its allies as the surest method of averting the impending interruption of the general peace, and of enabling the Powers of Europe to decide in Congress upon the arrangements best calculated to ensure the tranquillity of Italy and the happiness of its populations.

It may be, indeed, that when the summons was dispatched to Turin, the Cabinet of Vienna was not aware that Sardinia had consented unconditionally to disarm; and if that be so, Her Majesty's Government would fain hope that that summons would at once be recalled; otherwise the reproach will attach to Austria that the armaments of Sardinia were not the only cause of her jealousy and distrust, even to the extent of provoking her to war, but that another feeling urged her to have recourse to the step that she has now taken; that feeling being a determination to resist the appearance, at the Congress, of a Sardinian Plenipotentiary on an equal footing not only with the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers, but with the Representatives of the States of the rest of Italy. The Government of Austria has expressed its concurrence in the propriety of inviting the Italian States to send Representatives to be present, in some character or other, at the

Congress ; and Her Majesty's Government can hardly suppose that it would be prepared to encounter the desperate extremity of war rather than allow a Sardinian Representative to sit in the Congress on the same footing with the Representative of Austria.

Be that as it may, Her Majesty's Government can only now deal with the case as it is presented before them, namely, that Austria has peremptorily summoned Sardinia to disarm, under penalty of immediate war ; and the Undersigned is directed to say, that Her Majesty's Government feel it due to themselves, and to the great interests of humanity which they have so earnestly striven to uphold, and also to those who have aided them in their endeavours, solemnly to record their protest against the course that Austria, regardless of the terrible consequences to Europe, and indifferent to the public opinion of the world, has so rashly, and, as Her Majesty's Government believe, so unjustly, adopted. They assign to Austria, and fix upon her, the last responsibility for all the miseries and calamities inevitably consequent on a conflict which was on the eve of being averted, but which, once begun, will infallibly produce a more than ordinary amount of social suffering and political convulsion.

The Undersigned, &c.

No. 383. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Lordship stated in your telegram of the 22nd instant that Count Buol had apprized the French Chargé d'Affaires that the Cabinet of Vienna agreed to the first three points specified in the proposals made by Her Majesty's Government on the 18th of this month, but refused to comply with the last, respecting the representation of the Italian States at the Congress.

I have now to instruct your Lordship to ask Count Buol, as a final question, whether the above statement is correct ; and, if so, whether the Austrian Government refuses its consent to the admission of the Italian States, including Sardinia, in any form whatever to the Congress.

Should Count Buol not do so, then your Lordship will inquire in what form the Cabinet of Vienna proposes that the Representatives of the Italian States should be admitted.

Your Lordship will say that Her Majesty's Government require an official answer to their proposal of the 18th instant, and, as soon as you receive it, you will forward it to me by telegraph, and explaining what status, if any, Count Buol will allow the

Italian States, if he agrees to their being received under any form at all at the Congress.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 384. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to acquaint your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government have considered the suggestion made by Count Buol, and reported in your telegram of yesterday afternoon, that if Sardinia should disarm, all further questions should be settled on the basis of the four points, by direct negotiation, between Austria and France, and under the mediation of England.

It appears that the Austrian Government, though refusing to listen to mediation between Austria and Sardinia, is not indisposed to accept mediation between Austria and France, according to the tenor of the 23rd Protocol of the Conferences of Paris in 1856.

I have informed you by the telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government are ready to renew and continue the course of mediation between Austria and France which was begun by Lord Cowley, and interrupted by the proposal of Russia that the settlement of the Italian question should be deliberated upon in a Congress held by the Five Great Powers. Her Majesty's Government, however, can only consent to do this, on the understanding that their intervention shall be exercised in the same manner as at that time, and Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to demand, or even to ask, Sardinia to disarm alone, while the other Powers should remain armed, and Sardinia be totally excluded from any part in such a mediation, as far as her direct interests are concerned.

If she were required to disarm, and, the mediation having failed, the antagonists resumed their present positions, Sardinia would be helpless for defence, and Great Britain would be exposed to the degrading suspicion of having been party to a political fraud.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 385. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE seen the Austrian and Prussian Ministers this afternoon, but as I have stated to you by telegraph, I am unable to understand from the language which they held, and they seemed themselves uncertain, whether, if Her Majesty's Government should agree to renew the mediation between France and Austria, which was commenced by Lord Cowley at Vienna, Austria will, nevertheless, insist upon the previous and sole disarmament of Sardinia; or whether she only looks to such a general

disarmament as it was contemplated should be effected before the meeting of the Congress.

The telegram which I received from you this morning seems to intimate that Sardinia is alone to be required to disarm ; but Her Majesty's Government can be no party to any such arrangement. They are ready, however, in the event of its being determined that Austria, France, and Sardinia should all disarm, or should all remain armed and *in statu quo*, to undertake mediation between France and Austria ; and in that case it would remain for France at once to make this arrangement with Sardinia, and hereafter to negotiate with Sardinia with reference to any questions which may arise out of the negotiations between France and Austria, carried on under the mediation of England.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 386. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 23.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, April 21, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of an article which appeared this morning in the "Preussische Zeitung," the Government organ, stating that the uncertain state of things in Italy had induced the Government to prepare this force for defensive purposes, and that it is their intention immediately to invite the German Diet to call out the Federal Contingents of the different States.

It is calculated that the force now called out by the Prince Regent of Prussia will produce in effective numbers 40,000 men and 10,000 horses, and it is supplied from the 3rd, 7th, and 8th Corps, which are stationed in Brandenburg, Westphalia, and the Rhine.

Inclosure.—*Extract from the Preussische Zeitung of April 21, 1859.*

(Translation.)

THE uninterrupted efforts of the mediating Powers for the maintenance of peace, threatened as it is by the complications in the Italian question, have unfortunately hitherto not had the desired effect ; for the hope entertained of the meeting of the intended Congress of the European Powers for the solving of that question, becomes less and less, since an essential condition of the peaceful proposals, the disarmament of the opposing Powers, notwithstanding the numerous negotiations concerning the form in which it has been proposed, has not been attained.

During the efforts at mediation which Prussia was especially called upon to make, as a joint signer of the Treaty of Vienna, and from the very friendly footing on which it stands with all the States concerned, her Government has not, for one moment, been

unheedful of those duties which her position as a German Power of the Confederation imposes on her. Well knowing the loss of time which the organization of the Diet necessarily entails in its defensive arrangements, the Prussian Government has already taken the precautionary measures for this purpose, as well as having most cordially co-operated with those from time to time proposed.

In the meantime, as the position of affairs has assumed the most serious character, the Prussian Government, after mature consideration, considers that it is now the time to propose to the Diet a common measure in the interests of its security, preceding it by calling out the reserves of the three corps d'armée ("Kriegsbereitschaft").

In giving this order, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent was guided by an earnest wish of timely co-operation, for the credit and dignity of the Diet, amidst the universal preparations in the neighbouring States, and by a wish to place it in a position to act energetically for its security and defence, if events should place it in danger.

The calling out of the reserves of the three corps d'armée ("Kriegsbereitschaft"), destined as Prussia's contingent to the Diet, as well as the request of the Prussian Minister at the Diet for a similar preparation (Bereitschaft) of the other contingents of the Diet, has merely that end in view which corresponds with the defensive character of the Diet, and is entirely free from any aggressive signification; for Prussia firmly adheres, as before, to her position as a mediating Power, in the solution of the pending European question, as well in her own interests as in that of her German allies.

While she has regarded with satisfaction and gratitude the exertions of the latter during the present crisis, she can on her part feel assured, both with reference to the measure just taken and to the proposition made to the Diet, of the consent and confidence of Germany.

But at home His Majesty's Government will, it is sure, see the conviction every day become more firm, that its steps are guided by the most conscientious considerations; and that, more than ever, in cases which involve the maintenance of the most important and sacred interests of Germany. Neither the Crown nor the country will shrink from any sacrifice in defence of these.

With such readiness for self-sacrifice, and at the same time with the consciousness of the existence of most complete harmony between the Crown and the country, Prussia will await with firm confidence the approach of any eventuality.

No. 387. *Captain Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 23.)

Berne, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Swiss Federal Government have received from that of France the following answer to their circular note of the 4th March,* respecting the neutral territory:—

“En accusant réception de la communication qui lui a été faite, le Ministre déclare rendre toute justice aux sentiments qui ont inspiré cette mesure, et il se plaît à espérer que les dispositions des autres Puissances n’étant pas moins favorables que celles du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l’Empereur au respect et au maintien de la neutralité Helvétique, le droit qui la consacre ne saurait en aucun cas courir ne danger.”†

I have, &c.

E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 388. *Captain Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 23.)

Berne, April 20, 1859.

My Lord,—My Sardinian colleague, M. Jocteau, has just called on me, and informed me that he this day delivered the answer from his Government to the circular note of the Swiss Federal Council, dated March 14, respecting the neutrality of Switzerland, and the occupation of the neutral territory.

The Sardinian Minister repeated to me the substance of the answer, which is couched in nearly the same language as that of the other Powers.

He further informed me that the Federal Council had proposed, and that he had been instructed to accept, the proposition that Commissioners appointed by Sardinia and Switzerland should meet either at Turin, Berne, or Geneva, to arrange the details of the mode in which the neutral territory shall be occupied by the troops of the Swiss Confederation, in the event of the neutrality of Switzerland being threatened.

M. Jocteau said that the Federal Council did not consider that this last contingency would be involved by the passage of troops on the Victor Emmanuel Railway.

In my despatch, dated March 7,‡ I had the honour to make known to your Lordship the reasons stated to me by the President of the Swiss Confederation, why his Government would not

* No. 123.

† (Translation.)—“In acknowledging the receipt of the communication which has been made to him, the Minister declares that he renders entire justice to the sentiments which have inspired this measure, and he cherishes the hope that the dispositions of the other powers, not being less favourable than those of the Government of His Majesty the Emperor, in regard to, respect for, and the maintenance of, Swiss neutrality, the public law which consecrates it cannot in any case run any danger.”

‡ No. 102.

oppose the passage of troops by that portion of the railway which traverses this extreme part of the neutral territory.

I have, &c.

E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 389. *Count Buol to Count Apponyi.*—(*Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by Count Apponyi, April 23.*)

(Translation.)

Vienna, April 20, 1859.

M. le Comte,—LORD A. LOFTUS has read to me, and given me a copy of, the despatch of Lord Malmesbury, of which I have the honour to transmit to you the text inclosed.

This document is intended as an answer to the note which I addressed to Lord A. Loftus, dated the 31st of last March.

The Earl of Malmesbury declares that he is unable to accept the interpretation given by me to the four bases of discussion proposed by England, or rather, that he cannot undertake the task of confining the discussion on these four points to the limits traced by us.

In his opinion, such a restriction would impose unusual restraints on the liberty of judgment of the Plenipotentiaries, and would prejudice their decisions.

This tendency was not sought by us. We have only aimed to prepare the way to the final understanding, by occupying ourselves in defining more exactly that which was vague and indefinite in the four points as they were expressed. To attempt to agree beforehand on the starting-points of a discussion, is to obtain one more chance of a definitive agreement between the deliberating parties. We see, with regret, that this chance has escaped us; but we believe ourselves none the less to have performed an act of loyalty and frankness, in allowing no doubt to exist about the limits which the Imperial Government on its part cannot pass in deliberations, the initiative in which does not belong to them, and to which they have only consented under certain reservations.

As to the fifth point of discussion proposed by us, and relating to the disarmament of the Great Powers, Lord Malmesbury is ready to unite with all the other Powers in its acceptance and in its satisfactory solution. This question, moreover, has entered into a new phase by the telegraphic communications of a more recent date.

As far as concerns the result of the offer of Great Britain to insist conjointly with France, on the disarmament of Sardinia, Lord Malmesbury declares that, in the intention of the British Government, the exhortation to be addressed to the Cabinet of Turin to obtain the disarmament, was to be accompanied by a

collective guarantee, which would have been given to it by England and France, against an attack on the part of Austria. The French Government having declined to take part in this guarantee, and the British proposal having consequently remained unexecuted, Lord Malmesbury does not agree with us in the justice of a summons which we should address directly to Sardinia, to induce her immediately to adopt the peace establishment.

My despatch of the 12th instant, which your Excellency has communicated to Lord Malmesbury, having crossed that of the British Cabinet which is the subject of our analysis, we hope that, from the details contained in our despatch, his Lordship will derive the conviction that the right of legitimate defence fully authorizes us to obtain, by all the means in our power, the disarmament of a bordering State which has placed itself in a state of open and permanent aggression against us.

You will be so good, M. le Comte, as to read this despatch to Lord Malmesbury, and give him a copy of it, if he desires it.

Receive, &c.

BUOL.

No. 390. *Count Buol to Count Apponyi.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by Count Apponyi, April 23.)

(Translation.)

Vienna, April 20, 1859.

M. le Comte,—By my despatch of the 12th instant, which your Excellency has communicated to Lord Malmesbury, the British Government has been informed of the motives which suggested to the Emperor, our August Master, the resolution of making a final effort to obtain, by means of a direct summons, the placing on the peace footing of the Sardinian army.

In order to carry out this decision, I addressed to Count Cavour the letter of which I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy inclosed.

Whilst insisting on the immediate disarmament of the Sardinian Government, which has openly assumed an attitude of permanent aggression towards us, we still do not consider as retracted our proposal of proceeding, at the same time, by a joint agreement in the re-establishment of a peace footing on the part of all the Powers who have made extraordinary armaments. It should, however, be well understood, that the negotiations for bringing about this latter result can neither arrest nor modify the course which we have marked out for ourselves with regard to Sardinia.

The consent to the execution of the general immediate disarma-

ment would only have, in our eyes, the value of an effective proof of the pacific sentiments of all other Powers, in so far as it is not attached to conditions which it is already known, by our previous and reiterated declarations, we cannot admit.

Of this number would be the admission of Sardinia to the deliberations of the Congress, on whatever pretension she might found her claim.

What we have accepted is the invitation to a Congress of the Five Powers. On this subject we have referred to the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, to point out that, the Italian Governments having in no way demanded the intervention of the Great Powers in their internal affairs, these Powers would not be authorized to take, on this subject, decisions obligatory on independent States not represented at the Congress, and having no right to be so.

To invite these States to the Congress would essentially alter the nature of the proposal which has been addressed to us by the Court of St. Petersburg, and to which we have only agreed in the conviction that its basis would not be altered. The Government of Her Britannic Majesty has, from the beginning, shared in our opinion so far as to be unwilling to allow the Italian States to sit in the Congress, although of opinion that they should be invited to send Delegates to it in a consultative character.

All that we, on our part, have agreed to, and which we still adhere to, is that the Italian Governments, if they consider it suitable, should send agents in an unofficial character, to the seat of the Congress.

For still stronger reasons, we could not but reject any combination destined to open to the Cabinet of Turin the access to the Congress, since it is notorious that this Cabinet has, in its last public manifestoes, raised, with incomparable audacity, pretensions entirely incompatible, either with the dignity and sovereign rights of our august Master the Emperor, or with these which His Majesty exercises in virtue of European Treaties.

I invite your Excellency to read this despatch to Lord Malmesbury, and give him a copy of it.

Receive, &c.

BUOL.

Inclosure. *Count Buol to Count Cavour.*

(Translation.)

Vienna. April 19, 1859.

THE Imperial Government, as your Excellency is aware, has hastened to accede to the proposal of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to assemble a Congress of the Five Powers with the view to remove the complications which have arisen in Italy.

Convinced, however, of the impossibility to enter, with any

chance of success, upon pacific deliberations in the midst of the noise of arms, and of preparations for war carried on in a neighbouring country, we have demanded the placing on a peace footing of the Sardinian army, and the disbanding of the free corps, or Italian volunteers, previously to the meeting of the Congress.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government finds this condition so just, and so consonant with the exigencies of the situation, that it did not hesitate to adopt it, at the same time declaring itself to be ready, in conjunction with France, to insist on the immediate disarmament of Sardinia, and to offer her in return a collective guarantee against any attack on our part, to which, of course, Austria would have done honour.

The Cabinet of Turin seems only to have answered, by a categorical refusal to the invitation to put her army on a peace footing, and to accept the collective guarantee which was offered her. This refusal inspires us with regrets, so much the more deep, that if the Sardinian Government had consented to the testimony of pacific sentiments which was demanded of her, we should have accepted it as a first symptom of her intention to assist, on her side, in bringing about an improvement in the relations between the two countries which have unfortunately been in such a state of tension for some years past. In that case it would have been permitted us to furnish, by the breaking up of the Imperial troops stationed in the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, another proof that they were not assembled for the purpose of aggression against Sardinia.

Our hope having been hitherto deceived, the Emperor, my august Master, has ordered me to make directly a last effort to cause the Sardinian Government to reconsider the decision which it seems to have resolved on. Such is the object of this letter.

I have the honour to entreat your Excellency to take its contents into your most serious consideration, and to let me know if the Royal Government consents, yes or no, to put its army on a peace footing without delay, and to disband the Italian volunteers.

The bearer of this letter, to whom, M. le Comte, you will be so good as to give your answer, is ordered to hold himself at your disposition to this effect for three days.

Should he receive no answer at the expiration of this term, or should this answer not be completely satisfactory, the responsibility of the grave events which this refusal would entail would fall entirely on His Sardinian Majesty's Government.

After having exhausted in vain all conciliatory means to procure for these populations the guarantee of peace, on which the Emperor has a right to insist, His Majesty will be obliged, to his great regret, to have recourse to the force of arms to obtain it.

In the hope that the answer which I solicit of your Excellency will be congenial to our wishes for the maintenance of peace, I seize, &c.

BUOL.

No. 891. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 23.)

Paris, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the “*Moniteur*” of this day, an announcement of the non-adhesion of Austria to the proposal made by Her Majesty’s Government, and accepted by France, Russia, and Prussia, and of the orders of the Emperor for the concentration of troops on the Piedmontese frontier.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

Inclosure.—*Extract from the “Moniteur” of April 22, 1859.*

(Translation.)

Paris, April 21, 1859.

AUSTRIA has not adhered to the proposition made by England, and accepted by France, Russia, and Prussia.

Moreover, it would appear, that the cabinet of Vienna has resolved to address a direct communication to the Cabinet of Turin, to obtain the disarmament of Sardinia.

In the presence of these facts, the Emperor has ordered the concentration of several divisions on the frontiers of Piedmont.

No. 392. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 23.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 22, 1859.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship’s telegram* of 6.40 p.m. yesterday, I called this afternoon on Count Walewski, and informed him that it was the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to protest, in the strongest manner, against the step taken by Austria in the threatened invasion of Sardinian territory, and that you still hope that she will be actuated by the 23rd Protocol of the Congress of Paris, by accepting mediation.

I then inquired of Count Walewski whether he had any intelligence from Vienna or elsewhere.

* No. 367.

His Excellency replied that M. de Banneville had had a lengthened interview with Count Buol yesterday, at which he had inquired of the Austrian Minister whether the Austrian Government had accepted the four points contained in the last proposal of the British Government, and that Count Buol had replied that the three first were accepted, but not the last. On M. de Banneville's expostulating with Count Buol, the latter replied that it was the Emperor's decision that His Majesty had declared that he would never permit a Plenipotentiary of Austria to sit with a Plenipotentiary of Sardinia.

Count Buol having been asked by M. de Banneville whether he was aware that Sardinia had agreed to a preliminary disarmament when the summons to Sardinia was dispatched, replied in the negative; but he observed that it did not much signify, as Sardinia had only to reply that she had already assured the Four Powers of her consent to an immediate disarmament.

M. de Banneville states himself to be convinced that Austria is determined on war.

The intelligence from Turin is to the effect that the Sardinian Government will reply to Count Buol by informing him of the engagement given to the Four Powers to disarm, provided the language of the summons is such as will permit the Sardinian Government to do so without dishonour.

From Berlin, Count Walewski hears that it was known to the Prussian Government that the summons was to be addressed to the Sardinian Government, so that the Austrian army might commence the campaign on the 1st of May. The step has been hastened for some reason not known at Berlin.

The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg writes word that Count Buol, in apprizing M. Balabine of the intentions of the Austrian Government, added the expression of an expectation that the step taken by the Emperor would not lead to war. Prince Gortchakoff has addressed a very strong remonstrance to the Austrian Cabinet, throwing on them the responsibility of all the consequences which may attend the aggressive position assumed by Austria.

Here matters remain in the same state as when I had the honour to address your Lordship yesterday. Another meeting of the Council is to take place this afternoon, and the Legislative Body has been summoned for an extraordinary sitting on Monday next, to receive a communication from the Government, when both men and money will probably be asked for. I understand that it is the Emperor's intention to arm upon a very large scale.

No. 393. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 23.)

Paris, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Germanic Confederation is called upon, for the first time since its institution, to exercise a considerable influence in a great European question, and France feels that her action may be very much paralyzed in the Adriatic, if, by abstaining from attacking federal territory, she attempts to ensure the neutrality of the Confederation. The whole question is under the consideration of the French Government.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 394. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*¹

Foreign Office, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Excellency will have received, direct from Lord Augustus Loftus, an account of a suggestion* thrown out by Count Buol for a direct understanding being arrived at, on the basis of the four points, between Austria and France; and I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the answer that I have returned to it.

Her Majesty's Government consider that Count Buol has attached to his suggestion a condition to which it is impossible for them to subscribe; for it would be wholly out of the question for them to require Sardinia to disarm, or even to ask her to do so, while they were engaged in mediating between Austria and France; as Sardinia, if the mediation failed, would, in that case, be left helpless, and Her Majesty's Government would be justly exposed to the imputation of having been parties to an apparent fraud.

If, however, no conditions were insisted on in respect to the disarmament of Sardinia during a mediation that would contemplate making no direct provision for her security, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared again to take up mediation between Austria and France, which, though their interposition was not so designated in terms, they were practically engaged in before the Russian proposal for a Congress interrupted proceedings which might very probably have been attended with satisfactory results.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 395. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram† of this afternoon, stating that you had been informed by the Tuscan Minister that the Grand Ducal Government wished to declare the neutrality of Tuscany, and desired to know whether it would be respected and guaranteed by the Great Powers; and I have to

* See No. 381.

† See No. 409.

state to you, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government will take the question into their consideration.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 396. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE seen the Austrian and Prussian Ministers this afternoon, but as I have stated to you by telegraph, I am unable to understand from the language which they held, and they seemed themselves uncertain, whether, if Her Majesty's Government should agree to renew the mediation between France and Austria which was commenced by your Excellency at Vienna, Austria will, nevertheless, insist upon the previous and sole disarmament of Sardinia ; or whether she only looks to such a general disarmament as it was contemplated should be effected before the meeting of the Congress.

The telegram which I received from Lord A. Loftus this morning seems to intimate that Sardinia is alone to be required to disarm ; but Her Majesty's Government can be no party to any such arrangement. They are ready, however, in the event of its being determined that Austria, France, and Sardinia should all disarm, or should all not disarm but remain in *statu quo*, to undertake mediation between France and Austria ; and in that case it would remain for France, at once, to make this arrangement with Sardinia, and hereafter to negotiate with Sardinia with reference to any questions which may arise out of the negotiations between France and Austria, carried on under the mediation of England.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 397. *Memorandum communicated by the Earl of Malmesbury to the Sardinian Minister, April 24, 1859.*

Answer recommended to be given by the Sardinian Government to the Austrian Summons.

SARDINIA has already agreed, at the request of England, France, and Prussia, to a general disarmament, the details of which are to be carried out by Civil or Military Commissioners in London.

Offer of Her Majesty's Government to mediate, to be sent by the Marquis d'Azeglio by telegraph to Count Cavour.

England, notwithstanding the manner in which her good offices, used through Lord Cowley, were interrupted, would consent to mediate between Austria and France upon the basis of the four points proposed for Congress, but only on condition that Austria, France, and Sardinia should all three consent to a preliminary disarmament, such as was lately agreed to, the details of which should be settled by Military or Civil Commissioners ; or, that all

three Powers should remain in the exact *statu quo* as regards their military forces and movements.

Sardinia would make known her views to England, through France ; Austria refusing to have any mediation direct between her and Sardinia.

April 24, 1859.

No. 398. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 25, 1859.

I HAVE to instruct you to ask Prince Gortchakoff what are the nature and objects a Treaty generally believed to be concluded between France and Russia, if, indeed, such Treaty exists. You will state to his Excellency that the impression of it entertained in this country, is, that it involves an agreement for a hostile alliance against England on the part of France and Russia, in certain specified contingencies ; and that, if that impression is erroneous, it behoves the Russian Government to lose no time in dispelling it by a frank statement as to its stipulations : for no doubt or uncertainty should prevail on such a subject between this country and Russia.

The Cabinet of St. Petersburg has professed its anxiety to return to the former intimacy which subsisted in the relations between the two countries previously to the late war, and that anxiety is certainly shared in all sincerity by Her Majesty's Government ; but you will point out to Prince Gortchakoff how impossible it must be for any real cordiality to be felt towards Russia in this country, while a doubt is entertained whether that Power has not actually entered into an alliance with another, based on principles hostile to Great Britain.

As regards the question which at the present time occupies the attention of Europe, I have stated to you, by telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government have been given by Austria to understand that she would not be indisposed to accept the mediation of a third Power between herself and France, on the basis of what passed with Lord Cowley at Vienna ; and that her Majesty's Government would be willing to undertake the office of mediator, if it were agreed beforehand, either that the three Powers should at once disarm, or that they should continue in arms during the mediation.

At present Austria insists that, at all events, Sardinia should disarm in the first instance, even if she did so alone ; but Her Majesty's Government will not lend themselves to any demand of that nature on the Cabinet of Turin.

Her Majesty's Government, notwithstanding all the discouraging circumstances of the present moment, have nevertheless not ceased from their endeavours to preserve peace. They desired Lord Cowley, on the 23rd instant, to ascertain from the French Go-

vernment what view they would take of an offer of British mediation between Austria and France; and although Count Walewski only expressed a willingness to take into consideration any definite proposal to that effect, and Her Majesty's Government were at first unable to say anything more specific on the subject than that if Austria and France were really desirous of being extricated from their present difficulties, they were ready to lend their good offices towards bringing about a reconciliation between them on the basis of the four points first proposed by this country, Her Majesty's Government have stated they could only mediate alone. Her Majesty's Government, having since received from Vienna information which leads them to anticipate that the case is not hopeless, have now directed Lord Cowley formally to offer to the French Government the mediation of Her Majesty's Government between Austria and France, on the basis of the four points; they leave it, in that case, to France to arrange with Sardinia, but place to the account of France the responsibility of the war which might result from her refusal to accept the proffered mediation.

Her Majesty's Government have reason to infer, from what Lord Augustus Loftus has reported, that if France were to accept British mediation, Austria would do so also.

Count Buol says, that as Sardinia has agreed to disarm unconditionally, Austria and France may settle their own disarmament by direct negotiation between themselves, and thereupon enter upon a direct negotiation for the settlement of their differences on the Italian question on the general basis of the four points.

The case rests, therefore, now on the decision of the French Government in regard to the offer of mediation about to be laid before them, and I need not say how anxiously Her Majesty's Government hope that that decision may be favourable.

No. 399. *Mr. Scarlett to the Earl of Malmesbury*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

Florence, April 20, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies and translations of replies I have received from Modena and Parma, to my notes addressed to the Ministers of those Duchies respectively, by your Lordship's instructions, of the fulfilment of which I had the honour to inform you in my despatch of the 30th ultimo.*

By the terms of the Modenese note, your Lordship will see, as I have already stated by my telegram of the 15th instant, that the Modenese Government have entered into explanations with the Austrian Government for the purpose of placing at the disposal of that Power the provisions of the Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, and of internal intervention, concluded, in 1847,

* No. 287.

between that Duchy and Austria. The Modenese Government at the same time declines sending any Representative to the Congress.

The Parmese Government has arrived at no conclusion with respect to the offer of a seat at the Congress; but the Tuscan Government is expecting a Cabinet messenger from Parma, whose arrival will probably throw more light upon that subject.

Since receiving the inclosed notes I communicated, in accordance with your Lordship's telegram of the 16th instant,* again with those Governments by telegraph through the Tuscan Government, and have now the honour to forward to your Lordship copies and translations of the telegrams received in reply, of the substance of which I informed your Lordship on the 19th instant by telegraph.

I have, &c.

P. CAMPBELL SCARLETT.

Inclosure 1. *Count Forni to Mr. Scarlett.*

(Translation.)

Modena, April 13, 1859.

Sir,—IN conformity with the reservation which I made at the close of my private note of the 31st of March last to your Excellency, I am now able to add that the general circumstances, and the spirit of the publications which have appeared relative to the Congress, not having been such as to convey a more tranquillizing impression respecting the tendencies and extent of the proposed negotiations, the Modenese Government has thought it right, with reference to the Austro-Modenese Convention of 1847, to adhere to the opinions which I had the honour to express to your Excellency in the course of the Conferences we held on this subject.

The reciprocal character of the Convention itself has, however, induced the Modenese Government to enter into negotiations with Austria, in order that that Power may act, in regard to the Convention, in such manner as she may consider most expedient.

The only question regarding which the Modenese Government could have sent a Representative to the Congress being thus disposed of, all farther necessity for eventually sending one has ceased, the more so as it appears decided that no questions beyond those laid down in the Memorandum which your Excellency communicated to me by your note of the 30th of March last, are to be discussed, and that on no account the subject of the particular interests or internal arrangements of these States would be treated of; indeed, (in the contrary case) His Royal Highness my august Sovereign would feel himself called upon formally to decline the competency of any arbitration thereupon.

I have, &c.

G. FORNI.

* No. 321.

Inclosure 2. *The Marquis Pallavicino to Mr. Scarlett.*

(Translation.)

Parma, April 5, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note dated the 30th of March last, which I made it my duty to communicate to Her Royal Highness the Duchess Regent, my august Sovereign.

I beg to thank the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain for having communicated (to me) the conditions proposed by that Government as the subjects for deliberation at the approaching Congress of the Great Powers, as well as the mode in which, according to the views of that Government, all the Italian States should be heard by means of their Representatives.

I beg your Excellency to make known to the Earl of Malmesbury the feelings of gratitude entertained by this Court for the communication in question, which begins to throw some light upon the painful obscurity of the future, and may enable this Government to see its way in regard to the line of conduct which its sense of honour and its true interests call upon it to follow on the solemn occasion of the meeting of an European Congress.

I beg, &c.

G. PALLAVICINO.

Inclosure 3. *Telegram from the Parmese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Tuscan Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Translation.)

Parma, April 17, 1859, 11.30 P.M.

As it is not yet known on what footing the Representatives of the Italian States will be admitted to the Congress, this Government is not as yet in a position to lay down anything on this subject.

Inclosure 4. *Telegram from the Modenese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Tuscan Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Translation.)

Modena, April 18, 1859, 2.20 P. M.

THE answer of the 13th instant to the English Minister has already made known our determination, whatever the mode may be in which the Representatives are to be admitted to the Congress.

No. 400. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

Berlin, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 19th instant,* informing me of the result, which your Lordship had already communicated to me by telegraph, of your interview with the Chevalier Massimo d'Azeglio; and I have read this despatch to Baron Schleinitz, who deeply regrets that the precipitate proceedings of the Austrian Government are likely to prevent the carrying into execution a project which held out a

* No. 347.

fair chance of arriving at a pacific solution of the differences between Austria and Sardinia.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 401. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, April 21, 1859.

COUNT BUOL has stated that he had forwarded to Count Apponyi, as he had already foreshadowed to me on the 12th instant, a proposal for communication to your Lordship.

He explained to me that he had not previously made me acquainted with it, as he had wished that it should not be forestalled by a private communication by telegraph, a mode of transmission which was so liable to lead to misapprehensions and wrong appreciations.

He had instructed Count Apponyi to inform your Lordship that the Austrian Cabinet proposed addressing an invitation to Sardinia to disarm, and that he was anxious that both England and Prussia should support this invitation.

I observed that this appeared to me a very grave and important proposal, but that very much depended on the form and manner in which it was made.

His Excellency said that it would be couched in very courteous terms, and that it would be in the form of a letter, which he should address to Count Cavour.

I inquired of his Excellency what would be the exact nature of this invitation.

He replied that he should invite the Sardinian Government to place their army on the peace establishment, and to disband the Free Corps. In that event Austria would withdraw her troops, and reduce their numbers.

It appeared to me, from Count Buol's manner, that this step had been fully decided on as a means of bringing matters to a final issue; the present suspense being most prejudicial to the country, both in a financial and in a commercial sense.

It was doubtless conceived also with the conviction that France was merely seeking to gain time for her military preparations, and that Austria should profit of the advantage which she now possessed of being able to take the field at once.

No. 402. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

Vienna, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the article of the "*Moniteur*" of April 10,* addressed more particularly to the German nation, has produced here among all the German Representatives, great feelings of indignation against France.

It is a subject of some surprise that the French Government should display such ignorance of the present feeling of Germany as this article bears token of; for if it was intended thereby to sow the seeds of jealousy and rivalry between the North and South, the effect produced has been in a totally contrary sense, and nothing has more awakened in Germany a distrust and suspicion of the ulterior designs of France than the effusions which have, of late, appeared in the "Moniteur," to the address of the German nation.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 403. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

Vienna, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—In conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I read to Count Buol on the 18th instant, and placed in his Excellency's hands, a copy of your Lordship's despatch to me of the 11th instant.*

Count Buol remarked that Austria had never deviated from the original condition which she had made on accepting the Congress of the Five Powers proposed by Russia, namely, the disarmament of Sardinia, and the disbanding of the free corps. This condition had emanated from Austria, and Her Majesty's Government had concurred in the justice of it. But to save the honour of Sardinia the Austrian Cabinet had subsequently proposed a general disarmament to be carried out previous to the Congress, in which proposal had been naturally included the disarmament of Sardinia, and the disbanding of the free corps. From this condition the Austrian Cabinet could make no deviation.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 404. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

Vienna, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—At an interview which I had with Count Buol on Monday last, the 18th, I read to his Excellency, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, and placed in his Excellency's hands, a copy of your Lordship's despatch to me, of the 12th instant,† containing the official answer solicited by his Excellency as to the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the interpretation given by his Excellency, in the Memorandum annexed to his note to me of the 31st March, of the four points proposed by Her Majesty's Government as the basis of the deliberations of the Congress on the affairs of Italy.

His Excellency did not enter into any further conversation on the subject, but merely stated that he would acknowledge the receipt of this communication, and reply to it through Count

* No. 273.

† No. 292.

Apponyi, and, as I understood his Excellency, rather in an explanatory than in a controversial sense.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 405. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

Vienna, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—I COMMUNICATED yesterday to Count Buol the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 19th instant, 2 P.M.,* stating that Her Majesty's Government protested against demanding the immediate disbandment of the Free Corps, on public grounds, and that they conceived nothing could be more fatal to the cause of order than releasing these men suddenly from military discipline.

Count Buol said that the step had been already taken, as the summons to Sardinia to that effect had been already dispatched.

"We have," said his Excellency, "to put down the revolutionary system, which is represented by these Free Corps, and we cannot tolerate that large bands of armed revolutionists should congregate at our frontier, and menace us at any time with insurrection and revolt in our own provinces. It is a duty which we owe to our own safety. We do not care what may become of these Free Corps—whether they may be sent to the Island of Sardinia or elsewhere; but they must be disarmed and disbanded."

I could only again repeat to his Excellency that the step was a heavy responsibility, which rested with the Austrian Government.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 406. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Apr. 25.)

Vienna, April 21, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT BUOL received, lately, communication of a despatch† from Prince Gortchakoff, in which, with reference to the allusion of the Protocol of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in Count Buol's note to M. de Balabine, Prince Gortchakoff states that the case of urgency and the grave state of affairs were quite sufficient authority for a departure from the principle that the invitation for the assembling of an European Congress should emanate from one of the parties aggrieved; and, secondly, Prince Gortchakoff asserts that, in conformity with the Protocol, all the Italian States were authorized to participate in the Congress now to assemble.

Count Buol has replied to this despatch, stating that he can neither accept nor agree to either of these points. He held strongly to the point so lightly cast aside by Prince Gortchakoff, and was directly opposed to the principle laid down by Prince

* No. 354.

† No. 270.

Gortchakoff on the second point. First, he considered that, as the invitation had not emanated from the Sovereigns whose affairs were to be discussed, the Congress could only suggest or propose, but not enforce, reforms on those independent States; and, secondly, that he could not acknowledge the right of the Italian States to take part in the Congress, and especially that of Sardinia, inasmuch as no Sardinian question was to be treated.

Count Buol read to me these documents very hurriedly, and I am only thus enabled to report to your Lordship very cursorily, but I trust accurately, as far as my memory bears me out, the general nature of their contents.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 407. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, April 21, 1859.

I WAS not fortunate enough to find Count Buol at home on the Sunday when I called to communicate to his Excellency the opinions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 16th instant,* relating to the ultimatum proposed to be addressed to Sardinia by the Austrian Government. But I profited by an occasion the same evening, at his Excellency's weekly reception, to mention the subject to him, stating that it was a matter of great importance to Austria not to forfeit, by any precipitate act, the sympathy of the public opinion in England and in Germany. I represented to his Excellency the dangers which a disbanding of these free corps might produce; and I again observed to him that, as the principle of general disarmament had been accepted by France, with the understanding that it should form the first matter of deliberation in Congress, the practical end desired by the Austrian Cabinet would be fully attained, and that Austria could then be no longer exposed to the reproach that she had, by her refusal, thrown away the last hope of peace.

Count Buol observed, that if it were only a delay of three weeks, why should not the Austrian proposal be agreed to? He said that they had repeatedly yielded to our counsels, and had accepted what had been proposed, and that subsequently we had put forward some fresh demand for concession. "Now," said his Excellency, "we must take our own line."

Well, I replied, of course such is perfectly free and open to you; but do not forget that you will thus separate from us, not we from you, and you will do so entirely on your own responsibility, and at the risk of isolation. Reflect, I beseech of you, before you take any decision in the matter, and consider whether you can discover any means of giving a favourable turn to this question.

On the following morning I waited on Count Buol, and my interview with his Excellency immediately followed that of the

French Chargé d'Affaires. The Marquis de Banneville had previously informed me that he was to communicate to Count Buol the conditions to which France had agreed, and which were the same as those contained in Earl Cowley's telegram to me of the 15th instant, and which stated that the Emperor would consent to join in an official demand to Piedmont to accept the principle of a general disarmament, the details of which were to be regulated at the opening of the Congress, provided that all the Italian States were invited to send Plenipotentiaries on the same footing as those of the Great Powers; or, that the French Government would agree, under the same proviso, to join England and the other Powers in guaranteeing Austria for a limited period (say six months), against any attack from Sardinia, in the which event Sardinia would not be called upon to disarm; these were not, however, submitted in the form of direct proposals to the Austrian Cabinet.

Count Buol informed me that he had replied to the Marquis de Banneville, that it had appeared to him, and he believed, that the last Austrian proposals, submitting the choice of two alternatives, were exceedingly clear and precise. If, therefore, there existed between them and those he now referred to, any shade ("nuance") of difference of any material or important nature, they could not be acceptable; if they were of no such consequence or importance, there was surely no reason for making them.

It was thus evident, that although no direct refusal was given by Count Buol, there could be no question of their acceptance.

Count Buol further told me, that he had in the course of conversation said to M. de Banneville, that if his Emperor really and sincerely desired peace, he could have it—a frank and cordial advance on his part would be met in a similar spirit; but if, said Count Buol, he intends war, I have only one advice to give: it is, "Let him arm to the teeth."

I found Count Buol on this occasion more than ever determined to hold to his last proposals, and with a fixed purpose not to deviate from them.

No. 408. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 25, 1859.

I HAVE instructed your Lordship, by telegraph, to acquaint Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government have offered to the French Government to mediate directly between Austria and France. You will hear the result from Lord Cowley; but you will urge the Austrian Government in the meanwhile to defer for a few days the advance of the Austrian troops into Sardinia.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 409. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

Paris, April 24, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Tuscan Minister, the Marquis Tannay de Nerli, called upon me yesterday morning, and said that he had been desired by his Government to apprise me, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that the Grand Duke of Tuscany meditated declaring the neutrality of Tuscany, but wished to ascertain whether that neutrality would be respected and guaranteed by the Great Powers.

I replied that I felt certain that Her Majesty's Government would be anxious to circumscribe the war, which appeared too imminent, to the narrowest possible limits, and would be very glad if the neutrality of Tuscany could be established and maintained, but that they were not likely to give a guarantee which might embroil them at any moment in hostilities, from which they were most desirous to keep aloof. I then asked M. Tannay de Nerli whether his Government had made a similar announcement to the other Great Powers, and more particularly to France and Austria, and if so what was the nature of the replies furnished. He answered, that he had spoken on the subject, the previous day, to Count Walewski, who had given no decided opinion, but seemed inclined to treat the proposal with favour. With regard to Austria he knew nothing, but he was instructed to speak to the Prussian Minister in the same sense as he had spoken to me. Count Pourtalès happening at that moment to come in, M. Tannay de Nerli made him the same communication which he had just made to me, which the Prussian Minister received *ad referendum*, as I also did on my part.

Later in the day I spoke to Count Walewski on this matter, who replied that he had certainly been disposed to receive the Tuscan proposal favourably, but that he could say nothing positive without having taken the Emperor's orders. Of course the consent of the French Government would be made to depend upon the acceptance of the proposal by Austria.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 410. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

Paris, April 24, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT WALEWSKI informed me, yesterday, that at the eleventh hour, and unfortunately too late to be of use, the Pope had expressed his willingness to send a Plenipotentiary to the Congress.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 411. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 24, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, ex-

tracted from the "Moniteur" of yesterday the announcement of the Austrian summons to Sardinia to disarm within three days.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

Inclosure. *Extract from the "Moniteur" of April 23, 1859.*

(Translation.)

Paris, April 22, 1859.

THE Austrian Government has thought fit to address a direct communication to the Sardinian Government to invite it to put its army on a peace footing, and to disband the volunteers. This communication was to be forwarded to Turin by an Aide-de-camp of General Gyulai, Commander-in-chief of the Austrian army in Lombardy. This officer was to be instructed to state that he would wait three days for the answer, and that an answer sent too late would be considered a refusal.

England and Russia have not hesitated to protest against the line of conduct adopted by Austria on this occasion.

No. 412. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 25.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 24, 1859.

THE Extraordinary Council which met yesterday afternoon at the Tuilleries separated without having come to any decision as to the moment when military operations should commence; but in the course of the evening a copy of Count Buol's letter to Count Cavour, summoning Sardinia to disarm, was received; and the last phrase of it, which your Lordship will find inclosed, was considered to be so offensive that orders were issued for the immediate advance of French troops into Sardinia.

Inclosure.—*Extract from a Letter addressed by Count Buol to Count Cavour, published in the "Vienna Gazette" of April 24, 1859.*

(Translation.)

IF at the expiration of this term (three days) he (the bearer of this letter) receives no answer, or if the answer be not altogether satisfactory, the responsibility of the serious consequences which this refusal would entail, will fall entirely on the Government of his Sardinian Majesty.

After having exhausted in vain all conciliatory means to procure for his people the guarantee of peace, on which the Emperor has a right to insist, His Majesty will be obliged, to his great regret, to have recourse to the force of arms to obtain it.

No. 413. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—In consequence of the refusal* of Austria to agree to the last proposal made by Her Majesty's Government to admit

* No. 424.

of the presence in the Congress of the Representatives of Italian States on the same footing as at Laybach, Her Majesty's Government consider that, so far as they are concerned, the negotiations for holding a Congress are at an end.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 414. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 25 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 24th instant,* reporting a communication made to you by the Tuscan Minister, respecting the wish of the Grand Ducal Government to ascertain whether the Great Powers would respect and guarantee the neutrality of Tuscany, and also a conversation which you afterwards had with Count Walewski on the subject; and I have to state to your Excellency in reply, that Her Majesty's Government can give no such guarantee, but they will earnestly request the belligerents to do so.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 415. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Excellency will have seen from Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram of yesterday afternoon, that there is still room for hope that the immediate breaking out of war may be averted.

It appears that Count Buol, although he will make no direct overture, is nevertheless not disinclined to direct negotiation between Austria and France, on the basis of a mutual disarmament on the part of the two Powers, Sardinia having already accepted it unconditionally; and that thereupon the negotiation should proceed between Austria and France directly, for the settlement of the Italian question on the basis of the four points; and it would seem also that Count Buol is of opinion that the landing of the French at Genoa, and the entrance of the Austrians into Piedmont, need be no bar to the mediation of England.

Count Buol, however, says that France must signify her acceptance of any proposal of the kind before it is made to Austria.

In this state of things, I have to instruct your Excellency to offer to the French Government the mediation of England between Austria and France, on the basis thus stated by Lord Augustus Loftus, and by my telegram of the 23rd instant as recited in my despatch† of that day; and your Excellency will send to Vienna, by telegraph, the reply of the French Government.

If the French Government accept the offer, it will be for them to arrange with Sardinia on the subject; but if the French Government refuse the offer, they will then be responsible for the war.

† No. 409.

‡ Nos. 384, 394.

Your Excellency will keep Her Majesty's Ministers at Vienna and Turin fully informed, by duplicate telegraphs, of all that you may communicate to Her Majesty's Government by the same channel.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 416. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—I RECEIVED yesterday afternoon your telegram, stating that you apprehended that great difficulties would be found in carrying out the idea of Her Majesty's Government, that they might offer with advantage the mediation of England between France and Austria, and that all that you could extract from Count Walewski on the subject was, that if a positive plan could be offered, the French Government would take it into consideration; and it appeared from your further conversation with Count Walewski, that his Excellency was desirous that Her Majesty's Government should dictate terms to Austria.

Your Excellency will have seen by my telegram of last night that it was the wish of Her Majesty's Government, in the present state of affairs, that you should confine yourself to saying, that if Austria and France were really desirous of being extricated from their present difficulties, Her Majesty's Government, notwithstanding what had passed with reference to your Excellency's mission to Vienna, would still lend their good offices to effect a reconciliation between the two Powers on the basis of the four points first proposed by Her Majesty's Government when they agreed to enter into Congress, and afterwards generally accepted by the other Great Powers.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 417. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 25, 1859.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to state to Count Walewski, that an impression has obtained in this country, that a Treaty has been concluded which, whatever else it may contain, involves, at all events, an agreement between France and Russia for a hostile alliance against England, in certain eventualities.

Her Majesty's Government are most unwilling to believe it possible that any Treaty of that nature can have been concluded by France with any Power, and still less with Russia, against whom England and France have so recently, and with so much good faith and zeal on both sides, been arrayed in arms for the defence of a most vital European interest. But it is important that the public mind in this country should be reassured on this point, and Her Majesty's Government owe it to the friendship and intimate alliance which has so long subsisted between the two countries, to their mutual advantage, and to the inestimable

benefit of the world, frankly to state to the Imperial Cabinet the feelings which the rumour of such a Treaty having been concluded, which rumour has now been confirmed by Count Walewski himself, has excited in this country.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, press upon the Cabinet of the Tuileries to lose no time, by a frank and complete communication of the stipulations of that Treaty, in dispelling the doubts to which any reserve on its part is calculated to give rise; for Count Walewski will assuredly agree with Her Majesty's Government in considering that no doubt or uncertainty on such a point should be suffered to prevail between two Powers who have maintained so intimate an alliance.

No. 418. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to my despatch* of this day, respecting the willingness of Her Majesty's Government to mediate between France and Austria, I have to state to your Excellency that if Her Majesty's Government undertake that task, they can only do so alone, so that they may be free to withdraw from all further interference in the matter if at any time circumstances should lead them to the conclusion that it was of no avail to pursue it any further.

I have stated to your Excellency the bases on which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to mediate, are the four points, deduced from your conversations with the Austrian and French Governments at Vienna and at Paris.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 419. *Baron Schleinitz to Count Bernstorff.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by Count Bernstorff, April 25.)

(Translation.)

Berlin, April 19, 1859.

M. le Comte, — LORD MALMESBURY has addressed to Lord Bloomfield, under date of the 11th instant, a despatch of which I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy inclosed.

According to the contents of this document the reception which the Government of the King gave to the proposal of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to convoke the Four Powers, without Austria, in Congress, might appear doubtful; it is for this reason, and in order to avoid any kind of misunderstanding on this point, that I have the honour to inform your Excellency that we have, without hesitation, and by means of the Envoy of the King at St. Petersburg, made a declaration to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, that, in our eyes, a meeting of the Four Powers would no longer have the character of an European Congress, and consequently could not answer its object in the affair in question.

* No. 416.

Be so good as to communicate what is stated above to Lord Malmesbury, by leaving a copy of the present despatch with his Lordship, and receive, &c.

SCHLEINITZ.

No. 420. *Count Apponyi to the Earlof Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)
(Translation.) London, April 26, 1859.

M. le Comte,—In answer to the verbal proposals which I had the honour to receive from your Excellency, I have been authorized by the Imperial Cabinet to inform you, M. le Comte, that the Government of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty accepts the offer of mediation which has been made to it by that of Her Britannic Majesty, with the intention of effecting a direct understanding between the Governments of Austria and France, on the bases brought back from Vienna by Lord Cowley.

Accept, &c.

APPONYI.

No. 421. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 26.)
(Extract.) Turin, April 23, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a translation of a project of law presented this day at 12 o'clock to the Chamber of Deputies, by Count Cavour, for granting extraordinary powers to His Majesty the King during the war.

Inclosure. *Project of Law.*

(Translation.)

Article 1. IN case of war with the Austrian Empire, the King shall be invested with all legislative and executive powers, and shall be empowered with ministerial responsibility to do by simple royal decrees all the acts necessary for the defence of the country and our institutions.

Art. 2. The King's Government shall, during the war, have the power of taking measures for the temporary restriction of the liberty of the press and individuals, the Constitutional institutions remaining, nevertheless, intact.

No. 422. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 26.)
Turin, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 21st instant,* I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, at an interview which I have just had with Count Cavour, I communicated to his Excellency the advice which your Lordship was disposed to offer respecting the answer to be given by the Sardinian Government to the expected Austrian summons to disarm. His Excellency asked me whether I was in possession of any information as to the terms in which the Austrian communication

* No. 367.

would be drawn up, and the manner in which it would be delivered.

I replied that upon these points I was as much in ignorance as his Excellency himself appeared to be; and he then said that until he knew the precise nature of this communication, he was unable to give any idea of the answer which the Sardinian Government might feel itself called upon to return. I called his attention to Protocol 23, of 14th April, 1856, of the Treaty of Paris, and to Articles VII and VIII of the General Treaty. He admitted their application to the present crisis, but said that it appeared to him that, as far as England and Prussia were concerned, the principle sent forth in the Protocol had been all along acted upon, but, as it would appear at present, without success. I pressed his Excellency again to consider the expediency of framing his answer in accordance with your Lordship's suggestion; and he said that it should meet with all due consideration.

I subsequently saw my Prussian colleague, who informed me that he had received instructions to tender similar advice, and that he had spoken to Count Cavour in the same sense as myself.

I have, &c.

L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

No. 423. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAD the honour to receive, on the 19th instant,* your Lordship's telegrams of the preceding day, of 5.20 and 10.10 P.M., containing the last proposals which Her Majesty's Government had decided to submit to the acceptance of the Austrian Government; and stating that if this, their last effort in behalf of peace, was unsuccessful, they would withdraw from the negotiation.

I waited on the 19th instant on Count Buol, but his Excellency having been called away to the Emperor, I had only sufficient time to communicate to him the substance of those telegrams and the exact nature of the proposals they contained.

He informed me that M. de Banneville had likewise made to him a similar proposal, with the exception of the military commission, as means of regulating the disarmament. He stated that he objected to this latter; and that he held to the primitive proposal made by Russia of a Congress of the Five Powers. He could not then state whether, or on what terms, the Italian States had been invited to the Congress of Lyabach; but his impression was that it had been merely to liberate the King of Naples, who was under the Revolutionary Government of Naples. He said there could be a reason for the appearance at the Congress of Parma and Modena, as their affairs were to be treated of; but that Sardinia had no claim of the kind to urge. He

* No. 354.

should submit these proposals to the Emperor, his master, and take His Majesty's orders respecting the answer to be given.

M. de Banneville and I agreed not to send a decidedly negative reply to our Governments until we should receive a definitive answer on the following day.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 424. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to my previous despatch of this date,* I have to inform your Lordship that on the 20th instant Count Buol stated to M. de Banneville and myself that the Austrian Government could agree to no proposal which included the participation of the Italian States in the Congress.

M. de Banneville accordingly informed his Government, by telegraph, that Count Buol maintained the exclusion of the Italian States, including Sardinia, from Congress.

Count Buol did not, at this interview, inform M. de Banneville, as he did myself, the Russian Minister, and several of my German colleagues, that the summons to Sardinia, in the form of a letter to Count Cavour, had been dispatched on the previous day.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 425. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram of the 19th instant,* 2.45 P. M., on the morning of the 20th instant; and on the same day I communicated to Count Buol the substance of it, stating that Count Cavour had telegraphed to say, that as France joined England in asking Piedmont to disarm previously, the King, although fearful of consequences, submitted.

The value of this important intelligence was greatly diminished, and the hopes which I had formed of a satisfactory conclusion being now attained on this difficult and thorny point were completely blighted, by the announcement made to me in reply by Count Buol, of the summons which he had sent to Turin on the previous day.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 426. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE already had the honour to inform your Lordship, by my telegram of the 21st instant, that the French Chargé d'Affaires waited on Count Buol yesterday, to inquire, by order of his Government, whether Count Buol refused the four

* No. 423.

† No. 354.

conditions agreed to by the four Powers, as contained in the "Moniteur" of yesterday, and which were conformable with those transmitted to me by your Lordship's telegram of the 18th instant.*

Count Buol replied that he was prepared to accept the first three conditions, but that he could not assent to the fourth, which provided that the Italian States should be invited by the Congress to sit with the five Powers, on the same footing as the Italian States at the Congress of Laybach.

M. de Banneville was further instructed to inquire whether Count Buol had been informed that Sardinia had consented to disarm, and without condition, when he sent off his letter to Count Cavour.

Count Buol replied that he had not then been aware that Sardinia had accepted the disarmament without conditions.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure. *Extract from the "Moniteur" of April 21, 1859.*
(Translation.)

THE Government of Her Britannic Majesty has made the following propositions to the four Powers :

1. That a preliminary, general, and simultaneous disarmament should be effected.

2. That the disarmament should be regulated by a Military or Civil Commission, independent of the Congress.

3. That as soon as this Commission was assembled, and had commenced its task, the Congress should assemble in its turn, and proceed to the discussion of the political questions.

4. That the Representatives of the Italian States should be called upon by the Congress, immediately after its meeting, to take their places with the Representatives of the Four Great Powers, in precisely the same manner as at the Congress of Laybach in 1821.

France, Russia, and Prussia, have adhered to the propositions of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty.

No. 427. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE not failed to communicate to Count Buol the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 20th instant, 1.43 P.M.†

I will not here advert to the subject of the proposed Military Commission to arrange the disarmament therein mentioned, as I have treated of that subject in my other despatch of this date.†

I referred to the proposal submitted by your Lordship, that the Italian States should be invited to the Congress, and should be admitted on the same footing as were represented the Italian States at the Congress of Laybach, and I stated that all the Powers had agreed to this proposal, and the Sardinians to a general disarma-

* No. 354.

† No. 355

‡ No. 430.

ment. Consequently, if Austria did not adhere she would be isolated, and would be left to bear the obloquy.

I represented to his Excellency that the principle of the Congress of five was hereby fully maintained, for the Italian States were to be invited by that body after it had met, and not to appear at it *proprio motu*: and I further stated that the proposal ought to be viewed by Austria as eminently advantageous to her interests, as she could doubtless count upon the support of the greater part, if not all of those States, with the exception of Sardinia. Furthermore, his Excellency must bear in mind that where all the Italian States were present (and Austria could certainly, through her influence, assure herself of their presence), Sardinia could not assume to herself the right of speaking in the name of Italy.

His Excellency stated that Austria had originally accepted the Congress of five, and that, as an inducement to her to do so, it had been put forth that the exclusion of Sardinia was of itself a great moral triumph to her. Now fresh proposals were made which changed the nature of the Congress. He could not assent to the participation of Sardinia in the Congress, and would not agree to an invitation to be addressed to her.

But I remarked to his Excellency that he had been the first to take up (and as I thought and expressed to him at the time, very unnecessarily), the Protocol of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, as a reason for the participation of the Italian States.

"Yes," he replied, "but that Protocol contains two principles: first, that a Congress can only be called on the invitation of the parties interested; and secondly, that in such case the Sovereign or Representative of the State whose affairs were to be treated must be present. In the present instance it was agreed that the decisions of the Congress were to be submitted to the several States for their approbation and acceptance, and not to be forced upon them, and consequently there would have been no violation of that Protocol. But," continued his Excellency, "Austria will never consent to sit in Congress with Sardinia. There is no question relating to Sardinia to be treated of; and consequently she has no claim for admission."

I then read to his Excellency the Memorandum which your Lordship forwarded to me concerning the status of the Italian States at the Congress of Laybach.*

* *Memorandum.—Invitation to Italian Courts to send Plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Laybach in 1821.*

IN consequence of the alarming state of affairs in Italy, &c., the Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, determined upon holding a Congress, for the purpose of taking these questions into consideration.

The Conferences were at first held at Troppau, but in order to be nearer the scene of action, the Congress was transferred to Laybach.

The Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the Crown Prince of Prussia, met in January, 1821, and, at their invitation, the King of Naples joined them at Laybach.

Invitations were also addressed by the three allied Sovereigns (Austria, Prussia, and Russia), to the Italian Courts of Piedmont, Rome, Tuscany, &c., to send Plenipotentiaries to the Conference: and Ministers from the various Courts met, in consequence at Laybach.

Count Buol did not offer any objection to that narration ; but observed that the question was a different one, and the case not analogous. At that period the Sovereigns had met to set at liberty the Kings of Naples, and the question in deliberation was that of an armed interference in Naples, which necessitated the passage of an army through the Italian States. It was, therefore, necessary to consult with them, and to represent clearly to them the object in view.

I remarked to his Excellency that this might have been one of the objects, but it was not the only one, nor could it have been alleged as a reason for inviting Sardinia ; and, I added, that so harmonious was apparently their understanding that on parting they agreed all to meet again at Florence the following year.

I then called his Excellency's serious attention to the grave results which might arise by a refusal of Austria at this moment to accept the proposal which formed one of the four conditions which had been accepted by all the Powers. Such a refusal might, probably, greatly influence the decision of the Emperor Napoleon as to the course he should now pursue, and would reflect generally in Europe to the disadvantage of Austria. It would place Austria alone, and represent her as being the prime obstacle to the pacific efforts in which the Powers were so ardently engaged.

I urgently requested his Excellency not to close this door to a last effort in behalf of peace ; and to reflect on the consequences which might result if he did.

The first formal Conference was held on the 11th January, 1821, at which the Plenipotentiaries of the following Powers were present :—Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia.

The eighth Conference was held on the 26th January, when the Italian Plenipotentiaries were admitted for the first time ; the Representatives of Sardinia, Tuscany, Naples, and Modena, and Cardinal Spina, on behalf of his Holiness the Pope, being present.

The proceedings of the seven previous meetings having been read, the Austrian Plenipotentiary “addressed the Italian Ministers on the question of the Neapolitan revolution ; on the sentiments of the Sovereigns ; on their recorded resolutions ; and on their desire, as far as possible, to have the concurrence of the sentiments of the different Italian States as to the nature of the evil, the necessity of its correction, and the expediency of the measures taken to arrive at that end.”

The views of the King of Sardinia, the Pope, and of other Italian States, were then recorded through their respective Ministers.

The last Conference was held on the 26th of February, 1811, when the Plenipotentiaries of the following Powers were present ;—Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Naples, Sardinia, Tuscany, Modena, and Rome. All the Plenipotentiaries had taken part in the deliberations since the 26th January.

At that sitting the Congress was declared to be closed : but it was determined that they should meet again at Florence in the following year, to deliberate upon the question of the military occupation of the Kingdom of Naples.

Although the British Ministers were present at these deliberations, Great Britain preserved a strict neutrality upon the whole Neapolitan question.

In announcing the termination of the Congress, Mr. Gordon stated that the object of the invitation of the Italian Plenipotentiaries to Laybach was considered to have been effectuated by their assent to the basis proposed for the reconstruction of the Neapolitan Government ; and that a declaration was to be prepared and communicated in a final Conference, explanatory of this, and intimating the joint desire of the Three Powers to meet them again in the autumn of the following year.

Foreign Office, April 4, 1859.

I fear that all my persuasive attempts to change his Excellency's opinion on this subject were unavailing, and that the determination of the Austrian Cabinet on this point is irrevocable.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 428. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Apr. 26.)

Vienna, April 22, 1859.

My Lord,—In conformity with your Lordship's despatch of the 11th instant,* and with the instructions contained in your Lordship's several telegrams therein referred to, I have been unremitting in my endeavours to dissuade this cabinet from taking any precipitate resolution with regard to Sardinia, and in exposing every danger which they would incur in doing so.

Continuing in this course, I have again to-day exhausted all my efforts to induce Count Buol to arrest the execution of the orders sent to General Giulay, stating that he could reasonably do so on the communication made to his Excellency by M. de Banneville yesterday, that Sardinia had agreed to disarm at the instance of England and France, without conditions.

Count Buol replied that he had no knowledge that Sardinia had agreed to disarm without conditions; but that under any circumstances he could not interfere with the Imperial decision, and the orders given; and that no recall or modification of them was possible. "You do not know us," said his Excellency, "if you think that in such matters we retrace our steps. We have borne the weight of indecision and doubt long enough. It is now full time for it to cease."

I reminded his Excellency, however, that the moment for taking this decision would appear in the eyes of Europe most unpropitious, if not unpardonable, and would infallibly alienate from them the sympathy and support of public opinion both in England and elsewhere.

"It may be so," said his Excellency, "and we shall regret it; but you must consider that we also have a public opinion to take account of, and a young and chivalrous Emperor, to whom the dignity and honour of his country is dear. We have been bearded, provoked, and insulted by Sardinia for a long time past. We have borne it with patience, and have evinced the greatest proofs of moderation, and of our love of peace. All efforts having failed in procuring that condition which we laid down as indispensable for our entry into Congress, we have taken the matter into our own hands. It is against the 'revolution' that we are acting, and although you may protest against the disbanding of the free corps as a dangerous measure, we consider that the very fact of their embodiment constitutes a danger; and the very argument put forth, of the impracticability of their being disbanded, only

* No. 269.

proves in our estimation the reality of this danger, and the necessity of removing it."

But, I remarked to his Excellency, there were other dangers as imminent and of no lesser degree, of which the Austrian Cabinet in their late decision had appeared to take no account. Had they calculated on the consequences of the step they had taken? Had they not acted in a manner to alienate their friends? I could only repeat to his Excellency what I had stated to him on Sunday evening last, previous to the departure of the summons,—that such a measure would produce war, isolation to Austria, and probably desolation to Europe. It was, therefore, I said, a grave responsibility, the consequences of which would rest wholly with the Austrian Cabinet.

His Excellency replied that the Austrian Cabinet could not be accused of any precipitation in taking this step. They had previously announced their intention to do so, both to Her Majesty's Government and to that of Prussia; months had passed in vacillating proposals and counter-proposals, which only served to evince the bad faith of Sardinia, and her increasing defiance of Austria, till at last the patience and forbearance of Austria were wholly exhausted, and the spirit of the nation could no longer passively endure a position intolerable to them.

In reply to the inquiry as to whether his Excellency had been informed that Sardinia had agreed to disarm before the letter had been dispatched to General Giulay, he stated that he had not been acquainted with that fact on the evening of Tuesday the 19th, when his letter was sent off. It was on the following morning that I communicated to his Excellency this intelligence, which had reached me both from your Lordship and Earl Cowley, by telegraph, late on the Tuesday night. That letter was forwarded by General Benedech, who I believe is to be the bearer of it to Turin.

I then communicated to his Excellency the substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, 6.30 P.M.,* which reached me this morning, stating that Her Majesty's Government would protest in the strongest manner against the step taken by Austria in the threatened invasion of Sardinian territory, and that by this untimely measure, Austria had forfeited all claim to the support and sympathy of England.

In reply, his Excellency said, that when the whole subject was clearly and truthfully submitted to the impartial judgment of public opinion in England, he could not believe that they would withdraw their sympathies from Austria; but he repeated that the Austrian Cabinet had likewise to consult and to be guided by the public opinion of their own country, which had loudly called for energetic action to relieve the country from the weight of

* No. 366.

doubt and suspense which had for some time past completely paralyzed all commercial and industrial undertakings.

With reference to the concluding paragraph of your Lordship's telegram, expressing a hope that Austria would still be induced to act on the 23rd Protocol of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, by accepting mediation, which proposal had been made to his Excellency on a previous occasion by Baron Werther, I have to remark that Count Buol's opinion rather differed, as regards Sardinia, from the language which Baron Werther had mentioned that he had held to him; for in expressing himself to me on this point, his Excellency was of opinion that Austria might have no objection to a mediation between France and herself, but that he felt convinced that the Emperor Francis-Joseph would never accept of any mediation with Sardinia. He said, however, that he would report the substance of your Lordship's telegram to the Emperor, and take His Majesty's orders thereon.

Although I fervently hope, and do not wholly despair, that my observations, and more especially the strong disapprobation expressed in your Lordship's telegram above referred to, of the step taken by the Austrian Cabinet may avail in inducing Count Buol to reflect on the gravity of their late decision, and the dangers of the path on which they have entered, my conversation with Count Buol did not lead me to expect that His Imperial Majesty would deviate from the course which he has laid down.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 429. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, April 22, 1859.

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I lost no time, after its receipt, in communicating to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch to me of the 16th instant.*

During the reading of that despatch to his Excellency, he remarked that the invitation to disarm, in the form of a letter, which he had addressed to Count Cavour, was expressed in very courteous terms, and did not bear, in any respect, the character of a haughty summons.

With reference to the further part of your Lordship's despatch, stating, "that as the French Government had declined to be a party to the proposal made by Her Majesty's Government, to give to Sardinia a joint guarantee against the consequence of her disarmament, the proposal of making a demand on Sardinia to disarm, of which the guarantee was to form a part, necessarily fell to the ground," his Excellency observed that I had on a previous occasion, stated to him that the Sardinian Government had refused to the British Government either to disarm, or to send a Representative to the Congress on the footing proposed, and, further, that Count Cavour had refused the guarantee which had been proposed.

* No. 322.

I replied to his Excellency, that I certainly had a perfect recollection of having given that information to his Excellency ; but that, so far as my memory then served me, it rather bore the character of a refusal of Count Cavour which had been officially conveyed through the Marquis d'Azeglio, with a view, perhaps, to prevent the offer being made, than of an official reply of the Sardinian Government to the offer, after it had been made.

No. 430. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I DULY communicated to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 15th instant,* which was delivered to me by the messenger Poignand, on the morning of the 20th instant.

With reference to that part of your Lordship's despatch, requiring to know what are Count Buol's views with respect to the extent of, and mode of carrying out, the general disarmament, I have the honour to report the following opinions expressed to me by his Excellency.

Count Buol, in treating the general question of disarmament, does not consider that Sardinia can be reckoned on the same footing as Austria and France, inasmuch as the two latter are Great Powers which require to keep up a large armed force for the protection of their own States, and to enable them to fulfil the duties which, as Great Powers, they owe to Europe.

Sardinia, his Excellency stated, was in a different position. But, as concerns the present moment, Sardinia had, contrary to all international custom, in a time of peace, enrolled an irregular force (whether under the name of Free Corps, or Italian Volunteers, was very immaterial), and the whole conduct of her Government had, of late, been one of continued menace to the internal security of the Austrian Possessions in Italy.

This irregular force, armed and officered by men of known revolutionary and republican principles, constituted a serious danger, and it became, therefore, a duty, as well as a necessity, on the part of Austria, not to allow a continuance of so menacing a state of things on her frontier. As regards Sardinia, therefore, the Austrian Government had already taken their own steps, and had directly addressed themselves to the Sardinian Government, to disband these free corps or volunteers, and to place their army on a peace footing.

As regards the question of the disarmament of Austria and France, his Excellency stated that this was a question which should be, and could be, easily arranged between the two Governments, and could not be, with due consideration to the dignity of either, placed in the hands of a Commission.

Great Powers cannot be called upon to disarm summarily, or to

* No. 313.

submit a question of this nature to the deliberation and decision of a Commission. Such a mode of proceeding would, in Count Buol's opinion, be wounding to the military feeling and honour of a Great Power. He is, therefore, of opinion, that when the Sardinian disarmament is effected, or even simultaneously with it, Austria and France could cordially come to a direct understanding on the subject of a disarmament, in such a manner as would be satisfactory to both, and without any Military Commission, as had been proposed.

As a basis for this understanding, Count Buol considers that France might agree to break up the camp formed, or forming, at Lyons, and allow to return to their homes, any furlough men, or extras, who have been called under arms. Further, that France might send back to Algeria those troops which had been called to France for active operations.

Austria, in like manner, would send away all the furlough men, and whatever reserves had been lately added to her army, placing that army on the ordinary peace establishment. Austria would recall a corps d'armée from Italy, and would resume the peace establishment.

These measures would be preceded by an announcement in the Official Gazette of each State, that they had mutually agreed to disarm, and that its execution should be forthwith proceeded with.

Count Buol is convinced that this would be the most practical and most dignified course for carrying out the principle of disarmament, and not by a Military Commission.

He would willingly assent that, if required, or thought necessary, there should be a verification of the execution, either under the auspices of England or of Prussia, or of both.

Count Buol has informed me that he has forwarded to your Lordship in a private letter a very detailed exposition of his views on this subject, of which I have given your Lordship the foregoing general outline.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 431. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—LATE on the evening of the 19th instant I had the the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram,* as also one from Earl Cowley, announcing that Sardinia had accepted the disarmament.

On the following morning I sought an early interview with Count Buol, and on entering his *salon* I greeted his Excellency with the agreeable announcement that I was the bearer of a pacific and satisfactory arrangement. After informing his Excellency of the

* No. 354.

above-named intelligence I had received by telegraph, Count Buol stated that he had forwarded on the previous evening (Tuesday the 19th instant), a letter he had addressed by the Emperor's orders to Count Cavour, in which, referring to the difficulties which had arisen concerning the disarmament, and which had given rise to various and divergent proposals, the Austrian Cabinet had finally resolved to address themselves directly to the Sardinian Government, to invite them to disband the free corps, or volunteers, and to place their army on the peace footing.

The officer charged to present this letter at Turin would be instructed to wait there three days for the reply. I am informed, although I have not seen this document, that it terminated by stating, that in the event of a refusal, the Austrian Government, however deeply they would regret it, would, nevertheless, find themselves under the disagreeable necessity of resorting to war ("pénible nécessité d'avoir recours à la guerre").

Count Buol did not state to me that this alternative had been put, but he gave me clearly to understand that such would be the case.

I replied to his Excellency that this step was one of very great gravity and importance, and would produce considerable sensation in England, and, I feared, in a sense very disadvantageous to Austria.

I regretted that his Excellency had not awaited the result of the negotiation now being carried on between the English and French Governments and that of Sardinia, on this question of disarmament; for, as I had just informed him, the Sardinian Government had now consented to that measure.

I feared, therefore, that the summons of the Austrian Government would be productive of great mischief, and at the very moment when our unceasing efforts in the cause of peace gave well-founded hopes of success.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 432. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE only time, previous to the departure of the messenger, to inform your Lordship that the Russian Minister has just called on me to state that, by order of his Government, he has addressed a note to Count Buol, in which he refers to the acceptance by all the Powers of the general disarmament, and states that the invitation to the Italian States to participate in the Congress was founded on legal precedents, and that, consequently, if the peace of Europe should be disturbed, the responsibility would alone rest with Austria.

M. de Balerbine has just received a telegraphic instruction from Prince Gortchakoff, desiring him to protest most solemnly against

the summons addressed by the Austrian Government to that of Sardinia to disarm.

I informed M. de Balerbine, that in pursuance of similar instructions from your Lordship, by telegraph, I had yesterday informed Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government would protest in the strongest manner against the step taken by Austria in the threatened invasion of Sardinian territory, and that Austria, by taking this step, forfeited all claim to the support and sympathy of England.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 433. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Vienna, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith in original and translation (the latter by Mr. Wodehouse) an article from the official columns of the "Vienna Gazette," announcing the dispatch of a summons to the Sardinian Government to disarm, and setting forth the reasons which have led the Imperial Government to adopt this measure.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure. *Extract from the "Wiener Zeitung" of Ap. 22, 1859.*

(Translation.)

MATURED by the events which, since the commencement of this year, have cast an ever-darkening shadow upon the future of Europe, a resolution of great consequence is at this moment before us.

The sincere desire of our Emperor and Master to avert, even at the last hour, the dangers which menace the world, the feeling of duty, to leave no means untried for the preservation of peace, as far as may be consistent with the rights and dignity of the Emperor, the wish to prove before the eyes of all that Austria would be free from all responsibility if the destinies of war should burst over happy and prosperous lands; these motives have determined his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to take the step of entering into direct communication with the Government of His Majesty Victor Emmanuel as a last attempt to preserve peace.

For years past has Sardinia shown hostility to the sacred rights of Austria. By the last announcement of the Turin Cabinet she has become the declared opposer of these rights; by her armaments she has put herself in continual preparation for attack. There remains for the Sardinian Government only one course to pursue, in order to persuade the world that she is not meditating war and revolution, and that she is ready to render possible the restoration of legitimate relations between her and the neighbouring kingdom. This course consists in this: that Piedmont shall lay down the arms which could only be used for the purpose of

committing a gross offence against the law of nations, the principles of lawful order, the real welfare of Italy, and the prosperity of Europe.

The Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Von Buol-Schauenstein, has, by His Majesty's order, addressed a note to the head of the Turin Cabinet, Count Cavour, in which the Royal Sardinian Government is urgently, and in the most conciliatory spirit, but with the earnestness of a last and momentous warning, summoned to take measures for disarming.

If Sardinia, by adopting this course, which is supported by the representations of other powers of Europe, returns to a peace footing, she knows that she is secured by Austria's word against every attack.

Now, it is not the intention of the Imperial Government to withdraw from the proposal which emanated from it, that an understanding for a general return to a peace footing at once, and before the opening of the projected Congress, should be come to by the Great Powers, who have advanced towards a condition of extraordinary armament.

Austria maintains this proposal unchanged, though she may not be willing to subordinate the measure which she has determined to take regarding Piedmont, to the march of further negotiations for a general disarmament.

May it be vouchsafed to us to be able soon to cause another communication to follow the present one, which may afford due satisfaction to the partisans of an honourable peace, and at the same time promote the secure and calm self-consciousness of Austria.

We may, indeed, be about to encounter trying destinies ; but the confidence which right and courage give will not, for an instant, forsake our noble-hearted Monarch and his faithful people.

No. 434. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 26, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT APPONYI has communicated to me a copy of Count Buol's letter to Count Cavour, calling upon Sardinia to disarm. I inclose a copy of it, for your Lordship's information ;* and you will at once perceive that, so far as regards the course taken by Her Majesty's Government, the statements in that letter are in some respects incorrect.

Count Buol alleges, in the first place, that Her Majesty's Government concurred with that of Austria in the propriety of requiring Sardinia to disband the free corps ; whereas Her Majesty's Government have repeatedly and urgently remonstrated against that measure, as calculated to produce the worst consequences to the tranquillity of Italy, by suddenly throwing loose on the country a large number of reckless individuals, who, having

* Inclosure in No. 390.

no resources of their own to fall back upon, would infallibly be guilty of the greatest disorders.

Again, Count Buol asserts that Her Majesty's Government had insisted on the disarmament of Sardinia alone. But this is not the case. Her Majesty's Government had, indeed, been prepared, in conjunction with France, to urge Sardinia to disarm, and to offer, if she would consent to do so, to guarantee, conjointly with France, the Sardinian territory against any attack on the part of Austria. But the French Government having declined to join in the proposed guarantee, and Her Majesty's Government being of opinion that it would be unreasonable to ask Sardinia to disarm without giving her the security which such a guarantee would have conferred upon her, the whole plan fell to the ground, and no proposition whatever in connection with that plan was made to Sardinia by Her Majesty's Government.

It is only within a few days that Her Majesty's Government, anxious to leave untried no expedient by which war might be averted, proposed to Sardinia, not indeed to disarm alone, but to join in a general disarmament, which was to be simultaneous, and preliminary to a Congress. Although the Government of Prussia co-operated with Her Majesty's Government, and no immediate result ensued from that proposal, Sardinia at last yielded to the representations addressed to her from all quarters, and on the 19th instant announced that she was prepared unconditionally to disarm.

I have thought it right to make these observations on the erroneous statements, as far as this country is concerned, in Count Buol's letter to Count Cavour; and, as regards the more general question of the course adopted by Austria in addressing to the Court of Turin the categorical demand contained in that letter, I have only to repeat that Her Majesty's Government deeply and sincerely deplore the precipitate step taken by the Court of Vienna.

Her Majesty's Government are still convinced that if more moderate counsels had held sway in that Court, and if a greater disposition had been shown candidly to weigh the various considerations which should have influenced it at this momentous crisis, the Cabinet of Vienna might, with honour and advantage to itself, and with infinite benefit to the rest of Europe, have left open a door for a satisfactory adjustment of Italian questions, and have averted a war of extreme opinions, which Europe is, unhappily, about to witness, which will imperil the maintenance of those Treaties which for forty-four years have been her landmarks, and which every friend of humanity will deplore.

Your Lordship will read, and give a copy of, this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 435. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury*.—(Rec. Ap. 26.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 24, 1859.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday,* I called on Count Walewski this afternoon, for the purpose of ascertaining whether his Excellency would be willing to accept the mediation of Her Majesty's Government to prevent the commencement of hostilities between France and Sardinia on the one side, and Austria on the other. As the suggestion had come from Prussia, I requested my Prussian colleague to prepare the ground for me by letting Count Walewski know that the Prussian Government leant to this idea.

I said to Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government being to the last desirous of doing all in their power to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, were ready to act upon a suggestion made by the Prussian Government that they should resume the mediation which had been dropped when the idea of a Congress was put forward.

But, in order that this mediation should have a chance of success, I must beg of him to tell me candidly whether the sentiments of the French Government were still in favour of a pacific solution of the present crisis, or whether they were resolved to profit by the fault made by Austria, and engage in war?

Count Walewski's reply expressed, in general terms, a conciliatory disposition. He said that, if the French Government could still see their way to a settlement of the Italian question by negotiation, they would not refuse mediation, but that events were hurrying on; that the terms of the Austrian summons were such as left but small hopes of a pacific solution; but that, still, he would not refuse to examine any distinct and positive terms of arrangement which might be made to him.

No. 436. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury*.—(Rec. Ap. 26.)

Paris, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—HAVING received, last night, a copy of Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram to your Lordship of 4.40 P.M.† yesterday, and being in possession this morning of your Lordship's telegram of 11.4 P.M.† yesterday, I conceived that I should be acting up to your Lordship's wishes in informing Count Walewski, in a confidential letter, that I had reason to believe that Austria would not object to opening direct negotiations with France on the bases of the four points already accepted by both Governments, and that I need hardly repeat to his Excellency the assurance that if the mediation of Her Majesty's Government could be of any utility, it was assured to both Governments beforehand.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

* No. 396.

† No. 416.

No. 437. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 26, 1859.

My Lord,—I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copy of a note which I have received to-day from the Austrian Minister at this Court,* stating that the Austrian Government accept the offer of the mediation of England to produce an understanding between Austria and France on the bases brought from Vienna by your Excellency.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 438. *Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff.*—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Duke of Malakoff.)

(Translation.)

April 26.

M. le Maréchal,—THE Government of the Emperor has known how to appreciate at their just value the efforts which have been made by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, since the origin of the present crisis, to preserve peace. I am willing to hope that, on its side, the English Cabinet renders full justice to the spirit of conciliation of which we have constantly given proof, and to the deference which we have shown for its counsels on several occasions.

We have thus reason to hope that the cordiality of our relations will remain intact, whatever may be the duties which the situation imposes upon us. These duties, M. le Maréchal, will be traced out to the Government of the Emperor by the determination at which Austria may definitively arrive.

It is manifest that if Piedmont is invaded, urgent and divers considerations will oblige us to interfere in the unequal struggle which would result. In truth Piedmont could not succumb without its defeat having the most serious consequences for France. Austria not being content with the position which the stipulations of 1815 assigned to her in the north of Italy, has wished to secure its preponderance in the whole of the Peninsula; and, contrary to the spirit of the stipulations upon which the equilibrium of Europe rests, the Cabinet of Vienna has forced the greater part of the States to enter into engagements, which endanger their independence, by placing them at its discretion. Piedmont alone, up to the present time, has succeeded in resisting these attempts, which have been made to attach it to the political system of Austria in Italy; and if it were conquered in the war by which it is menaced, if this last obstacle to the complete preponderance of Austria in the Peninsula were to disappear, a state of things would arise contrary to the equilibrium established by the Treaties, and which care for our own safety imperiously obliges us to prevent.

Independently of the interests which more particularly affect

* No. 420.

France, there are those to which England has never showed herself indifferent. Piedmont occupies an important position in the European system, which has been secured to her by Treaties, and of which it has showed itself worthy by the care which it has always taken to ameliorate its internal condition. The British Cabinet will remember that, in our joint efforts to induce the other States of Italy to take into consideration the wants and wishes of the populations, the progress accomplished by Piedmont is one of our principle arguments, and its example is one of our most powerful motives of action. England and France cannot forget, on the other side, the proofs of devotedness which Sardinia has given to their policy in circumstances which are still recent.

From all these considerations, the interest of England would seem of right to be due to Sardinia in the struggle which is about to commence ; and besides, should not England and France seek to come to an understanding on this question, with the entire confidence which has unceasingly subsisted in the relations between them ?

The Government of the Emperor, M. le Maréchal, being neither influenced by any *arrière pensée*, nor by any ambitious views, have no cause for silence, no cause for concealment, and would be quite ready to concert with the Government of Her Britannic Majesty the most suitable means of attaining an object which, in our opinion, should be common to the policy of the two Governments.

I request you, accordingly, to enter into explanations on this subject without any reservation, with Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State ; and even if the frank and loyal explanations exchanged on this occasion between the two Governments should not result in cementing a new alliance between them, they cannot fail to strengthen the friendly relations which we have always desired to maintain with the British Cabinet.

Receive, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

P.S.—I request you, M. le Maréchal, to read this despatch to Lord Malmesbury, and even to give him a copy of it if he expresses a wish to that effect.

No. 439. *Baron Schleinitz to Count Bernstorff*.—(Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by Count Bernstorff, April 27.

(Translation.)

Berlin, April 23, 1859.

M. le Comte,—THE difference which has arisen between the Courts of Vienna, of Paris, and of Turin, on the subject of the affairs of Italy, has at present arrived at a phase in which I consider myself bound to point out to you the attitude which the Cabinet of the Prince Regent has resolved on taking.

You know that Russia had proposed to convoke the five Great Powers in Congress, and that four points had been defined by England, to serve as base to the deliberations of this Congress.

These propositions, to which we had given our support, were accepted by Austria. There still remained, however, two preliminary questions to decide; disarmament, and the admission of the Italian States. On this subject, after laborious and complicated negotiations, Prussia, France, Great Britain, and Russia, agreed on the following arrangement:—

1. General, effective, and simultaneous disarmament.
2. Arrangement of the details of this disarmament by six Commissioners, civil and military, delegated *ad hoc* by the Five Powers and Sardinia.
3. Meeting of the Congress to discuss political questions, as soon as the Commission had begun its work.
4. Invitation addressed to all the Italian States to take part in the Congress, in conformity with what was observed in 1821, at the Congress of Laybach.

This arrangement offered to the Powers which desired the success of the negotiations, a serious security for peace by the certainty of a general disarmament; it, moreover, appeared equitable to us, and in conformity with diplomatic precedents. After Sardinia had accepted it, the Four Powers recommended it to Austria in a friendly but pressing manner, as the last means of a pacific solution. This advice from the whole of Europe Austria opposed by a peremptory refusal to sit in a Congress of which Sardinia would form a part, and addressed to this latter a summons, to demand her immediate disarmament, and appointing to the Court of Turin a term of three days, to choose between the pure and simple accession to this demand and war.

The Cabinet of the Prince Regent could only deplore such a proceeding, which was contrary to what she had not ceased to urge upon Austria, and which must seriously compromise that Power with regard to the other Cabinets; we, therefore, lost not a single moment in expressing to the Cabinet of Vienna our disapprobation, and since our representations have remained fruitless, Prussia owed it to herself and to her position in Europe, to assert formally her opinion in so important an affair. It is with this object that Baron Werther has been commissioned to transmit an official note to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Notwithstanding the extreme importance of the situation, we cannot yet believe that we ought entirely to renounce the hope of a pacific solution. But, whatever may happen, we should have incurred a serious responsibility, and failed to observe the most simple rules of prudence, if, whilst actively working for the maintenance of peace, we had not, in the midst of so dangerous a crisis, allowed the possibility of an armed conflict to enter into our forebodings. In face of so deplorable an eventuality, the Royal Government was obliged to place itself in a position to preserve the inviolability and the integrity of the territory of the Germanic Confederation. It is with this object that it has

just called under their flags the reserve of three corps d'armée, destined to form its federal contingent, and that, on its imitation, the Diet of Frankfort has voted the placing on a war footing of the other Contingents of the Confederation.

I consider it the more important to assert here the purely defensive character of these measures, since it by no means enters into the intentions of the Royal Cabinet to deviate from the line of conduct which it has hitherto followed, and to quit its reserved and expectant attitude. Prussia, without doubt, would not fail in her duty, if the rights which Europe has guaranteed to the Germanic Body were attacked; but beyond this duty, the limits of which are traced by the Treaties of 1815, she preserves an entire liberty of action, and free from engagements with any one, she will never cease to devote her efforts to the re-establishment of peace and general tranquillity.

Authorising you, M. le Comte, to declare yourself to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of this despatch.

I seize, &c.

SCHLEINITZ.

No. 440. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 27.)
(Extract.)

Berlin, April 25, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a translation of the proposition to the German Diet to call out the Federal contingents, which has been made by Prussia, and immediately passed into a resolution.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure.—*Proposition of the Prussian Government at Frankfort, April 23, 1859, for setting on a War Footing the Federal Contingents.*

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to a telegraphic announcement, the Assembly of the Diet has, at its sitting of yesterday, finally deliberated on the Prussian proposition as to the Federal Contingent being placed on a war footing. The proposition and the motive for it, as the Prussian Plenipotentiary, according to the instructions of his Government, brought them forward, run as follows:—"Since the commencement of the Italian crisis Prussia, animated by the high motive of preserving the peace of Europe, and, in concert with the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg, has directed her most hearty endeavours to bring to a peaceful issue, by friendly mediation, the discord existing between the Governments of France and Sardinia, on the one hand, and of Austria on the other.

"It seemed that the means most likely to bring about this issue would be that the affair should become the subject of the common deliberation of an European Congress. Unfortunately all efforts

in this direction have been, up to the present time, without result.

“The duty of preserving to Europe the blessings of peace, is too important for Prussia to discontinue her exertions in its favour, and to give up her hopes of the attainment of that object. Yet the Prussian Government cannot conceal from its confederates its conviction that, according to the present appearance of affairs, the disturbance of the peace of Europe seems to be seriously threatened. The position of the Confederation, in the middle of universal armaments on an extensive scale, has long been a matter of mature consideration to the King's Government; and, whilst it has already afforded its willing co-operation to individual precautionary measures connected with the organization of means of defence, she now thinks the time has come for her to give her assistance to general measures which, having in view the armaments in neighbouring States, have for their object the establishment of a corresponding state of defence for the German Confederation.

“For this object only, and animated by the desire to co-operate at the right moment in the interest of the credit and safety of the Confederation, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased to order three Prussian army corps to be placed on a war footing, which are destined to form the Federal contingent.

“His Royal Highness has a right to expect that this step will meet with a proper appreciation on the part of the German Confederation, whose efforts, in conjunction with those of Prussia, have been perceived with satisfaction and duly recognized. Moreover, in taking this step, Prussia puts aside all idea of aggression, since she intends in future, as heretofore, to keep her position as a mediating Power in the impending European question, in doing which she is also acting for the benefit of the Confederation; since now, in the opinion of the Government, the moment is come for the United Confederation, not losing sight of the defensive character of the aim of the Confederation, to set on foot such armaments as will place her in a position calmly to await the development of events, whatever may be their results. I therefore, in conformity with my instructions, put forward the motion:—

“That the Diet resolve to move the Governments of the Confederation to mobilize their contingents, and at the same time to make all requisite preparations in the Federal fortresses.”

No. 441. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 27, 1859.

My Lord,—In my despatch to your Lordship of yesterday's date,* I have instructed you to point out to Count Buol the incorrectness of some of the statements contained in his letter to

* No. 434.

Count Cavour, summoning Sardinia to disarm. These mis-statements are repeated in the report which your Lordship gives in your despatch of the 21st instant,* of Count Buol's observations on my despatch of the 11th instant,† which you communicated to his Excellency; and I have to remark that you would have done well at once to point out to Count Buol, that so far from assenting to the demand of Austria that the Sardinian Free Corps should be immediately disbanded, Her Majesty's Government repeatedly and earnestly remonstrated against that measure.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 442. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 27, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE to instruct you to inform Prince Gortchakoff that the Cabinet of Vienna having declined to accept the specific part of the proposals offered by Her Majesty's Government for the adoption of their allies on the 18th instant, which contemplated the admission to the Congress of the Representatives of the Italian States on the same footing on which they were admitted to the Congress of Laybach, Her Majesty's Government have considered that, consistently with the dignity of this country, no other course remained for them to pursue than to abandon all further attempts at assembling a Congress of the Five Great Powers on the affairs of Italy; and they will, accordingly, decline to take part in any such meeting, even if any further proposal were made to them to do so.

Her Majesty's Government sincerely regret that all the efforts which they have made to induce other Powers to contribute to carrying out to a successful issue the proposal made by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg for assembling an European Congress, by whose intervention Europe might be spared from the calamities of war, have proved unavailing; but Prince Gortchakoff will do them the justice to admit that they have laboured earnestly in the cause of peace, and have co-operated cordially and sincerely with the Russian Government for that purpose.

Although Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the results of the communications which Lord Cowley held with the Court of Vienna might have enabled them, by the exertion of their separate and unaided good offices, to reconcile the conflicting interests and wishes of the parties more immediately engaged in Italian affairs, they nevertheless yielded, without hesitation, to the invitation of Russia, and agreed to take part in the joint intervention proposed by that Power.

Her Majesty's Government had no direct interest at stake; but, as common friends and allies of all parties, they were anxious to contribute, as far as possible, to allay animosities, to reconcile

* No. 403.

† No. 273.

differences, to disarm suspicions, and to establish, on a firm and permanent basis, the peace and tranquillity of Italy. They have shrunk from no toil, and they have spared no sacrifices, consistent with the national honour of England, to effect these objects; while, in the united action of Russia and Great Britain for objects so beneficent, they saw an additional proof and pledge of the entire re-establishment of friendly relations between these two Empires.

But all has been to no purpose, and Her Majesty's Government are reluctantly compelled, in deep discouragement, to abandon all further hope of averting from Europe the calamities which threaten her.

In such a state of things, Her Majesty's Government can only be guided by what is due to the dignity and interest of the British Empire, and those prescribe to them the obligation of standing aloof from the contending parties, and of ceasing to interpose their efforts to stay the excited passions of antagonistic nations. But if, in the course of events, these feelings should subside, and the contending parties will allow reason to resume her sway, and they evince a desire to have recourse to the good offices of a friendly power for the reconciliation of their differences, the British Government will always be found at its post as a friend of humanity, and as an ardent promoter of peace.

Looking, however, to the results of the late attempts to settle these matters by an European Congress, and to the difficulties and disappointments with which they have so effectually struggled, Her Majesty's Government cannot anticipate that any state of things should arise which would now induce them again to listen to a proposal to take part in such an Assembly.

Her Majesty's Government believe that if their good offices are hereafter requested, their single action would be more likely to contribute to the restoration of peace, than a complicated negotiation in which other Powers, though equally sincere and anxious with themselves, should be called upon to participate.

You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, and give his Excellency a copy of it.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 443. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 27, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE acquainted you, by telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government have received from the Cabinet of Vienna intimation of its acceptance of British mediation between Austria and France, in a direct negotiation, on the basis of the four points, which it had been arranged should form the subject of the deliberations of the Congress. The mediation, therefore, would, in this case, be resumed at the point where it was interrupted by the interposition of the idea of a Congress, whereby the carrying out of the results

of Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna by the separate action of Her Majesty's Government was precluded.

To any such mediation as that in which Her Majesty's Government are now prepared to engage, the general and simultaneous disarmament of the three antagonistic Powers will necessarily be a preliminary.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 444. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Received Ap. 28.)
(Extract.)

Turin, April 24, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that volunteers from all parts of Italy continue to arrive here, and the number already enrolled may be estimated to amount to 15,000. Considerable numbers, however, have been drafted into the regular army.

With regard to the movement of the Sardinian troops, I may observe that for some time past the bulk of them have been withdrawn from the frontier, and concentrated on the lines extending from Alessandria on the right to the valley of the Dora Baltea on the left, having Casale for the centre.

In this position the Sardinian army will await any immediate attack.

No. 445. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Received Ap. 28.)

Turin, April 24, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith copy of the note* addressed by Count Buol to Count Cavour, calling upon Sardinia to disband her free corps, and place her army on a peace footing; which was delivered to his Excellency yesterday, at 5.30 P.M., by Baron Kellersberg.

Count Cavour placed this document in my hands himself.

I have, &c.

L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

No. 446. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 28.)

Turin, April 24, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inform you Lordship that the project of law for conferring extraordinary powers on His Majesty the King during the war, passed the Chamber of Deputies yesterday, the numbers being 136 in favour of, and 24 against, its adoption.

I have, &c.

L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

No. 447. *Mr. West to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 28.)

Turin, April 24, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd instant,† I have the honour to state to your Lordship that

* See Inclosure in No. 390.

† No. 371.

at an interview which the Prussian Minister and myself had this day with Count Cavour, I pressed upon his Excellency the expediency of framing the answer to the Austrian ultimatum in such terms as to make it appear that Sardinia having accepted the principle of general disarmament to be carried out by a Civil and Military Commission, in accordance with the advice of England and France, she referred the Austrian Cabinet to those Powers to settle the matter in dispute. My Prussian colleague, who was in possession of somewhat similar instructions, cordially supported my suggestion, and added, on the part of his Government, that he trusted the answer to the summons would be delayed as long as possible, in the hopes that the Powers would find some means of arriving at a peaceable solution of the question. His Excellency said that he was in no hurry to deliver the answer, and that of this we might assure our respective Governments. He then proceeded to say that the Austrian note was couched in terms which required a concise answer, and that it appeared to him inexpedient and useless to enter into arguments as to the reasons upon which the answer of the Sardinian Government was founded. His Excellency, however, did not leave us without hope that the reply would be found to bear in some measure the sense of our suggestion. He then went on to speak of the note of Count Buol, which he held in his hand, and turning to me said, that it was with much surprise that he had read that paragraph in it which related to the proposition, on the part of Austria, that the disarmament alone of Sardinia should precede the meeting of the Congress, having met with the support of the British Government. I rejoined, that his Excellency must be well aware that Her Majesty's Government had resisted this demand on the part of Austria, and had maintained that the disarmament of Sardinia should be placed on the same footing with that of other Powers, and that if Count Buol intended to convey that Her Majesty's Government had ever supported the former proposition, I must express likewise my astonishment at an assertion so unfounded. His Excellency then alluded to the coming conflict, and, after requesting Count Brassier de St. Simon to interest himself in behalf of the Sardinian Consuls at Milan and Venice, placed a copy of the ultimatum in our hands.

I have, &c.

L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

No. 448. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Turin, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—By Royal Decree under date of the 22nd instant, the King's army in the field is to be composed of five divisions of Infantry and one of Cavalry : their composition is left to the discretion of the War Minister.

The divisions at present in the field are those of General Cialdini,

at Cigliano ; of General Fanti, at Tortona ; of General Cucchiari, at Casale ; of General Giannotti, at Alessandria.

General Sonnaz will command one wing of the army, General Alfonso della Marmora the other. The King will command in Chief, and the Prince Napoleon will be attached to His Majesty with a Corps d'Armée.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 449. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Turin, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to report that this morning, soon after my arrival, I called upon Count Cavour, and inquired of his Excellency the state of affairs at this capital.

He related to me the facts connected with the arrival of the Austrian Commissioners charged to demand the immediate disarmament of Sardinia, and said that the answer of this country was not yet put on paper ; but as far as he saw his way, the King's Government intended to reply very much according to the advice tendered by the Cabinets of St. James's and of Berlin, as communicated through this Legation on the 22nd instant.

I am to have an audience of the King to-morrow.

The spirit of this country seems to be unanimous in supporting the King to the utmost in resisting what is considered a most unjust provocation on the part of Austria.

In Savoy this was particularly the case, and along the line of road I travelled I heard nothing but declarations of loyalty and devotion to the House of Savoy.

The unanimous vote of the Senate this day will point out to your Lordship how readily that body has come to His Majesty's assistance in granting him full powers, and how entirely they rely upon his word to restore the Constitution intact, after he shall have used his best efforts to defend his kingdom and their liberties.

The Piedmontese troops march readily to the front. The Austrian troops are massed at Pavia. Those of France on the triangle formed by Lyons, Grenoble, and Marseilles.

General Bernard arrived at Turin this morning. He is to command a French corps of Infantry in Piedmont. General Baraguay d'Hilliers is said to have sailed from Toulon, and heavy smoke is reported as visible to the westward from Genoa. It is said here that 70,000 French troops are so disposed as to be able to enter Piedmont in from eight to ten days.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 450. *Mr. Paget to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 28.)

Dresden, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a

Decree, signed by the King, and countersigned by all the Ministers, containing the regulations for procuring a supply of horses for the Saxon army, in the event of its not being possible to obtain a sufficient number by voluntary sale, has been published in the "Dresden Journal" of the 24th instant.

According to the terms of this Decree a list of all horses possessed by private individuals is to be made, under the directions of the Minister of War, by the local authorities in the towns and country. Two Commissioners, one on the part of Government, and the other chosen by the proprietors of horses in each district, are to be appointed to name the price for each horse; but, in the event of difference in their valuation, a third Commissioner, chosen by mutual consent, will decide on the ultimate price to be paid.

The only exceptions from these regulations are Government employés who require horses in the performance of their official duties.

I have, &c.

A. PAGET.

No. 451. *Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Apr. 28.)

Frankfort, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the proposal of the Prussian Government to put the Federal contingents and fortresses in a state of preparation for war ("Kriegsbereitschaft") was made in the Diet on Saturday (as I had the honour of reporting would be the case, by a telegram sent on Friday night), and unanimously agreed to.

This step appears to have given immediate occasion to the announcement that a French corps is being assembled as an army of observation, to be commanded by the Duke of Malakoff, with his head-quarters at Nancy, and that Russia will also place a strong force on her western frontier, the command of which will be given to General Luders.

I have, &c.

A. MALET.

No. 452. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday, stating your opinion that Austria would not consent to the terms to which you had heard, from Lord Cowley, that France might be brought to agree, namely, that Austria should suspend the invasion of Sardinia, and agree to meet in Congress with preliminary disarmament; and I have to instruct you to ascertain whether the Austrian Government would be willing to accept the direct mediation of this country between France and Austria, on condition that the armies of Austria, France, and Sardinia, should remain in the positions which they now occupy, and should

receive no reinforcements, nor undertake any military movement for the space of three weeks, while mediation is in progress. The first question to which such mediation would apply would, in that case, be a general disarmament as between France and Austria.

Her Majesty's Government are inclined to believe that the Government of France would be willing to come into an agreement of this kind, although it will not entertain the notion of disarmament previous to mediation; and it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the suggestion which they now offer may be adopted by both parties, without any sacrifice of military honour.

Her Majesty's Government wish further that your Lordship should endeavour to ascertain whether the Cabinet of Vienna would be inclined to assent to an agreement by which the intervention of Austria in the internal affairs of the Italian States would be absolutely renounced. Unless Austria is prepared to acquiesce in such a course, mediation will be unavailing; but it can scarcely be doubted, and from what passed between Count Buol and Lord Cowley the Austrian Minister seemed to be of that opinion, that the position of Austria in Italy would be much stronger if she were to assent to a policy of non-intervention, than it now is, when Austria is not only liable to be called upon at any moment, however inconvenient to herself, to take part in the civil troubles of other Italian States, but is exposed to the continual suspicion, on the part of other Powers, that she cherishes designs inconsistent with the independence of those States, and incompatible with the good government of their subjects.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 453. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Berlin, April 26, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translation of the circular and memorandum forwarded by Baron Schleinitz on the 22nd instant, to the Representatives of Prussia at the German Courts, explaining the position of the Government as modified by the Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia, with special reference to the view taken by Prussia of the obligations of the Confederation in presence of the aggressive attitude assumed by Austria.

I have, &c.

BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure.—*Circular to Prussian Representatives at German Courts.*
(Translation.)

Berlin, April 22, 1859.

THE opening of the intended Congress for the regulation of the Italian question, for a long while met with an impediment in the circumstance that the Powers concerned could come to no agreement as to putting a stop to the preparations for war,

Whilst France, namely, wished to make the question of disarmament the object of negotiation in Congress, Austria demanded a general disarmament, inclusive of Sardinia, previous to the opening of Congress.

The mediating Powers, however, had succeeded within the last few days in at length obtaining for the latter proposition the consent of France and Sardinia. On the other hand, all the Italian Governments concerned were to be invited to the Congress of the Five Powers in the same manner as had taken place at the Congress of Laybach.

Thus a basis for the Congress seemed at last obtained. Prussia, England, Russia, France, and Sardinia had unanimously adopted it, and the same could be expected of Austria. That which, only a few days previously, was hardly to be expected, namely, the meeting of the Congress, and with it the taking of an important step in the direction of peace appeared, at the eleventh hour, likely to be fulfilled.

The most urgent invitations to give in her adhesion were sent by the mediating Powers to Austria. To these invitations the Vienna Cabinet has answered by serving an ultimatum on Sardinia, threatening, within a delay of three days, to attack her in the event of her not immediately disarming. The possible offer on the part of Sardinia to disarm under condition of being admitted to the Congress, is, by anticipation, distinctly declared as an equivalent to a refusal to disarm.

This step has, in the highest degree, surprised us, and occasions us, we cannot deny it, the deepest regret. The unexpected move on the part of Austria has as good as broken off every friendly mediation, and without sufficient cause, has made the breaking out of war almost a certainty.

For ourselves the mode of proceeding has been all the more undesirable that the Austrian ultimatum coincides, in order of time, with the return of the Archduke Albert from here to Vienna, and with our motion for putting the contingents of the Confederation on a war footing. By this coincidence it is but too likely to appear as if the Austrian measure rested upon a joint plan previously agreed upon; and under what sort of light, we ask, under this supposition, quite incorrect as it is, would our conduct appear in the eyes of the other mediating Powers?

The truth of the matter is, that we met the intention of serving an ultimatum on Sardinia, which was communicated to us in the most confidential manner, by warning Austria of the consequences (*"abmahnend entgegen geheten"*), and consequently we considered ourselves justified in hoping that no effect would be given to that intention. This, moreover, took place before we knew the last favourable offers of France and Sardinia.

On the other hand also before these favourable offers had afforded a fresh prospect of arriving at an understanding, we had

come to the determination of recommending to the Confederation the coming to a decision for putting the contingents on a war footing ("Kriegsbereitschaft").

We postponed our motion, as the question of the meeting of the Congress seemed to enter a more favourable phase. As, however, the last step taken by Austria seemed to render the war in Italy a certainty, we could not, in the interest of the security of Germany, any longer delay our proposition at Frankfort. This proposition, then, does coincide with the ultimatum of Austria; but, as regards its object, it is very far from being intended to serve as a support to the steps taken by Austria.

The Imperial Government has now, as regards Sardinia, undertaken the part of aggressor, and if there ever could have been a doubt upon the question as to whether Austria could claim, in a war for her Italian Provinces, the support of the German Confederation, under present circumstances, Section XLVI of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna pronounces a strong negative over every such doubt.

This matter is treated more in detail in the Pro-memoria, copy of which is herewith inclosed.

On our part, we are firmly determined not to allow ourselves to be dragged by Austria into a war against our will. Every attempt made in this direction will be resisted by us in the most determined manner; nor do we intend to let ourselves be influenced by any votes of a majority.

True it is, that a case of this nature would be much to be deplored, and that it would certainly not be to the advantage of Germany that a split of this nature should take place in the Confederation, but the responsibility would fall upon the shoulders of those from whom the attempt proceeded.

We shall take care to maintain the safety of German territory; but for everything beyond that we reserve to ourselves the fullest freedom of decision.

I was anxious by means of this communication to give your Excellency a cue to the true state of affairs. It is intended for your personal information; but you may, by reading it, bring it to the confidential knowledge of the Court to which you are accredited.

P.S.—The warning alluded to above was of the most urgent kind. It laid down the consequences of such a step in the most unreserved and decisive terms.

Inclosure.—*Promemoria.*

(Translation.)

THE Members of the Confederation (by Section XI of the Federal Act) have reciprocally guaranteed their possessions to each other, in so far as the same are comprehended within the Confederation.

The avowed object of the Confederation is mainly defensive, that is, maintenance of the independence and inviolability of the States coming within the pale of the Confederation (Section I of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna).

The Confederation possesses as a united body ("Gesamtmacht") the right to determine on peace and war, and to conclude alliances and other kinds of Treaties. According to the recorded purpose of the Confederation, however, that body exercises those rights only for the purpose of self-defence (Section XXXV of the Final Act of Congress).

The question arises :

What course is to be followed when a Federal State, which at the same time has possessions outside the territory of the Confederation, becomes in this its quality of European Power involved in a war?

There are under such an hypothesis two cases possible. Either such a Power is the party attacking, or it is the party attacked.

With reference to the first case, Article XLVI of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna lays down the rule of action ; with regard to the latter, Article XLVII.

Article XLVI says ;—

"If a Federal State, which at the same time has possessions outside the territory of the Confederation, begins a war in its character of European Power, such war, touching neither the relations nor the engagements of the Confederation, remains wholly foreign to that body."

This case would arise if, for instance, Austria were to find herself called upon to declare war against Sardinia, and were in consequence to take measures for attacking Piedmont.

A war of this kind would remain to the Confederation, as such, wholly foreign.

This appears quite clear, when we consider that in such a case the war would rest upon the free determination of the Federal State that was the attacking party.

What could, in such a case, move the Confederation, in its purely defensive character, to assist the aggressor, and that for purposes lying quite without the sphere of the Confederation?

A more favourable decision would be admissible in the event of the Federal State concerned being attacked, and therefore involved in a war against its will. And yet, even in this case, the fundamental law of the Confederation adheres to the leading and main principle that the Confederation has to confine itself to the defence of the Federal Territory.

In this second case, where the Federal State is the party attacked, Article XLVII lays down the rule of action :—

"In cases where a Federal State is threatened or attacked in its non-Federal possessions, the Confederation is only so far bound to take measures for a common defence or for participation and

assistance, as the same recognizes the existence of a danger to the Federal territory."

Whether such a danger is to be recognised as existing or not is matter of decision by a majority in the narrower Assembly of the Diet.

Here then, likewise, the action of the Confederation has for its object and purpose only the defence of the Federal territory, not the interests of the Federal State immediately concerned that go beyond this defence; although, upon the other hand, according to the circumstances of the individual case, for the sake of defending the Federal territory, the rendering of assistance beyond the mere protection of the frontier may appear necessary.

The *sine quâ non* condition for the intervention of the Confederation remains, however, the *de facto* existence of danger to the Federal territory. Such danger may, under any given circumstances, be doubtful, and its recognition must then be settled by a majority of the voices of the members of the Confederation. But it in no way rests with the good pleasure of the majority to determine arbitrarily upon rendering assistance where a *de facto* danger to the Federal territory does not exist.

Such a determination would transgress the bounds within which the Confederation has circumscribed its sphere of action, and which determine and limit its competence and duties (Section III of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna). It would in consequence be against the Federal Constitution, and therefore not binding. For only such decisions as fall within the limits of the competence of the Federal Assembly are in accordance with the Federal Constitution (Section X of Final Act of Congress of Vienna).

It was a transgression in this direction when, at the very commencement of the Italian crisis, it was maintained in many quarters, that the point at issue was not whether a violation of federal territory were threatened, but that it sufficed that the Italian possessions of Austria, with the eventuality of the Imperial State being thereby weakened, should be endangered, in order to empower a majority of the Diet to decree the rendering of Federal aid.

Views of this kind were opposed at the time by the King's Government with all its might, and it is beyond doubt that the European position of Prussia would be utterly lost if she were to allow herself, after this fashion, to be dominated by Austria, assisted by a majority of the Diet.

If Prussia recognizes a distinct danger for Germany, and at the same time for her own interests, she will, as a matter of course, take the lead, but she will never consent to receive passively a given direction from the Diet.

That Austria did not formerly look upon the protection of her Italian Provinces as a self-understood duty on the part of Prussia

and the Confederation, is plainly evident, from her former endeavours, at one time, to enter upon Treaties of reciprocal guarantee for our respective possessions outside the Confederation; at another, to obtain for the whole of her possessions, and especially for her Italian Provinces, entrance within the pale of the Confederation.

No. 454. *Capt. Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Berne, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—THE Federal Council, in a sitting yesterday, decreed that the 3rd and 13th Divisions of the Federal army should hold themselves in readiness, with the exception of the reserves of those Divisions.

The staff of these Divisions will be at once called out, as well as the staff of one of the brigades of the 7th Division, and also the battalions No. 8 (Tessin), No. 15 (Grisons), the half battalion No. 75 (Uri), and the Rifle Company No 45 (Tessin).

The Federal Assembly will be called together in the event of war being declared.

I have, &c.

E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 455. *Capt. Harris to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Berne, April 25, 1859.

My Lord,—THE President of the Swiss Confederation informed me this afternoon that he had received intelligence that the French troops had entered Piedmont to-day by the Victor Emmanuel Railway, as fast as the trains could convey them.

The President also informed me that the Sardinian steam-boats on the Lago Maggiore had taken refuge on the Swiss shore. The Federal Government have given notice to that of Sardinia that these vessels must refrain from any movement which would compromise the neutrality of Switzerland.

I have, &c.

E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 456. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Paris, April 26, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Lordship's telegram of 11.30 yesterday* did not reach me until too late to call upon Count Walewski, but I lost no time in addressing his Excellency a letter, in which I offered, under your Lordship's instructions, the mediation of Her Majesty's Government to effect a direct negotiation between France and Austria. I suggested that Sardinia having already agreed to a general, simultaneous, and effective disarmament, Austria and France might come to an amicable understanding with each other as to disarmament, which might form the first

* No. 415.

subject of deliberation between them. This point determined, the direct negotiation between France and Austria for the settlement of the Italian question on the basis of the four points already accepted by both might be entered upon. I concluded my letter by stating that Her Majesty's Government made the same proposal at Vienna; that they saw in it an honourable solution for all parties of the present deplorable crisis; and that they earnestly recommended it to the consideration of the Imperial Government as the last chance for preserving peace. I added that, if accepted by the Imperial Government, France would undertake to watch over the interests of Sardinia.

Late last night I received a reply from Count Walewski, in which he stated that he had discussed the proposal at length with the Emperor; that the French Government was always disposed *à priori*, as they had already given abundant proofs, to receive with readiness any suggestions or proposals coming from England; but that unfortunately he did not think that a direct negotiation, undertaken at this moment, between France and Austria could have any life in it. He considered, moreover, that it was impossible to set Sardinia aside; and that in fact, since the summons addressed to Sardinia by Count Buol, it was Austria and Sardinia that were in presence, and it was between these two Powers that a mediation should be exercised. If, however, continues Count Walewski's letter, Austria would consent to the admission of the Italian States, it might be possible to fall back upon the Congress, a previous understanding being come to upon the question of disarmament—a question, however, which, Count Walewski remarks, has become more complicated by the incidents of the last few days.

Count Walewski, however, does not conceal from himself the difficulty of this proceeding, and he terminates his letter by saying that, unless Austria completely abandons her errors, and accepts everything which she has until now refused, he sees but little serious chance of renewing negotiations.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 457. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Paris, April 26, 1859.

My Lord,—AFTER receiving this morning your Lordship's despatch of yesterday's date,* I called upon Count Walewski. I said that I was anxious, in the first place, to correct a mistake which I had inadvertently made in my written communication to his Excellency yesterday in having stated that Her Majesty's Government had addressed a similar communication, offering their mediation, to the Austrian Government. I ought to have stated that Her Majesty's Government had reason to believe that if the

* No. 416.

French Government would accept the mediation and suggestions of Her Majesty's Government, the Austrian Government would themselves make to France proposals in accordance with those suggestions.

Before entering, however, upon the proposal which I had to make to Count Walewski, I was desirous, I said, to place before his Excellency what I presumed to be the motives which had actuated Austria in her late proceedings, but I begged his Excellency to believe that I was speaking from my own inferences only, and that I had no intention to qualify in any way the conduct of Austria, which, his Excellency knew, had been severely reprobated by Her Majesty's Government. I thought, however, it might be advantageous to discussion, if matters were placed in what I conceived to be their true light.

The position of Austria, I continued, has been this: she has been for nearly three months armed to the teeth, without an enemy to combat, for she had engaged not to attack Sardinia, while France remained in the background unarmed, but making preparations for war, and ready to arm at a moment's notice. This state of things imposed burdens upon Austria too great for her to bear any longer. She knew, however, that to escape from this intolerable position, she must make concessions. She was willing to make them to France, but not to Sardinia; but France was not yet in the field, and it was necessary to bring her upon the scene. A summons to Sardinia to disarm, accompanied by a menace, must force France to take a decided line. The summons had been sent. The consequences were known; but Austria, being now in a position to treat with France, was ready to do so. Hence the supreme effort to renew negotiations, and to avert, at the last moment, the calamities of war, made by Her Majesty's Government.

Count Walewski replied that he was inclined to agree with me in the inductions which I had drawn from the proceedings of Austria. He commented, however, on the singular infelicity of the moment chosen for sending the summons to Sardinia, in which, I, of course, concurred, though I think it probable that Austria, when she took the resolution of acting as she has done, believed with all the world that the disarmament of Sardinia would never be consented to by M. de Cavour's Government. When the contrary was made known to the Austrian Government, it was still necessary, in their view, to persist in the only course which could bring them face to face with France.

With respect to the proposal which I had been charged to make, Count Walewski repeated to me what he had said in his letter, quoted in my despatch above mentioned, that the offer of mediation made by Her Majesty's Government had been discussed at length between himself and the Emperor last night, with a sincere desire to find in it the possibility of an arrangement which

might still avert the outbreak of hostilities, but that they had come to the conclusion that direct negotiations with Austria would lead to no result. Although the Emperor had accepted the four points as the basis of negotiation for a Congress, and would have been satisfied with the settlement, by Europe, of the Italian question on those bases, the matter assumed an entirely different aspect if France was called upon to negotiate alone. Italy expected more than the four points would give; and, although France could not defend the interests of Italy against an arrangement which Europe might deem satisfactory, the case became altered when the whole responsibility would, as would be the case in direct negotiation, rest with the Imperial Government. If, then, direct negotiation was to be resorted to, Austria must be prepared to state beforehand what concessions she was disposed to make, and he must add that the ground of discussion (*"le terrain de discussion"*) must be changed.

I begged Count Walewski to explain himself more clearly. Did his Excellency's observations, I asked, tend to any modification of the Treaties of 1815?

"By no means," replied Count Walewski. "But to put a case hypothetically (for I do not suppose that Austria will ever do anything of the kind), supposing her to address herself to us, and to say that Austria and France being the two Powers most interested in the welfare of Italy, she wished to come to a direct understanding with us upon Italian affairs, she might begin by making reserves of territorial rights, concerning which she would receive every satisfactory assurance from us; but she must then be prepared to add that she is ready to abandon all the pretensions which she has had to exercise exclusive influence over Italy; that she abandons her separate Treaties, and will leave the Italian States to themselves; that she will help us, if we wish it, to form an Italian Confederation, and to introduce reforms into the different Governments."

"But are you," I inquired, ready to make similar declarations with regard to non-interference?"

His Excellency having replied in the affirmative, I said that I did not see in this any great variance from the four points.

"But then there are the fortresses," observed Count Walewski; "she must be prepared to surrender them."

"The fortresses," I replied, "she holds by European Treaties. It may be matter of regret that it is so, but the rights of Austria cannot be disputed."

Count Walewski argued that Austria had secured those rights by Treaties posterior to those of 1815; but I remarked that they were Treaties signed by a French Plenipotentiary, and equally binding as international acts, and that he might be assured that Austria would not be likely voluntarily to make such a sacrifice as his Excellency had indicated. Count Walewski

said that such also was his opinion, and therefore he considered direct negotiation to be impossible.

If, then, negotiations were to be renewed, continued his Excellency, it must be by Austria declaring that in face of the protestations of all Europe she abandons all thoughts of invading Piedmont, and that she accepts the Congress of the Five Powers, with the Italian States. I replied that under these circumstances I feared that negotiations were impossible.

Count Walewski then said that an opening would be given to Count Buol for entering into explanations by a message which had just been sent to the French Chargé d'Affairs at Vienna. M. de Banneville had been desired to inform Count Buol that the invasion of the Sardinian territory by Austrian troops, would be considered by the French Government as a declaration of war against France. If Count Buol chose to make any offer of a direct negotiation with France, he would thus have an opportunity of doing so. I observed that I could entertain no hopes of such being the result of the French declaration. I trusted I might prove wrong, but I could conceive nothing more likely, with a man of the Emperor of Austria's temperament, to produce the immediate invasion of Sardinia, than such a message as that with which M. de Banneville had been charged.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 458. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Paris, April 27, 1857.

My Lord,—COUNT WALEWSKI informed me yesterday that he had written to the Duke of Malakoff* a despatch, for communication to Her Majesty's Government, in which he had given assurances that the present attitude of the Imperial Government was dictated by no projects of conquest or ambition; that if war should break out, they would be sincerely desirous of establishing an understanding with Her Majesty's Government as to the objects of the war; and that if France could not in the pursuit of it count upon the material, she hoped at least for the moral, support of England.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 459. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)

Paris, April 27, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT WALEWSKI read to me yesterday M. de Cavour's note to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, asking for the assistance of France in presence of the summons to disarm made by the Austrian Government. A preliminary succour of 50,000 men is demanded.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 460. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)
(Extract.) Paris, April 27, 1859.

IN the course of the conversation which I had yesterday with Count Walewski, his Excellency said that he wished to speak to me on a point which he considered of great importance, namely, that if hostilities commenced between France and Austria, every effort should be made to localize the war, and prevent its extending beyond the Italian frontier. His Excellency thought that Her Majesty's Government might aid that of Prussia, whose conduct he eulogized, in calming the warlike spirit displayed in Germany.

I said that I could state without reference to your Lordship that, deploring as Her Majesty's Government do, the possibility of war, the first wish of their hearts must be to see the calamities which war entails as little extensive as possible; but I added, that I doubted whether Her Majesty's Government, under the uncertainty in which they stood with respect to the engagements existing between France and Russia, with the knowledge they had of Prince Gortchakoff's menacing language in reference to Austria, and in presence of reports that Russia was about to place an army of observation on the frontiers of Galicia, and was arming a fleet for the Mediterranean, could conscientiously take measures to prevent Germany giving to Austria that assistance of which, under such circumstances, she might soon stand in great need.

Count Walewski replied, that he had reason to think that Russia herself was extremely desirous to localise the war.

No. 461. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 28.)
(Extract.) Paris, April 27, 1859.

I took advantage of the interview which I had yesterday with Count Walewski upon the all-absorbing crisis which menaces Europe to speak to him in the sense of your Lordship's despatch of the 25th instant,* regarding the Treaty supposed to exist between France and Russia.

Count Walewski neither admitted nor denied the existence of a Treaty, though I infer from his language that there are engagements of some kind. He said that since the commencement of the Italian question there had been a constant exchange of opinions between the French and Russian Governments, but that, as any engagements which might exist between them did not bear on any existing international obligations, he had nothing to communicate to me on the subject.

This morning I received from Count Walewski a private letter, referring to this matter, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, together with a copy of my reply.

* No. 417.

Inclosure 1.—*Count Walewski to Earl Cowley.*

(Translation.)

Paris, April 26, 1859.

My dear Cowley,—THEY write to me from St. Petersburg that I have spoken to you of a secret Treaty between Russia and France. Since I desire that not the lightest cloud should obscure our relations, I wish to explain myself very frankly with you, without delay, on this subject.

You know as well as I do, that diplomatic usages do not admit of questions touching secret Treaties, from the very simple reason that, to consent to answer in the negative would be to establish implicitly that a refusal to answer on another occasion would be equivalent to a tacit avowal. Besides, if our conversation had not been of a strictly "private" character, you would not probably have thought of asking me such a question; and, if you had asked it, my duty would have obliged me to remind you that I could not admit a question to which I could answer neither yes nor no, and that, for the reasons which have been above mentioned. I had not thought it necessary to proceed in such a manner with you, taking the amicable and intimate character of our relations into consideration; anyhow, I have not spoken to you of a Treaty, but greatly wishing that you should not deceive yourself as to the nature of the relations which have been established between Russia and ourselves, I attempted in our conversation to rectify some erroneous ideas in this respect.

Thus, then, in order that there should be no misunderstanding between us, my dear Cowley, I must repeat to you, that it would not have been within my competence to accept a question touching the existence of secret Treaties, and that, in the confidential conversation which we had together, I said nothing which could imply the idea of a Treaty.

Accept, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

Inclosure 2.—*Earl Cowley to Count Walewski.*

My dear Walewski,

Paris, April 27, 1859.

I AM much obliged to you for your note of yesterday, received this morning. Permit me to reply to it with the same friendly frankness that you have used towards me. I cannot pretend to contest the right which you claim of peremptorily refusing to answer a question that may be put to you, whether regarding Secret or any other Treaties, or, indeed, anything else; but I cannot admit, either that the conversation to which you allude, when I first spoke to you of your supposed engagements with Russia, was a private one, or that I then put any question respecting a Secret Treaty. What passed, to the best of my recollection, was this: You had told me that, in your very laudable desire to maintain peace, you had pressed the Russian Government to declare themselves, and either to say that they were prepared to

assist you in a war against Austria, or else to press, with all their weight, at Turin to obtain the disarmament of Sardinia. I took that opportunity of mentioning to you the reports which were in circulation as to engagements existing between France and Russia : and I said that these reports had naturally caused anxiety to Her Majesty's Government, who would be very glad to know what truth there was in them. You replied, as it seemed to me with some little embarrassment, that all you could say was, that there existed no Treaty, offensive or defensive, between France and Russia. I am free to confess that I augured from this answer that some sort of Treaty did exist ; and I am sure that you will admit that I could not do otherwise than convey to Her Majesty's Government the impression which your words had left upon me ; but so far from putting any question to you respecting a Secret Treaty, I purposely abstained from so doing, feeling that you had told me all that you chose I should know. Indeed, I can in truth add that, up to that moment, I had given no credence to the report in question, convinced as I had been that, considering the intimate relations which existed between France and England, you could never have entered into engagements with a Power which, a few years back, had been a common enemy, without voluntarily stating to Her Majesty's Government the nature of those engagements. Yesterday, however, in speaking to you, I acted under direct instructions from Her Majesty's Government, dictated, no doubt, in part by the report of my previous conversation with you, but still more by an impression having obtained in England, that a Treaty did exist between France and Russia for a hostile alliance against England in certain eventualities. But even then, if my memory is correct, I did not speak of a Treaty, but of engagements, being desirous of avoiding any expression that could embarrass you ; and you may recollect, that when you expressed a wish that I should urge Her Majesty's Government to use what influence they had to prevent Germany from assisting Austria, I replied in the nature of a remark—and I particularly requested you to understand that I asked no further question upon the matter—that it would be difficult for Her Majesty's Government to press neutrality upon Germany *quoad* Austria, when, for aught they knew to the contrary, Russia might have bound herself to assist France.

I assure you that I deeply regret this misunderstanding, and am, with you, sincerely desirous that it may in no way interfere with those frank and cordial relations which have so long, and I should fain hope with some advantage to both Governments subsisted between us.

I remain, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 462. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—YOUR Excellency's communication with Count Walewski on the subject of Treaty engagements supposed to have been contracted between France and Russia, with reference to the present crisis, appear to have been confined to that engagement, whatever form it may have assumed, of which, as reported in your despatch of the 27th instant,* his Excellency seemed to admit the existence.

But Her Majesty's Government desire also to be informed in regard to that other Treaty of which they have received intimation from Berlin, and which is said to have been concluded on the 21st or 22nd instant, to involve an offensive and defensive alliance between France and Russia, and to impose upon the latter Power the obligation to declare war against Austria within fourteen days after she should have commenced hostilities against Sardinia.

I have to instruct your Excellency to request information from Count Walewski in regard to the existence of this second Treaty, and to the stipulations which it contains; and you may explain to his Excellency, in justification of your adverting to the matter, that the rumours relating to it which have got abroad have produced the most painful impression in this country.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 463. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE instructed your Excellency by the telegraph to make known to Count Walewski the acceptance by Austria of the offer of British mediation, with a view of bringing about a direct understanding between the Austrian and French Governments on the bases which your Excellency brought back from Vienna.

It is clear, therefore, that Austria will not attack Sardinia, if the tenor of the answer given by the latter to the Austrian summons to disarm is of a favourable nature.

It seems, however, from your telegram of yesterday, that France will not agree to direct negotiation with Austria on the four bases, though Count Walewski hints that she might find it difficult to refuse an offer to suspend the invasion of Sardinia, and to revert to the proposal for a Congress with preliminary disarmament.

I have instructed your Excellency to state that, after all that has happened, Her Majesty's Government consider themselves to be released from any proposals which they made, or agreements which they entered into, with respect to the Congress of which there was question; and I have since stated to your Lordship,

* No. 461.

with reference to the observations which fell from Count Walewski, that if France were to engage in direct negotiation with Austria it must be on larger bases than the four points hitherto proposed, that Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to renew negotiations for a Congress.

Her Majesty's Government have had too many difficulties from all sides to contend with, and if the attempt were again made to lay down basis for negotiation, the only result which would be likely to ensue would be a renewal of endless disputes, and a still bitterer development of the hostile feelings now existing.

But if the Government of France will consent, like Austria, to accept the mediation now offered by England, they may be assured of the cordial co-operation of this country in the attempt to mitigate or remove the evils with which Italy is now afflicted.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 464. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—It would seem that some portion of the force dispatched from France to the succour of Sardinia has been moved through Culoz, and over the Mont Cenis. This line of march has thus been through a portion of Savoy, the neutrality of which, under circumstances similar to the present, is distinctly provided for by the Treaties and other Acts of 1815, and specifically by the Act of November 20, 1815, which says: “Toutes les fois que les Puissances voisines de la Suisse se trouveront en état, d’hostilités ouvertes ou imminentes, les troupes de Sa Majesté le Roi de Sardaigne qui pourraient se trouver dans les provinces neutralisées, se retireront et pourront à cet effet passer par le Valais, si cela devient nécessaire; qu’aucunes autres troupes armées d’aucune Puissance ne pourront y stationner ni les traverser, sauf celles que la Confédération Suisse jugerait à propos d’y placer.”*

Her Majesty's Government are aware, from the Communications which have reached them from Berne, that the Swiss Government do not propose to raise any objection, founded on the Treaties, to the passage of the French troops along the road which traverses the neutralized portion of Savoy; but as parties to the Treaties by which the neutrality of that district was recognized, Her Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty to place on record that the march of the French troops through that district has been effected contrary to the Treaty engagements to which France, in common with other Powers, was a party.

* (Translation.)—“Whenever the neighbouring Powers of Switzerland shall be in a state of actual or impending hostility, such troops of His Majesty the King of Sardinia as may be in the neutral provinces shall withdraw, and may for that purpose pass by Le Valais, if expedient so to do; but no other armed troops of any Power shall be stationed in nor pass through them, except those that the Swiss Confederation shall think proper to place there.”

Your Excellency will give to Count Walewski a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 465. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—In consequence of the receipt of your Excellency's telegram of this day at noon, expressing your opinion that the French Government might consent to such an arrangement, I have instructed Lord Augustus Loftus to ascertain whether the Cabinet of Vienna would be disposed to enter into direct negotiations with France under British mediation, on the understanding that, whilst they are pending, the troops of the respective parties should not move from their present position, and that the French troops should not be augmented.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 466. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to point out to the French Government that, as the Cabinet of Vienna has accepted British mediation, and, as far as Her Majesty's Government are informed, has not yet moved her troops across the frontier, the blame of having precipitated matters will attach to France if she, on her part, refuses to accept that mediation, and sets the example of entering Piedmont with her armies.

The French Government, when your Excellency proceeded to Vienna, would have been satisfied with obtaining from Austria engagements in substance the same as those to which your Excellency saw reason to conclude that Austria was prepared to subscribe; and, if those bases could be now secured, provision would be made for the objects which it is most essential to obtain. For, proceeding on those bases, the future occupation by Austria of parts of Italy beyond her own frontier might be guarded against; administrative reforms might be introduced into the States of Italy, and the neutrality and Confederation of those States might be provided for; and mutual declarations might be obtained from Austria and Sardinia, whereby jealousy and distrust on either side might be dispelled.

But if, as your Excellency's account of Count Walewski's language seems to show, the French Government would require a direct negotiation between Austria and France to rest on more extended bases, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that such bases would necessarily involve an infraction of the Treaties of 1815, against which Her Majesty's Government must strongly protest.

In the hope, however, that the French Government will, on

reconsideration, be content to enter into negotiation with Austria on the bases originally contemplated, Her Majesty's Government will not take as final their refusal to accept British mediation for that purpose.

I take this opportunity of adding that, as far as Her Majesty's Government, can interpret the several statements of Count Apponyi and Lord Augustus Loftus, the Cabinet of Vienna does not insist upon the previous disarmament of Sardinia, but only that it should be effected simultaneously with that of France and Austria.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 467. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Scarlett.*

Foreign Office, April 28, 1859.

Sir, — I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday, announcing the intention of the Grand Duke to withdraw from Tuscany, in consequence of the insurrectionary movement which had taken place at Florence; and I have lost no time in authorizing you, by telegraph, to offer, in case of need, an asylum to the Grand Duke and his family on board of any British ship of war that may be at Leghorn, and a passage to any port that His Imperial Highness may name. It is desirable, however, that the ship of war should not leave Leghorn unless absolutely required to do so.

As regards yourself, you will remain at Florence until further orders; and you will keep Her Majesty's Government as fully informed as possible of the events that may occur in Tuscany.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 468. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Apr. 29.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 28, 1859.

AFTER the departure, yesterday, of my despatch of yesterday,* in which I inclosed to your Lordship copies of letters which had passed between Count Walewski and myself, with reference to a Treaty supposed to exist between France and Russia, I received a further written communication from his Excellency.

In the evening I saw his Excellency, and he reverted to the subject. The object of this letter, he said, had been to establish that he had never told me that there was a Treaty in existence.

I admitted that fact, and explained how it had happened that an erroneous impression on that point had gone abroad.

He then went on to say that he could assure me, that in all the communications and projects which had been exchanged between the French and Russian Governments, nothing had passed which treated directly or indirectly on British interests. They had reference solely to the Italian question, and if the overtures made

* No. 461.

by the French Government, through the Duke of Malakoff, to come to a common understanding with Her Majesty's Government as to the objects of the war—if war there was to be—were answered as his Excellency hoped, everything that had passed between the French and Russian Cabinets should be freely communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

I asked Count Walewski whether I might give Her Majesty's Government the assurance that there was no understanding between France and Russia on Eastern affairs. I asked the question, I said, because the language of Russian Agents abroad gave Her Majesty's Government a right to suspect that Russia would no longer defend the Treaties of 1815, if she could secure thereby the abrogation of the Treaty of 1856.

Count Walewski replied in a tone which carried conviction to my mind, that he could give me his word that there was not a syllable of truth in the report. All allusion to Eastern affairs had been studiously avoided by France.

His Excellency added, that the existence of a Treaty, offensive and defensive, with Russia, having appeared in the newspapers, he entirely contradicted it. At first it had been decided that the contradiction should appear in the "*Moniteur*," but it had been thought afterwards that such a proceeding would give too much importance to the rumour, and the denial would be inserted in other papers.

No. 469. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Apr. 29.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 28, 1859.

EARLY yesterday morning official intelligence reached Paris by the telegraph that the Austrians had entered Sardinia the night before. I felt that it would be useless, in the excitement which prevailed, to attempt to follow up the last proposal of Her Majesty's Government; but the intelligence having been contradicted in the course of the day, and having received further despatches from your Lordship desiring me to urge on the French Government the acceptance of the offer of mediation made by Her Majesty's Government, I saw Count Walewski last night.

His Excellency, though stating himself to be anxious to avail himself, even at this the eleventh hour, of any chance of renewing negotiations, gave me but little hope that the Emperor would entertain the proposals made by Her Majesty's Government. There might be a chance, he said, of obtaining His Imperial Majesty's consent to direct negotiation with Austria if all parties were to remain armed during the negotiations. Unfortunately, I could say nothing to this, because, although there may have been some obscurity in the telegram of Lord Augustus Loftus respecting the period of disarmament, Count Buol's telegrams to M. de Hübner left no doubt upon the subject. Count Buol states that

he has accepted the mediation of Her Majesty's Government to bring about direct negotiations with France, but that Austria insists, as before, on the previous disarmament of Sardinia. If, however, that previous disarmament can be insured by the simultaneous disarmament of Austria and France, Austria has no objection. Count Buol reserves also full liberty of action with regard to entering Sardinia. With the knowledge of this despatch, I could not risk making a proposal, as agreed to by Austria, which Austria might afterwards repudiate, and I was forced to maintain the condition of previous disarmament. But I lost no time in inquiring both of your Lordship and of Lord Augustus Loftus, by telegraph, whether the principle of an armed negotiation would be accepted by the British and Austrian Governments.

In the meantime a copy of the principal passages of Count Cavour's answer to Count Buol had reached Paris, and was so favourably thought of, that it seemed impossible that Austria could any longer find an excuse for attacking Sardinia. I inclose a copy of these passages as they were given to me by Count Walewski.

His Excellency having promised to see the Emperor this morning, I addressed his Excellency at an early hour the letter of which your Lordship will find a copy annexed. I was most anxious that the Emperor should see, from an impartial and no unfriendly judgment, what his position was.

I regret to add that all these efforts have proved fruitless.

My Prussian colleague, who saw Count Walewski after my interview with his Excellency, called on me early this morning, and informed me that Count Walewski had told him that the French Government could neither accept preliminary disarmament, nor the sole mediation of England; but that the Emperor would, perhaps, consent to direct negotiation of England, Russia, and Prussia.

I observed that as far as Her Majesty's Government were concerned, what they desired was peace. They cared not who obtained it; if Prussia and Russia could do so, let them act; but Her Majesty's Government could not be changing their proposals from day to day, and from minute to minute. A mediation of three was, in my opinion, impracticable. The three must first of all be of the same opinion. Time would be lost, events were passing (the revolutions in the smaller States of Italy were becoming known). Success, therefore, depended on promptitude. Besides, Her Majesty's Government, I said, had, months ago, proposed to Russia to associate herself with England and Prussia for the maintenance of peace, and had been refused. If the proposal was to be renewed now, it must come from some one else.

The unfavourable opinion of the intentions of the French Government which I had gained from this conversation were fully

realized when I saw Count Walewski after his interview with the Emperor. He said most positively that His Majesty would no longer consent to preliminary disarmament, nor, if he would, could it now be obtained of Sardinia. Any negotiation, therefore, must be carried on, the parties to it remaining armed. Then, again, Prussia and Russia could not be set on one side; they must be consulted. After a conversation, in which much that I had said to the Prussian Minister was repeated, this was the result: that a Council had been summoned to meet at 2 o'clock; that the Emperor would not take upon himself the responsibility of replying to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, but would consult his Ministers; and that the probability was that a resolution would be taken, that if a proposal was made for a direct negotiation between France and Austria, under the mediation of England, Prussia, and Russia, the respective armies in the field keeping their present positions during the negotiations, that proposal would be accepted.

I am to see Count Walewski again at 5 o'clock. after the decision of the Council shall have been taken.

Inclosure 1.—*Extract from Count Cavour's Answer to the Austrian Ultimatum.*

(Translation.)

COUNT CAVOUR, after having analyzed Count Buol's communication, thus terminates his answer:—

"The question of the disarmament of Sardinia, which constitutes the basis of the demand which your Excellency addresses to me, has been the subject of numerous negotiations between the Great Powers and the Government of the King. These negotiations led to a proposition drawn up by England, to which France, Prussia, and Russia adhered. Sardinia, in a spirit of conciliation, accepted it without reserve or afterthought. Since your Excellency can neither be ignorant either of the proposition of England nor the answer, I could add nothing in order to make known the intentions of the Government of the King with regard to the difficulties which were opposed to assembling of the Congress.

"The decided conduct of Sardinia has been appreciated by Europe. Whatever may be the consequences which it entails, the King, my august master, is convinced that the responsibility will devolve upon them who first armed, who have refused the propositions made by a great Power, and recognized as just and reasonable by the others, and who now substitutes a menacing summons in its stead."

Inclosure 2.—*Earl Cowley to Count Walewski.*

(Private)

Paris, April 28, 1859.

My dear Walewski,—I FOUND, on my return home last night,

a telegram from Lord Malmesbury stating that Austria asked for general disarmament prior to direct negotiation ; I say general, because it is the only means of arriving at the disarmament of Sardinia, which is what Austria really wants. The proposal, then, which I submit to you is, that you should consent to direct negotiation with Austria, under the mediation of Her Majesty's Government, a general disarmament being the first point to be settled. If you will agree to this, I am authorized to assure you that you will have the sincere and cordial co-operation of Her Majesty's Government in your endeavours to remove the evils which exist in Italy.

Permit me, as I have a pen in my hand, to add a few observations upon this proposal. Her Majesty's Government are convinced, after the difficulties which have occurred, that no satisfactory results would be obtained from a Congress, supposing even that Austria could be brought to accept it. They are equally convinced that a great deal may be obtained for Italy by direct negotiation ; France and England acting in concert. I have always felt that your arguments in favour of Congress, namely, that France could accept for Italy, in Congress, that for which she would not undertake to be alone responsible, had great weight ; but if that responsibility is partaken by England, France might, I think, bear her share in it without apprehension.

I come now to a more delicate matter. You cannot but have seen, during the events of the last three months, that Europe entertained a very strong opinion that the Emperor was bent on war at all hazards, and that the confidence which Europe had placed in His Majesty's judgment and moderation was seriously impaired. It would be useless to inquire now whence this distrust arose. But how necessary is it for the repose of the world that it should be removed ! There never was a more golden opportunity. The Emperor, true to the solemn promise which he had given to Sardinia, a promise which no one gainsays, is nobly fulfilling his engagements at the cost of enormous sacrifices to France. The French legions are pouring into Sardinia. There can hardly be a doubt that Austria, if she should have passed the frontier, must eventually retire again upon her own line of defences. If, then, the Emperor at this moment will listen to the voice of his friend and ally, and will forego the glory that perhaps awaits him in war, in order to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, I venture to say that there will not be a man, woman, or child in Europe that will not bless his name. I say that confidence will be restored, because it will be seen that His Majesty wants justice and not revolution ; and if His Majesty yet cares for the sympathies and alliance of England, I say that under such circumstances they cannot fail him. Will war produce better results than these ? I doubt it. The struggle must be dreadful. Think of the misery and mourning that awaits the

world if the dogs of war are once let loose ; and you will not, I feel sure, refuse your co-operation in a last endeavour to save mankind from such calamities.

Yours, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 470. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 29.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 27, 1859.

IN a conversation which I had, the day before yesterday, with the Austrian Ambassador, I endeavoured to impress upon him, in the hope that he would communicate my opinion to his Government, the immense advantages which would accrue to Austria if, yielding to the remonstrances which had been addressed to her by all the Great Powers, she determined on desisting from her intention of attacking Sardinia. Austria, I observed, would follow this course without dishonour. It was with nations as with individuals—neither one nor the other can run counter to public opinion, however much they may think themselves right, and the public wrong. Therefore there could be no dishonour to Austria in bowing before the bar of Europe, retaining her own opinions if she pleased.

But what I chiefly dwelt upon was this : that Austria, in accepting the defensive position to which she was condemned by the public voice, would completely change the state of the whole question. If public indignation had been aroused against her when she was supposed to entertain aggressive intentions, public sympathy would revert to her if she should be unjustly attacked. Now that France had armed, the uncertainty under which Austria has been labouring, and which was killing her by inches, was at an end. Immediate negotiation or the sword must decide the fate of Italy ; but let Austria beware being the power to draw the sword, unless in her own legitimate defence.

Not being a military man, I said, I was not aware what the advantages might be to Austria, strategically speaking, were the Austrian troops to take the initiative in attack ; but this I would affirm, that no such advantages would compensate for the terrible loss of esteem, sympathy, and reputation, which an act of violence would entail.

M. de Hübner seemed struck with my observations ; and he promised to make my opinion known to Count Buol by telegraph.

No. 471. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 29, 1859.

My Lord,—ALTHOUGH the exertions of Her Majesty's Government may have proved unavailing to prevent war, they think that the French Government will not take it ill of them if they endeavour, in some respects, to mitigate its calamities.

I have, therefore, to instruct your Excellency to remind Count Walewski of the course pursued by the two Governments at the

commencement of the war with Russia, and to suggest, for the consideration of the Imperial Government, whether a mutual understanding might not be entered into between France and Austria for assigning to the merchant-vessels of each Power a specific time to load in, and clear out from, the ports of the other; for admitting into the ports of either of the respective countries the merchant-vessels of the other which have sailed from foreign ports previously to the commencement of war; and for permitting the subjects of either to reside unmolested in the dominions of the other, so long as they maintain a demeanour and conduct consistent with their peculiar position in the country of an enemy.

As your Excellency may not have at hand the British Order in Council on the first two points to which I have adverted, and which were adopted in terms by the French Government, I inclose copies thereof for your information.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 472. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, April 29, 1859.

My Lord,—HER Majesty's confidential servants have duly considered the reports contained in your successive telegrams of 3 P.M. and 8 P.M. of yesterday, from which it appeared that the French Government refused the sole mediation of England, but that there was reason to expect that it would accept the joint mediation of England, Prussia, and Russia: that the condition of preliminary disarmament could not be accepted by France, but that possibly a distinct proposal, tracing out a plan for negotiation, might be entertained by France.

I have now to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government appreciate the desire shown by the French Government to meet, by a counter-proposal, the offer which you were instructed to make of the sole mediation of England; but as they have ascertained that the Cabinet of Vienna will not depart from its demand of preliminary disarmament, and will not consent to an armistice, it appears to them useless to take any further steps with reference to the idea of a tripartite mediation. Her Majesty's Government are also convinced that it is out of the question to suppose that Austria would accept of Russia as a mediating Power, looking at the semi-belligerent attitude which Russia has recently assumed, by moving an army of observation towards the frontier of Austria.

Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government have no alternative but to abandon, for the present, any further attempt to stay the outbreak of war; but they will, nevertheless, be at all times ready and anxious, during the progress of the war, to lend their best efforts to promote the reconciliation of the contending parties and they will take advantage of every favourable opportunity that may offer for effecting that object.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 473. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir J. Crampton.*

Foreign Office, April 29, 1859.

Sir,—It appears, from your telegram of yesterday afternoon, that Prince Gortchakoff expressed something like surprise at the attempt making by Her Majesty's Government by their single interference to prevent the interruption of peace.

You may say, in reply, that having formerly renounced separate action when combined action was proposed to them, Her Majesty's Government cannot be supposed to have any special predilection for the former; but when, as it has turned out to be the case, combined action did more harm than good, Her Majesty's Government cannot think that they lay themselves justly open to remark for reverting to a course of separate action to which, although they always considered it would have been more likely to lead to good results, they have proved that they had no wish pertinaciously to adhere.

As matters stand, however, there is no likelihood of inducing the contending parties to have recourse to mediation before trying the chances of war.

You will not, however, disguise from Prince Gortchakoff that the report of an alliance having been concluded between France and Russia, which will bring the latter into the field against Austria within a few days, has made a very unfavourable impression in this country; and it is of the utmost importance, if no such alliance has been entered into, that you should be formally and officially enabled, by Prince Gortchakoff, to deny its existence.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 474. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 30.)

Turin, April 27, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that yesterday evening, at 5·30, Count Cavour delivered to Baron Kellersberg the answer of the Sardinian Government to the Austrian ultimatum.

Baron Kellersberg and Chevalier Ceschi di Santa Croce left Turin, on their return to Lombardy, at 6 o'clock, by a special train, for Alessandria, from whence they proceeded to Stradella and Pavia, accompanied as far as the frontier by Colonel Govone, of the Sardinian staff.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 475. *Sir J. (Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 30.)

Turin, April 27, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith copy of the answer which has just been returned by the Sardinian Minister for Affairs to the Austrian ultimatum.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure.—Count Cavour to Count Buol.

(Translation.)

Turin, April 26, 1859.

M. le Comte,—BARON KELLERSBERG delivered to me on the 23rd instant, at 5.30 P.M., the letter which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me, summoning me, in the name of the Imperial Government, to answer by a “yes,” or by a “no,” the invitation which has been made to us to reduce the army to a peace footing, and to disband the corps formed of Italian volunteers, adding that if, at the end of three days, your Excellency should receive no answer, or should the answer returned to you not be completely satisfactory, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria was resolved to have recourse to arms in order to impose upon us by force the measures which form the object of his communication.

The question of the disarmament of Sardinia, which constitutes the basis of the demand which your Excellency addresses to me, has been the object of numerous negotiations between the Great Powers and the Government of His Majesty. These negotiations have resulted in a proposition, drawn up in due form, by England, to which France, Prussia, and Russia have agreed. Sardinia, in a spirit of conciliation, accepted it without reserve or after-thought. As your Excellency cannot be ignorant either of the proposition of England, or of the answer of Sardinia, I can add nothing towards making you acquainted with the intention of the Government of the King with regard to the difficulties which were opposed to the assembling of the Congress. The conduct of Sardinia on this occasion has been appreciated by Europe. Whatever may be the consequences that it may produce, the King, my august Master, is convinced that the responsibility will devolve upon those who were the first to arm, and who have rejected the propositions formally drawn up by one great Power, and recognized as just and reasonable by the others, and who now substitute for it a threatening summons.

I seize, &c.

C. CAVOUR.

No. 476. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 30.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 28, 1859.

THE extraordinary Council which I informed your Lordship, in my despatch of yesterday's date,* had been summoned to take into their consideration the offer of mediation made by Her Majesty's Government, consisted, in addition to the usual Council of Ministers, of the Members of the Privy Council. The deliberation lasted four hours, and it was not until half-past 6 o'clock that I learnt the decision taken. It was to the effect that, as a preliminary disarmament was the condition of negotiation, the proposal could not be entertained.

* No. 469.

Count Walewski informed me that this decision had been taken unanimously ; that it was felt that the French troops already in Italy could not return after the pressing summons for succour which had been sent from Sardinia, and in presence of the grave events which are passing in other parts of Italy. He assured me, however, that the deliberations of the Council had extended to the length I have mentioned, from a desire to examine every chance of coming to an understanding with Her Majesty's Government, and that had he been enabled to lay before the Council any positive propositions for an arrangement, he might have had a chance of inducing the Members to listen to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government.

I pressed Count Walewski strongly to know what he meant by positive propositions. I said that it was impossible to define more clearly what was to be obtained of Austria, than was done in the four points. We could not say so and so shall be done. We could but promise our best assistance to attain the objects which both Governments had in view.

I will not waste your Lordship's time by reporting any further the details of a conversation which led to nothing, but your Lordship may be sure that the least at which the French Government now aim, is the clearance of the right bank of the Po from all Austrian troops ; consequently the abandonment by Austria of the fortresses she holds by Treaty beyond her own frontier. If Austria, said Count Walewski, would voluntarily offer to make this sacrifice for the welfare of Italy, peace might yet be preserved.

I replied that, whatever might be the opinion whether it had been a wise and prudent policy to give to Austria the commanding position which she held in Italy, this was not the moment to hope that she would give it up.

No. 477. *Earl Cawley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 30.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 29, 1859.

I RECEIVED a message, this morning, from the Emperor, desiring to see me at 2 o'clock. His Majesty said that he had sent for me as he wished to give me, personally, the assurance that there was no foundation whatever for the reports in circulation of a Treaty, offensive and defensive, having been signed between France and Russia.

I asked His Majesty whether I had his permission to give your Lordship officially the assurance that no Treaty or Convention existed between France and Russia, and he was pleased to reply in the affirmative.

No. 478. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. Ap. 30.)
(Extract.)

Paris, April 29, 1859.

AFTER speaking to me as recounted in the foregoing despatch,

the Emperor turned to the question of his relations with Austria. The Austrian troops, according to the information which His Majesty had received, were to cross the Tessin to-day. His Majesty, therefore, looked upon hostilities as inevitable.

His Majesty then touched on the question of negotiations, and said that he had a right to complain that Her Majesty's Government, after offering an ultimatum for the acceptance of the Five Powers and Sardinia, which had been agreed to by every one of them except Austria, who had replied by a declaration of war to Sardinia, should, instead of leaving Austria to the consequences of her obstinacy, have put France into the predicament of refusing a further proposal.

I said that His Majesty's reproach was hardly just, for that the last proposal of Her Majesty's Government was merely reverting to the first proposal which had been made. Her Majesty's Government, I observed, were bound, in the interests of the British nation, to leave nothing untried by which the commencement of a war, of which none could foresee the termination, or in what direction it might spread, might be averted. I explained to His Majesty how it had happened that the proposal had been made, observing that it had been suggested by the Austrian Government, and was an earnest, therefore, of their pacific desires.

The Emperor gave me to understand that its acceptance was impossible, and repeated his apprehension that hostilities were now unavoidable, unless indeed Austria were to remain within her own territory, in which case, the French troops would certainly not attack the Austrians. Negotiations might then be resumed.

His Majesty, however, considers that the bases of any negotiation to be undertaken under present circumstances must be enlarged. I observed that that was impossible, unless international engagements were to be trenched upon; to which Her Majesty's Government would not be parties. The Emperor talked of the necessity of the abandonment by Austria of the fortresses on the Po, and of her at least giving a national administration to Lombardy; to which I could only reply that it was useless looking for such concessions, unless the French army could dictate peace under the walls of Vienna.

His Majesty made some observations about the advantage of localising the war, and asked whether Russia had not made, both to England and Prussia, overtures to observe strict neutrality. I said that I was not aware that such a proposition had been made, but I did not think it likely that Her Majesty's Government would enter into any engagements which could fetter the free action of Great Britain, particularly with a Power which seemed disposed to show its neutrality by an indirect menace towards one of the combatants. Nothing, I expressed the conviction, would be more likely to bring Germany into the field, than the concentration of a Russian force on the Austrian frontier.

The Emperor inquired whether Her Majesty's Government intended to augment their naval force in the Mediterranean. I replied that I thought it likely, but that I had no positive knowledge on the subject.

No. 479. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. April 30.)

Paris, April 29, 1859.

My Lord,—ONE other subject touched upon by the Emperor was the origin of the proposal for a Congress. His Majesty repeated what is already known to your Lordship respecting the Russian proposals, but he added that, in making them, General Kisseleff had stated that it was known at St. Petersburg that the overtures made by Her Majesty's Government at Vienna had failed.

I told His Majesty that Prince Gortchakoff, on the contrary, asserted that he had made no proposals until he had been informed by the French Government that my mission to Vienna had been attended by no results.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 480. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 30, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government are bound to receive with implicit confidence the assurances made to you by the Emperor of the French, and reported in your telegram, and despatch of yesterday,* as to the non-existence of any Treaty or Convention between France and Russia having reference to the present state of affairs in Italy; and I have to instruct your Excellency to express to the Emperor the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learned, and with which the public in this country will receive, the solemn assurance which, in your telegram of yesterday afternoon, you state to have been given to you by the Emperor that the reported offensive and defensive alliance between France and Russia has no real existence whatever.

I have received, this afternoon, an account of a Treaty which, it is said, was concluded between France and Sardinia on the 18th of January, and which is said to provide for the cession of Savoy, and to certain arrangements for the future government of Italy. Your Excellency will endeavour to ascertain whether any such Treaty has been concluded.

No. 481. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 30, 1859.

YOUR Excellency will have seen by Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram of yesterday afternoon, that the Austrian Manifesto and Declaration of War were published yesterday morning at Vienna,

* No. 477.

and that the Fourth Division of the Austrian army had crossed the Ticino yesterday.

This intelligence altogether puts an end to all possibility of a mediation ; and it is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the question of a joint mediation, which after all would be little else than a parody of the negotiations which have already proved abortive.

Austria, it appears, will not agree to a suspension of hostilities or armistice with Sardinia, and France declines our sole mediation. The idea of further intervention at the present time must, therefore, be abandoned, and Her Majesty's Government can now only wait for a more favourable moment.

No. 482. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*
(Translation.) (Received May 1.)

(Extract.) Albert Gate House, April 29, 1859.

THIS morning's packet brings me nothing new but the despatch which I communicate to you.

The horizon is clearing, and seems to promise a fine day ; may it be the same with the political horizon.

Inclosure.—*Count Walewski to the Duke of Malakoff.*
(Translation.) Paris, April 27, 1859.

M. le Maréchal,—THE communication which has been made, by order of His Imperial Majesty, to the Senate and to the Legislative Body, absolves me from the necessity of recurring to the incidents with which public opinion has been pre-occupied for some weeks, and which have formed the subject of my late despatches. The gravity of the situation has become extreme, and the *denouement* which is announced will, unhappily, not be that which loyal and persevering efforts have been applied to bring about. In such serious conjunctures, it is a great consolation for the Government of the Emperor to be able to submit, without fear, to the appreciation of Europe the question of knowing on which Power rests the responsibility of the events.

That the state of things in Italy was abnormal ; that the uneasiness and suppressed (*sourde*) agitation which resulted therefrom constituted a danger for the whole world ; that reason counselled to avert, by a sound foresight, an inevitable crisis, is what England, Prussia, and Russia thought at the same time as France. Unanimity of apprehensions created, at the same time, conformity of sentiments and measures. The mission of Earl Cowley to Vienna, the proposition of a Congress emanating from St. Petersburg, the support lent by Prussia to these attempts at arrangement, the eagerness of France to assent to the proposals (*adhérer aux combinaisons*), which succeeded one another up to the last hour ; all these acts, in one word, were inspired by the same motive, by the lively and sincere desire to consolidate peace by no longer

closing the eye to a difficulty which so evidently threatened to disturb it.

In this phase of the affair, M. le Maréchal, the Government of the Emperor had its part of initiative and of action ; but this part, I am anxious to prove, has always been merged in a collective work. France simply offered her assistance, in the quality of a great European Power, to settle, in a spirit of understanding and confidence with the other Cabinets, a question which, I do not disguise, exacted her sympathy, but in which she did not yet perceive either particular duties to fulfil, or pressing interests to defend. The day on which the Cabinet of Vienna promised, with solemn declarations, not to commence hostilities, it had itself appeared to foresee the attitude which any aggression directed against Piedmont would infallibly impose on the Government of the Emperor.

A similar assurance, by giving time for the exercise of the mediation of the Powers, permitted the assembly of the Congress to be hoped for. In fact, England had just laid down, with the assent of France, of Prussia, and of Russia, the last conditions of the meeting of this Assembly, in which the place which justice and reason assigned to the Italian States was granted to them. Sardinia, on her side, adhered to the principle of the simultaneous and preliminary disarmament of all the Powers who had recently augmented their military strength. To these signs of peace the Cabinet of Vienna suddenly opposes an act which, to characterise it as it deserves, is equivalent to a declaration of war.

Thus Austria, by herself, and with settled intent, destroys the work followed with so much patience by England, seconded with so much loyalty by Russia and Prussia, facilitated with so much moderation by France. Not only does she shut the door of the Congress to Sardinia, she summons her, under pain of seeing herself compelled by force, to lay down her arms without any condition, and in the space of three days.

A formidable military force deploys at the same time on the banks of the Tessin, and it is, to speak truly, in the middle of an army on the march that the Austrian General-in-chief awaits the answer of the Cabinet of Turin.

You know, M. le Maréchal, the impression caused in London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, by the resolution, so inopportune and fatal, of the Cabinet of Vienna. The astonishment and displeasure of the three Powers have been expressed in a protest of which public opinion has now made itself the echo in all parts of Europe.

If England, Prussia and Russia, by the step which they have hastened to take, have been able to discharge fully their moral responsibility, and to satisfy the requirements of their offended dignity, the Government of the Emperor moved for its part, by analogous considerations had to mark more clearly its attitude,

and other obligations were imposed upon it. Nothing modifies the firm union (*solidarité*) which was originally established between ourselves and the mediating Powers; the question remains the same at bottom, but we have too great a confidence in the dispositions of which these Powers have given us such striking proofs, to fear for a single instant that they would misunderstand the sense of the policy which ancient traditions and the imperious necessities of our geographical position so naturally indicate to us.

France, for half a century, has never attempted to exercise in Italy an interested influence, and it is assuredly not she that can be accused of having tried to revive the memory of ancient struggles and of historic rivalries. All that she has demanded hitherto, and the Treaties are in accordance with her wishes, has been that the States of the Peninsula should manage their own affairs (*vécussent de leur vie propre*) and both in their domestic affairs and their relations with foreign countries, should have only to consult themselves. I do not know that they think differently with regard to this at London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg to what they do at Paris; however it may be, circumstances have invested Austria, with regard to the different Powers of Italy, with a position unanimously adjudged to be preponderant.

Sardinia alone has escaped up to the present a process which, according to general avowal, has altered, in an important part of Europe, the system of equilibrium which it had been wished to establish there. Everywhere else this fact was very serious; but whatever might be our private sentiments, it might be sufficient for us, with the opinions which we knew to be entertained by other Cabinets, to point out to them the evil to be corrected.

A like reserve, M. le Maréchal, when treating of Sardinia, would become a neglect of our most essential interests. It is not the configuration of the ground which covers, on this side, one of the frontiers of France; the Passes of the Alps are not in our hands, and it is in the highest degree important to us that the key of them should remain at Turin—at Turin only. Considerations, French, but equally European, as long as respect for the rights and legitimate interests of the Powers continue to regulate their reciprocal relations; these considerations, I say, do not permit the Government of the Emperor to hesitate as to the conduct which it is to hold when so considerable a State as Austria adopts towards Piedmont a tone of menace, and openly prepares to dictate laws to her. This obligation lends fresh gravity to the refusal of Austria to discuss before acting. We do not wish, at any price, to find ourselves confronted by an accomplished fact, and it is this that the Government of the Emperor is resolved to prevent. It is not, then, an offensive attitude, it is a measure of defence that we adopt at this moment.

Old memories, a common origin, a recent alliance of the Sove-

reign Houses, unite us to Sardinia. These are serious reasons for sympathy, and ones that we appreciate at their full value, but which would, perhaps, not suffice to decide us. That which surely traces out for us our path, is the permanent and hereditary interests of France ; it is an absolute impossibility for the Government of the Emperor to allow that a stroke of force should establish at the foot of the Alps, contrary to the wishes of a friendly nation, and to the will of its Sovereign, a state of things which would give up Italy entirely to a foreign influence.

His Imperial Majesty, strictly faithful to the words which he pronounced when the French people recalled him to the throne of the Chief of his dynasty, is animated by no personal ambition, by no desire of conquest. The time is not long past when the Emperor proved in an European crisis, that moderation was the soul of his policy. This moderation, at the present hour, presides with the same force over his designs, and while guarding the interests which Providence has confided to him, His Majesty has no thought, you can give the most positive assurance to those about you, of separating his views from those of his Allies. Far from this, his Government, referring to the incidents which have marked the negotiations of the preceding weeks, nourishes the steadfast hope that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty will continue to persevere in an attitude which, by uniting with a moral bond the policy of the two countries, allows the Cabinets of Paris and London to express themselves unreservedly, and to bring about, according to circumstances, an understanding destined to preserve the Continent from the effects of the struggle which may arise in one of its extremities. Russia, we have a profound conviction, will ever be ready to direct her efforts to the same end. As to Prussia, the spirit, at once impartial and conciliatory, of which she has given proof since the beginning of the crisis, is a sure guarantee of her disposition to neglect nothing to confine its explosion.

We desire more particularly (*d'une façon toute particulière*), that the other Powers who compose the Germanic Confederation will not allow themselves to be led away by the recollections of a different era. France cannot see without regret the agitation which has seized upon some of the States of Germany. She does not understand that this great country, ordinarily so calm and so patriotically imbued with the feeling of its own strength, can believe its safety menaced by events of which the theatre ought to remain far from its territory. The Government of the Emperor would then believe that the statesmen of Germany will soon acknowledge that it depends in great measure upon themselves to assist in limiting the extent and duration of a war which France, if she is obliged to sustain it, has at least the consciousness of not having provoked.

I request you, M. le Maréchal, to speak in the sense of the con-

siderations set forth in this despatch, in your next interview with the Earl of Malmesbury, and to leave him a copy of it. After the clearness of the language which I now hold to you, by order of the Emperor, and which implies, in His Majesty's opinion, the wish to offer to the other Cabinets every possible guarantee to bring them to a just appreciation of the situation, and to reassure them, in as far as they are concerned, as to the consequences, it is difficult for me to suppose that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty will not receive our explanations with a confidence equal to that which has dictated them to me.

Accept, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 483. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Sir A. Malet.*

Foreign Office, May 1, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE received your telegram of this day, by which it appears that a motion will probably be made to-morrow in the Diet, calling upon the Confederation, without any *casus fœderis*, to make common cause with Austria.

Her Majesty's Government trust, however, that the answer which I immediately returned to you by telegraph may have arrived in time to prevent any such ill-advised step on the part of the Confederation, and that the protest which I have instructed you to make against its adoption, and the warning that I have desired you to give, that if Germany should at this early stage involve herself, without a Treaty obligation, in the present war, she would have no assistance to expect from England, and that without such assistance her coasts would be exposed to the ravages of hostile fleets in the Baltic, will deter the Diet from adopting so precipitate a course, which would at once extend to Europe the ravages of war, which every friend of humanity must desire to see confined, if possible, to the country in which it has broken out.

Her Majesty's Government know of no offence given directly by France to the States of the German Confederation as a body, and up to this time Austria has not been attacked even in her Italian dominions, and I have only to repeat that under existing circumstances Her Majesty's Government are resolved maintain the severest neutrality.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 484. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.* (Rec. May 2.)

Vienna, April 27, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd instant,* and to inform your Lordship that, in conformity with the instruction therein contained, I addressed a note to Count Buol, of which a copy is annexed, in strict accordance with the draft transmitted to me

* No. 382.

by your Lordship, on the subject of the summons which had been sent by Austria to Sardinia, requiring her to disarm under penalty of immediate war.

It may be important to your Lordship to know that this note was in his Excellency's possession yesterday at 3 o'clock P.M.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure. *Lord A. Loftus to Count Buol.*

Vienna, April 26, 1859.

THE Undersigned, &c., having apprized Her Majesty's Government by the telegraph of the communication made to him by Count Buol, &c., on the 20th instant, that a formal demand had, on the previous day been sent, through General Giulai, to the Cabinet of Turin requiring that Sardinia should disarm, he has been instructed to address to his Excellency the following observations in reply.

Her Majesty's Government, from the commencement of the painful discussions on the affairs of Italy, in which the Governments of Austria, France, and Sardinia have for some time been engaged, have earnestly endeavoured to promote a good understanding between the respective parties, and, although having themselves no direct interest in the questions at issue, they have spared no pains to avert the consequences of a protracted difference of opinion between Powers with whom Great Britain has long been connected by bonds of amity and alliance.

With this view Her Majesty's Government did not hesitate, in the month of February last, to depute on a confidential mission to the Court of Vienna one of the ablest and most distinguished servants of the British Crown, who, from the position which he occupied as Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of France, no less than personal acquaintance with the Minister charged with the conduct of the foreign relations of Austria, appeared to be eminently qualified for the delicate commission with which he was entrusted. This task was to ascertain whether any bases could be established for the settlement of the various points which the existing state of things in Italy invested with peculiar importance.

The Undersigned need not remind Count Buol of the details of what passed between his Excellency and Earl Cowley: but it is enough for him to say that Her Majesty's Government were much gratified with the disposition shown by the Cabinet of Vienna to lend itself to an amicable settlement of Italian questions, and were induced to hope that the explanations which Her Majesty's Ambassador, on his return to Paris, would be able to give to the French Government as to the policy of Austria would much facilitate the resumption of cordial and friendly intercourse between the respective Governments.

It would be equally superfluous for the Undersigned to explain to Count Buol the process by which any good effects that might have arisen directly from Earl Cowley's intervention were apparently neutralized; but Count Buol could not have failed to recognize in the four points, to which Her Majesty's Government proposed to confine the deliberations of the Congress, which the Great Powers were invited by Russia to hold on the affairs of Italy, the same principles which had been in discussion between his Excellency and Count Buol, and which Her Majesty's Government had every reason to suppose were fully acquiesced in by the Cabinet of Vienna.

The Great Powers of Europe, including Austria, successively accepted the bases propounded by Her Majesty's Government. They agreed, moreover, in the principles that the several States of Italy should be admitted to send Representatives to be heard at the Congress, and that a general disarmament should form part of the measures for the settlement of the affairs of Italy.

Count Buol will do Her Majesty's Government the justice to admit that they have shown no indisposition to defer, as far as was compatible with the maintenance of the general principles on which the Congress was convened, to any representations that may have been made by the Austrian Government. It has been only when Austria has insisted upon conditions in respect to the disarmament of Sardinia without and equivalent security, and to the disbandment of the free corps enrolled in that country, which appeared to Her Majesty's Government to be not only unjust in the former case, and in the latter dangerous to the tranquillity of Italy, that Her Majesty's Government expressed themselves decidedly opposed to the demands of Austria, and urged their modification.

The Undersigned is not instructed to enter into details as to the various hues which, for some time past, the discussion, in regard to disarmament have assumed, and as to the unnecessary delays which have been interposed, to the extreme disappointment of Her Majesty's Government, who were anxious that no impediment should exist to the meeting of the Congress on the appointed day.

But the Undersigned is instructed to press upon Count Buol the fact, that within the last few days an agreement was arrived at, among the Great Powers, for a general disarmament, and that on the 19th instant Sardinia expressed her readiness to agree also to disarm, without insisting any longer on the condition that she should be admitted, in common with the Great Powers, to take part in the Congress.

Her Majesty's Government had, however, in the meanwhile, come to the conclusion that some of the difficulties which impeded the meeting of the Congress might be removed if the original understanding as to the position which the Italian States

should occupy before the Congress were departed from, and those States should all be invited, as at the Congress of Laybach in 1821, to sit in Congress by their Representatives, on the same footing with the Great Powers of Europe.

The Governments of France, Prussia, and Russia coincided in this view of the case; but Austria has declined to adhere to the proposition to that effect, which the Undersigned, by order of his Government, has communicated to Count Buol.

Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government have received with equal disappointment and surprise, the intimation which Count Buol has given to the Undersigned of the peremptory demand which his Excellency appears to have addressed to the Prime Minister of Sardinia for the disarmament of the forces, and for the disbandment of the free corps recently enrolled in that country.

The Undersigned is instructed to say that Her Majesty's Government look forward with dismay to the consequences of this precipitate measure on the part of Austria, wholly uncalled for as it is by the circumstances of the present time. Sardinia has yielded to the representations made by other Powers, and has agreed to disarm; and this deplorable act on the part of Austria is calculated, by wounding the natural pride of the Sardinian nation, to compel the Cabinet of Turin to retract its consent to a measure which has been insisted upon by its allies as the surest method of averting the impending interruption of the general peace, and of enabling the Powers of Europe to decide in Congress upon the arrangements best calculated to insure the tranquillity of Italy and the happiness of its populations.

It may be, indeed, that when the summons was dispatched to Turin, the Cabinet of Vienna was not aware that Sardinia had consented unconditionally to disarm; and if that be so, Her Majesty's Government would fain hope that that summons would at once be recalled. Otherwise, the reproach will attach to Austria that the armaments of Sardinia were not the only cause of her jealousy and distrust, even to the extent of provoking her to war, but that another feeling urged her to have recourse to the step that she has now taken; that feeling being a determination to resist the appearance at the Congress of a Sardinian Plenipotentiary on an equal footing not only with the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers, but with the Representatives of the States of the rest of Italy. The Government of Austria has expressed its concurrence in the propriety of inviting the Italian States to send Representatives to be present, in some character or other, at the Congress; and Her Majesty's Government can hardly suppose that it would be prepared to encounter the desperate extremity of war rather than allow a Sardinian Representative to sit in the Congress on the same footing with the Representative of Austria.

Be that as it may, Her Majesty's Government can only now deal with the case as it is presented before them, namely, that Austria has peremptorily summoned Sardinia to disarm under penalty of immediate war; and the Undersigned is directed to say, that Her Majesty's Government feel it due to themselves, and to the great interests of humanity which they have so earnestly striven to uphold, and also to those who have aided them in their endeavours, solemnly to record their protest against the course that Austria, regardless of the terrible consequences to Europe, and indifferent to the public opinion of the world, has so rashly, and as Her Majesty's Government believe, so unjustly adopted. They assign to Austria, and fix upon her, the last responsibility for all the miseries and calamities inevitably consequent on a conflict which was on the eve of being averted, but which, once begun, will infallibly produce a more than ordinary amount of social suffering and political convulsion.

The Undersigned, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 485. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

On the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 25th instant,* I lost no time in informing Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government had offered their mediation to France.

In reply to my pressing request that, under these circumstances, his Excellency would use his influence to defer the execution of the orders sent to General Giulay, and would arrest the advance of the Austrian troops, his Excellency informed me that he was utterly powerless in this matter, and that the decision in this respect rested solely with the Emperor and the military authorities. His Excellency could further give me no hope that any modification of the original instructions to General Giulay would be assented to.

So strong is the conviction here in the minds of the military, and, indeed, of all parties, that the Emperor of the French is intent on war, and is only seeking to gain time for his military preparations, that the chief and principal aim of the Austrian Government, in the course they have taken, is to forestall the French, and to carry out their object in reducing Sardinia before sufficient aid from France can arrive.

No. 486. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAD the honour to report to your Lordship, on the 26th instant, by telegraph, that the Marquis de Banneville, the French Chargé d'Affaires, had informed Count Buol on that day, by order of his Government, that the passage of the Ticino

* No. 408,

by Austrian troops would be considered by the French Government as a declaration of war against France.

Count Buol replied to M. de Banneville that he was the more desirous that the answer of the Sardinian Government to the invitation of the Austrian Government should be of such a nature as to obviate the eventuality referred to.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

N. 487. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

IN reply to your Lordship's telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd instant,* requiring to know whether Count Buol had agreed to three of your Lordship's conditions, and had refused the last, and whether he adhered to his refusal to admit the Italian States in any form to the Congress, I had the honour to inform your Lordship, by telegraph, on the 23rd instant, that Count Buol had not wholly accepted your Lordship's, while he positively refused to agree to the fourth.

He objected to the Military Commission, or, indeed, any special Commission, for the arrangement of the general disarmament, as he considered that it militated against the dignity of a Great Power, and he believed that the same feeling would be shared by France.

I have further communicated to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant.†

With reference to the participation of the Italian States in the Congress, as a deliberative body, his Excellency still adheres to their exclusion, and to the limitation of the Congress to five. He had never assented, he said, to the principle of their sending Representatives to be heard at the Congress, but had admitted that they might have unofficial Agents ("des Agents officieux") at the seat of Congress, who might be consulted on local matters, but who should not be of the Congress.

I pointed out to his Excellency that the refusal of those States to send Representatives cannot be given or known till the invitation had been officially made by the Congress, and I referred to their having taken part in the Congress of Laybach.

His Excellency stated that neither the King of Naples, nor the Pope, nor the Duke of Modena, would depute any one to appear at the Congress on the terms proposed, or on any terms, as they did not recognize the right of an European Congress to meet and discuss the internal affairs of these States. "But," said his Excellency, "I may plainly state to you that we can never consent to sit in a Congress with Sardinia."

* Nos. 380, 384.

† No. 357.

No. 488. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—I have read to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd instant* (of which I had previously communicated to his Excellency the substance received by telegraph), expressing the strong feeling of indignation in London at the summons addressed by the Austrian Government to Sardinia, calling upon her to disarm under penalty of immediate hostilities.

The grounds on which the Austrian Government explain this step are, that for a long time past the language and bearing of the Sardinian Government have been most provoking and insulting to Austria; and that the time had now arrived when they (the Austrian Government) could no longer remain passive; that having, during several months, evinced the greatest patience and moderation, in the hopes that the Great Powers would be able to bring these matters to a satisfactory and pacific solution, and being now fully convinced that there existed a firm and fixed purpose on the part of Sardinia, aided by France, to have recourse to war in order to obtain their ends, the Imperial Government could no longer delay in bringing matters to an issue.

No impartial Government, it is argued, could expect that, after having given the most striking proofs of their desire for peace, Austria should calmly and passively await the moment when her adversaries should be perfectly prepared for the contest, whilst, during that period of delay, Austria was expending her resources and ruining herself by a costly state of armed preparation.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 489. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)
(Extract.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

I HAD the honour to submit to your Lordship, by telegraph, on the 24th instant, as the only remaining chance of maintaining peace, if the proposed Congress fell to the ground, the suggestion that direct negotiations might possibly be resumed between France and Austria, as they had been previously commenced under the auspices of Earl Cowley, and which had been subsequently interrupted by the proposal of Russia for a Congress of the Five Powers. In my conversations with Count Buol, on this subject, with reference to the disarmament of Sardinia, I had never conceived it to be the intention of his Excellency that either the disarmament of Sardinia should be given up, or that she should disarm alone, but that the disarmament should be general, effective, and simultaneous. As far as regarded Sardinia, it was assumed that she had assented, at the instance of England and France, to disarm without conditions, and that, therefore, this might be considered as an established fact. As regarded

Austria and France, Count Buol considered that they should come to a direct and amicable understanding on the question of disarmament, without the aid of a Commission; and he was of opinion that, with sincerity and goodwill on both sides, this question would neither offer serious difficulties nor occasion delay. It should, in his Excellency's opinion, form the first question of deliberation, in the same manner as it was proposed to have been the first subject to be treated of by the proposed Congress. These points once settled, the direct negotiations could then be commenced on the basis of the four points originally laid down by Her Majesty's Government.

I then endeavoured to induce his Excellency to suspend the proceedings taken against Sardinia, and to arrest the orders given to the military commanders.

His Excellency expressed his entire inability to concur in this proposal, saying that he had no power in the matter, and that the question was removed from within his sphere of action to that of the Generals. Nor could his Excellency give me the smallest hope that the Emperor would revoke or recall the orders which had been sent to General Giulay. He stated that his information led him to believe that 6,000 French troops would be landed, in a few days, at Genoa, and that others were pouring towards the Sardinian frontier. But his Excellency observed that even if the French had landed at Genoa, and the Austrians had crossed the Ticino, the mediation of England might still be turned to account.

No. 490. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

I HAVE communicated to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 19th instant* (in confirmation of your Lordship's telegram of the 18th instant), containing the last proposals of Her Majesty's Government for a solution of the existing complications on Italian affairs, and to which my despatches of the 22nd instant† have already referred.

At my last interview with Count Buol, I applied to his Excellency, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, for an official answer from the Austrian Cabinet on the subject of those proposals, and I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd instant.‡

His Excellency said that he had already given me a verbal answer, which was that Austria will not consent to sit in Congress with a Sardinian Plenipotentiary, and will not agree to invite the Italian States to participate in the proposed Congress. But, said his Excellency, I cannot give a written answer to every telegram: nothing but confusion arises from the present mode of

* No. 354

† Nos. 423, 424.

No. 383.

transacting public business by the telegraph. If you require an answer, leave me the despatch you have just read.

I consented to do so, as I felt sure your Lordship could have no objection to my doing so, and I had no hopes otherwise of obtaining from his Excellency an official answer.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 491. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

IN my despatch of the 22nd instant,* I stated that the first proposals made by the French Chargé d'Affaires did not contain the conditions respecting a Military Commission to arrange the question of general disarmament.

I think it right to state that the proposals subsequently submitted to the Austrian Cabinet by the Marquis de Banneville were textually the same as those which were announced in the "Moniteur" of the 21st instant, and were a correct translation of those enumerated in your Lordship's despatch to me of the 19th instant.†

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 492. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

WITH reference to the concluding part of your Lordship's telegram of the 21st instant,‡ relative to the application, in the present instance, of the 23rd Protocol of the Treaty of Paris, of 14th April, 1856, I have had the honour to announce to your Lordship, in my telegram of the 26th instant, that Count Buol had informed Count Apponyi, by telegraph, that Austria accepted the offer of Her Majesty's Government to mediate between her and France.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 493. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—IN conformity with the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant,§ I have read to Count Buol, and placed in his Excellency's hands copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 18th instant || to Earl Cowley, on the subject of the present state of things arising out of the negotiations of the affairs of Italy.

His Excellency rendered full justice to the sincere and laudable efforts of Her Majesty's Government in the cause of peace.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

* No. 423.

† No. 354.

‡ No. 366.

§ No. 357.

|| No. 343.

No. 494. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship a translation of a Manifesto and Declaration of War against Sardinia, which has been addressed by the Emperor Francis-Joseph to his people.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure.—*Manifesto.*

TO MY PEOPLE.

(Translation.)

I HAVE ordered my faithful and gallant army to put a stop to the inimicable acts ("anfeindungen") which for a series of years, have been committed by the neighbouring State of Sardinia against the indisputable rights of my Crown, and against the integrity of the realm placed by God under my care, which acts have lately attained the very highest point. By so doing I have fulfilled the painful but unavoidable duty of a Sovereign. My conscience being at rest, I can look up to an omnipotent God, and patiently await His award. With confidence I leave my decision to the impartial judgment of contemporaneous and future generations. Of the approbation of my faithful subjects I am sure. When more than ten years ago, the same enemy, violating international law, and the usages of war, and without any cause being given, invaded the Lombardo-Venetian territory with an army, with the intention of seizing upon it, although he was twice totally defeated by my gallant army, and at the mercy of the victor, I behaved generously, and held out my hand to a reconciliation. I did not appropriate to myself one inch of his territory; I encroached on no right which belongs to the Crown of Sardinia, as one of the members of the European family of nations. I insisted on no guarantees against the recurrence of similar events. The hand of peace which I, in all sincerity, extended, and which was taken, appeared to me to be a sufficient guarantee. The blood which my army shed for the honour and right of Austria, I sacrificed on the altar of peace ("dem frieden brachte Ich das blut meiner arnee zum opfer"). The answer to this forbearance, which has hardly had an example in history, was a resumption of hostility, and an agitation carried on by all the expedients of perfidy, increasing from year to year, against the peace and welfare of my Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. Well knowing how much I ought to value the priceless boon of peace for my people and for Europe, I patiently bore with these new hostilities. My patience was not exhausted when the more extensive measures which recently I was forced to take, in consequence of the revolutionary agitation on the frontiers of my Italian provinces, and

within the same, were made an excuse for a higher degree of hostility. Willingly accepting the well-meant mediation of friendly Powers for the maintenance of peace, I consented to become a party to a Congress of the Five Great Powers. The four points proposed by the Royal Government of Great Britain, as a basis for the deliberations of the Congress, were forwarded to my Government, and I accepted them, with the conditions which alone were calculated to bring about a true, sincere, and durable peace. But in the consciousness that no step on the part of my Government could, even in the most remote degree, lead to a disturbance of the peace, I required at the same time that the Power which was the cause of the complication, and had brought about the danger of war, should, as a preliminary measure, disarm. Being pressed thereto by friendly Powers, I at length accepted the proposal for a general disarmament. The mediation failed in consequence of the inadmissible nature of the conditions on which Sardinia made her consent dependent. Only one means of maintaining peace remained. I addressed myself directly to the Sardinian Government, and summoned it to place its army on a peace footing, and to disband the free corps. Sardinia did not accede to my demand; therefore the moment for deciding the matter by an appeal to arms has arrived.

I have ordered my army to enter Sardinia.

I am aware of the vast importance of the measure, and if ever my duties as a Monarch weighed heavily on me it is at this moment. War is the scourge of mankind. I see with emotion that the lives and property of thousands of my subjects are imperilled, and deeply feel what a severe trial war is for my realm, which, being occupied with its internal development, greatly requires the continuance of peace. But the heart of the Monarch must be silent at the command of honour and duty. On the frontiers the enemy stands in arms, in alliance with the revolutionary party, openly announcing his intention to seize upon the possessions of Austria in Italy. To support him the Ruler over France, who, under futile pretexts, interferes in the legally established relations of the Italian Peninsula, has set his troops in movement. Detachments of them have already crossed the frontiers of Sardinia. The Crown which I received without spot or blemish from my forefathers has already seen trying times. The glorious history of our country gives evidence that Providence when the shadows of a revolution, menacing to the highest good of humanity, appear about to spread over this quarter of the world, has frequently used the sword of Austria in order to dispell those shadows with its lightning. We are again on the eve of a period when the world is threatened with an overthrow of everything subsisting, and that not by parties only, but from thrones downwards. If I draw the sword, that sword receives a consecration, as a defence for the honour and the

good right of Austria, for the rights of all peoples and States, and for all that is held most dear by humanity.

To you, my people, whose devotion to the hereditary reigning family may serve as a model for all the nations of the earth, I now address myself. In the conflict which has commenced, you will stand by me with your oft-proved fidelity, devotion, and self-sacrifice. To your sons, whom I have taken into the ranks of the army, I, their commander, send my martial greeting. With pride you may regard them, for the Eagle of Austria will, with their support, soar high in honour.

Our struggle is a just one, and we begin it with courage and confidence. We hope that we shall not stand alone in it. The soil on which we have to do battle was made fruitful by the blood lost by our German brethren when they won those bulwarks which they have maintained up to the present day. There the crafty enemies of Germany have generally begun their game when they have wished to break her internal power. The feeling that such a danger is now imminent prevails in all parts of Germany, from the hut to the throne, from one frontier to the other. I speak as a Sovereign member of the Germanic Confederation when I call attention to the common danger, and recall to memory the glorious times in which Europe had to thank the general and fervent enthusiasm for its liberation.

For God and Fatherland !

Given at my residence and metropolis of Vienna on this 28th day of April, 1859.

FRANCIS JOSEPH.

No. 495. *Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—
(Rec. May 2.)

(Extract.)

Munich, April 25, 1859.

SINCE the appointment of the new War Minister, the military preparations, which were gradually making before, have received a stronger impulse, and it is confidently asserted in well-informed quarters, that in the course of four or five weeks the Bavarian Federal Contingent, to the command of which His Royal Highness the Prince Charles is already named, will be on the full war footing.

All these preparations have been going on in anticipation of the orders from the Diet, which arrived here yesterday, and the same course has been adopted, though more imperfectly, in regard to the Bavarian fortresses, which I hear are not yet by any means in a position to meet emergencies.

There is up to this moment no question of any movement or concentration of the Contingent, but I believe it is intended to

place the troops composing it in convenient cantonments along the lines of railway leading towards the Rhine.

No. 496. *Mr. Paget to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

My Lord,

Dresden, April 28, 1859.

IN presence of the grave events which are now occupying your Lordship's attention, I feel I should not be justified in intruding upon you by any lengthened report of my communications with this Government, relative to what has passed since I last had the honour of addressing you, the more particularly as M. de Beust has been, and still continues, absent from Dresden.

I will, therefore, confine myself to informing your Lordship that when the Saxon Government became acquainted with the summons to disarm addressed by Austria to Piedmont, they expressed their regret at the moment which had been selected by the Cabinet of Vienna for taking this step, because of the injury, morally speaking, which it was calculated to produce to the cause of Austria, as constituting her the first actually to break the peace of Europe.

Putting this aside, the Saxon Government, participating in the general impression which undoubtedly exists in Germany, that France is only trying to gain time in order to complete her preparations for war, and that she has no intention of negotiating seriously in the Congress, fully justifies the decision of the Austrian Government, and are prepared to use whatever influence they possess in supporting it.

I need, therefore, scarcely observe, that when it became known here that England and Prussia had protested, a very unfavourable impression was produced, and the most gloomy anticipations were rife that Prussia was about to separate herself in the coming struggle from the rest of Germany.

To add to the general consternation, a telegraphic despatch was received on Wednesday morning, from Count Vitzthum, the Saxon Minister in London, saying that a Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance had been concluded between France and Russia, which news was also communicated unofficially from Berlin, but has not since been confirmed.

Besides this, there is scarcely a rumour, whether it be in reference to hopes of further negotiations, or in connection with events which do or do not take place, that does not reach this capital, and is not eagerly seized upon and believed until it is replaced by one of later date.

Amidst all this confusion of hopes, of fears, and conjectures, I have held one uniform language, viz., that Her Majesty's Government had protested against the summons addressed to Piedmont, as being most unjustifiable at a moment when, by dint of almost superhuman efforts, they had induced all the Powers to agree to a

proposition founded, in great measure, on conditions coming originally from Austria herself; that they were still employing their utmost exertions to prevent hostilities, and that all hope of success should not yet be abandoned: but that if, at last, in spite of every remonstrance, Austria thought fit to incur the awful responsibility which would attach to the execution of her threat, the object and endeavour of every one should be to confine and localize the war within the narrowest possible sphere; that much would depend on the attitude of the German Powers, which, while they took all necessary precautions to guarantee their own safety, should avoid giving any pretext for attack by abandoning a position of neutrality, which, for the present moment, at least, it was their interest to preserve, for one of active interference and material support of Austria.

A Decree, dated the 26th instant, announces that the Saxon army has been placed upon a war footing.

I have, &c.

A. PAGET.

No. 497. *Consul-General Ward to the Earl of Malmesbury.*
(Rec. May 2.)

(Extract.)

Leipsic, April 28, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in consequence of the Resolution passed by the Germanic Diet on the 23rd instant for putting the Federal contingents into a state of preparation for war, the Government of Saxony is taking measures for purchasing horses here and throughout the country, at a compulsory valuation, in order to complete the number required for the artillery and train, and that similar preparations are being made in other German States. The Saxon Government is also making arrangements, in conjunction with Hesse-Cassel and Nassau, relative to the probable future operations of the 9th Federal Army Corps, which is composed of the united contingents of Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau.

These military preparations are, of course, purely defensive, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Constitution, and are preliminary to the next step, viz., that of making the contingents mobile, or in marching order. Still, when taken in connection with the daily-expected declaration of war by Austria against Sardinia, they are sufficient to excite the alarm and uneasiness of the commercial world, lest the war should inevitably extend to Prussia, and all the other States of the Germanic Confederation.

Within the last week, there has been a heavy fall, on the Exchanges of this and other places in Germany, of the prices of Government stocks, railway shares and other objects of traffic; a general mistrust in business has begun to show itself; and fears are entertained that the Easter fair, which begins here next week,

will be very unfavourable to the sale of manufactures, and that the purchases will be confined to articles of mere necessity. Another apprehension which seriously disturbs the minds of mercantile men is, that of the French blockading not only the Austrian ports on the Adriatic, but the mouths of the Elbe and Weser; and such proceedings are naturally to be anticipated whenever the Germanic body may be forced into the war.

Notwithstanding these evils in prospect, it is remarkable that the feeling of all sorts of people, even of the commercial classes, sets stronger than ever in favour of Austria. No one here reproaches Austria for threatening Sardinia with hostilities, because it is said that the provocations of Sardinia have long been insufferable, and that Austria could hardly be expected to wait until it should suit the convenience of her adversaries to begin the war. Without venturing to express any view of my own upon the point, I am desirous of submitting to your Lordship the undoubted fact, that the circumstance of Austria having threatened Sardinia with immediate war, has not at all detracted from the popularity of the Austrian cause in this part of Germany.

No. 498. *Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)
(Extract.)

Frankfort, April 29, 1859.

ALTHOUGH it is felt that the conduct of Austria, in the last step taken by her towards Sardinia, has lost her much support, the public opinion of this part of Germany does not condemn the measure. It is generally regarded as a sad necessity, brought on by the intolerable nature of Austria's own position, the insulting attitude of Sardinia, and the premeditated hostility of France.

By commencing war, Austria loses the right of claiming Federal aid. The Prussian Government, as your Lordship must be informed, has already proclaimed its disapproval of Austria's conduct, and its determination to remain strictly neutral.

Whether the other states of the Confederation will assume a similar attitude is at present uncertain. They will not, at any rate, be so anxious to declare what their policy will be.

No. 499. *Mr. Gordon to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)
(Extract.)

Hanover, April 29, 1859.

I WENT to Brunswick on the 25th instant, to present my felicitations to the Duke on the occasion of His Royal Highness's birthday. The King of Hanover, accompanied by a numerous suite, and the members of the Austrian, French, and Prussian Legations here, who are also accredited to Brunswick, were there, as well as deputations from the Courts of Berlin and Cassel, to compliment the Duke, and all took part at an official dinner, to which we were invited by His Royal Highness.

The chief points insisted on at Brunswick, as at Hanover, and

likewise at Oldenburg (where I spent a couple of days the end of last month), were, the strong conviction entertained by all, that the French Empire would, sooner or later, endeavour to abolish in every point prejudicial to its pretensions, the Treaties and territorial arrangements of 1815; and that, therefore, the hour for Germany to be attacked must eventually come: consequently, that the policy was evident of now making common cause with Austria, and aiding her to resist French hostilities, rather than waiting until the occurrence of this anticipated attack, when, possibly, Austria might already have been overcome, and might be powerless to aid Germany: further, the rankling recollection of former French Imperial invasions; and, lastly, the hope and confident expectation that Great Britain would, in such a contest, should it arise, be found ranged on the side of Germany.

Respecting this last point, I hope it is only requisite for me to observe that, since the receipt of your Lordship's last communications, my invariable reply, where it has been called for, has been, that England would certainly for the present remain neutral.

No. 500. *Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)
(Extract.)

Berlin, April 29, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a translation of the communication which was made yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the House of Deputies on the subject of the proposition submitted to the German Diet on the 23rd instant, as to calling out the Federal contingent.

This communication was received by the house with loud cheers.

Inclosure.—*Communication made by the Prussian Government, April 28, 1859, to the Chamber of Deputies, respecting Military measures taken at Berlin and Frankfort.*

(Translation.)

Gentlemen,—At the moment when the Prussian Houses of Representatives reassemble to renew their labours, after a short recess, most important events are taking place at a distance.

The differences between Austria, on the one hand, and Sardinia and France, on the other, have arrived at a crisis which causes an outbreak of war to be feared. England has made a last effort for the maintenance of peace, and all hope of it is not yet taken away. The Government cannot conceal from itself, however, that the hope of favourable results is extremely small. Although under such circumstances, and in the present state of uncertainty, the Government does not find itself in a position to make a more precise communication to the Houses of Representatives, it feels itself, nevertheless, bound to acquaint them with the measures which it has considered it necessary to take. Amidst the universal preparations, the Government has not been unmindful of the proper

measures ; and it has been the hope of the maintenance of peace, which has been greater during the last few days, which alone has retarded the prosecution of their plans. When, therefore, a few days ago the prospect of the meeting of Congress vanished, the Government no longer hesitated. Conscious that it must be guided by the duty of taking precautions for its own security, and that of Germany, it has, in addition to other preparatory measures, not confined itself to mobilising three army corps, but has also proposed to the Diet the mobilisation of the Federal contingents, which was in consequence decreed upon. The Government is determined to abide by its well-known principles, and it has not departed therefrom in their proposal to the Diet, which, in accordance with the Diet's character, is essentially a defensive one. In concert with its German confederates it is prepared against every attack. Above all, the Government will be guided in its policy by this principle, that the interests of Germany are the interests of Prussia.

No. 501. *Circular addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at the German Courts.*

Foreign Office, May 2, 1859.

Sir,—I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government witness, with great anxiety, the disposition shown by the States of Germany to enter at once into a contest with France.

Her Majesty's Government cannot perceive that, at the present moment, Germany has any grounds for declaring war against that Power ; and still less would the Confederation, in their opinion, be justified in prematurely adopting any course which would bring on an European war.

It is desirable, however, that the Governments of Germany should entertain no doubt as to the course which, in such a case, Her Majesty's Government would pursue, and therefore you will explicitly state to the Government[s] to which you are accredited, that if Germany should at present, and without a *casus fœderis*, be so ill-advised as to provoke a war with France, and should, without any sufficient cause, make general a war which, on every account, ought, if possible, to be localized, Her Majesty's Government, determined to maintain a strict neutrality, can give to Germany no assistance, nor contribute, by the interposition of the naval forces of this country, to protect her coast from hostile attack.

The elections now proceeding afford an undeniable test of public feeling on this point, and it may be said to be the only one in which the English people appear to be at the present moment absorbed. That Germany should arm and prepare for eventualities is natural and right ; but, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, no act has been as yet committed by France against

Germany, and no Treaty obligation subsists which justifies her to provoke an attack on her own territory, or an invasion of France.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 502. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

Paris, May 1, 1859.

My Lord,—COUNT WALEWSKI informs me that, on its becoming known that the Austrians had crossed the Tessin, he had addressed a despatch *raisonnée* to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, desiring him to ask for his passports.

As soon as the Austrian Ambassador here shall have been made acquainted with this proceeding, he will, on his part, ask for passports also.

The Dutch Government has been applied to, and has agreed to undertake the protection of Austrian interests in France.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 503. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

(Extract.)

Paris, May 1, 1859.

I TRUST that your Lordship will approve my having addressed a note to Count Walewski, founded on your Lordship's despatch of the 30th ultimo.*

I have the honour to annex a copy of it.

Inclosure.—*Earl Cowley to Count Walewski.*

Paris, May 1, 1859.

M. le Ministre,—THE Emperor, at an audience which I had the honour to have of His Majesty on the 29th ultimo, in alluding to the reports so freely circulated that an offensive and defensive Treaty had been contracted between France and Russia, was graciously pleased spontaneously to assure me that no Treaty of the kind existed, nor, indeed, any other Treaty between France and Russia, arising out of the present political conjuncture.

His Majesty further gave me permission to repeat this assurance to Her Majesty's Government, adding that in His Majesty's communications with Russia, nothing had passed in any way affecting the interests of Great Britain.

Your Excellency is too well aware of the effect produced in England by the reports to which I have referred, not to be convinced of the satisfaction with which this voluntary assurance of His Majesty has been received. They would fain see in it an earnest of His Majesty's desire to maintain unimpaired his political relations with England; and I am desired to request your Excellency to convey to His Majesty the acknowledgments of Her Majesty's Government for the frank and friendly declaration upon this matter, which His Majesty has been pleased to proffer.

I avail, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 504. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

Paris, May 1, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE informed Count Walewski, in the sense of your Lordship's despatch of the 29th ultimo,* that Her Majesty's Government, in presence of all the difficulties which have arisen, have abandoned, however reluctantly, any further attempt to stay the outbreak of war, but that they will, nevertheless, at all times be ready and anxious, during the progress of the war, to lend their best efforts to promote the reconciliation of the contending parties, and that they will take advantage of any favourable opportunity that may offer for doing so. I added, that I felt sure that Her Majesty's Government might count on his Excellency's co-operation whenever they might find that an attempt could be made.

Count Walewski expressed, in very becoming terms, his regret that his own efforts, as well as those of Her Majesty's Government in the cause of peace, should have failed; and he welcomed with satisfaction your Lordship's assurance that you would watch for opportunities to put an end to the war. Much, he thought, would depend on the tact and judgment of choosing a right moment.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 505. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

Paris, May 1, 1859.

My Lord,—ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 28th instant,† I wrote a letter to Count Walewski, calling his attention to the passage of the French troops through the neutral portion of Savoy as being an infraction of the Treaties of 1815, and I received from his Excellency the answer which your Lordship will find inclosed.

This afternoon I placed in his Excellency's hands, according to your Lordship's instructions, a copy of your despatch of the 28th ultimo† on this subject.

Count Walewski said that he would reply to it in detail, but in the meantime he would tell me that the question had been fully examined before the passage of the troops had been ordered, and that it had appeared both to the French and to the Swiss Governments that Culoz was not included within the neutral territory stipulated by the Treaties of 1815. It was true that the line had never been exactly defined, and a Sardinian and Swiss Joint Commission was now at work upon it, to the decision of which the French Government would submit, whatever it might be, as they were more interested than any other Government in seeing the neutrality of Switzerland maintained.

I observed that this was not a question which could be decided by the French and Swiss Governments alone. I hoped, therefore, that the further march of troops by that road would be suspended

* No. 472.

† No. 464.

until the decision of the Joint Commission should have been made known, and have been ratified by the Powers who created the neutrality of Switzerland.

Count Walewski replied that the passage of troops had already been stopped, and would remain suspended for the present.

His Excellency remarked further, that although he admitted that the strict letter of the Treaty relative to this point must be abided by, it should be recollected that it was intended to forestall a hostile attack from France on Sardinia, and not to prevent the former going to the assistance of the latter, that the stipulations in question had been made.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

Inclosure.—*Count Walewski to Earl Cowley.*

(Translation.)

Paris, April 29, 1859.

M. le Comte,—We do not think that the territory of Savoy which is traversed by the railway is comprised in the portion of Savoy which participates in the neutrality of Switzerland. I think I can assure you that the Swiss Government is of the same opinion as ourselves on this subject. It results, on the other hand, from diplomatic acts, that the application of the principle of neutrality to the country north of Ugive, ought to be concerted between Sardinia and Switzerland, whose troops would have to occupy the neutralized territory.

I have, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 506. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)

Paris, May 1, 1859.

My Lord,—Your Lordship will have heard directly of the state of affairs at Frankfort, and of the intention of the Austrian Government to demand of the Diet to-morrow *séance tenante*, the mobilization of the whole of the Federal forces, but for defensive purposes only. According to the account which Count Walewski gave me this afternoon, it had been the intention of Prussia to oppose this demand; and she had gone so far as to ask the French Government to aid her in this opposition by giving assurances that there was no intention on the part of France to collect an army of observation towards the frontier of Germany. Count Walewski directed M. de Moustier, at Berlin, and the French Ministers in general at the smaller German Courts; to state that France had no thoughts of attacking Germany, and that if the Confederation did not arm on their part, there was no intention in the French Government to do more than assemble the usual camp of manœuvres at Chalons. At present there were no troops whatever collecting towards Germany; and the Duke of Malakoff, who was to have the command of the army of observation, had not yet left London.

It seemed, however, that in spite of these assurances, the Prussian Government had found it necessary to give way to the general feeling, and he (Count Walewski) had received intelligence this morning that the whole of the Prussian army was to be mobilized.

The Prussian Government, in giving this information to M. de Moustier, had added the assurance that M. de Pourtales would be charged to explain to the Imperial Government that it was for defensive purposes alone that the Confederation would arm.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 507. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 2.)
(Extract.) Paris, May 1, 1859.

COUNT WALEWSKI having given me an opportunity, I said to to him, this afternoon, that without putting any question to him upon the subject, I thought it right to let him know that Her Majesty's Government had been informed that a Treaty had been signed on the 17th January last, between France and Sardinia, by which the latter agreed to cede Savoy to France, provided she was put in possession of Lombardy.

Count Walewski replied that all he could assure me was, that up to this moment there was no Treaty whatever between France and Sardinia ; but he said, that, under present circumstances, an offensive and defensive one would become necessary. He made no allusion to the territorial question.

No. 508. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, May 2, 1859.

My Lord,—Your Excellency will have seen by my telegram of last night, that previously to the receipt of your despatch of yesterday,* Her Majesty's Government were taking steps to prevent the Diet of Frankfort from adopting any precipitate step with reference to the war which has broken out in Italy.

Upon hearing yesterday morning from Sir Alexander Malet of the intention of the Wurtemberg Minister to move to-day in the Diet that the Confederation should make common cause with Austria, I instructed Her Majesty's Minister strongly to protest against so impolitic a step, and to point out that if Germany involved herself in the war, without a *casus fœderis*, she must expect no assistance whatever from this country. Without such assistance her northern coasts would be exposed to maritime blockades and attack on the part of France, and probably on that of Russia also, and would be almost defenceless.

But your Excellency, while mentioning this to Count Walewski, will observe that if the French Government really shares the desire of that of Her Majesty, that the present war should as far as possible be localized, and not extended beyond the confines of

* No. 506.

Italy, it behoves France to discourage to the utmost all attempts to produce disturbance in Turkey.

We already have intelligence of troubles on the frontier of Montenegro, which threaten to put an end to the operations of the Boundary Commissioners, and we have, as you are aware, received complaints from the British Commissioner of the disposition shown by the French and Russian Commissioners unduly to favour the Prince of Montenegro, and to claim for his Delegate a position which it was never intended that he should occupy.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the Government of the Emperor is fully alive to the serious complications which might ensue if, in addition to the war in Italy, the intelligence of which has caused so much excitement throughout Germany, commotion in Turkey should be fostered or encouraged by foreign instrumentality. It cannot be the wish of France to disturb the settlement of Turkey sanctioned by the Treaty of 1856, neither can she contemplate the possibility of setting aside the solemn guarantee given by her, in conjunction with England and Austria, by the Treaty of the 15th of April of that year, of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire; and it is in order to remind him of the duty which, in addition to the necessities of the present war, might devolve upon France, if that integrity and independence were assailed, that Her Majesty's Government wish your Excellency to call Count Walewski's attention to the matter, and earnestly to entreat him to discountenance to the utmost any proceedings by which they might be imperilled.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 509.--*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmsbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

Vienna, April 30, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE used every endeavour with Count Buol to further the views and several propositions transmitted to me in your Lordship's and Earl Cowley's telegrams of the 28th instant,* for averting war by bringing about a resumption of direct negotiation between Austria and France, under the mediation of England.

Count Buol has repeated to me, on each occasion, that, having accepted the mediation of England on the terms proposed, Austria was perfectly prepared to adhere to it. He stated that Austria had no grievance against France, and that there was no reason why direct negotiation should not be entered upon between them; but his Excellency as often repeated that there could be no question of Austria accepting a mediation with Sardinia. They had taken their line of action, and they neither could, nor would, depart from it.

* No. 452.

I accordingly had the honour to inform your Lordship and Earl Cowley, on the 28th instant, by telegraph, and again on the 29th, that Austria implicitly held to her acceptance of the mediation offered by Her Majesty's Government, and as firmly refused to suspend operations against Sardinia. On this subject his Excellency said to me yesterday that the orders had been given to the General to act, and they would not be recalled.

With reference to Lord Cowley's last proposal for the participation of Russia and Prussia as co-mediators with England, I had the honour to inform your Lordship yesterday, the 29th instant, that Count Buol did not express any dissent to this view, and he said that he would leave that question entirely in the hands of Her Majesty's Government; but he explicitly added that this mediation would not arrest their present operations against Sardinia. He considered the disarmament of Sardinia as a completely separate question, the solution of which was now placed in the hands of the Imperial Commissariess.

It is evident that there can be no hope for mediation between the respective parties unless Sardinia shall consent to disband the volunteer corps and restore her army to the peace footing; and it is, I fear, equally apparent that no such favourable issue can at present be looked for.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 510. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

Vienna, April 30, 1859.

My Lord,—THE French Chargé d'Affaires has received a notification from his Government that a courier is on the road, and will probably reach this on Monday, and he is instructed to await his arrival. It is said that this courier is the bearer of a note which the Marquis de Banneville will address to this Cabinet, to record the rupture of relations between the two empires.

I believe that the Marquis de Banneville, with the *personnel* of the French Embassy, will leave this on Monday evening for Paris.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

510. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

Vienna, April 30, 1859.

My Lord,—WITH reference to your Lordship's despatches of the 22nd and 23rd instant,* and to my despatch of the 28th instant,† replying thereto, I have now the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a note from Count Buol, giving the official answer of the Austrian Government to the last propositions submitted to them by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

* Nos. 381 and 383.

† No 490

Inclosure—*Count Buol to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Translation.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

My Lord,—You have been so good as to leave in my hands a despatch dated Foreign Office, the 23rd instant, and by which you are instructed to request from me an official answer to the proposal of your Government, transmitted to Vienna by telegram on the 18th of this month.

This proposal, which you communicated to me at the time, was based on the following four points ;

1. Previous effective and simultaneous disarmament of the Four Powers.

2. The details of the disarmament will be arranged by a commission of six superior officers ;

3. Congress of the Five Powers to meet ; and,

4. An invitation to be addressed to the Italian Governments to take part in the deliberations, according to the rules followed at Laybach.

To-day, Lord Malmesbury desires to know whether it is true, as you had informed him on the 22nd instant by electric telegraph, that I have declared to the French Chargé d'Affaires that the Imperial Cabinet agreed to the three first of these points, but declined the last one, concerning the admission to the Congress of the States of the Peninsula.

I hasten to warn you, my lord, that this information must be founded on some mistake.

Although, by our last conversations, you are perfectly informed of the views of the Imperial Government, and although the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty has been equally informed of them by means of Count Apponyi, I think I cannot accede to the desire expressed by Lord Malmesbury better than by defining once more, and in writing, an answer to the overtures of the 18th of April. I will do it briefly, without entering into any explanation of the motives which have guided the Imperial Cabinet, which, moreover, are sufficiently known to you from the different explanations which I have had the honour of giving you.

Ad. 1. The effective and simultaneous disarmament of the three Powers previous to the Congress, had been originally proposed by the Imperial Government itself ; there is no necessity to say that it adheres to a proposition the initiative in which belongs to it.

Ad. 2. The meeting of a Congress of six superior officers to arrange the disarmament appears to us inadmissible, as the Envoy of the Emperor at London has already had orders to declare.

Ad. 3. The Congress of the Five Powers has been accepted by Austria.

Ad. 4. The invitation to be addressed by the Congress to the Italian Governments to take part in the deliberations of the Five Great Powers, being of a nature essentially to alter the primitive

proposal, we were obliged to decline this modification, since the precedent cited of the Congress of Laybach appears to us to offer no analogy with the circumstances, and since we have from the first declared that we could accept of no arrangement which should tend to give a Sardinian Plenipotentiary a seat by the side of the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers. In one of the two notes which I had the honour to address to you, my Lord, on the 31st of March last, we have explained in what measure, in our opinion, the Governments of the Peninsula should be admitted to be represented at the seat of the Congress. The Imperial Cabinet persists in its views on this point, as it asserted also for the last time by a despatch addressed to Count Apponyi, dated the 20th instant, and transmitted in copy to Lord Malmesbury.

Requesting you, my Lord, to communicate the above remarks to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, I have the honour to return enclosed the aforementioned despatch of Lord Malmesbury, and I seize, &c. BUOL.

No. 512. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

Vienna, April 30, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a note which I have received from Count Buol, replying to the note which I addressed to his Excellency on the 26th instant,* conveying the protest of Her Majesty's Government against the summons addressed by the Imperial Government to Sardinia to disarm and to disband the volunteer corps under the penalty of immediate war.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure.—*Count Buol to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Translation.)

Vienna, April 28, 1859.

THE Undersigned, &c., has received the letter which Lord A. Loftus, &c., has done him the honour of addressing to him, dated the 26th instant, to inform him of the impression produced on the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty by the news that Austria had directly summoned the Cabinet of Turin to proceed to place the Sardinian army on a peace footing, and to disband the Italian volunteers.

After having related the history of the negotiations which preceded the present crisis, and after having recapitulated the efforts made by the British Government, with the intention of bringing about a peaceable solution, Lord A. Loftus announces the painful surprise with which the resolution of Austria has affected the British Cabinet: he protests against this measure, and throws

* See Inclosure in No. 484.

upon the Imperial Government the responsibility of the disastrous consequences which it may bring about.

The Imperial Government can fully understand the painful impression produced on the British Government by a measure which appears to diminish the chances of peace, to the maintenance of which it devotes a solicitude so sincerely shared by Austria. The Imperial Government has highly appreciated the conciliatory intentions of Great Britain. It has done its best to second them by accepting the proposals of a Congress of the Great Powers, and by adhering, within certain limits, to the bases of discussion proposed by the British Cabinet. It is only when England has informed the Imperial Government that the disarmament of Sardinia, which it had demanded as a previous condition, could not be obtained, that Austria has taken the irrevocable resolution to obtain this disarmament by her own means. If the Cabinet of Turin, as Lord A. Loftus declares, has ended by consenting, on the 19th instant, to the disarmament without any condition, it had only to avoid all conflict by repeating this assurance in answer to the summons of Austria.

The Imperial Cabinet has given a final unequivocal proof of its sincere desire to maintain peace by accepting the mediation of Great Britain between itself and France, at the very moment when the French troops had already entered the Piedmontese territory.

The Undersigned hopes that, looking at the whole state of the case, and weighing the elements of a situation made intolerable to Austria, without giving her the hope of a satisfactory solution, the British Government will modify the view which it has taken of the direct step taken by the Imperial Government, with regard to the Cabinet of Turin.

However this may be, it appears to it that this step, not having the character of an infraction of international law, and not interfering with the direct interests of Great Britain, is not of a nature to furnish her with reason for a protest, and that it would not be just to throw the responsibility of the consequences which it may bring about on Austria, who has exhausted all conciliatory means of obtaining peace. This responsibility will, on the contrary, rest on those who, by innumerable and endless provocations, have placed Austria in the imperative necessity of making a last effort to avoid, if possible, a general conflagration.

The Undersigned, begging Lord A. Loftus to inform his Government of the contents of this note, seizes, &c.

BUOL.

No. 513. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

Vienna, April 30, 1859.

My Lord,—IMMEDIATELY on the receipt of Earl Cowley's telegram of the 28th instant,* and in order that no delay should occur

* No. 452.

in acquainting Count Buol with the information therein contained, which still presented, however faint, a chance of averting war, I thought it advisable (as at that hour I could not have a personal interview with his Excellency) to submit the opinion of Earl Cowley in a private form, and I accordingly addressed to his Excellency a few lines, of which I inclose to your Lordship herewith a copy.

I received no reply in writing, but on the following morning I waited on his Excellency, when he gave me to understand that these proposals were no longer admissible, and his Excellency at the same time replied to the further proposals contained in your Lordship's telegrams of the 28th instant of 1.40 A.M. and 6 P.M., as was reported to your Lordship and to Earl Cowley in my telegram of yesterday, and is recorded in my despatch of this day.*

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure.—*Lord A. Loftus to Count Buol.*

Vienna, April 28, 1859, 6 P.M.

My dear Count Buol,—I HAVE just received from Lord Cowley a telegram informing me that the French Government will, he thinks, consent to direct negotiations under the mediation of England, if the respective troops keep their present position during negotiations. If this should be agreed to, they will not augment theirs. Lord Cowley does not think that more could be obtained. He is extremely anxious to know whether your Excellency will agree to these terms. As I am unwilling to encroach on your valuable time, by asking to see you, I have thought it best to address you these few lines, to inquire what answer your Excellency would wish me to give to Earl Cowley.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 514. *Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

Vienna, April 30, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a circular despatch addressed by Count Buol to the Austrian Representatives at foreign Courts, on the Manifesto of the Emperor Francis-Joseph to his people, and on the occasion of declaring war against Sardinia.

The extreme length of this document, which only appeared in this day's "Official Gazette," prevents my being enabled to accompany it with a translation.

I have, &c.

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

* No. 509.

Inclosure.—*Circular addressed to the Austrian Representatives at Foreign Courts.*

(Translation.)

Vienna, April 29, 1859.

I SEND you herewith a copy of the Manifesto which the Emperor our Master has this day addressed to his people. The words of His Majesty announce to the Empire that he has resolved to order the Imperial army to cross the Ticino. The Cabinet had accepted the last proposition of mediation of Great Britain, but our adversaries have not followed that example, and we have accordingly committed to arms the defence of our cause. At this solemn moment it is my duty to explain, once again, to our Representatives abroad, the circumstances against the fatal power of which all the attempts have failed which were made to maintain the peace of Europe, so long and so happily preserved.

The Court of Turin, in returning an evasive reply to our summons to disarm, has only given one more proof of the same hostility which for too long a time already has had the triple and unfortunate privilege of combating the indisputable rights of Austria, disquieting Europe, and encouraging the hopes of revolution. As this hostility could not be broken down by the forbearance of Austria, the Empire was at last under the necessity of having recourse to arms.

Austria has tranquilly supported a long series of offences from an enemy weaker than herself, because she knows that her high mission is to preserve as long as possible the peace of the world, and because the Emperor and his people know and love the labours of a progressive pacific development, which leads to a higher degree of prosperity. But no man of just mind and of upright heart can now doubt the right of Austria to make war on Piedmont.

Piedmont has never sincerely accepted the Treaty by which, ten years ago, she promised at Milan to live in peace and friendship with Austria. Twice beaten by the arms which her arrogance had invoked, although she has been severely punished, that State still maintains her former views with a deplorable obstinacy. The son of Charles-Albert appears passionately to desire the day when the inheritance of his house, which had been restored to him in its integrity by the moderation and magnanimity of Austria, should be for the third time made the stake of a game disastrous to the world.

The ambition of a dynasty whose vain and mischievous pretensions touching the future welfare of Italy are neither justified by the nature or history of that country, nor by its own past and present state, has not hesitated to form an unnatural alliance with revolution. Deaf to all warnings, it has surrounded itself with the malcontents of all the States of Italy, and the hopes of all the enemies of the legitimate Governments of the Peninsula have found their central action at Turin. A criminal abuse has been made at Turin of the national feelings of the Italian people. En-

deavours have been made to keep up and encourage disturbances in Italy, in order that Piedmont might have a pretext for hypocritically deploring the state of Italy, and for assuming in the eyes of short-sighted and senseless people the part of liberator.

To assist this rash undertaking an unbridled press every day endeavoured to carry beyond the frontiers of the neighbouring States a moral insurrection against the legitimate order of things. This state of things no country in Europe could tolerate, without exposing itself in the end to deep and dangerous excitement. Out of love for those hollow dreams of the future, and in order to secure to herself support from abroad, Piedmont took part in a war against a foreign Power, in which she had no concern, and sacrificed her soldiers for a foreign object. She was also seen at the Conferences of Paris, with a presumption quite new in the annals of diplomacy, to criticise with effrontery the Governments of Italy, her own country—Governments which had never offended her.

But that nobody might believe that these wild desires and efforts were associated with the smallest sincere sentiment in favour of the peaceful prosperity of Italy, the angry passions of Sardinia redoubled whenever any of the Sovereigns of Italy followed the inspirations of indulgence and conciliation, and whenever the Emperor Francis-Joseph gave signal proofs of his love for his Italian subjects, of his solicitude for the happiness and progress of the most favoured countries of Italy.

When their Imperial Majesties visited the Italian provinces, receiving the homage of their faithful subjects, and marking every step by conferring a host of benefits, the journals of Turin were allowed unchecked to speak in approval of regicide.

When the Emperor entrusted the administration of Lombardy and Venice to the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, his brother, a Prince endowed with high intelligence, animated by liberal and kindly intentions, and profoundly sympathising with the true spirit of the Italian people, no pains were spared at Turin to cause the Prince's noble intentions to be repaid with as much ingratitude as could be produced in the midst of a well-disposed nation, by odious instigations every day repeated.

The Court of Turin, having once entered upon the path in which its only choice was either to follow the revolution or take the lead, could not but more and more lose the power and the will to observe the laws which regulate the relations of independent States, or even to recognize any of the limits imposed by the law of nations on the conduct of all civilized States. Under the most frivolous pretexts, Sardinia declares herself liberated from the obligations clearly imposed by Treaties, as proved by the Conventions with Austria and the Italian States, for the extradition of criminals and deserters. Her emissaries overrun the neighbouring States, exciting soldiers to disobey their Chiefs; treading under foot all

the rules of military discipline, Piedmont admitted deserters into the ranks of her own army.

Such were the acts of a Government which boasts its civilizing mission, and in whose States there are journalists whose journals find readers, and who, not content with simply making an apology for assassination, count their bleeding victims with impious joy.

Who, after this, can be astonished that that Government regarded as the chief obstacle the rights which Austria derives from Treaties, and accordingly sought to get rid of them by all the means of a dishonest policy? The true intentions of Piedmont, which had long ceased to be a secret to any one, were openly avowed, as soon as that State was sufficiently assured of foreign assistance, to require no longer to mask its projects of war and revolution. Europe, which sees in the respect of existing Treaties, the palladium of its repose, received with just disfavour the declaration containing the assertion that Sardinia considered herself attacked by Austria, because Austria would not renounce the exercise of the rights and duties conferred by Treaties; because she maintained her right to keep a garrison in Piacenza, a right guaranteed by the great Powers of Europe; and because she ventured to form alliances with other Sovereigns of the Peninsula for the common defence of their legitimate interests. There remained but one other pretext, and that was alleged accordingly. The Cabinet of Turin declared that all remedies for the state of Italy would be mere palliatives, as long as the Austrian dominion extends over the Italian soil. This is an open attack on the territorial possessions of Austria, exceeding the utmost limit to which a Power like Austria could tolerate the provocations of a less powerful State, without an appeal to arms.

Such is, stripped of the tissue of falsehoods with which it was enveloped, the truth respecting the line of conduct which for ten years past the House of Savoy has followed, at the suggestion of unprincipled advisers. We will now farther assert that the accusations and reproaches by which the Sardinian Cabinet endeavours to present under a false light its attacks on Austria, are nothing but wanton calumnies.

Austria is a Conservative Power, with whom religion, morality, and historical right are sacred. She knows how to estimate, to protect, and to weigh in the scales of equal justice what is noble and legitimate in the national spirit of peoples. Her extensive dominions consist of different races, of different languages; the Emperor embraces them all in the same love, and their union under the sceptre of our august dynasty is advantageous to the whole of the great family of European nations; but the pretension of forming new States, according to the limits of nationalities, is the most dangerous of all utopian schemes.

To put forward such pretension is to break with history; and

to seek to carry it into execution in any point of Europe is to shake to its foundations the firmly organized order of States, and to threaten the Continent with subversion and chaos. Europe feels this, and she attaches herself the more firmly to the territorial divisions fixed by the Congress of Vienna at the close of an epoch of continental wars with as much regard as possible to historical conditions. There is not a Power whose possessions are more legitimate than those in Italy restored to the House of Hapsburg by the Congress which re-established the Kingdom of Sardinia, and conferred upon it the splendid acquisition of Genoa.

Lombardy has been for centuries a fief of the Empire of Germany : Venice was given to Austria in exchange for giving up her Belgian Province. Thus, therefore, what the Cabinet of Turin calls the true reason of the discontent of the inhabitants of Lombardo-Venetia—showing thereby itself the utter want of foundation of its other alleged grievances, namely, the domination of Austria on the Poland on the Adriatic—is a solid and unquestionable right in every respect, and one which the Austrian eagles will preserve from all attack.

But it is not only a legitimate Government—it is a just and benevolent one, which Administers the Lombardo-Venetian Provinces. Those beautiful countries have prospered more rapidly than could have been hoped after the sad fate of so many years of revolution. Milan and other celebrated towns display wealth worthy of their history ; Venice is recovering from her profound decline, to new and growing prosperity ; the administration of justice is regular ; manufactures and commerce prosper ; science and art are cultivated with ardour. The public burdens are not heavier than in other parts of the monarchy ; they would even be lighter, if the fatal effects of Sardinia policy did not require that the State should augment its forces, and consequently raise new revenues. The great majority of the people of Lombardy and Venetia are content : the number of the discontented who have forgotten the lessons of 1848 is small in comparison, and it would be less than it is without the incessant excitations of Piedmont to increase it.

Piedmont, therefore, does not trouble herself about populations which are suffering and oppressed ; but she rather interrupts a regular state of things, and the development of future prosperity. Human prudence cannot foresee how long this deplorable enterprise will trouble the peace of Italy, but a terrible responsibility weighs on those who have wickedly and deliberately exposed their country and Europe to new catastrophes.

The revolution, so carefully kept alive in all the Peninsula, has promptly followed the impulse given it. A military rising has taken place at Florence ; it has compelled His Imperial Highness the Duke of Tuscany to leave his States. Insurrection reigns at Massa and Carrara, under the protection of Sardinia.

But France, which for a long time past, we repeat, has shared that terrible moral responsibility, France has hastened by acts to assume it altogether. Although in nowise injured by Austria, she has not delayed to make the unjust cause of Sardinia her own. The Government of the Emperor of the French caused, on the 26th of this month, his Chargé d'Affairs at Vienna to declare that he should consider the passage of the Ticino by the Austrian troops as a declaration of war against France. While we were still waiting at Vienna for the reply of Piedmont to the summons to disarm, France caused her troops to enter Sardinia by the land and sea frontiers, knowing well that by so doing she placed in the balance the weight which would determine the last resolutions of the Court of Turin.

And why, we ask, were the legitimate hopes of the friends of peace in Europe thus to be annihilated by a single blow? Because the time had arrived at which projects long meditated in silence have arrived at maturity—at which the second French Empire desires to give substance to its “ideas”—at which the political state of Europe, based on right, is to be sacrificed to its unauthorized pretensions—at which the Treaties which form the basis of European law of nations are to be replaced by the “political wisdom” which the Power which rules at Paris has announced to the astonished world.

The traditions of the first Napoleon are resumed. Such is the signification of the struggle on the eve of which Europe is placed.

May the world, undeceived, be penetrated with this conviction, that now, as half a century ago, the question at stake is to defend the independence of States, and to protect the most precious possessions of nations against ambition and the spirit of domination.

The Emperor Francis-Joseph, the chief of our Empire, although he deplores the evils which will be occasioned by the impending war, has confidently placed his just cause in the hands of Divine Providence. He has drawn the sword because guilty hands have attacked the dignity and honour of his Crown; he will wield it with the profound sentiment of his right; strong in the enthusiasm and courage of his people, accompanied by prayers for his triumph on the part of all those whose consciences distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong.

You will communicate to the Government to which you have the honour to be accredited, both the Imperial manifesto and the present despatch.

Accept, &c.

BUOL.

No. 515. *Mr. Scarlett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

(Extract.)

Florence, April 21, 1859.

WHEN I arrived in Central Italy from England, and during the whole month of February, there was no remarkable symptom in

Tuscany of political excitement; the minds of people in general being at that time apparently more occupied with the pleasures and follies of the Carnival, than engaged in the contemplation of important political events.

Soon after, the pamphlet published at Paris, and attributed to the inspiration of the Emperor of the French, began to be in general circulation here, and was followed by more violent productions contributed by eminent men in Italy of the Liberal party, the distribution of one of which, as your Lordship is aware, entitled "*La Toscana, e Austria*," the Tuscan Government was more solicitous than able to suppress.

Political feeling, and the agitation of the public mind in Tuscany, from that time until now, has been daily gathering strength, and taking a more serious turn, aided by the clandestine dissemination of printed appeals to the people, telling them that the hour of their emancipation from Austria is at hand, and calling upon them to enlist in the army of King Victor Emmanuel.

Volunteers, both Roman and Tuscan have lately passed on their way for Piedmont, without ceasing, from this territory, across the Modenese frontier, or have reached their destination by sea from Leghorn.

Having occasion to go to Leghorn a few days ago, the Governor, with whom I had an interview, informed me that the only course he could pursue with safety with respect to these volunteers, who have never ceased pouring into the town, was to avoid giving his sanction to their proceedings by appearing to ignore them; as they leave the country without arms, he said he had no right to prevent their departure.

A few days ago, a whole battalion of Tuscans, 700 in number, and some Romans, amounting in all to 1,500 men, embarked at Leghorn for Genoa; the former under the auspices of a Livornese leader, named Malanchini, formerly a lawyer who served against Austria in 1848.

Cavaliere Lenzoni informs me that 25 soldiers of the regular Tuscan army, in garrison at Lucca, have deserted, and marched to Sarzana, in Piedmont.

Since then an artillery officer at Florence was arrested by General Ferran, for applauding some of these volunteers on their departure; but he has since, I hear, been released, to prevent the bad impression caused by his confinement on the spirit of the troops.

A useless attempt was made not long since, to call upon the Grand Duke to grant reforms, in order, it was said to give His Imperial Highness an opportunity of regaining his popularity by making concessions to the Liberal cause. For this purpose some 1,000 peasants, under the direction of over-zealous partizans of the Grand Duke, were induced to come into the town; but they met with no sympathy from the populace of the city, and they retired

without any other demonstration than that of insisting that two prints, in a shop window, of the Emperor Napoleon and of the King of Sardinia, should be withdrawn, and the likeness of the Grand Duke and Duchess substituted in their place.

The liberal party, generally, in Tuscany, has never forgiven the Grand Duke for suppressing the Tuscan Constitution, which he had sworn to maintain, and for having consented to the Austrian occupation in 1849.

There are many, however, who have not forgotten that at that period Rome, Leghorn, and Genoa were all three in a state of complete insurrection, and served as a pretext both to the Pope and the Grand Duke to call in a foreign force; but I have no doubt that there is a sincere desire among the majority of the Tuscan people that the reigning family should continue on the throne rather than any other, although, I regret to say an opinion prevails among Liberals of various shades, that, should war break out, the Grand Duke will only be allowed to exercise the supreme authority on the condition of his taking part immediately in the struggle against Austria, as he did in 1847.

The news, when it arrived in Florence, of the expectation of a general disarmament was, of course, joyfully received by the Grand Duke, whilst it gave at the same time little satisfaction to those of his subjects who are opposed to the present Government and its policy, and to a numerous class more anxious for war than for even an attempt to settle the Italian question in any other way.

Nor can I conceal from your Lordship my belief that the invitation on the part of the Five Great Powers to the Italian Governments to take part in a Congress is regarded by people in general in Italy with great distrust. They are well aware that the actual Governments in Italy, with the exception, perhaps, of Parma, cannot represent the real feelings and sentiments of those who desire to be emancipated entirely from Austrian influence, and to obtain Liberal institutions, and they naturally object to a selection of agents for this purpose by those in whom they can place no confidence, and who are not likely to be the expression of their hopes and views.

I cannot help believing in one opinion which the French Minister often announces, namely, that the possession of Lombardy is in reality a source of weakness to Austria, and that, were she to declare its independence, and make an Austrian Archduke King of Lombardy and Venice, entirely withdrawing her German troops from Italy, not only would she, by such a policy, disappoint the ambition of Piedmont, but might hereafter establish for herself in these countries a more healthy and legitimate influence, instead of being execrated throughout the whole Peninsula.

No. 516. *Mr. Scarlett to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

(Extract.)

Florence, April 27, 1859, midnight.

I INFORMED your Lordship in my telegram of yesterday of the probability of a revolution in Florence, and of the critical position of the Grand Duke.

My worst apprehensions have been realised. Last night the troops, who had long been, like the people, tampered with and worked upon by Piedmontese Agents, and Tuscan partisans of the Italian cause, deserted the Grand Duke's standard, adopted the tri-coloured Italian flag, and fraternized entirely with the mob in the streets.

This morning a large demonstration, including even the gendarmerie, as well as the soldiers, linked arm in arm with the people, paraded about the streets, crying "Viva l'Italia!" and "Viva l'Indipendenza!" Assembling first before the house of the Sardinian Minister, Signor Buoncompagni, who made them a speech recommending discipline and order, they afterwards, still at an early hour of the morning, went to the French Minister's Palace to render homage to France. The Marquis de Ferrière, who went out on his balcony to show himself, was received with loud applause.

In the course of the morning I was summoned by the Grand Duke, with the rest of the Diplomatic Representatives at Florence, to the Pitti Palace. Upon my arrival in the antechamber of His Imperial Highness, I found assembled there all the Grand Ducal Cabinet, in addition to the Diplomatic Body, and learnt that, the latter having given in their resignation, Marquis Laiatico-Corsini, one of the leaders of the Liberal party, had been empowered to form another Administration.

Shortly after, the Grand Duke entered the apartment in which we were, and in a formal manner made the announcement, to my great surprise, that Marquis Laiatico and his friends were unable to take charge of the Government, and satisfy the revolutionary party and soldiers, unless the Grand Duke consented to abdicate in favour of his son. This proposal the Grand Duke considered an insult and violence offered to him in his character of Sovereign, to which he never would consent. He stated that his determination was fixed on that point; that he had made up his mind to retire from Tuscany immediately with all his family; and that he should throw himself for his justification and protection upon all the Powers of Europe.

Before the meeting terminated, I proposed that the whole Diplomatic Body should protest against the alleged necessity of the Grand Duke's abdication, and endeavour to change or modify the resolution of the parties pressing His Imperial Highness to abdicate.

No one seconded this attempt; and after informing us that

he should leave Florence in the course of the day, he bid us good-bye.

As a few days before an Austrian General had been the bearer of a letter from the Emperor at Vienna to the Grand Duke, I was not astonished to learn that his Imperial Highness had decided to take his departure for that destination, of which I was informed by Baron de Hügel, the Austrian Minister.

Several members of the Diplomatic Body went to see the Grand Duke depart. But, disapproving as I do, of this very sudden retreat, and being certain that in placing himself thus at once in Austrian hands, the Grand Duke compromises the principle of neutrality, and endangers the future interests of the dynasty he represents, I refrained from appearing to sanction this step by my presence.

The Imperial party took their departure by the Bologna route soon after seven o'clock, escorted out of the town by a few Cavalry.

For several weeks, the Grand Duke's Government believed that the intrigues of Piedmont, superintended by Signor Buoncompagni, had paved the way to a popular explosion in the event of war being certain. I placed myself in communication with Marquis Capponi, Signor Matteucci, Carlo Feuzi, and others belonging to the essentially Italian party actively engaged in the cause of independence, and pressed often, but in vain, on the Grand Duke's Ministers, and some of those of his Court more immediately about his person, the absolute necessity of making some concessions in time to the popular feeling. Admitting the danger, the Grand Duke's Cabinet did not appear to think it imminent, and they were certainly ignorant of the temper of the troops. They have now found to their cost that the pains taken to embody and discipline a fine army of 15,000 men has been only the construction of a weapon to be used against Austria under the authority of Piedmont. The Austrian General Ferrari retired from the command of the troops only yesterday, and is to be succeeded by General Ulloa, of Spanish extraction, in the service of Piedmont. This officer, together with Malenchini, a lawyer in command of a body of Tuscan volunteers, have just arrived, I believe, this evening, from Piedmont, to take charge of the troops in Florence, some of whom will probably march soon into Piedmont.

For the present, a Junta of three persons, Cavaliere Ubaldino Peruzzi, Major Danzini, and Vincenzo Malenchini, conduct the Government provisionally, until King Victor Emmanuel has determined upon the future fate of Tuscany. In other words, this country is now annexed to Piedmont.

I have learnt to-day that the Austrians have landed several thousand men at Ancona, but whether their operations will extend into Tuscany will depend, I imagine, upon the probability or

otherwise of the arrival here of a French force, which may be sent easily from Toulon to Leghorn.

No doubt a similar movement has already taken place by this time at Leghorn, and in other Tuscan cities, where the efforts have been unceasing of late to determine people's minds in favour of the War of Independence.

The Austrian Minister, Baron de Hügel, removed the arms of Austria from his Legation after the interview of the Diplomatic Body with the Grand Duke, and has already left Tuscany. I am happy to add that these events have not given rise, as yet, to any violence done to either persons or property. The Sardinian Minister has been one of the principal actors, or, at least, an abettor, of the revolution, and the "*Monitore Toscano*" of to-day contains an address to the people, signed by him.

No. 517. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 3.)

Turin, April 30, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a translation of a Proclamation which has been issued by the King to his subjects, and the people of Italy, with which the walls of Turin were this day placarded.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure. *Proclamation.*

(Translation.)

People of the Kingdom!—AUSTRIA attacks us with a powerful army, which, while professing a love of peace, she has assembled to assault us in the unhappy provinces subject to her domination.

Unable to support the example of our civil order, and unwilling to submit to the judgment of an European Congress, on the evils and dangers of which she alone is the cause in Italy, Austria violates her promise to England, and makes a case of war out of a law of honour.

Austria dares to demand the diminution of our troops; that that brave youth, which from all parts of Italy has thronged to the standard of national independence, be disarmed, and handed over to her.

A jealous guardian of the ancestral common patrimony of honour and glory, I have handed over to my beloved cousin Prince Eugène the government of the State, while I myself again draw the sword.

The brave soldiers of the Emperor Napoleon, my generous ally, will fight the fight of liberty and justice with my soldiers.

People of Italy!—Austria attacks Piedmont because I have advocated the cause of our common country in the Councils of Europe, and because I have not been insensible to your cry of

anguish. Thus she has violently broken those Treaties which she never respected ; thus now all right is on the side of the nation, and I can conscientiously perform the vow made on the tomb of my illustrious parent. Taking up arms in defence of my Throne, of the liberty of my people, and of the honour of the Italian name, I fight for the rights of the whole nation.

We trust in God and in our concord ; in the valour of the soldiers of Italy, and in the alliance of the noble French nation, and we trust in the justice of public opinion.

My only ambition is to be the first soldier of Italian independence.

Turin, April 29, 1859.

Viva l'Italia.

C. CAVOUR.

VICTOR EMANUEL.

No. 518. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 4.)

Paris, May 3, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the communication made this afternoon to the Senate and Legislative body, containing the declaration of war with Austria ; also a copy of the Proclamation addressed by the Emperor to the French people.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

Inclosure 1. *Communication made to the French Chambers by the Emperor of the French, May 3, 1859.*

(Translation.)

Gentlemen,—I HAVE had the honour to present to the Senate (to the Legislative Body) the statement of the negotiations followed by the Powers up to the moment when Austria, separating her course of action from that of the other Cabinets, decided to address to Sardinia an ultimatum, proclaiming, if it was not complied with, her intention to have recourse to arms.

The Government of the Emperor did not wish to allow the Court of Austria to remain in ignorance of the light in which it viewed this eventuality, and the Chargé d'Affaires of His Majesty at Vienna warned the Austrian Government, since the 26th of last month, that if its troops crossed the frontier of Piedmont, France would be obliged to consider this invasion of an allied country as a declaration of war.

The Court of Austria, having persisted in employing force, and its troops having entered, on the 29th, the Sardinian territory, the Emperor has commanded me to bring this fact to the knowledge of the Legislative Corps, which constitutes Austria in a state of war with France.

Inclosure. *Proclamation.*

The Emperor to the French People.

(Translation.)

Frenchmen!—AUSTRIA, in causing her army to enter the territory of the King of Sardinia, our ally, declares war against us. She thus violates Treaties and justice, and menaces our frontiers. All the Great Powers have protested against this aggression. Piedmont having accepted the conditions which should have insured peace, one asks, what can be the reason of this sudden invasion? It is that Austria has brought matters to this extremity, that her dominion must either extend to the Alps, or Italy must be free to the Adriatic; for in this country every corner of territory which remains independent endangers her power.

Hitherto, moderation has been the rule of my conduct; now energy becomes my first duty.

Let France arm, and say resolutely to Europe, "I desire no conquest, but I desire firmly to maintain my national and traditional policy. I observe the Treaties on condition that no one shall violate them against me. I respect the territory and rights of neutral powers, but I boldly avow my sympathy for a people whose history is mingled with our own, and who groan beneath foreign oppression."

France has shown her hatred against anarchy; she has been pleased to give me a power strong enough to reduce to helplessness the abettors of disorder and the incorrigible members of those old factions whom one perpetually sees plotting with our enemies: but she has not, therefore, abdicated her task of civilization. Her natural allies have always been those who desire the improvement of the human race, and when she draws the sword it is not in order to dominate, but to liberate.

The object of this war, then, is to restore Italy to herself, not to make her change masters, and we shall then have next our frontiers a friendly people, who will owe to us their independence.

We are not going into Italy to foment disorder or to shake the power of the Holy Father, whom we have replaced upon his throne, but to free him from this foreign pressure, which weighs upon the whole Peninsula, and to help to establish there order upon legitimate satisfied interests.

We are going, in fine, to seek upon this classic ground, illustrated by so many victories, the footsteps of our fathers. God grant that we may be worthy of them!

I am going soon to place myself at the head of the army. I leave in France the Empress and my son. Seconded by the experience and the enlightenment of the last surviving brother of the Emperor, she will understand how to show herself equal to the grandeur of her mission.

I confide them to the valour of the army which remains in France, to watch over our frontiers as well as to protect our homes ; I confide them to the loyalty of the National Guard ; I confide them, in a word, to the whole people, who will encircle them with that affection and devotion of which I daily receive so many proofs.

Courage, then, and Union ! Our country is going once more to show the world that she has not degenerated. Providence will bless our efforts, for the cause which rests on justice, humanity, love of country, and independence, is holy in the eyes of God.

No. 519. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 4.)

Turin May 1, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the King has granted a complete and entire amnesty to all persons under sentence for political offences, and for offences against the law of the press.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 520. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 4.)

Turin May 1, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the Parliament was yesterday prorogued, *sine die*.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 521. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 4.)

Turin, May 1, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Sardinian Government have authorized the National Bank (Turin), to suspend payment of its notes in specie and at sight ; to issue notes of the value of 20 francs up to 6,000,000 francs ; to advance 30,000,000 francs to Government, half-yearly, at 2 per cent., and to open a current account with Government for that item ; to increase its note circulation up to the proportion of 1 to 3 of its specie, the loan of 30,000,000 francs not inclusive ; not to alter the rate of exchange without the consent of the Government.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

No. 522. *Sir J. Hudson to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 4.)

Turin, May 1, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a note from the Sardinian Minister for Foreign Affairs, informing me that by a Decree of 28th ultimo, issued by the Prince Eugène, restricting the liberty of the press, the publication of any information respecting the movements of the allied

armies is forbidden, beyond that furnished by Government, and, consequently, that no newspaper correspondents will be admitted to the camp, or allowed to follow the military operations.

I have, &c.

JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure.—*Count Cavour to Sir J. Hudson.*

(Translation.)

Turin, April 30, 1859.

M. le Ministre,—His Royal Highness the Prince Eugène, Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, by virtue of powers which His Majesty the King, my august Sovereign, has delegated to him, issued on the 28th of this month a Royal decree, with the object of regulating the liberty of the press during the war with the Austrian Empire.

This decree which was inserted in the Piedmontese "Gazette" of yesterday, forbids the publication of all news, reports, or discussions, referring to the movements of the allied armies, with the exception of what may be communicated or published by the Government.

As a consequence of the measure adopted, and to obtain more completely the end it has in view, the Government of the King has thought right, at the same time, to decide that the correspondents of foreign journals cannot be admitted into the camp, nor follow the military operations. I have the honour, for every good purpose, to bring this decision to your knowledge.

For the Minister.

MINGHETTI.

No. 523. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 4.)

Paris, May 3, 1859.

My Lord,—M. DE HUBNER addressed a note this morning to Count Walewski, asking for his passports. They were sent him immediately, and he will leave Paris, with the members of his Embassy, to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 524. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 4.)

(Extract.)

Paris, May 3, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a note which I received last night from Count Walewski, in reply to that which I addressed to his Excellency on the 1st, expressing the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the assurances given to me by the Emperor respecting the nature of His Majesty's engagements with the Russian Government.

Inclosure.—*Count Walewski to Earl Cowley.*

(Translation.)

Paris, May 2, 1859.

M. l'Ambassadeur,—I HAVE received the letter which you did

me the honour of writing me to inform me of the satisfaction which Her Britannic Majesty's Government had received the spontaneous assurances which it had pleased the Emperor to give you verbally on the subjects of the relations which have been lately established between Russia and France. His Majesty has deigned to authorize me to repeat to your Excellency that nothing, in the existing arrangements between the Government of the Emperor and that of Russia, nor in the communications exchanged on the subject, with reference to the affairs of Italy, is of a nature to affect in the slightest degree the interests of Great Britain, and that the new report of a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, existing between Russia and France, is entirely without foundation.

Accept, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 525. *Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.*—(Rec. May 4.)

Paris, May 3, 1859.

My Lord, — THE French Consul at Parma has informed his Government that on the day following the departure of the Duchess a popular demonstration was made against the Regency which Her Royal Highness had appointed, and which was forced to abdicate, and a provisional Government was instituted in its place.

I have, &c.

COWLEY.

No. 526. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, May 4, 1859.

My Lord, — ALTHOUGH it is fair to suppose that the belligerent Powers would not, under any circumstances, violate the neutrality of the territory of the Swiss Confederation, yet it would doubtless relieve the public mind in Switzerland, on whose confines hostilities will be carried on, if it were publicly announced by each of them that the neutrality of the Swiss Cantons would be strictly observed during the war, and that orders to that effect had been sent to the Generals in command.

I have accordingly to instruct your Excellency, and I have sent similar instructions to Her Majesty's Representatives at Vienna and at Turin, to call the attention of the French Government to this matter, and to suggest the propriety of such a declaration being made, and such orders given, on the part of the French Government.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 527. *The Duke of Malakoff to the Earl of Malmesbury.*
(Rec. May 4.)

(Translation.)

May 4, 1859.

THE Undersigned, Marshal Pelissier, Duke of Malakoff, Ambassador from His Majesty the Emperor of the French to Her Britannic Majesty, has received orders from his Government to address the following communication to his Excellency the Earl of Malmesbury.

The Emperor of the French finds himself under the necessity of joining the arms of France to those of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, his ally, to repulse the attack which has been directed against the Sardinian territory by the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria.

His Majesty has given orders that in carrying on this war, of which he desires anxiously to restrict the limits, the Commanders of his forces on sea and land should strictly respect the territorial rights, the navigation, and the commerce, of the Powers who remain neuter, and that they should strictly observe, with regard to the States who adhered to it, the principles laid down in the declaration of the Congress of Paris, of April 16th, 1856.

The Emperor is confident that, by a just reciprocity, the Government of Her Majesty the Queen will prescribe measures in order that the British authorities and subjects may observe exactly during the war the duties of a strict neutrality.

The Undersigned, &c.

MARSHAL PELISSIER.

No. 528. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, May 4, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd ultimo,* reporting your conversation with Count Buol on the occasion of communicating to his Excellency my despatch of the 16th ultimo;† and as a doubt seems to exist in your mind as to the refusal of Sardinia to accept a guarantee from Her Majesty's Government in case of disarmament, I wish to point out to you that the proposed guarantee was suggested by Her Majesty's Government to that of France as part of the conditions of the disarmament of Sardinia, but that France would not entertain the proposal, as they said that it would be useless to make it to Sardinia.

Your Lordship will find these facts in Lord Cowley's despatch of the 9th ultimo,‡ which I forwarded to you, on the 13th ultimo.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

* No 429.

† No. 322.

‡ No. 279.

No. 529. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, May 4, 1859.

Sir,—ALTHOUGH the exertions of Her Majesty's Government may have proved unavailing to prevent war, they think that the Austrian Government will not take it ill of them if they endeavour, in some respects to mitigate its calamities.

I have, therefore, to instruct your Lordship to suggest to Count Buol, for the consideration of the Imperial Government, whether a mutual understanding, similar to that come to by the British and French Governments at the commencement of the war with Russia, might not be entered into between France and Austria, for assigning to the merchant-vessels of each Power a specific time to load in and clear out from the ports of the other; for admitting into the ports of either of the respective countries the merchant-vessels of the other, which have sailed from foreign ports previously to the commencement of war; and for permitting the subjects of either to reside unmolested in the dominions of the other, so long as they maintain a demeanour and conduct consistent with their peculiar position in the country of an enemy.

As your Lordship may not have at hand the British Orders in Council on the first two points to which I have adverted, and which were adopted in terms by the French Government, I inclose copies thereof for your information.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 530. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, May 4, 1859.

As far as England is concerned, there are no immediate interests which necessitate any direct action on her part; and Her Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty to maintain a strict neutrality between the belligerents. This is also the feeling of the people of England; and it is obvious that any other course at present would tend to complications which can scarcely yet be foreseen.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, deprecate any act which would unnecessarily extend the theatre of war, and they will be prepared to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that may be afforded to them of being the medium of restoring peace.

The position of England and Prussia is different, and Her Majesty's Government can scarcely give advice as to the measures of defence which should be adopted elsewhere, and which must depend upon local circumstances.

No. 531. *Circular to Her Majesty's Ministers abroad.*

Foreign Office, May 4, 1859.

Sir,—THE apprehensions which, as I stated to you at the close of my despatch of the 7th ultimo, Her Majesty's Government at

that time entertained lest all their efforts to prevent peace from being interrupted should prove unavailing, have unfortunately been realised. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to enter into a detailed account of the various transactions which intervened between the date of my last despatch and the breaking out of war between France and Sardinia, on the one side, and Austria, on the other, although it is right that you should have a general idea of what has occurred in the interval.

The negotiations turned generally on two points, the one relating to disarmament, the other to the admission of the Italian States, in some form or other, to the proposed Congress.

The Cabinet of Vienna insisted, at first, as an indispensable condition to its entry into the Congress, that Sardinia should, in the first instance, disarm and disband the free corps which she had enrolled; but it finally acquiesced, with some modification, in a proposal made by Her Majesty's Government, and declared it would be contented if a general disarmament were carried out by Austria, France, and Sardinia, previously to the meeting of the Congress.

The Government of France was prevailed upon to admit, for itself, the principle of a general disarmament; but it hesitated for a long time before it consented to press the acceptance of it on Sardinia, and at length only agreed to do so on condition that the Italian States should be admitted to send Representatives to the Congress, not simply as Advocates, but as Plenipotentiaries, having an equal position and voice with the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers in the deliberations that might ensue.

On reviewing the state of the negotiation, Her Majesty's Government conceived that there was still a chance of effecting such an understanding between the parties as would ensure the meeting of the Congress, and for this purpose they proposed, on the 18th of last month,—

1st. That there should be a previous, immediate, effective, and simultaneous disarmament, on the part of Austria, France, and Sardinia;

2ndly. That the details of that disarmament should be settled by six Military or Civil Commissioners, to be named severally by the Great Powers and by Sardinia;

3rdly. That those Commissioners having met and entered upon their duties, the Congress should forthwith be convened; and,

4thly. That the Congress, when convened, should invite the Italian States to send Representatives, who would be admitted to, and take part in the deliberations of, the Congress, in the same manner and on the same footing as they were admitted to, and took part in the deliberations of, the Congress of Laybach.

This proposal was accepted in the main by the Governments of France, Prussia, and Russia, and partially by the Cabinet of Vienna. The latter, however, absolutely refused to agree to the

admission of the Representatives of the Italian States to the Congress, or to the participation of Sardinia in that Assembly, under any conditions whatever.

The decision on the part of the Austrian Government put an end to all hope of any Congress being brought together; for, though the point was not again raised, I may as well mention to you that, in an earlier stage of the negotiations, Her Majesty's Government and that of Prussia refused to entertain a suggestion made by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, that,—in consequence of the hesitation at that time shown by Austria,—England, France, Prussia, and Russia should hold a Congress on the affairs of Italy, without her participation.

The refusal of Austria to accept the last proposal of Her Majesty's Government, was accompanied, on her part, by a peremptory summons to Sardinia to disarm, and to disband the free corps. Her Majesty's Government, on receiving this intelligence, addressed to the Cabinet of Vienna the strongest remonstrances on the impolicy of this proceeding, and directed Her Majesty's Minister at that Court to place on record a formal protest against it. This precipitate measure was the more to be regretted inasmuch as the Cabinet of Turin, which had previously declined to comply with the combined representations of England and Prussia, on the subject of disarmament, had announced, on the very day that the summons was dispatched from Vienna, though the Austrian Government were unacquainted with the fact when the summons was dispatched, that as France had united with England in demanding the previous disarmament of Sardinia, the Cabinet of Turin, although foreseeing that such a measure might entail disagreeable consequences for the tranquillity of Italy, was disposed to submit to it.

In this state of things, all hopes of accommodation seemed to be at an end: nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government resolved to make one more attempt to stay hostilities, and they accordingly tendered the mediation of England between Austria and France, for the settlement of the Italian question, on bases corresponding with the understanding arrived at between Lord Cowley and Count Buol at Vienna.

But this too failed: and Her Majesty's Government have only to lament the little success which has attended all their efforts, jointly with other Powers or singly, to avert the interruption of the general peace. In the present position of the contending parties, it would obviously be to no purpose to attempt to restrain them from engaging in a deadly struggle. Her Majesty's Government will, however, watch the progress of the war with the most anxious attention, and will be ready to avail themselves of any opportunity that may arise for the exercise of their good offices in the cause of peace.

It is their earnest desire and firm intention to observe the most scrupulous neutrality between the contending parties.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 532. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Lord A. Loftus.*

Foreign Office, May 5, 1859.

My Lord,—I INCLOSE for your Lordship's information, a copy of a despatch addressed by Count Walewski to the Duc de Malakoff* in which the French Government request the co-operation of England with France in their policy with regard to the Italian question.

I also inclose a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Cowley, in reply to this proposal.†

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.

No. 533. *The Earl of Malmesbury to the Duke of Malakoff.*

Foreign Office, May 5, 1859.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which the Duke of Malakoff, &c., addressed to him on the 4th instant, announcing that His Majesty the Emperor of the French had given orders, that in the war which had commenced between France and Austria, the military and naval Commanders of France should strictly respect the rights of the territories, of the navigation, and of the commerce of neutral Powers, and specifically that they should observe, in regard to the States that had given in their adhesion to them, the principles laid down in the Declaration of the Congress of Paris of April 16, 1856.

The Undersigned requests the Duke of Malakoff to have the goodness to convey to the Imperial Government the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have received this communication, and their appreciation of the intentions which have dictated the declaration of the determination of the Emperor scrupulously to observe the agreement entered into by the Powers parties to the Treaty of 1856, and subsequently acceded to other Powers.

The Undersigned has the honour to acquaint the Duke of Malakoff that Her Majesty will forthwith issue a Royal Proclamation, requiring all her subjects to observe, on their part, the duties of a strict neutrality, and warning them of the consequences to which they would expose themselves by a contrary course of conduct.

The Undersigned, &c.

MALMESBURY.

* No. 438.

† No. 535.

No. 534. *Count Walewski to M. de Banneville.*—(*Communicated to the Earl of Malmesbury by the Duke of Malakoff, May 5.*)

(Translation.)

Paris, April 29, 1859.

Sir,—At the moment that I have the honour of writing this despatch to you, I can hardly doubt that the Ticino has been crossed by the Austrian army. I have already informed you by my telegraphic message of the 26th of April, the meaning which the Government of the Emperor would see itself obliged to ascribe to such a demonstration.

If the precipitation of events renders, unfortunately, discussion superfluous, it is my duty to recall, in few words, a general summary of the events which show, at the same time, the imperious necessity of our conduct, and the perseverance of our efforts, in order to arrive at a different result.

The Government of the Emperor, assuredly, has not to justify the solicitude with which the state of things in Italy inspired it. The crisis which has now come in the centre of the Peninsula, gives but too much cause for our foresight; and it has, in fact, sufficed to us to make known our apprehensions, in order that the Great Powers of Europe might partake in them to the same degree as ourselves. This simultaneous agreement of the Cabinets, in face of a danger which they all had, for some years, secretly foreseen, proves how ripe the question seemed to them. We have the profound conviction that the Congress, assembled under the conditions which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had proposed for its convocation, and confining itself to the plan traced out for its deliberations by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, would have fully resolved the difficulties which prudence no longer permitted to be left unheeded.

Who could now doubt that the rock on which the work of conciliation split, was the pretension put forward by the Court of Vienna on the subject of a disarmament, of which it would probably have been more just and more true to say, that Court had to give the example?

Had not Sardinia, in fact, accepted, without any afterthought, the situation which would result for her from the terms of the Russian proposition, and if military preparations had already been effected upon her territory, besides that the disproportion of forces made all aggression on her part inadmissible, did not the most obvious reasons impose upon her the duty of waiting quietly for the decision of the Great Powers? No guarantee, in a word, was more real or more complete for Austria, than the immediate assembly of the Congress; and if the first condition, of which she demanded the fulfilment before answering the appeal of the Allies, a condition considered unacceptable by all the world, gave rise subsequently to combinations which she was the first to reject, it is permitted to me to state that at the beginning, as well as at the

end, the obstacle to the harmony which was the wish of the other Courts, was, only encountered at Vienna.

The situation, Sir, acquired, no doubt, through so many delays, an importance which became more and more serious, but the bond (*faisceau*) of good intentions which had been formed and maintained itself to the end between the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, London, and St. Petersburg, opposed, so to say, its resistance to the perils of this situation. Nothing was irremediably compromised, when Austria, not satisfied with refusing its consent to the last propositions of England, took the step of addressing to Turin a summons, at brief notice, which must, perforce, have altered our attitude.

The Government of the Emperor would only see in the general position of the affairs of Italy a great European question, the settlement of which demanded the co-operation of all its Allies. These affairs, nevertheless, were bound up, on one side only, with interests which concerned it in a more personal and particular manner. Austria herself, in promising not to begin hostilities against Piedmont, recognized by implication the existence of a limit which the most lively desire for a peaceful solution could not allow us to let her go beyond.

The Government of the Emperor had, besides, announced that if it did not sustain Sardinia in an aggressive attempt, it would give her its support for defensive measures. This engagement entailed an obligation from which the Court of Vienna only could exempt us.

Informed of the menace which weighed upon Piedmont at such brief notice, we were obliged, in so short a space, to put ourselves in a position to mitigate its consequences; and upon the demand of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, the advanced guard of the French army entered his territory. Sympathies which we do not hesitate to proclaim would have, with difficulty, permitted us to remain indifferent to the trials of a country in close relations with France, but more positive reasons influenced our conduct when that country was our near neighbour, marched with one of our frontiers, and formed the last obstacle to the extension of an influence which England, Prussia, and Russia, like us, looked upon as being already of a nature either to compromise the equilibrium of Europe, or to keep up, in that part of Italy of which it had been intended to constitute independent and sovereign States, a perpetual cause of agitation and confusion.

In coming, Sir, to a resolution, of which I have explained the purely defensive character, the Government of the Emperor made it a point not to allow the Court of Vienna to remain in ignorance that its ultimatum, and the eventualities which it so clearly exposed, laid down, besides the general question, until then treated of in common by the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, London, and St. Petersburg, a purely French question. It was a last warning,

a last attempt to prevent, whilst it was still time, Austria and France from meeting elsewhere than on the ground of an European discussion. The sentiments which have not ceased to animate the Government of the Emperor, I fear not in this solemn moment to guarantee, did not lead it to the extremities to which another will has fatally conducted it. It is the passage of the Ticino which obliges us to cross the Alps, whilst declining before Europe the responsibility of the events. You ought, then, Sir, as soon as you have no longer any doubt as to the movement of the Austrian troops, go to M. le Comte de Buol, and, after having read this despatch to him, of which you will leave him a copy, you will ask him for your passports.

Receive, &c.

A. WALEWSKI.

No. 535. *The Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley.*

Foreign Office, May 5, 1859.

My Lord,—I HAVE already transmitted to your Excellency a copy of Count Walewski's despatch of the 25th ultimo,* which was communicated to me by the Duc de Malakoff on the following day.

In this despatch, Count Walewski claims for France the same credit that he allows to England for the endeavours in which both have concurred for the the maintenance of peace; and he counts, therefore, on a continuance of a good understanding with this country, whatever may happen. His Excellency then refers to the motives which must induce France to assist Sardinia; to the constant endeavours of Austria to acquire for herself a preponderating influence in Italy, to which she has no claim; to the meritorious conduct of Sardinia in resisting these endeavours; and to the mischief which would ensue if Sardinia were overcome. He alludes to the claims which Sardinia has on the sympathy of England and France, in consequence of the political system which she upholds, and on the goodwill of those Powers for her zealous co-operation in the late war against Russia; and on all these grounds he appeals to Her Majesty's Government whether England and France should not seek to come to an understanding between themselves; and he declares that the Government of the Emperor, disclaiming all ambitious views, and having nothing to conceal, is prepared to concert with the British Government for the attainment of an object which he assumes to be common to both Governments.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government have received the communication of this despatch in the same spirit of friendship as that by which they are convinced it was dictated.

You may assure his Excellency of the great value which Her Majesty's Government place on the alliance which has so long

* No. 438.

subsisted between this country and France, and which it is their earnest desire may long continue to prevail. It has existed throughout the calm of peace and the vicissitudes of war, to the mutual benefit of both countries ; and Her Majesty's Government, believing that the events now passing in Italy, and the interruption of peace, will act injuriously upon the material interests of their ally, as well as upon the common cause of civilization, have, on these grounds, laboured earnestly to induce all parties to maintain it.

Her Majesty's Government believe that it never was intended by Europe, when recognising the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom as a portion of the dominions of the House of Austria, that Austria should, as a consequence of that recognition, be at liberty to extend her moral and material sway over all other portions of the Peninsula. It never was intended that Austria should constantly and systematically interfere beyond her frontier ; that she should, at will influence the internal administration, and occupy by her armies the territories, of other Italian States, whose independence was recognized by the same Treaties. It never was intended that the progress of freedom and of social improvement in the Italian States should be left to the control of Austria.

But if Her Majesty's Government do not shut their eyes to the defects of the system upon which Austria has acted in Italy, and which could hardly fail, sooner or later, to entail upon Austria a fearful unpopularity, and upon Italy the concomitant miseries of a social or of a foreign war, neither can they hold Sardinia blameless for the course she has pursued in these latter times, and which has now produced its certain and lamentable results.

Her Majesty's Government have hitherto always looked with satisfaction on the progress which Sardinia was making, as affording a bright example, to be imitated hereafter by other Italian States, of the benefits which result to the Sovereign and to the subjects from the adoption of a wise and liberal system of administration.

If Sardinia could have contented herself with the improvement of her own material prosperity, by developing the natural advantages of her position, and with the liberal system of administration which she so wisely adopted, and which she has so consistently maintained, she would have been a landmark for the rest of Italy, and respected by the whole world, and would by her moral force have been unassailable. Under those circumstances, and with such a policy, Her Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that she would have been molested by her powerful neighbour.

It was an evil hour for herself, and for Europe, that Sardinia lent herself to dreams of ambition and aggrandizement, and forgetful of the little sympathy shown in 1848 by the Milanese for her cause, and their ingratitude for her gallant actions, she has provoked the war in which she is now engaged.

By violating her Treaties of Extradition with Austria ; by fostering deserters from her army ; by rallying in Piedmont the disaffected spirits of Italy ; by menacing speeches against the Austrian Government, and by ostentatious declarations that she was ready to do battle as the champion of Italy, against the power and influence of Austria, Sardinia invoked the storm, and is deeply responsible to the nations of Europe. Her Majesty's Government saw this dangerous policy with apprehensions, which have now been realized, and they cannot forbear from remarking that the first and immediate effect of the war which it has caused has been the suspension of Constitutional Government in Sardinia itself.

It was with these forebodings that, on the 10th of January* last, Her Majesty's Government directed your Excellency to explain, clearly and frankly, to the Imperial Government the anxiety which they felt at the unsatisfactory state of the relations between France and Austria, and to point out the mischief which must ensue if a better understanding could not be established between them. They offered the co-operation of this country, as far as it could be afforded with advantage, for bringing about an improvement in the social condition of Italy. To the sincere regret of Her Majesty's Government—a regret that has been increased by subsequent events—Count Walewski informed your Excellency, on the 14th of January last,† that he did not think the moment a favourable one for executing their purpose.

Her Majesty's Government, on the 12th of January,‡ directed Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna to make a similar communication to the Austrian Government, and they appealed to the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin to aid them in their endeavours to promote a good understanding between France and Austria, to which Prussia at once acceded ; Russia replying that she could not give any advice which was not solicited by the parties at variance.

Her Majesty's Government then spared no pains, by the most impressive language, to convince the Sardinian Government of the danger which it incurred by arousing the expectations and inflaming the passions of the Italian people, and thereby provoking a war of opinion, the consequences of which could hardly fail to act injuriously on the political interests and constitutional principles of the House of Savoy.

Her Majesty's Government could give no better proof of their earnestness in the maintenance of peace, and of their confidence in the Emperor of the French than by directing your Excellency, towards the end of February (having first obtained the concurrence of His Imperial Majesty, and a full knowledge of his wishes and objects), to proceed to Vienna to endeavour to ascertain

* No. 5.

† No. 13.

‡ No. 207.

whether a common understanding on the affairs of Italy might not be established between the two Courts.

The position was peculiar, and hardly admitted of an official interference, or of an official offer of mediation, for there was no substantive controversy between the Governments of Austria and France, and no positive case upon which to mediate between them. For some time the relations between those two States had been daily becoming less friendly, and all that appeared feasible to Her Majesty's Government at the moment was to sound the lurking causes of a jealousy which threatened Europe with disaster.

It was, therefore, in a purely officious character that your Excellency undertook your friendly mission to Vienna, and the expectations of Her Majesty's Government were not falsified, for your Excellency ascertained exactly by what mutual course of action it would be possible, at the same time to remove the sources of ill-will, to establish good relations between the two Empires, and to improve the condition of Italy.

If no immediate result ensued from your Excellency's mission, it was the consequence of the intervening proposal of Russia, that a Congress of the Great Powers should be convened for the discussion of the Italian question—a proposal which Russia has since stated to have been made with a view to meet the wishes of France.

Notwithstanding this, the Government of the Emperor of the French will do your Excellency, and Her Majesty's Government, the justice to admit that your interposition was not unavailing, and that in point of fact it prepared the ground for those bases which Her Majesty's Government, on receiving your Reports, laid down for the deliberations of the Congress. These were recognized and admitted by the French Government, no less than by the other Powers, as well calculated to lead to a permanent settlement of the Italian question.

Deeply as Her Majesty's Government deplore that circumstances which, notwithstanding all their endeavours, they could not control, should have prevented the negotiations, begun with so much promise, from being continued, they still have the satisfaction of feeling that for a time at least they have tended to avert hostilities; and they feel sure that the Government of France, no less than that of Austria, will admit that in all these matters they have acted the part of impartial friends and allies, and that all their counsels and representations have invariably tended to inculcate in all quarters moderation and peace.

I will not recapitulate, in all their details, the various efforts that Her Majesty's Government subsequently made for this object, either singly or jointly with other Powers. Her Majesty's Government found that one of the most difficult questions upon which they could obtain unanimity was that of disarmament.

At first, for the sake of obtaining a Congress, they would have agreed to postpone its accomplishment until the Congress had met, but the common dictates of reason indicated that the only real security for obtaining a peaceful result from its deliberations lay in the fact of its being an Assembly of unarmed States.

It was evident that prejudices and arguments, supported by a million of soldiers, were not likely to be defended by either moderation or logic.

Furthermore, an armed Congress would have seemed to acknowledge a case of war as between the principals who composed it; whereas, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, no case of war existed between any of them respectively.

It was with these views that Her Majesty's Government pressed all the Powers, and finally obtained their unanimous consent to a general, simultaneous, and preliminary disarmament.

I now pass to the formal proposal made by Her Majesty's Government on the 18th ultimo, which declared that measure, and the eventual admission of the Italian States as substantive members of the Congress, and I am desirous of giving full credit to the Government of France for acceding to that proposal. It will be ever a matter of regret and disappointment to Her Majesty's Government that the Cabinet of Vienna, after agreeing with all the other Powers on a general, preliminary, and simultaneous disarmament, should have been so ill advised as to reject this last opportunity of averting a war on the insufficient ground of its unwillingness to admit the participation in the Congress of the Representatives of the Italian States, although it is a matter of history that such Representatives were, on the common instance of Austria and other Great Powers, invited to take part in the Congress of Laybach.

Her Majesty's Government have still more deeply lamented the precipitate conduct of Austria in calling upon Sardinia to disarm on pain of immediate invasion of her territory in case of her refusal to obey. They lost not a moment in expressing their strong disapprobation of this proceeding; and Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna has since delivered to the Austrian Cabinet a formal protest on the part of the British Government.

Her Majesty's Government had full reason to hope that the peace of Italy might be secured, by following up, in some form or other, the negotiations which your Excellency had placed on apparently so sound a footing during your stay at Vienna. Whether these negotiations should be carried out by themselves alone, or in a Congress with other Powers, they trusted that the result might put an end to a state of things in Italy of which they had long disapproved, and which they agree with the Government of France in considering to be inconsistent with the spirit of European Treaties.

Animated by true friendship and frankness, Her Majesty's

Government cannot refrain from expressing their opinion, that if the Government of France, which possesses so great an influence over Sardinia, had warned her as to the danger of her policy, at the time that Her Majesty's Government protested against it, those complications might have been avoided, which, in virtue of their promises, have obliged the French Government to seek their solution in the entrance of a French army into Piedmont.

Her Majesty's Government do not presume to constitute themselves judges of the course which France considers herself bound in honour to pursue in this last and fatal period of the controversy; but it will ever be a source of regret to Her Majesty's Government that their advice tendered to her in my despatch of the 10th of January was not followed. It is evident to Her Majesty's Government, that from that moment Sardinia believed that the difficulties of Italy would not be solved by a concert of the two great Empires which in 1857 had considered the problem, but that she might hope for the material assistance of France, not only to obtain the liberties of Italy, but even the fulfilment of her long-cherished hope, the expulsion of Austria from Lombardy.

Viewing impartially the conduct of both Austria and Sardinia in regard to Italy, and lamenting most deeply the spirit by which both have been actuated, Her Majesty's Government can, nevertheless, have no doubt as to the course which it befits them to pursue in the present emergency.

The British Government have always recognized as a sacred rule of international obligation, that no country has a right authoritatively to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign State, or, with a sound policy, long withhold its acknowledgment of any new form of Government which may be adopted and established without territorial usurpation or absorption, by the spontaneous wish of its people.

The British Government have shown, for a long series of years, how steadily they have observed these principles, and they certainly cannot depart from them on the present occasion, however earnest may be their desire to secure the freedom of the Italian people, and to maintain the Treaties which confirmed the independence of their respective States.

The Government of the Emperor of the French appears to anticipate that, notwithstanding the abhorrence with which Her Majesty's Government contemplate the coming war, and the value which they attach to the principle of non-interference, they will yet be brought to co-operate with France on the present occasion.

The Imperial Government has had too many proofs, of late years, of the anxiety of the British Government to act together with them in all measures calculated to lead to the general advantage of nations, to suppose that it is otherwise than with sincere regret that Her Majesty's Government feel themselves

precluded, by every consideration, from associating themselves with France in the present struggle. They believe that that struggle will be productive of misery and ruin to Italy, and, so far from accelerating the development of freedom in that country, will impose upon it a heavier burden of present ruin and future taxation. They feel that the war, on whatever principles it may be commenced, and whatever objects it may contemplate, will infallibly become a war of extreme political passions and opinions. They cannot but dread that the events in Italy may react on other nations, and that, at an early day, all Europe will be involved in the conflict.

Your Excellency, who has taken so active a part in the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to avert these results, will, more easily than any one, understand the bitter disappointment of Her Majesty's Government that all those efforts have proved unavailing. Nevertheless, your Excellency will assure the French Government that Her Majesty's Ministers will not be deterred by difficulties, past or future, from entertaining hereafter any overture which may be made to them by either of the contending parties, indicating a disposition to avail themselves of the good offices of England. Nay, more; Her Majesty's Government will watch with the utmost attention the various phases of the war; and if an opportunity should present itself for pleading the cause of peace and reconciliation, they will not wait to be invited, but will at once tender themselves as mediators, in the sincere hope that their offer may be accepted, and lead to peace.

They will do so with the fixed determination to carry out such a mediation in a spirit of fairness and impartiality, and with an earnest desire to establish and secure a well-balanced and real independence of the Italian States, and a general improvement of the administrations throughout the Peninsula of Italy.

The Emperor of the French may be assured that if this opportunity should present itself, Her Majesty's Government will zealously co-operate with His Imperial Majesty, and will rejoice most sincerely at again finding themselves placed on the same line with a most valued ally, by acting cordially with France in every work of peace and civilization.

These are the things for which the people of England love to labour, and attached as they are to constitutional principles, they believe that if military glory may be the appanage, it must not be the object, of constitutional monarchy. A war without an imperative and evident necessity is repugnant to their feelings, and no British Minister would escape their condemnation who advised his Sovereign to seek or to share such a conflict.

The almost unanimous feeling of the British nation at this moment is one of disapprobation of the present war, and an anxious desire to avoid any concurrence in its progress, and an earnest hope that it will be confined within the Peninsula.

Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, received with sincere satisfaction the expression of the sentiments of the French Government upon this latter subject, as stated in its despatch to the Duc de Malakoff, of the 27th ultimo.

In these sentiments Her Majesty's Government cordially agree. Maintaining, without reserve, the most frank relations with the French Government, they will be ever ready to combine with it, as circumstances arise, to preserve the Continent of Europe from the effects of the conflict which may rage at one of its extremities."

Your Excellency will read this despatch to Count Walewski, and furnish him with a copy of it.

I am, &c.

MALMESBURY.



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